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THE MEANING OF
MODERN LIFE

A Series of Addresses Selected and Approved by a Committee of Scholars headed by

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ISSUED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF

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Civilization

THE MEANING OF MODERN LIFE

AS SOUGHT FOR AND INTERPRETED IN A SERIES OF LECTURES AND ADDRESSES BY THE LEADERS OF MODERN THOUGHT AND MODERN ACTION :::

THIS SERIES HAS BEEN ARRANGED IN SEQUENCE, AND EDITED WITH FOREWORD, INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES BY

CHARLES F. HORNE, PH.D.
Professor in the College of the City of New York

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FOREWORD

WHEN, as sometimes happens, a tattered manuscript of mediæval times is resurrected from amid forgotten rubbish heaps, scholars hesitate and argue as to the century of its production. Accidental outward marks may guide them; but as to the thought, the outlook, the opinions, there is little to discriminate one century from the next, or the next. Mankind did march onward, it is true, but with such slow step that they seemed often to be merely marking time without advance. The unsolved problems of one generation were still disputed by their children's children.

Now, however, we move at railroad speed. The problems of to-day are not those of two decades ago; and at such accelerating rate do we rush onward that soon a year may see changes such as once engrossed a century. Nay, so swiftly are we swept face to face with new issues that the dead past at times forgets to bury its dead. There are elderly gentlemen among us, held by a comfortable income in some eddy of the current, who still maintain that the only vital issue of to-day is England's attitude towards us in the Civil War or the fact that Japan began her modern career under our tutelage in 1854.

To these pleasantly reminiscent gentlemen, charming after-dinner speakers, interesting relics of an extinct age, the present series of addresses can possess little interest, except for its "newness," the radical spirit of its thought. But to more active brains, to the men who, in office, in factory, or in field, are "making the nation" of to-day, it must have an obvious value. Each one

of us is so busy in his own life that he cannot keep abreast of the lives of others. A well-known literary man, a twenty years' graduate of my college, wrote me the other day for a copy of the college register. By mistake a clerk forwarded him instead a pamphlet containing the requisites for admission to the freshman class, whereon my literary friend wrote back to me, only half in jest, that despite my vigorous hint he must abandon any idea of re-taking his college course, as he could not possibly pass the entrance examinations.

The schools of to-day do not teach what was taught twenty years ago. Our colleges are wholly different institutions. The man who closed his scholastic education in the "eighties," perhaps even in the "nineties," and went out into life, his brain awhirl with certain problems which he and his generation must some day solve perforce, that man is surprised now by stumbling, in his newspaper, on some casual reference to his special difficulty as a thing done with, dismissed, and half forgotten. He realizes for a moment that the age has somehow swept along without him, that progress has passed him by. Then, being a busy man, he turns again to his own personal problem, with perhaps only a half-formed wish that he had kept more nearly abreast of the times, a half-formed resolve that "some day" he will "read up" again.

To that man, and to every one among us who seeks to maintain the fulness of his heritage as "heir to all the ages," is offered the present series of addresses. They give the most recent thought on each vital issue of the moment. They are written by men and women, the foremost leaders of the battle. Each name is a guarantee not only that the address is notable and worth the reading, but also that it is broadly thoughtful and deeply true. These are no hurried, superficial views, held to-day to be dismissed to-morrow; they are the meditated opinions of the greatest

specialists. Each address is worth incorporating into the reader's permanent body of thought, his outlook upon life.

Several of the series have already received the stamp of public approval. They have been delivered as recent speeches, some before vast audiences of the people, others before learned societies, small bodies of the selected few. Surely, under such circumstances if ever, under the criticism and approval of his fellow men, restrained from exaggeration by the sceptic's smile, stimulated to passion and power by the applause of all whose voiceless thoughts he has nobly interpreted in speech, then if ever does a speaker rise above his hearers, above himself, and become "inspired." Essays of inspiration these, and needful indeed was it that their earnest words should not perish on the breeze that caught them, but should be here preserved in print and given permanent weight—heralded to a wider audience. Others of the series have been written specially for this occasion. Others again have appeared in some temporary printed shape, and are now given permanent form. These, wherever necessary, have been revised by the author, or under his supervision, for the present purpose.

For there is a purpose, an "increasing purpose," which runs through them all. They are not a hap-hazard collection of famous speeches, chance thrown together. Their themes have been laboriously selected, their sequence studied, their expression placed in the hands of those best fitted for the task. Thus, though each author speaks upon a different subject, there is a carefully outlined harmony runs through the whole. Here is, in brief, not many books, but one book. Each address does but face another aspect of the same great riddle and gives a strong man's reading of its secret. Taken as a whole, the series may be found to answer better than any one volume could, better than any one man could, the question that faces each among us, the question

suggested by the title as to the meaning, the cause, and the issue of the life we live.

A special introduction for this opening number of the series seems scarcely needful. Seth Low is so widely known for his long and honorable career, as President of Columbia University during its period of widest development, as Mayor of New York in days of peculiar stress and strain, as one of the foremost citizens of our land in every moment of need, that his voice must everywhere receive attention, his views command respect. This address, delivered by him before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard, was published in the Atlantic Monthly and is here reproduced by the kind permission of the publishers, after being revised under Mr. Low's supervision for its present use. It looks, as its title page suggests, over the general field of life, and indicates briefly the general character of some of the problems which the ensuing addresses must view at closer range.

Perhaps he who will go step by step with our authors through each one's thought may before closing with the last find himself strengthened to give his own answer to the riddle. He may take a new attitude more confident, more self-assured towards life itself.

C. F. H.

I

THE OUTLOOK

"THE TREND OF THE CENTURY"

BY

SETH LOW

FORMER PRESIDENT OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

VERY century has its own characteristics. The two influences which made the nineteenth century what it was seem to me to be the scientific spirit and the democratic spirit. Thus, the nineteenth century, singularly enough, was the great interpretative century both of nature and of the past, and at the same time the century of incessant and uprooting change in all that relates to the current life of men. It was also the century of national systems of popular education, and at the same time of nation-great armies; the century that did more than any other to scatter men over the face of the earth, and to concentrate them in cities; the century of a universal suffrage that is based upon a belief in the inherent value of the individual; and the century of the corporation and the labor union, which in the dominion of capital and of labor threaten to obliterate the individual. I want to trace, if I can, what has been the trend of this remarkable century in the domain of thought, of society, of commerce, of industry, and of politics. Especially I want to do this as it concerns life in the United States.

I speak first of the trend of thought; for thought, immaterial though it be, is the matrix that shapes the issues of life. The mind has been active in all fields during this fruitful century; but, outside of politics, it is to science that we must look

for the thoughts that have shaped all other thinking. When Von Helmholtz was in this country, a few years ago, he said that modern science was born when men ceased to summon nature to the support of theories already formed, and instead began to question nature for her facts, in order that they might thus discover the laws which these facts reveal. I do not know that it would be easy to sum up the scientific method, as the phrase runs, in simpler words.

It would not be correct to say that this process was unknown before the past century; for there have been individual observers and students of nature in all ages. The seed idea is to be found at least as far back as the time of Bacon, not to say of Aristotle. But it is true that only within the last century has this attitude towards nature become the uniform attitude of men of science. The results that have flowed from this general attitude towards nature have been so wonderful that the same method has been employed by students of other subjects, with results hardly less noteworthy. To this attitude towards nature on the part of men of science we owe the great advances in our knowledge of natural law which the century has witnessed; and from this increased knowledge of natural law the manifold inventions have come that have changed the face of the world. To the scientific method applied to the problems of the past by men of letters, we owe our ability to understand the hieroglyphs of Egypt and the cuneiform inscriptions of Babylonia.

One of the chief results of the scientific method as applied to nature and the study of the past is the change that it has wrought in the philosophic conception of nature and of human society. By the middle of the century, Darwin had given what has been held to be substantial proof of the theory of the development of higher forms out of lower in all living things; and since then the doctrine of evolution, not as a body of exact teaching, but as a working theory, has obtained a mastery over the minds of men which has dominated all their studies and all their thinking. The consequences of the doctrine have been very different in different fields of mental activity. In the field of religious thought it has undoubtedly been a

source of very serious perplexity, because it has confronted men with the necessity of reshaping their conceptions of the divine method of creation according to a theory exactly the opposite of that which had been previously held. When Copernicus, in the sixteenth century, began to teach that the earth revolved about the sun, it must have seemed to be doctrine that disputed the most evident of facts. All men in all ages had seen the sun rise in the east and set in the west, and therefore the new doctrine must have appeared, at first sight, to be utterly subversive both of the science of that day and of the religion of that day. The men of science, then as now, easily accommodated themselves to the new teaching as its truthfulness became clear, despite its revolutionary character; for to them it meant only a fresh start along a more promising road. But the opposition of the Church reveals the agony of mind that was involved for the Christian believer in the effort to restate his conception of man's importance in the sight of God, from the point of view of the newly recognized truth instead of from the point of view of the old error. Still, men were able to do this, though it took them a long time to do it. The discovery of Copernicus was announced in 1543; yet I read the other day, in the life of Samuel Johnson, the first president of King's College in New York city, that it was by him and his colleagues of Yale, in the early part of the eighteenth century, that even the learned people of Connecticut were led to accept the Copernican theory of the universe instead of the Ptolemaic. Indeed, so late as the first Commencement of King's College, in 1758, one of the students, "in a clear and concise manner, demonstrated the revolution of the earth round the sun, both from astronomical observations and the theory of gravity, and defended the thesis against two of his classmates." These incidents illustrate happily how far America was from Europe in those days. It is easy to believe, therefore, that the evolutionary conception of creation, with its sublime suggestion of the limitless possibilities of endless development, will in time be accepted as the basis of men's religious thinking as universally as religious men now accept the Copernican system of the universe. In the mean while,

it should be a source of comfort to every man whose mind has been troubled by this new teaching of science that, in this experience, nothing has happened to him which has not happened before; and it may be observed that if the man of science has thus taught, in a new way, that man is allied to the beasts that perish, he has also shown, by his own wide reading of natural law, that man is capable of tracing the processes of the infinite, thus setting the seal of science to the doctrine of revelation, that man, in his essence, is the child of God.

The effect of the scientific method and of the doctrine of evolution upon philosophy, during the century, has been to bring the philosopher and the man of science closer together. In ancient times, the philosopher was in his own person a man of science; that is to say, he not only knew all of the science that was known, but he was himself the principal agent in advancing man's scientific knowledge. Through the centuries, as man's knowledge of nature has increased, one science after another has been set aside from the domain of philosophy, so to speak, as a field apart. Thus, astronomy, physics, and chemistry have long been recognized as independent fields of knowledge; and the philosopher has left it to the astronomer, the physicist, and the chemist to enlarge man's knowledge in those fields. During the nineteenth century, even psychology has become, to a great extent, an experimental science, so that philosophy, in our day, has come to concern itself once more with all knowledge rather than with special fields of knowledge. Accordingly we find the greatest philosophers basing their philosophies upon the widest possible survey of facts; and the greatest scientists turning from their facts to account for them, as they may, by some adequate philosophy. Thus, the theory of evolution, resting as it does upon the observed facts of nature, has come to dominate the philosophy of the century no less than its science.

In the domain of education one sees the same philosophy at work, having for its handmaid the democratic tendency which has marked the political development of the century. Every public educational system of our day, broadly speaking, is the child of the nineteenth century. The educational system

of Germany, which in its results has been of hardly less value to mankind than to Germany itself, dates from the reconstitution of the German universities after the battle of Jena. Whatever system France may have had before the Revolution went down in the cataclysm that destroyed the ancient régime, so that the educational system of France also dates from the Napoleonic period. In the United States, while the seeds of the public school system may have been planted in the eighteenth, or perhaps even in the seventeenth century, it has only been in the nineteenth century, with the development of the country, that our public school system has grown into what we now see; while in England, the system of national education, in a democratic sense, must be dated from 1870. This attempt on the part of the great nations to provide systematic instruction for the people, from childhood to manhood, from the elementary school to the university, reflects, as it seems to me, the commingling of the two great tendencies of the century, the democratic and the evolutionary. Out of the growth of the democratic principle has come the belief that it is worth while to educate all the children of the state; and out of the scientific method, which has led to the general acceptance of the evolutionary theory, has been developed the advance in educational method which is so marked a feature of the last decades of the century. Formerly, it was satisfactory to educate a child according to some preconceived theory, or as it had always been done. To-day, the best systems of education are increasingly based upon the laboratory method, and upon the observation of facts relating to childhood and youth. The new disciplines, also, are freely admitted on even terms with the old.

In other domains of knowledge, such as history and literature, the application of the scientific method has resulted not only in the overthrow of many of our preconceived conceptions in regard to the past, but also in the opening up of vast fields of information which formerly were closed to the seeker after truth, because he did not command the open sesame to their treasures. I think, therefore, the statement is justified which I made at the beginning of this address, that it is to science

we must look for the thoughts which, in the nineteenth century, dominated and fructified all other thinking. The illumination of the century proceeded from that source, and the light that has been shed, especially by the study of nature, has been carried into every nook and corner of human history and human life.

But the consequences of the general scientific attitude towards nature which was characteristic of the century have been twofold. Not only has the scientific method furnished a philosophy of nature and of human life, but, by the great increase in man's knowledge of natural law to which it has led, it has resulted in endless inventions, and these, in turn, have changed the face of the world. It is not my purpose to catalogue these inventions,—not even the most conspicuous of them. I rather wish to point out some of the changes in the life of society which have been caused by them. One of the most noticeable of these results is the great increase in the number and size of cities. What the elevator is to the high building the railroad and steamboat are to the city. They make practicable a city such as without them could not be. In striking contrast with this tendency of people to concentrate in cities, we observe, on the other hand, a world-movement of people which has been facilitated by the same inventions. Man's knowledge of the earth that he inhabits has been made substantially complete, and the ends of the earth and the islands of the sea have been brought into rapid and easy communication with the centres of the world's life. In other ages, tribes often migrated from one part of the world to another. The path by which they went was stained with blood, and the country of which they took possession they made their own by violence and conquest. But in the past century millions of people, not as tribes, but as families and as individuals, migrated peacefully from Europe to America, to Australia, to Asia, and to Africa. This world-wide movement of the peoples has been made possible only by the inventions that have, on the other hand, built up the cities; but it reflects, also, as it seems to me, the influence of the democratic spirit urging men, in vast numbers and upon their own responsibility, always to seek for conditions of life

in which they may enter upon life's struggle less handicapped by the past.

The rapid march of invention during the century has been coincident with one far-reaching and progressive change in the habits of society, the importance of which is seldom recognized. I refer to deposit banking. Of all the agencies that affected the world in the nineteenth century, I am sometimes inclined to think that this is one of the most influential. If deposit banking may not be said to be one fruit of democracy, it certainly may be said that it is in those countries in which democracy is most dominant that deposit banking thrives best. One of the first banks in the United States was the Bank of Maryland, opened in Baltimore in 1790. It was opened for a year before it had a depositor. Even fifty years ago the discussions of bankers turned mainly upon circulation. Comparatively little attention was given to the question of deposits. At the present time our banks are comparatively indifferent to circulation; but they aim to secure as large deposits as possible. Deposit banking does for the funds of a country precisely what mobilization does for the army of a country like France. Mobilization there places the entire manhood of the country in readiness for war. Deposit banking keeps every dollar of the country on a war-footing all the time. Some one has said that it would have been of no use to have invented the railroad at an earlier period of the world's history, for there would not have been enough money at command to make the invention available before this modern banking system had made its appearance. If this be so, then indeed the part that was played by deposit banking in the developments of the century cannot be overestimated.

During the century the conditions of the world's commerce radically altered. It is not simply that the steamboat and the locomotive have taken the place of the sailing-ship and the horse; that the submarine cable has supplanted the mails; nor even that these agencies have led to such improvements in banking facilities that foreign commerce is done, for the most part, for hardly more than a brokerage upon the transaction. These are merely accidents of the situation. The

fundamental factors have been the opening up of virgin soil in vast areas to the cultivation of man, and the discovery of how to create artificial cold, which makes it possible to transport for long distances produce that only a few years ago was classed as perishable. The net result of these influences has been to produce a world-competition at every point of the globe, both on a scale never before known, and as regards articles that have been heretofore exempt from all competition except neighborhood competition. Thus, not only has it become impossible to raise wheat profitably in England, or even on our own Atlantic coast, but the price of such an article as butter, for example, is fixed in the State of New York by what it costs to produce a similar grade of butter in Australia. Under the influence of these changes, the merchant of the early part of the nineteenth century has become "as extinct as the mastodon."

But if these changes have introduced new and strange problems for the merchant, they have also presented to the statesman problems of no less difficulty. In the first half of the century, China was the great source of supply for both tea and silk. At the present time more than half of the tea consumed in England comes from India and Ceylon, and more than three-quarters of the tea consumed in the United States comes from the island of Formosa and from Japan. Even in silk China has largely lost her market to Japan and Europe. Who shall say that this gradual destruction of China's export trade has not had much to do with bringing the ancient empire to the point where it seems about to be broken up? The outflow from the old empire is not sufficient to stem the inflow; and the aggressive commerce of the outside world appears to be ready to break down the ancient barriers and overflow the country, whether it will or no.

This unification of the world, and its reduction in size from the point of view of commerce, reveal some tendencies that are full of interest. The general tendency to protection was the first answer of the statesman and of the nations to the pressure of competition from new quarters. It represented an effort to make the terms of the world competition between young countries and old, between old countries and new, somewhat

more even. The remarkable exception to this tendency presented by Great Britain reflects the exceptional situation of Great Britain among the nations. Her home domain is too small to furnish occupation for either her men or her money, and therefore the people of the little island have swarmed all over the world. As a consequence, Great Britain's commercial policy, is in a sense, a world-policy; but it is noticeable that the other great nations, whether young or old, being obliged to frame their policy from a different point of view, have hitherto relied, with few if any exceptions, upon protection to equalize the terms of the competition. Now, however, a second tendency appears to be discernible. If protection represents the attempt of a nation to hold itself aloof, to some extent, from the competition of the world, the tendency of the aggressive nations of Europe to divide up among themselves the undeveloped portions of the earth, and even the territory of weaker nations, seems to me to represent a growing conviction that the policy of protection, from its nature, must be a temporary one, and also to reveal a dimly recognized belief that the true way for the old countries to contend with the semicivilized, in the long run, is to raise the standard of living in the less advanced countries, so that the semicivilized shall not be able to drag the most highly developed peoples down to their own level. That is to say, if the first response of the civilized nations to the world competition to which I have referred has been the attempt to limit its unwelcome effects by the erection of artificial barriers at every custom-house, the second response seems likely to come in the effort of the strong nations to dominate the weak,—not for their destruction, but for their uplifting. In other words, civilization, being brought face to face with the competition of the uncivilized, appears to believe that the best way to preserve its own integrity is to introduce the conditions of civilization everywhere. If this be a correct diagnosis of the recent developments of foreign policy on the part of several of the great nations, it indicates a disposition to secure protection in the future by aggressive rather than by defensive action as heretofore. I am not discussing the merits of the case, but only trying to point out the possible significance

of movements that are likely to have no little influence on the future.

But we should lose sight of one of the most important factors that have been at work in producing these results, and in changing the life of men, if we did not consider for a moment the influence of invention in the great domain of industry. In its relation to agriculture this influence appears in three forms: there has been a much more intelligent application of chemistry to the cultivation of the soil; steam-power has been very largely substituted for hand-power; and the railroad has made accessible vast areas of country which, in any previous age of the world, it would have been impossible to cultivate profitably. In the substitution of machinery for hand-power in the domain of manufacture, two incidental results have proved of far-reaching importance, although neither was necessarily involved in the substitution of the machine for the hand. I refer, first, to the division of labor, and second, to the interchangeability of parts in many standard manufactured articles. It has added enormously to the productiveness of a factory to divide the labor employed according to the processes. By this means the labor becomes more expert, the product is increased, and the quality is improved. It is true that the action of the laborer thereby becomes also, to a great extent, automatic; but so does the execution of the skilled musician, as the result of his practice and his skill. Does this automatic character of the occupation tend to the belittling or the enlargement of the minds of the working-men? It is probable that the mind of a laborer, thus largely set free during his hours of toil, is at work quite as busily as before, and in ways that make him more than ever an active factor in the world's life. The practice of making interchangeable parts in many manufactured articles has also added greatly to the convenience and availability of such articles. The standardizing of the threads of screws, the sizes of bolts, and the like, adds beyond measure to the effectiveness of manufacture and to the convenience of industry. But it is a superficial view of these things to suppose that their effect is exhausted in a tendency to cheapen products and to improve industrial opportunity. It is evident

that division of labor is permanently possible under freedom only in communities the members of which are animated by mutual trustfulness and mutual respect. Interchangeable parts are of value only when men trade continually with one another. They involve a recognition of the advantage to be had by considering the general welfare rather than simply one's own convenience. That is to say, both of these things reveal and emphasize the tendency to democracy in industry, which seems to me as marked a feature of our times as the tendency to democracy in the political life of men. In other words, industry rests more and more completely upon the mutual interdependence of the masses of mankind.

Other changes, less material, took place in the commercial and industrial world during this same great century. The wage system became universal, and the corporation and the trade union became dominant in many branches of industry and commerce. Commodore Vanderbilt laid the foundation of his fortune by operating a small boat on a ferry. The business of transportation grew under his hands to such an extent that even so exceptionally able a man as he could not control it in his own person. Under the form of a corporation, he was obliged to associate with himself many others, in order to carry on the immense business which he developed. The corporation in this aspect, therefore, is democratic, resting as it does upon the substitution of the ownership of many for the ownership of one. It may, indeed, be said that the corporation is oligarchic rather than democratic; but the oligarchic tendency in society made corporations even for general business purposes that rested upon exclusive privilege. The corporations of our day seem to me democratic, except as they control exclusive public franchises, in that they are open to all, and must compete with all. A sailing-ship used to cost comparatively little, and many an individual could afford to have one or two or a small fleet of them. The modern steamship, on the other hand, is exceedingly costly; and there would be few of them indeed if there were no more than could be owned by individuals. But just as in political democracy there is a tendency on the part of the many blindly to follow one, so in corporations

one man is apt to determine the efficiency or inefficiency of the corporation. Similarly, in the trade union and other organizations of labor, the organizations which are most capably led are the most effective.

The corporation and the trade union interest me especially from another point of view, because of the strange contrast they present to the democratic tendencies of the times. Democracy, as a political theory, emphasizes the equality of men and the equal rights and privileges of all men before the law. The tendency of it has been, in this country, to develop in multitudes of men great individuality and self-reliance. Side by side with this tendency, however, we see the corporation supplanting the individual capitalist, and the trade union obliterating the individual laborer, as direct agents in the work of the world. Strange as this contrast is, both tendencies must be consistent with democracy, for the corporation and the trade union flourish most where democracy is most developed. Indeed, they seem to be successful and powerful just because democracy pours into them both its vital strength. The criticisms that are justly enough launched against both probably spring largely from the fact that, by reason of the rapidity of their development, men have not yet learned how to control them so as to secure the maximum of benefit and the minimum of abuse.

In this country, I suppose, there are few who would deny that the corporate form of doing business is not only inevitable but on the whole advantageous. At the same time, the opinion undoubtedly would be almost as universal that the abuses in corporate management confront the country with some of the most serious problems that lie before it. The impersonality of the corporation lends itself readily to many abuses from which the sense of personal responsibility saves individual men. The corporation, being a creature of legislation, as it has gradually acquired control of more and more of the field of business, has brought all business into relation with the legislator, which is as unfortunate as possible. When business was in private control, legislators interfered comparatively little, because those who conducted the business had votes. Corporations, how-

ever, have no votes, but they have money; and it is not exaggeration to say that the people fear, if they do not believe, that the money of the corporations is often more influential in shaping legislation than are the votes of the people. The statement of a railroad magnate, that in Republican counties he was a Republican, and in Democratic counties he was a Democrat, but that everywhere he was for the railroad, was the cynical admission of an attitude easily understood, but none the less dangerous. When one tries to devise remedies for the evident dangers of the situation, it is not easy to be precise. It is possible, I think, to indicate some directions in which to look for improvement, so far as improvement is possible outside of higher standards of public virtue. The fundamental evil in the corporate form of management, undoubtedly, is the loss of personal responsibility. It is a common remark that as directors men will do things which as individuals they would not think of doing. Indeed, the evil lies deeper than this. Because they are directors, and therefore, as they say, trustees for others, they feel constrained to do for the benefit of the stockholders what as individuals they abhor. This reasoning may well be considered fallacious, but that it is very influential in determining the action of corporate directors cannot be questioned. The remedy for this loss of personal responsibility, so far as there is any remedy by legislation, must come from publicity. When the legislature grants the impersonal form for the conduct of business, and grants, in addition, a limited liability, there is no reason why it should not, at the same time, demand that all of the operations of this artificial person —or perhaps I ought to say, of this combination of natural and privileged persons—should be matters of public record. Theoretically I cannot believe that there is any reason why the demand for publicity in relation to the actions of corporations should not be carried to any detail to which it may be necessary to carry it in order to secure the result of absolute honesty as towards stockholders, creditors, and the public. It should be observed, perhaps, that corporations naturally divide themselves into two classes,—those which exercise, by virtue of a public franchise, quasi-governmental functions, and those

which conduct purely private business. I think the same rule of publicity, as a general principle, should apply to both kinds of corporations; but it is evident that publicity may have to be carried much farther in regard to the first kind than in regard to the second.

I think there is one other direction in which corporations can be further controlled to the public advantage. In many of the States, already, it is impossible to organize a corporation without paying in the capital in cash. If this requirement could be extended so as to demand that neither stock nor bonds should be issued except for a cash equivalent, it would strike at the root of one of the evils incident to corporate management which has done much to arouse against corporations popular indignation. I do not know why the law might not require, where stocks or bonds are to be issued as the equivalent of invested property, patents, good-will, and the like, that the valuation upon which such issues may be made should be fixed by public authority. The corporation that means to serve the public honestly and fairly is not likely to object to being required to have assets of full value for all the securities which it offers to the public. It is the corporation which wishes to make money out of the public dishonestly that aims to float all manner of securities that have no value at all, or only a nominal value. I believe it to be a righteous demand that the laws regulating corporations should protect the public much more adequately than they do now against such frauds.

But while it is evident that the corporate form of conducting business has been of wide benefit to mankind, despite the abuses that have attached to it, there may not be such general admission of the truth that the trade union and the labor organizations have been equally beneficial. It is sometimes said that labor organizes because capital does, and that it is obliged to do so in self-defence. I am far from saying that there is no truth in this statement, but I think that it is only a partial statement of the truth. Labor organizes, primarily, not simply to contend against capital and for self-defence, but for precisely the same reason that capital does; that is, for its own advantage. It organizes in response to a tendency of the times which labor

can resist no more than capital. It is the recognition by labor of the vision of the poet, that "the individual withers, and the world is more and more." It may not be denied that organized labor has often been cruel in its attitude to laboring-men who wish to work upon an individual basis; but it cannot be justly said that it is more cruel than organized capital has been in its own field. The individual competitor has been removed from the pathway of the trust as remorselessly as the individual laborer has been deprived of work by the labor organization. Indeed, I think it may be said that there is no fault that can be charged against organized labor which may not be charged with equal truth against organized capital. The forms in which these faults exhibit themselves, from the nature of the case, are different; but in both instances the faults are the same. In the mean while, one has only to consider the protectionist policy of nations, in order to be able to understand the protectionist policy of the trade unions. No laboring-man can tell at what moment a new invention will appear which will deprive him of his livelihood. It is inevitable, at such a time, that men should draw together, and present a common front to the problems of life, rather than attempt to contend with them as individual atoms. It is evident, also, that in many directions the trade union has improved the condition of the laboring-man, looked at from the point of view of the mass. It seems to me that the true line of development, instead of antagonizing the organization of labor, is to endeavor to make it responsible, so as to substitute for the irresponsibility of the single laborer the adequate responsibility of the great body of laborers. I have been told that in the most progressive labor unions of England, where the question is an older one than it is here, the aim of the union is to determine by joint action and by agreement with the employers the conditions under which the trade shall be carried on, while the tendency is to be indifferent whether the person employed is in the union or out of the union, provided that the standard regulations thus established for the trade are observed upon both sides. Under such a policy the war of the union is waged against inequitable conditions of life, and not against individual laborers who

happen to be outside of the union. It is easy to understand that the employer would prefer to have all such matters entirely under his own control; but it is probably true that, under the complex conditions of modern life, this is no longer absolutely possible anywhere; and it is also probably true that, by a general recognition of this circumstance, the standard of living may be raised in any community, to the great benefit of all concerned.

The tendency to democracy in politics was unquestionably the dominant political fact of the century. Not to attempt to trace the operation of this tendency everywhere, it seemed to show itself not only in the wide extension of the suffrage in such countries as England and the United States, but also in the nation-wide army of Germany. It is true that there is little enough of the free spirit of democracy in a military system like that of Germany. On the other hand, the universal suffrage existing in Germany for the election of members of the Reichstag, and the universal demand of the state for military service from all its people, are both of them instances of the use of the democratic spirit of the times in the service of a different polity. In other words, outside of Russia, and possibly even there, monarchical government in Europe is obliged to depend for its support upon the great body of the nation, instead of upon the power of the great and the noble. In England the monarchy, although it retains the forms and expressions of power that were natural in the time of the Tudors, has become so responsive to the demands of the democracy as to give, in effect, a democratic government. In the United States the century, though it began with a limited suffrage, ends with universal manhood suffrage, and even with woman suffrage in some of the Western States. There is one essential difference, however, which ought never to be forgotten, between the democracy of the United States and the democracy of England. The struggle of democracy in England for centuries has been to convert a government of privilege into a modern democracy. This implies an hereditary disposition on the part of the great body of the people to look up to men of education and position as natural leaders—a tendency which still remains to temper very importantly all the activities of

English public life. In the United States there is no such tendency. Hence the problem of democracy here is to learn how to educate itself to higher standards, and therefore to the attainment of better results. In other words, democracy in the United States is building on hard-pan, and every advance gained is an advance that raises the education of the whole people up to a higher level. Undoubtedly, universal suffrage and the large immigration of people without any experience in self-government have given form to many of our problems; but I often think there is far too great a disposition among us to magnify the difficulties which these conditions present. If all our failures be admitted, whatever they are, the history of the United States is certainly a marvellous one. Surely it is bad philosophy to assume that our history is what it is in despite of, and not because of, our democracy. It is a notable fact that hardly an immigrant who remains in this country long enough to become a citizen is willing to return to live in his own home. This is a striking testimony to the fact that, whatever our shortcomings, the average conditions of life are freer and happier here than anywhere else in the world. And our institutions have certainly sufficed to produce people of the very highest average of intelligence.

The fact is, in my judgment, that our problems arise not so much from universal suffrage as from the effect of the multiplication table applied to all the problems of life. I recollect that Mr. James Bryce, when in this country a few years ago, delivered an interesting lecture which he entitled "An Age of Discontent." In the lecture he pointed out that during the early part of this century the great desire of men was for political liberty. But when political liberty had been obtained, he said, instead of ushering in an epoch of universal good-will, it had brought with it apparently only universal discontent. Allowing the statement to pass unchallenged, I should be inclined to say, first of all, if I were to try to suggest an explanation of the prevailing discontent, that a partial explanation, at least, can be found in the immense increase of popular opportunity that is due to the spread of democracy, and which has resulted in so magnifying every problem that the world has not yet learned

how to deal with many of them. The problems are not only new; in scale they are thoroughly in keeping with the times, for nothing is more characteristic of the age than the large units of its enterprise. A single building to-day will hold as many tenants as a block of buildings in the beginning of the last century; a single bridge of our time will cost as much as twenty bridges of the earlier day; and so one might go through the entire catalogue of private and public undertakings. But size often makes simple things difficult. Any one building a house in the country, when he has dug a well, has solved the problem of his water supply; but to supply water for a great city calls for the outlay of millions of dollars, and for the employment of the best engineering talent in the land. Yet nothing has happened except that the problem has been magnified. Thus it is clear that the difficulties created by the multiplication table are real; so that the very enlargement of opportunity that democracy has brought with it has faced democracy with problems far harder than were formerly presented to any government.

Another cause of the prevailing discontent, if that be taken for granted, I find in the constant and uprooting changes in life that have been incident to the rapid progress of scientific invention in our day, and from which no class of people have been exempt. The unrest is so general and so world-wide that it is not surprising that men are seeking to find for it some remedy which, by its thoroughness, seems to give promise of a complete cure. Every one is conscious of the new problems, but no one is wise enough to see how they are to be worked out. Men want a universal panacea. Accordingly, the anarchist and the nihilist say that all government, or even society itself, is a failure; that the thing to do is to destroy the foundations of government or of society as they now exist and to start fresh. The communist, less radical, says that society is not at fault, but that the institution of private property is the source of all trouble. If communism could be introduced, and the people could own everything in common, then, he thinks, the inequalities and injustices of life would disappear. The socialist, on the other hand, recognizing

the fallacy of both claims, says, No, that is not the trouble. The state, as the one pre-eminently democratic corporation of the day, ought to control the instruments of industry and commerce. When these are controlled by the state, for the general good, instead of being held as now for private advantage then a better day will be ushered in. And so it goes. It cannot be gainsaid that under every form of government the times are trying men's souls in every condition of life; but there is no universal panacea. There is nothing to be done but patiently to meet each problem as it comes, in the best way possible, in the confidence that in the long run the outcome will be advantageous to mankind. This, at all events, I think may be said of our own people and of their equipment for the problems of the times: that the American people, in great crises, by their self-control, by their willingness to make sacrifices, and by their evident honesty of purpose, have gladdened the hearts of their friends, and have encouraged those who love to believe that mankind is worthy of trust. That our country has not perfectly learned the art of self-government goes without saying; but that it has made progress in many and difficult directions I think must also be admitted.

In the mean while, some of the problems of greatest difficulty are those which come simply from our size. Merely to get out the vote of a great city, or of a State, or of the nation requires so much machinery as to give to the machine in politics a power that does not always make for the public good. It is not surprising, therefore, that wherever this problem is greatest, as in the large cities and the large States, there the tendency to the control of the machine by one man, and to the control of the government by one man through his control of the machine, is the most evident. It does not yet fully appear how the country is to secure the legitimate results now obtained through the party machines, without paying to the machines, as such, a price which is out of all proportion to the value of their services. It is not to be believed, however, for one moment, that the wisdom and patriotism of the future will be any less equal to the solution of our problems than the wisdom and patriotism of the past have been. It is apparent that the power of the

machine, in the last statement, lies in its control of the power to nominate, because the control of that power opens or closes for every man the door to public life. In some way, it must be made easier for men whose aim is simply to serve the public to get into public life and to stay in it without loss of self-respect. The many movements toward primary reform which look to regaining for the people the control of nominations are movements in the right direction. It is evident that the public instinct has recognized the source of the difficulty, and that everywhere men are at work trying to find a remedy for the evils of which they have become aware. The saying, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," did not originate in our day. We are conscious of our own shortcomings and of our own difficulties, and we are apt to forget those out of which the world has grown. We have only to remember these things to gain heart. In a single word, I believe the problem of good government, in our day and country, is largely a problem of education; and in this view it is interesting to recall what was pointed out not long ago by Dr. Stanley Hall, that education is the one thing as to the value of which all men everywhere, at the present time, are agreed. Not that there is agreement on the methods and detail of education; but all men are agreed that education is a thing to be encouraged, a thing to be desired, a thing to be struggled for, and a thing to profit by. In this education our universities have a large part to play. They are already doing much in the direction of a constructive study of politics and of society. Perhaps they are not doing enough in the direction of the constructive study of industry and commerce, for in an industrial and commercial age both political and social questions are largely shaped by commerce and industry. In economics, the work of the universities is largely critical, not to say destructive; but because of their ability to illuminate the problems of the present with a broad knowledge of what is being done the world over, as well as with the knowledge of the past, and because of their own inherent democracy of spirit which puts them in vital touch with the spirit of the times, I am confident that they may, if they will, make valuable contributions to such a study of industry and commerce as will

cause the universities to become still more important factors in shaping the future of the country.

To sum up, therefore, I should say that the trend of the past century has been to a great increase in knowledge, which has been found to be, as of old, the knowledge of good and evil; that this knowledge has become more and more the property of all men rather than of a few; that as a result, the very increase of opportunity has led to the magnifying of the problems with which humanity is obliged to deal; and that we find ourselves, at the beginning of a new century, face to face with problems of world-wide importance and utmost difficulty, and with no new means of coping with them other than the patient education of the masses of men. However others may tremble as they contemplate the perplexities of the coming century, the children of the universities should find it easy to keep heart; for they know that higher things have been developed in pain and struggle out of lower since creation began; and in the atmosphere of the university, with its equality of privilege and wealth of opportunity open to all, they must have learned, if they have learned anything of value, the essential nobility of the democratic spirit that so surely holds the future in its hands—the spirit that seeks, with the strength of all, to serve all and uplift all.

II

THE DANGER

BY

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IF the general outlook for our people be fair, as Mr. Low has pointed out, nevertheless we face dangers in the future. Dangers obviously are of two classes. They are warning shadows which may extend either above an individual or above a race; and in this our search for the whole meaning of modern life we must examine the threat of the future in both these aspects. We take here and first its general warning for the race. Unfortunately it is just this broader danger that many of us are quite ready to ignore. We do not understand it; it seems to have no material threat for us, ourselves; and what is called the "social conscience" is not fully developed in us all. Many among us feel no vivid responsibility for our neighbor or for our children's children. "The nation will last my time" is a too common phrase wherewith a man turns back to his own narrow interests. Untrained in history, he does not know that when a racial danger strikes, it strikes with sudden rage. No magistrate expects it; a few ranting prophets proclaim it and are laughed at—as we are laughing at them to-day. Then comes the lightning bolt. Therefore it behooves even the most selfish of us, for his own sake, if he can find no broader standpoint, to take heed to the danger of the future, lest even he in his own narrow body be involved in the disaster.

To these dangers that approach the nation no man is more fully alive than he whom we have set to be our chief. Again and again, in private speech and in public proclamation, has President Roosevelt cried out words of warning, perhaps never more posi-

tively than in the address which is here incorporated in our series with his approval. It was delivered on Labor Day in 1903, at the New York State Fair at Syracuse; and Mr. Roosevelt weaves happily into his opening sentence the fact that he is addressing an audience of farmers and laborers. Later on he emphasizes that he sees also before him merchants and professional men, that, in short, his words are for the whole broad nation. They are worth our listening.

Governor Higgins; my fellow-citizens:

In speaking on Labor Day at the annual fair of the New York State Agricultural Association, it is natural to keep especially in mind the two bodies who compose the majority of our people and upon whose welfare depends the welfare of the entire State. If circumstances are such that thrift, energy, industry, and forethought enable the farmer, the tiller of the soil, on the one hand, and the wage-worker, on the other, to keep themselves, their wives, and their children in reasonable comfort, then the State is well off, and we can be assured that the other classes in the community will likewise prosper. On the other hand, if there is in the long run a lack of prosperity among the two classes named, then all other prosperity is sure to be more seeming than real. It has been our profound good fortune as a nation that hitherto, disregarding exceptional periods of depression and the normal and inevitable fluctuations, there has been, on the whole, from the beginning of our Government to the present day a progressive betterment alike in the condition of the tiller of the soil and in the condition of the man who, by his manual skill and labor, supports himself and his family, and endeavors to bring up his children so that they may be at least as well off as, and if possible better off than, he himself has been. There are, of course, exceptions, but as a whole the standard of living among the farmers of our country has risen from generation to generation, and the wealth represented on the farms has steadily increased, while the wages of labor have likewise risen, both as regards the actual money paid and as regards the purchasing power which that money represents.

Side by side with this increase in the prosperity of the wage-

worker and the tiller of the soil has gone on a great increase in prosperity among the business men and among certain classes of professional men; and the prosperity of these men has been partly the cause and partly the consequence of the prosperity of farmer and wage-worker. It can not be too often repeated that in this country, in the long run, we all of us tend to go up or go down together. If the average of well-being is high, it means that the average wage worker, the average farmer, and the average business man are all alike well off. If the average shrinks, there is not one of these classes which will not feel the shrinkage. Of course there are always some men who are not affected by good times, just as there are some men who are not affected by bad times. But speaking broadly, it is true that if prosperity comes, all of us tend to share more or less therein, and that if adversity comes, each of us, to a greater or less extent, feels the tension. Unfortunately, in this world the innocent frequently find themselves obliged to pay some of the penalty for the misdeeds of the guilty; and so if hard times come, whether they be due to our own fault or to our misfortune; whether they be due to some burst of speculative frenzy that has caused a portion of the business world to lose its head—a loss which no legislation can possibly supply; or whether they be due to any lack of wisdom in a portion of the world of labor—in each case the trouble once started is felt more or less in every walk of life.

It is all-essential to the continuance of our healthy national life that we should recognize this community of interest among our people. The welfare of each of us is dependent fundamentally upon the welfare of all of us, and therefore in public life that man is the best representative of each of us who seeks to do good to each by doing good to all; in other words, whose endeavor it is, not to represent any special class and promote merely that class's selfish interests, but to represent all true and honest men of all sections and all classes, and to work for their interests by working for our common country.

We can keep our Government on a sane and healthy basis, we can make and keep our social system what it should be, only on condition of judging each man, not as a member of a class, but on his worth as a man. It is an infamous thing in our

American life, and fundamentally treacherous to our institutions, to apply to any man any test save that of his personal worth, or to draw between two sets of men any distinction save the distinction of conduct, the distinction that marks off those who do well and wisely from those who do ill and foolishly. There are good citizens and bad citizens in every class as in every locality, and the attitude of decent people toward great public and social questions should be determined, not by the accidental questions of employment or locality, but by those deep-set principles which represent the innermost souls of men.

The failure in public and in private life thus to treat each man on his own merits, the recognition of this Government as being either for the poor as such or for the rich as such, would prove fatal to our Republic, as such failure and such recognition have always proved fatal in the past to other republics. A healthy republican government must rest upon individuals, not upon classes or sections. As soon as it becomes government by a class or by a section it departs from the old American ideal.

It is, of course, the merest truism to say that free institutions are of avail only to people who possess the high and peculiar characteristics needed to take advantage of such institutions. The century that has just closed has witnessed many and lamentable instances in which people have seized a government free in form, or have had it bestowed upon them, and yet have permitted it under the forms of liberty to become some species of despotism or anarchy, because they did not have in them the power to make this seeming liberty one of deed instead of one merely of word. Under such circumstances the seeming liberty may be supplanted by a tyranny or despotism in the first place, or it may reach the road of despotism by the path of license and anarchy. It matters but little which road is taken. In either case the same goal is reached. People show themselves just as unfit for liberty whether they submit to anarchy or to tyranny; and class government, whether it be the government of a plutocracy or the government of a mob, is equally incompatible with the principles established in the days of Washington and perpetuated in the days of Lincoln.

Many qualities are needed by a people which would preserve

the power of self-government in fact as well as in name. Among these qualities are forethought, shrewdness, self-restraint, the courage which refuses to abandon one's own rights, and the disinterested and kindly good sense which enables one to do justice to the rights of others. Lack of strength and lack of courage unfit men for self-government on the one hand; and on the other, brutal arrogance, envy—in short, any manifestation of the spirit of selfish disregard, whether of one's own duties or of the rights of others, are equally fatal.

In the history of mankind many republics have risen, have flourished for a less or greater time, and then have fallen because their citizens lost the power of governing themselves and thereby of governing their state; and in no way has this loss of power been so often and so clearly shown as in the tendency to turn the Government into a government primarily for the benefit of one class instead of a government for the benefit of the people as a whole.

Again and again in the republics of ancient Greece, in those of mediæval Italy and mediæval Flanders, this tendency was shown, and wherever the tendency became a habit it invariably and inevitably proved fatal to the State. In the final result it mattered not one whit whether the movement was in favor of one class or of another. The outcome was equally fatal, whether the country fell into the hands of a wealthy oligarchy which exploited the poor or whether it fell under the domination of a turbulent mob which plundered the rich. In both cases there resulted violent alternations between tyranny and disorder, and a final complete loss of liberty to all citizens—destruction in the end overtaking the class which had for the moment been victorious, as well as that which had momentarily been defeated. The death-knell of the Republic had rung as soon as the active power became lodged in the hands of those who sought, not to do justice to all citizens, rich and poor alike, but to stand for one special class and for its interests as opposed to the interests of others.

The reason why our future is assured lies in the fact that our people are genuinely skilled in and fitted for self-government and therefore will spurn the leadership of those who seek to excite

this ferocious and foolish class antagonism. The average American knows not only that he himself intends to do about what is right, but that his average fellow-countryman has the same intention and the same power to make his intention effective. He knows, whether he be business man, professional man, farmer, mechanic, employer, or wage-worker, that the welfare of each of these men is bound up with the welfare of all the others; that each is neighbor to the other, is actuated by the same hopes and fears, has fundamentally the same ideals, and that all alike have much the same virtues and the same faults. Our average fellow-citizen is a sane and healthy man, who believes in decency and has a wholesome mind. He therefore feels an equal scorn alike for the man of wealth guilty of the mean and base spirit of arrogance toward those who are less well off, and for the man of small means who in his turn either feels or seeks to excite in others the feeling of mean and base envy for those who are better off. The two feelings, envy and arrogance, are but opposite sides of the same shield, but different developments of the same spirit. Fundamentally, the unscrupulous rich man who seeks to exploit and oppress those who are less well off is in spirit not opposed to, but identical with, the unscrupulous poor man who desires to plunder and oppress those who are better off. The courtier and the demagogue are but developments of the same type under different conditions, each manifesting the same servile spirit, the same desire to rise by pandering to base passions; though one panders to power in the shape of a single man and the other to power in the shape of a multitude. So likewise the man who wishes to rise by wronging others must by right be contrasted, not with the man who likewise wishes to do wrong, though to a different set of people, but with the man who wishes to do justice to all people and to wrong none.

The line of cleavage between good and bad citizenship lies, not between the man of wealth who acts squarely by his fellows and the man who seeks each day's wage by that day's work, wronging no one and doing his duty by his neighbor; nor yet does this line of cleavage divide the unscrupulous wealthy man who exploits others in his own interest, from the demagogue, or from the sullen and envious being who wishes to attack all men

of property, whether they do well or ill. On the contrary, the line of cleavage between good citizenship and bad citizenship separates the rich man who does well from the rich man who does ill, the poor man of good conduct from the poor man of bad conduct. This line of cleavage lies at right angles to any such arbitrary line of division as that separating one class from another, one locality from another, or men with a certain degree of property from those of a less degree of property.

The good citizen is the man who, whatever his wealth or his poverty, strives manfully to do his duty to himself, to his family, to his neighbor, to the State; who is incapable of the baseness which manifests itself either in arrogance or in envy, but who, while demanding justice for himself, is no less scrupulous to do justice to others. It is because the average American citizen, rich or poor, is of just this type that we have cause for our profound faith in the future of the Republic.

Ours is a government of liberty, by, through, and under the law. Lawlessness and connivance at law-breaking—whether the law-breaking take the form of a crime of greed and cunning or of a crime of violence—are destructive not only of order, but of the true liberties which can only come through order. If alive to their true interests, rich and poor alike will set their faces like flint against the spirit which seeks personal advantage by overriding the laws, without regard to whether this spirit shows itself in the form of bodily violence by one set of men or in the form of vulpine cunning by another set of men.

Let the watchwords of all our people be the old familiar watchwords of honesty, decency, fair-dealing, and common-sense. The qualities denoted by these words are essential to all of us, as we deal with the complex industrial problems of to-day, the problems affecting not merely the accumulation but even more the wise distribution of wealth. We ask no man's permission when we require him to obey the law; neither the permission of the poor man nor yet of the rich man. Least of all can the man of great wealth afford to break the law, even for his own financial advantage; for the law is his prop and support, and it is both foolish and profoundly unpatriotic for him to fail in giving hearty support to those who show that there is in very fact

one law, and one law only, alike for the rich and the poor, for the great and the small.

Men sincerely interested in the due protection of property, and men sincerely interested in seeing that the just rights of labor are guaranteed, should alike remember not only that in the long run neither the capitalist nor the wage-worker can be helped in healthy fashion save by helping the other; but also that to require either side to obey the law and do its full duty toward the community is emphatically to that side's real interest.

There is no worse enemy of the wage-worker than the man who condones mob violence in any shape or who preaches class hatred; and surely the slightest acquaintance with our industrial history should teach even the most short-sighted that the times of most suffering for our people as a whole, the times when business is stagnant, and capital suffers from shrinkage and gets no return from its investments, are exactly the times of hardship, and want, and grim disaster among the poor. If all the existing instrumentalities of wealth could be abolished, the first and severest suffering would come among those of us who are least well off at present. The wage-worker is well off only when the rest of the country is well off; and he can best contribute to this general well-being by showing sanity and a firm purpose to do justice to others.

In his turn the capitalist who is really a conservative, the man who has forethought as well as patriotism, should heartily welcome every effort, legislative or otherwise, which has for its object to secure fair dealing by capital, corporate or individual, toward the public and toward the employee. Such laws as the franchise-tax law in this State, which the Court of Appeals recently unanimously decided constitutional; such a law as that passed in Congress last year for the purpose of establishing a Department of Commerce and Labor, under which there should be a bureau to oversee and secure publicity from the great corporations which do an interstate business; such a law as that passed at the same time for the regulation of the great highways of commerce so as to keep these roads clear on fair terms to all producers in getting their goods to market—these laws are in the interest not merely of the people as a whole, but of the propertied

classes. For in no way is the stability of property better assured than by making it patent to our people that property bears its proper share of the burdens of the State; that property is handled not only in the interest of the owner, but in the interest of the whole community.

In other words, legislation to be permanently good for any class must also be good for the nation as a whole; and legislation which does injustice to any class is certain to work harm to the nation. Take our currency system, for example. This nation is on a gold basis. The Treasury of the public is in excellent condition. Never before has the per capita of circulation been as large as it is this day; and this circulation, moreover, is of money, every dollar of which is at par with gold. Now, our having this sound currency system is of benefit to banks, of course, but it is of infinitely more benefit to the people as a whole, because of the healthy effect on business conditions.

In the same way, whatever is advisable in the way of remedial or corrective currency legislation—and nothing revolutionary is advisable under present conditions—must be undertaken only from the standpoint of the business community as a whole, that is, of the American body politic as a whole. Whatever is done, we cannot afford to take any step backward or to cast any doubt upon the certain redemption in standard coin of every circulating note.

Among ourselves we differ in many qualities, of body, head, and heart; we are unequally developed, mentally as well as physically. But each of us has the right to ask that he shall be protected from wrongdoing as he does his work and carries his burden through life. No man needs sympathy because he has to work, because he has a burden to carry. Far and away the best prize that life offers is the chance to work hard at work worth doing; and this is a prize open to every man, for there can be no work better worth doing than that done to keep in health and comfort and with reasonable advantages those immediately dependent upon the husband, the father, or the son.

There is no room in our healthy American life for the mere idler, for the man or the woman whose object it is throughout life to shirk the duties which life ought to bring. Life can mean

nothing worth meaning, unless its prime aim is the doing of duty, the achievement of results worth achieving. A recent writer has finely said: "After all, the saddest thing that can happen to a man is to carry no burdens. To be bent under too great a load is bad; to be crushed by it is lamentable; but even in that there are possibilities that are glorious. But to carry no load at all—there is nothing in that. No one seems to arrive at any goal really worth reaching in this world who does not come to it heavy laden."

Surely from our own experience each one of us knows that this is true. From the greatest to the smallest, happiness and usefulness are largely found in the same soul, and the joy of life is won in its deepest and truest sense only by those who have not shirked life's burdens. The men whom we most delight to honor in all this land are those who, in the iron years from '61 to '65, bore on their shoulders the burden of saving the Union. They did not choose the easy task. They did not shirk the difficult duty. Deliberately and of their own free will they strove for an ideal, upward and onward across the stony slopes of greatness. They did the hardest work that was then to be done; they bore the heaviest burden that any generation of Americans ever had to bear; and because they did this they have won such proud joy as it has fallen to the lot of no other men to win, and have written their names forevermore on the golden honor roll of the nation. As it is with the soldier, so it is with the civilian. To win success in the business world, to become a first-class mechanic, a successful farmer, an able lawyer or doctor, means that the man has devoted his best energy and power through long years to the achievement of his ends. So it is in the life of the family, upon which in the last analysis the whole welfare of the nation rests. The man or woman who as bread-winner and home-maker, or as wife and mother, has done all that he or she can do, patiently and uncomplainingly, is to be honored, and is to be envied by all those who have never had the good fortune to feel the need and duty of doing such work. The woman who has borne, and who has reared as they should be reared, a family of children, has in the most emphatic manner deserved well of the Republic. Her burden has been heavy, and

she has been able to bear it worthily only by the possession of resolution, of good sense, of conscience, and of unselfishness. But if she has borne it well, then to her shall come the supreme blessing, for in the words of the oldest and greatest of books, "Her children shall rise up and call her blessed"; and among the benefactors of the land her place must be with those who have done the best and the hardest work whether as law-givers or as soldiers, whether in public or in private life.

This is not a soft and easy creed to preach. It is a creed willingly learned only by men and women who, together with the softer virtues, possess also the stronger; who can do, and dare, and die at need, but who while life lasts will never flinch from their allotted task. You farmers, and wage-workers, and business men of this great State, of this mighty and wonderful nation, are gathered together to-day, proud of your State and still prouder of your Nation, because your forefathers and predecessors have lived up to just this creed. You have received from their hands a great inheritance, and you will leave an even greater inheritance to your children and your children's children, provided only that you practise alike in your private and your public lives the strong virtues that have given us as a people greatness in the past. It is not enough to be well-meaning and kindly, but weak; neither is it enough to be strong, unless morality and decency go hand in hand with strength. We must possess the qualities which make us do our duty in our homes and among our neighbors, and in addition we must possess the qualities which are indispensable to the makeup of every great and masterful nation—the qualities of courage and hardihood, of individual initiative and yet of power to combine for a common end, and, above all, the resolute determination to permit no man and no set of men to sunder us one from the other by lines of caste or creed or section. We must act upon the motto of all for each and each for all. There must be ever present in our minds the fundamental truth that in a republic such as ours the only safety is to stand neither for nor against any man because he is rich or because he is poor, because he is engaged in one occupation or another, because he works with his brains or because he works with his hands. We must treat each man on his worth

and merits as a man. We must see that each is given a square deal, because he is entitled to no more and should receive no less. Finally we must keep ever in mind that a republic such as ours can exist only by virtue of the orderly liberty which comes through the equal domination of the law over all men alike, and through its administration in such resolute and fearless fashion as shall teach all that no man is above it and no man below it.

III

THE BELIEFS

"RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND MIRACLE"

BY

SIR OLIVER LODGE

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THERE is one element of our being that, in many minds, is so deeply interwoven with every aspect of thought, one question so omnipresent, that no search into the meaning of life can far advance without that question being raised. What attitude does the search assume toward religious faith? This does not necessarily inquire into the particular sect or creed of the searcher. We have reached a point where even the most militant apostle, the one most satisfied as to the value and accuracy of his own beliefs, has ceased to enforce their acceptance upon his neighbor. Some of us might even admit that our heretic neighbor was the better man.

We are all, however, more or less fully aware that some time during the last half-century certain Scientists and certain Churchmen engaged in a somewhat vehement and wordy war. With the details of this strife most of us are not wholly familiar. It centred, we know, upon evolution and upon Adam. Perhaps many of us were unwilling to know more. We avoided inquiry lest our religious faith be shaken by scientific ideas of whose value we were incompetent to judge. Yet in this very withdrawal of ourselves, there were elements of uncertainty, of fear. The spirit of faith was disturbed, even if not made doubtful, in each thoughtful mind.

To all, therefore, who have not closely followed the course of the contest, the two following addresses must come as a relief. They show that this controversy, like many another, begins to be regarded as a thing of the past, that religious faith still survives

even in the minds of many philosophers the most "advanced." Sir Oliver Lodge, M.Sc., F.R.S., D.Sc., LL.D., is among the most widely known of British scientists. Perhaps he has done more than any other living man to bring scientific knowledge into the minds of the common people. Moreover, as head of one of the leading English universities, that of Birmingham, he has done much for the cause of higher education. Among the many honors which have come to him is that of being made, in 1905, President of the Social and Political Education League. The material of the following address is substantially that of a lecture recently delivered by him to his students at Birmingham, though it was rearranged for publication. The Duke of Northumberland ranks high among the great lords of the British Empire, as well as among the great scientific writers of the world. His religious attitude has always shown closer clinging to old forms of faith than that of the radical scientist and is well worth comparing with that of Sir Oliver.

In brief, religion has but passed through another of those crises common to all things that live and grow. Again and again in the course of ages, in Luther's time, in Galileo's, in other epochs and with other faiths less widely known, have the very foundations of the "living faith" seemed undermined. In other days even more perhaps than now, have men who loved and feared, shut their eyes in terror and turned away from the threatened downfall. Yet when the despairing mourners looked again, behold, the storm had passed them by; and belief in God, a living principle in the hearts of men, rose up mighty as ever, unshaken and eternal.

I

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

THERE was a time when religious people distrusted the increase of knowledge, and condemned the mental attitude which takes delight in its pursuit, being in dread lest part of the foundation of their faith should be undermined by a too ruthless and unqualified spirit of investigation.

There has been a time when men engaged in the quest of

systematic knowledge had an idea that the results of their studies would be destructive not only of outlying accretions but of substantial portions of the edifice of religion which has been gradually erected by the prophets and saints of humanity.

Both these epochs are now nearly over. All men realize that truth is the important thing, and that to take refuge in any shelter less substantial than the truth is but to deceive themselves and become liable to abject exposure when a storm comes on. On the other hand most men are aware that it is a sign of unbalanced judgment to conclude, on the strength of a few momentous discoveries, that the whole structure of religious belief built up through the ages by the developing human race from fundamental emotions and instincts and experiences, is unsubstantial and insecure.

The business of science, including in that term, for present purposes, philosophy and the science of criticism, is with foundations; the business of religion is with superstructure. Science has laboriously laid a solid foundation of great strength, and its votaries have rejoiced over it; though their joy must perforce be somewhat dumb and inexpressive until the more vocal apostles of art and literature and music are able to utilize it for their more aërial and winsome kind of building: so for the present the work of science strikes strangers as severe and forbidding. In a neighboring territory Religion occupies a splendid building—a gorgeously decorated palace; concerning which, Science, not yet having discovered a substantial and satisfactory basis, is sometimes inclined to suspect that it is phantasmal and mainly supported on legend.

Without any controversy it may be admitted that the foundation and the superstructure as at present known do not correspond; and hence that there is an apparent dislocation. Men of science have exclaimed that in their possession is the only foundation of solid truth, adopting in that sense the words of the poet:

> To the solid ground
> Of Nature trusts the mind which builds for aye.

While on the other hand men of Religion, snugly ensconced in their traditional eyrie, and objecting to the digging and the hammer-

ing below, have shuddered as the artificial props and pillars by which they supposed it to be buttressed gave way one after another; and have doubted whether they could continue to enjoy peace in their ancient fortress if it turned out that part of it was suspended in air, without any perceptible foundation at all, like the phantom city in "Gareth and Lynette" whereof it could be said:

> the city is built
> To music, therefore never built at all
> And therefore built for ever.

Remarks as to lack of solid foundation may be regarded as typical of the mild kind of sarcasm which people with a superficial smattering of popular science sometimes try to pour upon religion. They think that to accuse a system of being devoid of solid foundation is equivalent to denying its stability. On the contrary, as Tennyson no doubt perceived, the absence of anything that may crumble or be attacked and knocked away, or that can be shaken by an earthquake, is a safeguard rather than a danger. It is the absence of material foundation that makes the Earth itself, for instance, so secure: if it were based upon a pedestal, or otherwise solidly supported, we might be anxious about the stability and durability of the support. As it is, it floats securely in the emptiness of space. Similarly the persistence of its diurnal spin is secured by the absence of anything to stop it: not by any maintaining mechanism.

To say that a system does not rest upon one special fact is not to impugn its stability. The body of scientific truth rests on no solitary material fact or group of facts, but on a basis of harmony and consistency between facts: its support and ultimate sanction is of no material character. To conceive of Christianity as built upon an Empty Tomb, or any other plain physical or historical fact, is dangerous. To base it upon the primary facts of consciousness or upon direct spiritual experience, as Paul did, is safer.[1] There are parts of the structure of Religion which

[1] It will be represented that I am here intending to cast doubt upon a fundamental tenet of the Church. That is not my intention. My contention here is merely that a great structure should not rest upon a point. So might a lawyer properly say: "To base a legal

may safely be underpinned by physical science: the theory of death and of continued personal existence is one of them; there are many others, and there will be more. But there are and always will be vast religious regions for which that kind of scientific foundation would be an impertinence, though a scientific contribution is appropriate; perhaps these may be summed up in some such phrase as "the relation of the soul to God."

Assertions are made concerning material facts in the name of religion; these science is bound to criticise. Testimony is borne to inner personal experience; on that physical science does well to be silent. Nevertheless many of us are impressed with the conviction that everything in the universe may become intelligible if we go the right way to work; and so we are coming to recognize, on the one hand, that every system of truth must be intimately connected with every other, and that this connection will constitute a trustworthy support as soon as it is revealed by the progress of knowledge, and on the other hand, that the extensive foundation of truth now being laid by scientific workers will ultimately support a gorgeous building of æsthetic feeling and religious faith.

Theologians have been apt to be too easily satisfied with a pretended foundation that would not stand scientific scrutiny; they seem to believe that the religious edifice, with its mighty halls for the human spirit, can rest upon some event or statement, instead of upon man's nature as a whole; and they are apt to decline to reconsider their formulæ in the light of fuller knowledge and development.

Scientific men on the other hand have been liable to suppose that no foundation which they have not themselves laid can be of a substantial character, thereby ignoring the possibility of an ancestral accumulation of sound though unformulated experience; and a few of the less considerate, about a quarter of a century ago, amused themselves by instituting a kind of jubilant rat-hunt under the venerable theological edifice: a procedure

decision upon the position of a comma, or other punctuation—however undisputed its occurrence—is dangerous; to base it upon the general sense of a document is safer."—O. L.

necessarily obnoxious to its occupants. The exploration was unpleasant, but its results have been purifying and healthful, and the permanent substratum of fact will in due time be cleared of the decaying refuse of centuries.

Some of the chief hurly-burly of contention between the apparently attacking force and the ostensibly defending garrison arose round that bulwark which upholds the possibility of the Miraculous, and the efficacy of Prayer. It will be sufficient if in this Address I discuss these two connected subjects.

II

MEANING OF MIRACLE

I have to begin by saying that the term "miracle" is ambiguous, and that no discussion which takes that term as a basis can be very fruitful, since the combatants may all be meaning different things.

(1) One user of the term may mean merely an unusual event of which we do not know the history and cause, a bare wonder or prodigy; such an event as the course of nature may, for all we know, bring about once in ten thousand years or so, leaving no record of its occurrence in the past and no anticipatory probability of its re-occurrence in the future. The raining down of fire on Sodom, or on Pompeii; the sudden engulfing of Korah, or of Marcus Curtius; or, on a different plane, the advent of some transcendent genius, or even of a personality so lofty as to be called divine, may serve as examples.

(2) Another employer of the term "miracle" may add to this idea a definite hypothesis, and may mean an act due to unknown intelligent and living agencies operating in a self-willed and unpredictable manner, thus effecting changes that would not otherwise have occurred and that are not in the regular course of nature. The easiest example to think of is one wherein the lower animals are chiefly concerned; for instance, consider the case of the community of an ant hill, on a lonely uninhabited island, undisturbed for centuries, whose dwelling is kicked over one day by a shipwrecked sailor. They had reason to suppose

that events were uniform, and all their difficulties ancestrally known, but they are perturbed by an unintelligible miracle. A different illustration is afforded by the presence of an obtrusive but unsuspected live insect in a galvanometer or other measuring instrument in a physical laboratory; whereby metrical observations would be complicated, and all regularity perturbed in a puzzling and capricious and, to half-instructed knowledge, supernatural, or even diabolical, manner. Not dissimilar are some of the asserted events in a Séance Room.

(3) Another may use the term "miracle" to mean the utilization of unknown laws, say of healing or of communication; laws unknown and unformulated, but instinctively put into operation by mental activity of some kind—sometimes through the unconscious influence of so-called self-suggestion, sometimes through the activity of another mind, or through the personal agency of highly gifted beings, operating on others; laws whereby time and space appear temporarily suspended, or extraordinary cures are effected, or other effects produced, such as the levitations and other physical phenomena related of the saints.

(4) Another may incorporate with the word "miracle" a still further infusion of theory, and may mean always a direct interposition of Divine Providence, whereby at some one time and place a perfectly unique occurrence is brought about, which is out of relation with the established order of things, is not due to what has gone before, and is not likely to occur again. The most striking examples of what can be claimed under this head are connected with the personality of Jesus Christ, notably the Virgin Birth and the Empty Tomb; by which I mean the more material and controversial aspects of those generally accepted doctrines—the Incarnation and the Resurrection.

To summarize this part, the four categories are: (1) A natural or orderly though unusual portent, (2) a disturbance due to unknown live or capricious agencies, (3) a utilization by mental or spiritual power of unknown laws, (4) direct interposition of the Deity.

III

ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE MIRACULOUS

In some cases an argument concerning the so-called miraculous will turn upon the question whether such things are theoretically possible.

In other cases it will turn upon whether or not they have ever actually happened.

In a third case the argument will be directed to the question whether they happened or not on some particular occasion.

And in a fourth case the argument will hinge upon the particular category under which any assigned occurrence is to be placed:

For instance take a circumstance which undoubtedly has occurred, one upon the actual existence of which there can be no dispute, and yet one of which the history and manner is quite unknown. Take for instance the origin of life; or to be more definite, say the origin of life on any given planet, the Earth for instance. There is practically no doubt that the Earth was once a hot and molten and sterile globe. There is no doubt at all that it is now the abode of an immense variety of living organic nature. How did that life arise? Is it an event to be placed under head (1), as an unexpected outcome of the ordinary course of nature, a development naturally following upon the formation of extremely complex molecular aggregates—protoplasm and the like—as the Earth cooled; or must it be placed under head (4), as due to the direct Fiat of the Eternal?

Again, take the existence of Christianity as a living force in the world of to-day. This is based upon a series of events of undoubtedly substantial truth centering round a historical personage; under which category is that to be placed? Was his advent to be regarded as analogous to the appearance of a mighty genius such as may at any time revolutionize the course of human history; or is he to be regarded as a direct manifestation and incarnation of the Deity Himself?

I am using these great themes as illustrations merely, for our present purpose; I have no intention of entering upon them here

and now. They are questions which have been asked, and presumably answered, again and again; and it is on lines such as these that debates concerning the miraculous are usually conducted. But what I want to say is that so long as we keep the discussion on these lines, and ask this sort of question, though we shall succeed in raising difficulties, we shall not progress far toward a solution of any of them: nor shall we gain much aid toward life.

IV

LAW AND GUIDANCE

The way to progress is not thus to lose ourselves in detail and in confusing estimates of possibilities, but to consider two main issues which may very briefly be formulated thus:

(1) Are we to believe in unbreakable law?

(2) Are we to believe in spiritual guidance?

If we accept only the first of these issues we accept an orderly and systematic universe, with no arbitrary cataclysms and no breaks in its essential continuity. Catastrophes occur, but they occur in the regular course of events, they are not brought about by capricious and lawless agencies; they are a part of the entire cosmos, regulated on the principle of unity and uniformity: though to the dwellers in any time and place, from whose senses most of the cosmos is hidden, they may appear to be sudden and portentous dislocations of natural order.

So much is granted if we accept the first of the above issues. If we accept the second, we accept a purposeful and directed universe, carrying on its evolutionary processes from an inevitable past into an anticipated future with a definite aim; not left to the random control of inorganic forces like a motor-car which has lost its driver, but permeated throughout by mind and intention and foresight and will. Not mere energy, but constantly directed energy—the energy being controlled by something which is not energy, nor akin to energy, something which presumably is immanent in the universe and is akin to life and mind.

The alternative to these two beliefs is a universe of random

chance and capricious disorder, not a cosmos or universe at all—a multiverse rather; consequently I take it that we all hold to one or other of these two beliefs. But do we and can we hold to both?

So far as I conceive my present mission, it is to urge that the two beliefs are not inconsistent with each other, and that we may and should contemplate and gradually feel our way toward accepting both.

(1) We must realize that the Whole is a single undeviating law-saturated cosmos;

(2) But we must also realize that the Whole consists not of matter and motion alone, nor yet of spirit and will alone, but of both and all; we must even yet further, and enormously, enlarge our conception of what the Whole contains.

Scientific men have preached the first of these desiderata, but have been liable to take a narrow view regarding the second. Keenly alive on law, and knowledge, and material fact, they have been occasionally blind to art, to emotion, to poetry, and to the higher mental and spiritual environment which inspires and glorifies the realm of knowledge.

The temptation of religious men has also lain in the direction of too narrow an exclusiveness, for they have been so occupied with their own conceptions of the fulness of things that they have failed to grasp what is meant by the first of the above requirements; they have allowed the emotional content to overpower the intellectual, and have too often ignored, disliked, and practically rejected an integral portion of the scheme—appearing to desire, what no one can really wish for, a world of uncertainty and caprice, where effects can be produced without adequate cause, and where the connection of antecedent and consequent can be arbitrarily dislocated.

The same vice has therefore dogged the steps of both classes of men. The acceptance of miracle, in the crude sense of arbitrary intervention and special providence, is appropriate to those who feel enmeshed in the grip of inorganic and mechanical law, without being able to reconcile it with the idea of constant

guidance and intelligent control. And a denial of miracle, in every sense, that is of all providential guidance, and all controlling intelligence, may also be the result of the very same feeling, experienced by people who are conscious of just the same kind of inability—people who cannot recognize a directing intelligence in the midst of law and order, and hence regard the absence of dislocation and interference as a mark of the inorganic, the mechanical, the inexorable: wherefore the denial of miracle has often led to a sort of practical atheism and to an assertion of the valuelessness of prayer.

But to those who are able to combine the acceptance of both the above faiths, prayer is part of the orderly cosmos, and may be an efficient portion of the guiding and controlling will; somewhat as the desire of the inhabitants of a town for a civic improvement may be a part of the agency which ultimately brings it about, no matter whether the city be representatively or autocratically governed.

The two beliefs cannot be logically and effectively combined by those who think of themselves as something detached from and outside the cosmos, operating on it externally and seeking to modify its manifestations by vain petitions addressed to a system of ordered force. To such persons the above propositions must seem contradictory or mutually exclusive. But if we can grasp the idea that we ourselves are an intimate part of the whole scheme, that our wishes and desires are a part of the controlling and guiding will—then our mental action cannot but be efficient, if we exercise it in accordance with the highest and truest laws of our being.

V

HUMAN EXPERIENCE

Let us survey our position:

We find ourselves for a few score years incarnate intelligences on this planet; we have not always been here, and we shall not always be here: we are here, in fact, each of us, for but a very short period, but we can study the conditions of existence while here, and we perceive clearly that a certain amount of guidance

and control is in our hands. For better for worse we can, and our legislators do, influence the destinies of the planet. The process is called "making history." We can all, even the humblest, to some extent influence the destinies of individuals with whom we come into contact. We have therefore a certain sense of power and responsibility.

It is not likely that we are the only, or the highest, intelligent agents in the whole wide universe, nor that we possess faculties and powers denied to all else; nor is it likely that our own activity will be always as limited as it is now. The Parable of the Talents is full of meaning, and it contains a meaning that is not often brought out.

It is absurd to deny the attributes of guidance and intelligence and personality and love to the Whole, seeing that we are part of the Whole, and are personally aware of what we mean by those words in ourselves. These attributes are existent, therefore, and cannot be denied; cannot be denied even to the Deity.

Is the planet subject to intelligent control? We know that it is: we ourselves can change the course of rivers for predestined ends, we can make highways, can unite oceans, can devise inventions, can make new compounds, can transmute species, can plan fresh variety of organic life; we can create works of art; we can embody new ideas and lofty emotions in forms of language and music, and can leave them as Platonic offspring (*vide* Symposium) to remote posterity. Our power is doubtless limited, but we can surely learn to do far more than we have yet so far in the infancy of humanity accomplished; more even than we have yet conjectured as within the range of possibility.

Our progress already has been considerable. It is but a moderate time since our greatest men were chipping flints and carving bones into the likeness of reindeer. More recently they became able to build cathedrals and make poems. Now we are momentarily diverted from immortal pursuits by vivid interest in that kind of competition which has replaced the competition of the sword, and by those extraordinary inequalities of possession and privilege which have resulted from the invention of an indestructible and transmissible form of riches, a form over which neither moth nor rust has any power. We raise an in-

cense of smoke, and offer sacrifices of squalor and ugliness, in worship of this new idol. But it will pass; human life is not meant to continue as it is now in city slums; nor is the strenuous futility of mere accumulation likely to satisfy people when once they have been really educated; the world is beautiful, and may be far more widely happy than it has been yet. Those who have preached this hitherto have been heard with deaf ears, but some day we shall awake to a sense of our true planetary importance and shall recognize the higher possibilities of existence. Then shall we realize and practically believe what is involved in those words of poetic insight:

"The heaven, even the heavens are the Lord's: but the earth hath he given to the children of men."

There is a vast truth in this yet to be discovered; power and influence and responsibility lie before us, appalling in their magnitude, and as yet we are but children playing on the stage before the curtain is rolled up for the drama in which we are to take part.

But we are not left to our own devices: we of this living generation are not alone in the universe. What we call the individual is strengthened by elements emerging from the social whole out of which he is born. We are not things of yesterday, nor of to-morrow. We do not indeed remember our past, we are not aware of our future, but in common with everything else we must have had a past and must be going to have a future. Some day we may find ourselves able to realize both.

Meanwhile what has been our experience here? We have not been left solitary. Every newcomer to the planet, however helpless and strange he be, finds friends awaiting him, devoted and self-sacrificing friends, eager to care for and protect his infancy and to train him in the ways of this curious world. It is typical of what goes on throughout conscious existence; the guidance which we exert, and to which we are subject now, is but a phase of something running through the universe; and when the time comes for us to quit this sphere and enter some larger field of action, I doubt not that we shall find there also that kindness and help and patience and love, without which no existence would be tolerable or even at some stages possible.

Miracles lie all around us: only they are not miraculous. Special providences envelop us: only they are not special. Prayer is a means of communication as natural and as simple as is speech.

Realize that you are part of a great, orderly, and mutually helpful cosmos, that you are not stranded or isolated in a foreign universe, but that you are part of it and closely akin to it; and your sense of sympathy will be enlarged, your power of free communication will be opened, and the heartfelt aspiration and communion and petition that we call prayer will come as easily and as naturally as converse with those human friends and relations whose visible bodily presence gladdens and enriches your present life.

VI

SUMMARY

The atmosphere of religion should be recognized as enveloping and permeating everything; it should not be specially or exclusively sought as an emanation from signs and wonders. Strange and ultranormal things may happen, and are well worthy of study, but they are not to be regarded as especially holy. Some of them may represent either extension or survival of human faculty, while others may be an inevitable endowment or attribute of a sufficiently lofty character; but none of them can be accepted without investigation. Testimony concerning such things is to be treated in a sceptical and yet open-minded spirit; the results of theory and experiment are to be utilized, as in any other branch of natural knowledge; and indiscriminate dogmatic rejection is as inappropriate as wholesale uncritical acceptance.

The bearing on the hopes and fears of humanity of such unusual facts as can be verified may be considerable, but they bear no exceptional witness to guidance and control. Guidance and control, if admitted at all, must be regarded as constant and continuous; and it is just this uniform character that makes them so difficult to recognize. It is always difficult to perceive or apprehend anything which is perfectly regular and continuous.

Those fish, for instance, which are submerged in ocean-depths, beyond the reach of waves and tides, are probably utterly unconscious of the existence of water; and, however intelligent, they can have but little reason to believe in that medium, notwithstanding that their whole being, life, and motion, is dependent upon it from instant to instant. The motion of the earth, again, furious rush though it is—fifty times faster than a cannon ball—is quite inappreciable to our senses; it has to be inferred from celestial observations, and it was strenuously disbelieved by the agnostics of an earlier day.

Uniformity is always difficult to grasp; our senses are not made for it, and yet it is characteristic of everything that is most efficient; jerks and jolts are easy to appreciate, but they do not conduce to progress. Steady motion is what conveys us on our way, collisions are but a retarding influence. The seeker after miracle, in the exceptional and narrow or exclusive sense, is pining for a catastrophe; the investigator of miracle, in the continuous and broad or comprehensive sense, has the universe for a laboratory.

"RELIGION AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE"

BY THE

DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND

Of all the changes which have taken place in the attitude of thoughtful men in the course of the last thirty or forty years none are more striking than those affecting the relations between religion and physical science. The keen controversies which formerly raged between the two schools of thought, and the bitterness thereby engendered, have become things of the past, and the mutual distrust which certainly exercised a baneful influence upon both parties has been greatly diminished, if it has not altogether disappeared. To what is this great change due? Is it owing to lukewarmness, and to the indifference of either

of the combatants to their own pursuits and doctrines? Is it because the faith of either in their own theories has been undermined? Has victory declared itself so palpably on one side that the other is vanquished, and silenced, if not convinced? Or does each disputant take a saner and more appreciative view of his own position and sphere, and that of his opponent, being content to perform his own work without burdening himself with criticism of the other?

These are very grave and vital questions for all those who are strongly impressed with the importance of either of these great branches of human thought and effort, and however little we may be able to appreciate in our own day their full significance there can be little doubt that on the answer to them must depend the legitimacy of our hopes for the advance and improvement of the highest interests of mankind.

It is this, among many other things, which invests with peculiar importance the able address delivered by the president of the British Association at a recent meeting at Belfast. The distinguished services which the protracted and indefatigable labors of Professor Dewar have rendered to science, and the advances which it has made under his guidance, together with his well-known tolerance of opinion and width of grasp, attach the utmost weight and authority to any views he may express. Consequently it is very noteworthy that he should on that occasion have called attention in a marked manner to what he fitly describes as the "epoch-making deliverance" of Professor Tyndall in the same city some thirty years ago, and should have dwelt with special emphasis on his declaration on behalf of men of science that "we claim, and we shall wrest, from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory." Professor Dewar adds that this "claim has been practically, though often unconsciously, conceded." In other words, if I understand the Professor rightly, the somewhat militant dictum of Tyndall has been justified by the defeat of the theologian, and his abandonment since the year 1874 of a field he has been compelled to admit he had no right to occupy. This must be a somewhat startling assertion for some persons who, while sincerely interested in the results of scientific research, and profoundly sensible of the value

of the studies of those gifted men who devote themselves to it, are nevertheless firmly attached to the current theology of the day, and are absolutely unaware of having resigned an inch of its territory.

It is, therefore, justifiable, and, indeed, necessary, to examine this declaration of Tyndall's a little closely, and to ascertain exactly what it means before inquiring whether its prognostics have been actually fulfilled. But as it is always hazardous to criticise any single sentence of an utterance without giving its context it may be well to quote the whole passage.

"The impregnable position of science may be described in a few words. We claim, and we shall wrest, from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory. All schemes and systems which thus infringe upon the domain of science must, *in so far as they do this*, submit to its control, and relinquish all thought of controlling it. Acting otherwise proved disastrous in the past, and is simply fatuous to-day. Every system which would escape the fate of an organism too rigid to adjust itself to its environment, must be plastic to the extent that the growth of knowledge demands."[1]

Now let us revert to the sentence of the above which is quoted by Professor Dewar, and is indeed the text of that part of his address: "We claim, and we shall wrest, from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory."

"Theology" is the science which treats of the nature, attributes, and modes of working of the Deity; "cosmology" is the science which deals with the origin, qualities, and properties, active or passive, of the material world; a "domain" is either the lordship over a territory, or the territory under rule. And, put into less figurative and formal language, these words mean that the science which treats of the nature, attributes, and modes of the working of Deity has nothing to tell us of the origin, qualities, and properties of the material world, can throw no light upon them, and is, therefore, not worth listening to on the point.

Now one of three things must be true. Either there is no Deity, in which case there can be no science about Him, and it is

[1] See *Forty-fourth Report of the British Association* (1874), p. xcv.

impossible to wrest anything from that which has no existence; or there is a Deity, but we can know nothing about Him, in which case there can equally be no science of theology; or, thirdly, there is at any rate a Great First Cause, who has revealed Himself to some extent to man, and of whose attributes, etc., man can thus form some idea. If this last be the true state of the case (and we may gather from Tyndall's address that this was the direction in which his own convictions pointed), surely every scientist must regard the material universe as one of the most striking revelations of its supreme author which He has afforded.

And thus we are brought to this signification of Tyndall's dictum, viz., that the students of cosmology claim that the most striking revelation of Himself which God has given to man is no part of that science which deals with His nature and attributes. This seems hardly a scientific or logical position. Theology may or may not have grappled satisfactorily with the problems. She may need direction and limitation, but she can be no more dispossessed by physical science than the starry heavens can be shut to Galileo by the Index Expurgatorius.

An analogous, though not an identical, relation to that between theology and physical science may be traced between history and archæology. For many ages history held its own almost, if not entirely, unaided by the researches and discoveries of the archæologist. History so isolated not infrequently drew unwarranted conclusions, not so much on her theoretical and æsthetic side (for the philosophy of history and politics has advanced but slowly) as in her facts, and especially in their details. And she left, and, for the matter of that, still leaves, much unaccounted for and unexplained. Archæology, dealing with the material part, the dry bones, of the subject, has corrected some of her conclusions. But what would be thought of an attempt to wrest from history the whole domain of archæology for this reason? How great would have been the loss if Layard and Flinders Petrie, Sayce and Evans had turned Herodotus out of court! For many years the most suggestive pages of the Father of History have seemed as idle tales; and those too impatient to tolerate an apparent paradox, or to wait for a solution of a

startling statement, dubbed him the father of lies. But wider knowledge has largely vindicated the Greek, and the process is still going on. It is, for instance, only quite recently that the excavations in Crete have verified the accuracy of the stories of Minos, the labyrinth, and the Minotaur.

And just as the day is dawning when not only is archæology corroborating history, but history is, in innumerable cases, interpreting and vivifying antiquarian discoveries in a very unexpected manner, so there are many persons who are quite willing to bide in patience for the time when theology will illuminate many a scientific problem, and when science shall throw an unlooked-for light on theology.

The truth is that there are two classes of minds, each of which finds it extremely difficult, not merely to sympathize with, but to conceive the attitude of the other. The one is slow to believe anything the truth of which has not been either proved experimentally or logically shown to be probable. The other experiences no difficulty in saying "credo quia impossibile," and indeed regards such an attitude in the finite postulated by the existence of the infinite. For both these modes of thought there can be for many people no common and simultaneous acceptance. But it does not necessarily follow that either should attack the other. In the Middle Ages, the theologian assaulted the scientist with great success, having the "bayonets" on his side. Thirty years ago the tables were turned, and the scientist's onslaught on the theologian is expressed by Tyndall in a tone as decided as that of Urban the Eighth. Each wished to "wrest the domain of cosmological theory" from the other, and neither had the smallest right to do anything of the sort!

Another great obstacle to a common understanding is a verbal one. All men's thoughts are better than their words. Every one knows what it is to have ideas passing through the mind which the language at the thinker's command is totally inadequate to express. In the case of an exact science, this difficulty is in some degree met by the coining of new words, a practice so prevalent in the present day as to have lately called forth a vigorous protest in some quarters. But theology is not an exact science, and its subject-matter is to a large extent in-

capable of precise definition, as the history of all sects and heresies abundantly shows. Words are commonly used in a vague and general sense, and this vagueness is intolerable to minds trained in the schools of experimental research.

The true eirenicon consists in the frank recognition of these facts, and of the right of either party to traverse the whole domain of human thought without an indictment of trespass, each retaining its own opinion of the ability of the other to discover and develop the resources of that domain, but without interference with its proceedings. If this were fully recognized, science would at any rate be the gainer by her liberty to attract an audience from among those who, being much affected by theological and ecclesiastical influences, are scared by a militant attitude on the part of the scientist.

There is perhaps no better example of the character and value of such a position than the bearing which it would have on the acceptance of the great doctrine of evolution. As a working hypothesis which affords from the purely material side of the question a probable explanation of a vast body of fact, and which furnishes an admirable basis for the coordination and classification of cosmical phenomena, it receives the adhesion of almost every one at all qualified to form an opinion. And this is all that science need, or indeed does, demand for her most brilliant generalizations. Let us hear Professor Dewar's finely expressed statement of her posture.

"It is only poverty of language," he says, "and the necessity of compendious expression, that oblige the man of science to resort to metaphor, and to speak of the laws of Nature. In reality, he does not pretend to formulate any laws for Nature, since to do so would be to assume a knowledge of the inscrutable cause from which alone such laws could emanate. When he speaks of a 'law of Nature' he simply indicates a sequence of events which, so far as his experience goes, is invariable, and which therefore enables him to predict, to a certain extent, what will happen in given circumstances. But however seemingly bold may be the speculation in which he permits himself to indulge, he does not claim for his best hypothesis more than a provisional validity. He does not forget that to-morrow may bring

a new experience compelling him to recast the hypothesis of to-day. This plasticity of scientific thought, depending on reverent recognition of the vastness of the unknown, is oddly made a matter of reproach by the very people who harp upon the limitations of human knowledge."

But the theologian approaches the matter from another standpoint. He is accustomed to resolve problems according to what he considers to be their absolute and abstract truth or falsehood, and he asks, not whether "so far as experience goes" the theory of evolution holds good, but whether it is in fact the true explanation of the material world as we see it, and how far it is so. Is it not evident that science cannot, and does not profess to, give an answer? But two things are plain. That environment does modify the type of living organisms cannot be denied by any one. That all such organisms have been evolved from one primordial form cannot be affirmed with any certainty.

Between these two extremes lies an ocean of possibilities. Each man will adopt his position partly according to the character of his own mind, partly according to the value he attaches to abstract doctrines, partly according to his capacity for collecting evidence and for weighing it fairly. Why should he not hold it without insisting that his neighbor should assume it also? Why should not the man who cannot accept the Darwinian doctrine as the real explanation of the problems it claims to solve, entertain it as a working hypothesis? Why should the Darwinian wrest the domain of cosmological theory from him, when he himself can claim nothing more for his best hypothesis about the cosmos than provisional validity?

Professor Dewar asserts that science adopts a humble and a reverent attitude. He confesses on her behalf her "ignorance of the ultimate nature of matter, of the ultimate nature of energy, and still more of the origin and ultimate synthesis of the two." Nay, further, he regards the mystery of matter as inscrutable. One of the greatest theologians who ever existed asserted an equal humility for theology more than 1800 years ago, when he declared that he saw through a glass darkly, and knew only in part. Whether the theologian and the natural philosopher will ever see perfectly eye to eye until both stand face to face with

Him whose actings they alike study, and know even as they are known, may well be doubted. But every true advance achieved by either must necessarily tend to bring them to the same goal, however temporarily divergent the winding and intricate paths leading thereto may appear to be. Theology, no less than natural science (to quote after Professor Dewar the noble words of Lord Kelvin), is "bound by the everlasting law of honor to face fearlessly every problem that can fairly be presented to it," and to assert its right to range over every domain of theory with absolute freedom. It is not by elbowing out her sister that either will promote her own true interests, but by patient and tolerant occupation and development of a field amply sufficient for both to seek to advance side by side from one conquest to another till both shall join hands in the full enlightenment of the perfect day.

IV

THE SUCCESSES

FIVE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIVILIZATION"

BY

CHARLES W. ELIOT

PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

FROM the problems which menace the future, we turn for encouragement to the successes already achieved. As President Eliot himself expresses it, "Our country's future perils, whether visible or still unimagined, are to be met with courage and constancy founded firmly on these popular achievements of the past." How great these achievements have really been, he makes clear to us in the following address, which was first delivered before the Chautauqua educational conference and is here presented with the approval of President Eliot and by the courtesy of his publishers, the Century Company. The address is patriotic, as we all are patriotic, but it is wholly free from any extravagance of praise or pride. It uses nouns, not adjectives, states facts without attempting to color them. It is thoughtful, moderate, and conservative.

There was a time when America passed through an era of giant adjectives, of self-congratulation, self-consciousness, perhaps of boastfulness. Recently, however, as if in reaction against this excess, many of our citizens have swung to the other extreme. We have criticised our country, and decried ourselves; we have magnified every fault. Perhaps we have been more pessimistic of tongue than of heart; yet the fact remains that our country has been deliberately underrated by those who love it best. It is well

[1] Copyright 1897 by the Century Co.

then that a man who has the confidence of us all, a man serene and aged, the dean of American education, for thirty-eight years the president of our largest university, should speak out before us all, soberly estimate our past, and tell us what he accepts, what posterity will undoubtedly accept, as to the worthiness of the work so far accomplished by our United States.

LOOKING back over forty centuries of history, we observe that many nations have made characteristic contributions to the progress of civilization, the beneficent effects of which have been permanent, although the races that made them may have lost their national form and organization, or their relative standing among the nations of the earth. Thus, the Hebrew race, during many centuries, made supreme contributions to religious thought; and the Greek, during the brief climax of the race, to speculative philosophy, architecture, sculpture, and the drama. The Roman people developed military colonization, aqueducts, roads and bridges, and a great body of public law, large parts of which still survive; and the Italians of the middle ages and the Renaissance developed ecclesiastical organization and the fine arts, as tributary to the splendor of the church and to municipal luxury. England, for several centuries, has contributed to the institutional development of representative government and public justice; the Dutch, in the sixteenth century, made a superb struggle for free thought and free government; France, in the eighteenth century, taught the doctrine of individual freedom and the theory of human rights; and Germany, at two periods within the nineteenth century, fifty years apart, proved the vital force of the sentiment of nationality. I ask you to consider with me what characteristic and durable contributions the American people have been making to the progress of civilization.

The first and principal contribution to which I shall ask your attention is the advance made in the United States, not in theory only, but in practice, toward the abandonment of war as the means of settling disputes between nations, the substitution of discussion and arbitration, and the avoidance of armaments. If the intermittent Indian fighting and the brief contest with the Barbary corsairs be disregarded, the United States passed

through only four years and a quarter of international war in the one hundred and seven years following the adoption of the Constitution. Within the same period the United States have been a party to forty-seven arbitrations—being more than half of all that have taken place in the modern world. The questions settled by these arbitrations have been just such as have commonly caused wars, namely, questions of boundary, fisheries, damage caused by war or civil disturbances, and injuries to commerce. Some of them were of great magnitude, the four made under the treaty of Washington (May 8, 1871) being the most important that have ever taken place. Confident in their strength, and relying on their ability to adjust international differences, the United States have habitually maintained, by voluntary enlistment for short terms, a standing army and a fleet which, in proportion to the population, are insignificant.

The beneficent effects of this American contribution to civilization are of two sorts: in the first place, the direct evils of war and of preparations for war have been diminished; and secondly, the influence of the war spirit on the perennial conflict between the rights of the single personal unit and the powers of the multitude that constitute organized society—or, in other words, between individual freedom and collective authority—has been reduced to the lowest terms. War has been, and still is, the school of collectivism, the warrant of tyranny. Century after century, tribes, clans, and nations have sacrificed the liberty of the individual to the fundamental necessity of being strong for combined defence or attack in war. Individual freedom is crushed in war, for the nature of war is inevitably despotic. It says to the private person: "Obey without a question, even unto death; die in this ditch, without knowing why; walk into that deadly thicket; mount this embankment, behind which are men who will try to kill you, lest you should kill them; make part of an immense machine for blind destruction, cruelty, rapine, and killing." At this moment every young man in Continental Europe learns the lesson of absolute military obedience, and feels himself subject to this crushing power of militant society, against which no rights of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness avail anything. This pernicious influence,

inherent in the social organization of all Continental Europe during many centuries, the American people have for generations escaped, and they show other nations how to escape it. I ask your attention to the favorable conditions under which this contribution of the United States to civilization has been made.

There has been a deal of fighting on the American continent during the past three centuries; but it has not been of the sort which most imperils liberty. The first European colonists who occupied portions of the coast of North America encountered in the Indians men of the Stone Age, who ultimately had to be resisted and quelled by force. The Indian races were at a stage of development thousands of years behind that of the Europeans. They could not be assimilated; for the most part they could not be taught or even reasoned with; with a few exceptions they had to be driven away by prolonged fighting, or subdued by force so that they would live peaceably with the whites. This warfare, however, always had in it for the whites a large element of self-defence—the homes and families of the settlers were to be defended against a stealthy and pitiless foe. Constant exposure to the attacks of savages was only one of the formidable dangers and difficulties which for a hundred years the early settlers had to meet, and which developed in them courage, hardiness, and persistence. The French and English wars on the North American continent, always more or less mixed with Indian warfare, were characterized by race hatred and religious animosity—two of the commonest causes of war in all ages; but they did not tend to fasten upon the English colonists any objectionable public authority, or to contract the limits of individual liberty. They furnished a school of martial qualities at small cost to liberty. In the War of Independence there was a distinct hope and purpose to enlarge individual liberty. It made possible a confederation of the colonies, and, ultimately, the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. It gave to the thirteen colonies a lesson in collectivism, but it was a needed lesson on the necessity of combining their forces to resist an oppressive external authority. The war of 1812 is properly called the Second War of Independence, for it was truly a fight for liberty and for the rights of neutrals, in resistance to the im-

power and disposition to read been so general; 5, that nowhere has governmental power been more adequate, or more freely exercised, to levy and collect taxes, to raise armies and to disband them, to maintain public order, and to pay off great public debts —national, State, and town; 6, that nowhere have property and well-being been so widely diffused; and 7, that no form of government ever inspired greater affection and loyalty, or prompted to greater personal sacrifices in supreme moments. In view of these solid facts, speculations as to what universal suffrage would have done in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or may do in the twentieth, seem futile indeed. The most civilized nations of the world have all either adopted this final appeal to manhood suffrage, or they are approaching that adoption by rapid stages. The United States, having no customs or traditions of an opposite sort to overcome, have led the nations in this direction, and have had the honor of devising, as a result of practical experience, the best safeguards for universal suffrage, safeguards which, in the main, are intended to prevent hasty public action, or action based on sudden discontents or temporary spasms of public feeling. These checks are intended to give time for discussion and deliberation, or, in other words, to secure the enlightenment of the voters before the vote. If, under new conditions, existing safeguards prove insufficient, the only wise course is to devise new safeguards.

The United States have made to civilization a fourth contribution of a very hopeful sort, to which public attention needs to be directed, lest temporary evils connected therewith should prevent the continuation of this beneficent action. The United States have furnished a demonstration that people belonging to a great variety of races or nations are, under favorable circumstances, fit for political freedom. It is the fashion to attribute to the enormous immigration of the last fifty years some of the failures of the American political system, and particularly the American failure in municipal government, and the introduction in a few States of the rule of the irresponsible party foremen known as "bosses." Impatient of these evils, and hastily accepting this improbable explanation of them, some people wish to depart from the American policy of welcoming immigrants.

In two respects the absorption of large numbers of immigrants from many nations into the American commonwealth has been of great service to mankind. In the first place, it has demonstrated that people who at home have been subject to every sort of aristocratic or despotic or military oppression become within less than a generation serviceable citizens of a republic; and, in the second place, the United States have thus educated to freedom many millions of men. Furthermore, the comparatively high degree of happiness and prosperity enjoyed by the people of the United States has been brought home to multitudes in Europe by friends and relatives who have emigrated to this country, and has commended free institutions to them in the best possible way. This is a legitimate propaganda vastly more effective than any annexation or conquest of unwilling people, or of people unprepared for liberty.

It is a great mistake to suppose that the process of assimilating foreigners began in the last century. The eighteenth century provided the colonies with a great mixture of peoples, although the English race predominated then, as now. When the Revolution broke out, there were already English, Irish, Scotch, Dutch, Germans, French, Portuguese, and Swedes in the colonies. The French were, to be sure, in small proportion, and were almost exclusively Huguenot refugees, but they were a valuable element in the population. The Germans were well diffused, having established themselves in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia. The Scotch were scattered through all the colonies. Pennsylvania, especially, was inhabited by an extraordinary mixture of nationalities and religions. Since steam-navigation on the Atlantic and railroad transportation on the North American continent became cheap and easy, the tide of immigration has greatly increased; but it is very doubtful if the amount of assimilation going on in the nineteenth century has been any larger, in proportion to the population and wealth of the country, than it was in the eighteenth. The main difference in the assimilation going on in the two centuries is this, that in the eighteenth century the newcomers were almost all Protestants, while in the nineteenth century a considerable proportion have been Catholics. One result, however,

of the importation of large numbers of Catholics into the United States has been a profound modification of the Roman Catholic Church in regard to the manners and customs of both the clergy and the laity, the scope of the authority of the priest, and the attitude of the Catholic Church toward public education. This American modification of the Roman Church has reacted strongly on the Church in Europe.

Another great contribution to civilization made by the United States is the diffusion of material well-being among the population. No country in the world approaches the United States in this respect. It is seen in that diffused elementary education which implants for life a habit of reading, and in the habitual optimism which characterizes the common people. It is seen in the housing of the people and of their domestic animals, in the comparative costliness of their food, clothing, and household furniture, in their implements, vehicles, and means of transportation, and in the substitution, on a prodigious scale, of the work of machinery for the work of men's hands. This last item in American well-being is quite as striking in agriculture, mining, and fishing, as it is in manufactures. The social effects of the manufacture of power, and of the discovery of means of putting that power just where it is wanted, have been more striking in the United States than anywhere else. Manufactured and distributed power needs intelligence to direct it: the bicycle is a blind horse, and must be steered at every instant; somebody must show a steam-drill where to strike and how deep to go. So far as men and women can substitute for the direct expenditure of muscular strength the more intelligent effort of designing, tending, and guiding machines, they win promotion in the scale of being, and make their lives more interesting as well as more productive. It is in the invention of machinery for producing and distributing power, and at once economizing and elevating human labor, that American ingenuity has been most conspicuously manifested. The high price of labor in a sparsely settled country has had something to do with this striking result; but the genius of the people and of their government has had much more to do with it. As proof of the general proposition, it suffices merely to mention the telegraph and telephone, the

sewing-machine, the cotton-gin, the mower, reaper, and threshing-machine, the dish-washing machine, the river steamboat, the sleeping-car, the boot and shoe machinery, and the watch machinery. The ultimate effects of these and kindred inventions are quite as much intellectual as physical, and they are developing and increasing with a portentous rapidity which sometimes suggests a doubt whether the bodily forces of men and women are adequate to resist the new mental strains brought upon them. However this may prove to be in the future, the clear result in the present is an unexampled diffusion of well-being in the United States.

These five contributions to civilization—peace-keeping, religious toleration, the development of manhood suffrage, the welcoming of new-comers, and the diffusion of well-being—I hold to have been eminently characteristic of our country, and so important that, in spite of the qualifications and deductions which every candid citizen would admit with regard to every one of them, they will ever be held in the grateful remembrance of mankind. They are reasonable grounds for a steady, glowing patriotism. They have had much to do, both as causes and as effects, with the material prosperity of the United States; but they are all five essentially moral contributions, being triumphs of reason, enterprise, courage, faith, and justice, over passion, selfishness, inertness, timidity, and distrust. Beneath each one of these developments there lies a strong ethical sentiment, a strenuous moral and social purpose. It is for such work that multitudinous democracies are fit.

In regard to all five of these contributions, the characteristic policy of our country has been from time to time threatened with reversal—is even now so threatened. It is for true patriots to insist on the maintenance of these historic purposes and policies of the people of the United States. Our country's future perils, whether already visible or still unimagined, are to be met with courage and constancy founded firmly on these popular achievements in the past.

V

THE BEGINNINGS

"THE MAN OF THE PAST"

BY

E. KAY ROBINSON

FROM this general outline of the organization of our world of to-day, its position, its plans and its problems, we turn now to look more closely at the details. First, we must go back to the earliest problem of all, we must look to our race's very beginning, to the origin of life itself, and of mankind. Our steps fall here on doubtful ground, amid vague mists. We attempt to penetrate through ages immeasurable, through years that perhaps approach the infinite. Science offers herself as our guide and guard; yet even Science is here wavering and uncertain, must soar through these dim regions on wings of the imagination, must answer us with inference and supposition, rather than with definite conclusions, positive and ascertainable facts, such as ordinarily she prefers to dwell among, and from which she gathers all her strength.

It were well also to premise that this backward glance involves no problem of religion. There is no modern churchman who would maintain that suddenly, in an instant of time, man was created out of good, brown dirt. The creative process from which the human body sprang, extended over centuries, over eons of time. The length, the giant reach of this slow process, does not, however, affect the fact of the creation. Science is quick and eager to insist on this. Nor does the long time lessen the wonder of the fact. To many minds, indeed, it does but increase the mystery, the "miracle" of unending patience, of far-sighted purpose, of a wisdom beyond our thought or measure.

But these words are beside the intention of the present address. The duty of religion is with the soul, not with the body; with the future, not with the past; with the purpose of creation, not the physical facts employed in its accomplishment. It is these physical facts which are here imagined and arrayed for us by Mr. E. Kay Robinson, the well-known English scientific writer.

About twenty years ago I was permitted to introduce to readers the man of the future, that mysterious being who will look back across the dim gulf of time upon us, his ancestors, with much of the same incredulous but not unkindly scorn with which we mentally caricature the poor 'Missing Link' in the chain of human genealogy. 'The man of the future,' I then said, 'will be a toothless, hairless, and stiff-limbed being, incapable of extended locomotion, with no divisions between the toes, and priding himself upon various other "developments" which would not at the present time be regarded as improvements.' Much has been written on the subject since then; but the general tendency of essayists is to confirm the view which I had somewhat abruptly expressed, and to agree that the man of the future will hold his place, in the foremost files of time to come, by brain power alone, discarding the animal characteristics of teeth and hair, agility and combativeness, and disdaining the retention of such useless peculiarities as independent toes, each liable to the drawback of corns and chilblains.

It was not easy, however, even in the enthusiasm of youth, surfeited with Darwinism, to feel altogether proud of so maimed a descendant; and as years pass retrospect becomes the more congenial habit of thought. Youth is the age of enthusiasm and curiosity as to the future; for youth has no past of its own, and therefore little sympathy with the past of the world at large. As the vista of years lengthens behind us, however, we fall to counting the milestones of our journey through life, and this draws our eyes to the more distant landscape, with its dim traces of the devious paths trodden by those before us.

Science has not yet thrown her search-lights to the uttermost horizon of that misty landscape, and mortal vision still has limits which prevent us from seeing what the ancestor of humanity

was like before he became an entity. Even the outlines of his earliest being within our scientific ken are a trifle blurred and indistinct. We must therefore be content with the general assurance that the original man, the ancestor of the human race, was what would in modern language be loosely described as a microscopic dab of mud.

There are persons of considerable scientific attainments, still outside lunatic asylums, who cherish the hope of discovering the secret of the beginning of life by witnessing some process of spontaneous generation of microbes in bottled fluid; and other persons of equal or even greater scientific attainments have thought it worth while to conduct elaborate experiments to combat the views of the others. Both alike seem to forget that the microbe of the present day—however simple his organization may appear to the limited power of such microscopes as we already possess, or to the clumsy touch of our chemical analyses—stands, as man himself does, at the end of a long line of progressive development. His family is as ancient as ours; and, like us, he has partly created and partly accommodated himself to the conditions which now prevail upon this planet. He is as much at home as we are in this world of the twentieth century, and on the whole he has succeeded in making himself fairly comfortable. He is, too, the only rival whom we need fear as an enemy. Man will never extinguish the microbe, but the microbe may extinguish man. To expect him spontaneously to generate himself in a bottle of fluid is, then, no less insulting than would be the proposal to build a hermetically sealed town and after a lapse of a certain time expect it to be filled with men and women, or at least babies. If these men of science really desire to see as much of the beginning of life as is possible nowadays, let them take a basin of water, empty their solutions into it, and throw in the empty bottles and corks afterward. Then they will see the beginning of life with the naked eye on the surface of the water in the basin.

For what will they see? The empty bottles and the corks will, without assistance, either attach themselves to the sides of the basin or cluster together in the centre; while those bottles which can get rid of the air inside them will dive to the bottom. When

Newton saw the apple fall, he made a shrewd guess at a great truth; but he did not discover that what he saw was Life itself. He saw the attraction of the earth for the apple, and we call the principle 'gravitation': but if the apple had fallen, like our hypothetical empty bottles, into a basin of water, it would have bobbed up again to the surface, and ultimately have attached itself to the side, unless indeed there had been other objects in the basin, whose company it might have sought by preference. Attraction is, in fact, not only the universal law of life, but it is life itself. So far as those empty bottles and that apple possess individual life and power of action, they display it by forcing their way through the air or the water in order to attach themselves to the object that attracts them most. How nearly this process approaches in appearance sometimes to the highest development of deliberate choice, as we recognize that function in ourselves, may be witnessed by any one curious enough to float, say, a wooden match and a few grains of sawdust in some water. If the water could be kept absolutely motionless it is possible that the separate grains of sawdust and the match might be kept apart indefinitely, each pinned, as it were, to its own spot on the surface of the water by the attraction of the earth, although the water, being still more strongly attracted, would insist upon occupying the nearer place and so keep the wood floating aloft. But in ordinary circumstances the water would sooner or later be disturbed, moving the grains of sawdust hither and thither, until one by one they come into the sphere of attraction of each other or the match or the side of the vessel. It is when they are attracted to the match that the phenomenon is most interesting. There is almost the coyness of courtship in their circling approach, until they are quite close, and then it is by a positive leap that they throw themselves upon the attractive object and remain closely attached to it, insomuch that the water may be rudely disturbed without separating them. This not only looks like life—it is life: and we may see it also in the stone which, falling into a well, does exactly what you or I would do. It obeys the downward attraction of the earth, but at the same time recognizes that of the wall of the well by swerving toward and striking it before reaching the bottom.

Now let us return to our ancestor, the prehistoric dab of mud which retrospective vision dimly discerns seated on the surface of an as yet inchoate world. It would be more correct, perhaps, to say *in* the surface; for it is only with the eye of imagination that we can elevate him above his fellows, and promote him to the status of a distinguishable entity, breaking the sky-line of that distant horizon. We may take him up by the pound with the spade of fancy, and he will slide back into his parent chaos, mere slime. Yet even in the slime of the past there were gradations of rank among its particles. Let us lay down the spade and filter the ooze through the meshes of thought; much—most of it—slides through, intangible and imperceptible to the touch, but some remains. What? Particles of matter. And here we reach the first milestone of human history.

What constituted this prehistoric particle of matter, our penultimate parent, so far as our present family knowledge extends? We may be content with knowing, from our acquaintance with the general law of attraction, that a particle of homogeneous matter large enough to be retained in the meshes of a commonplace mind must be composed of minor atoms sticking together. We have seen how grains of sawdust stick together in the water; we can see how grains of water stick together in a drop at the end of our wet finger; it requires, therefore, no great effort to see how, in the ooze where the first scenes in the drama of human life were played, atoms stuck together and made particles. It does not matter how large or small atoms or particles may be—I use no word in a severely scientific or unintelligible-to-the-vulgar sense—we know that the law of attraction made those, which had attraction for each other and came sufficiently near to each other, stick together. How tightly they adhered does not matter either; the fact that they adhered is sufficient, because it means that they showed *life*, and with the commencement of life commenced their struggle for continued and improved existence, and their upward march toward the top-hatted and kid-gloved style now affected by their descendants.

Viewed across so vast a stretch of time, with its innumerable milestones graduating almost to invisible infinity, the progress our ancestors had so far made may not appear extensive. But

the first step of the journey is the most important; they had made a start and in the right direction. They had individualized themselves among the surrounding slime, and had acquired a new status and new power. The fruit-vender who places the largest strawberries at the top of the basket might plead that he does so in obedience to a natural law: for, other things being equal, it is undeniably the rule in this world of stress and struggle for existence, that the biggest comes to the top. Sometimes other things are not equal, and the biggest sinks by sheer weight, which may be only another phrase for incapacity to rise. The truth of both axioms may be observed by the simple experiment of gently shaking a little mixed bird-seed in a wine-glass. The larger seeds will come to the surface; but the superior size of the stones with which the dishonest seed-merchant has eked out the weight of his wares avails them naught. They can be descried through the glass, sinking ignobly to the bottom, past even the smallest and most insignificant of the seeds. And herein we see repeated the first parting that our ancestors suffered—when one branch of the family by its inert weight had to sink down below and people the interior of the earth with stones and minerals, while the other remained above to cover the surface with life and beauty. From this momentous epoch in our history, when we became the 'upper classes,' we have nothing to do with the struggle for existence of our poor relations, the stones.

Since they parted company with us and came down in the world, they have gone through great trials, and have, like human unfortunates, suffered the extremes of heat and cold—now molten into igneous strata, and now cloven by the frost of glacial epochs. But they have also achieved great things: and there are beauties in gem and crystal, stalactite and ores of rainbow hue, in marbles and alabasters, which still move our minds with the sense of a beauty kindred to the loveliest products of the life—the higher life, as we are justified in regarding it—to which our branch of the family has attained; just as, in India, you may often find the loveliest women in the lowest castes.

We soon forgot our poor relations, however: for one step necessitates another, and the position of our ancestors, in the surface of the slough which the world of the past resembled, sub-

jected them to the inevitable process of knocking against other things and each other whenever natural movements agitated their surrounding slime. In such conditions it was inevitable that they should, like pebbles upon a wave-washed beach, tend to assume a rounded or oval outline; and with the conservatism that is the marked characteristic of the animal and vegetable kingdom this early shape of our common ancestors is retained in the beginning of all life, as in the eggs of birds, reptiles, and insects, and the seeds of plants: while the fact that we and other mammals have left off the habit of laying eggs need not fill us with unseemly progressive pride. Comparative anatomy shows that we are still conservative to the backbone in our allegiance to types that were ours before we had backbones; for even we are oviform in our earliest beginnings. The first triumph, then, of our ancestors was to be able to maintain their position at the top of things, generally by their superior size and what we may call in a prophetic sense their agility, as opposed to the inert weight of their relatives who sank to make the mineral world; and the second was the accidental acquisition of an oval shape, which enabled them to survive the buffetings of their neighbors. But if they imagined that the struggle for existence was finally decided by those two achievements, the subsequent experiences of us, their descendants, show how vastly they were mistaken. In what way, then, did this struggle for existence next spur them on to self-improvement? It is obvious that those were most favorably circumstanced who possessed, in addition to relative size and regularity of outline, a special power of cohesion beyond the ordinary attraction of matter to matter. We see varying degrees of attraction around us every day of our lives: we feel them in the presence of victuals and drink, in the choice of occupations, and above all in the vicinity of the opposite sex. The various forms and degrees of special attraction may, therefore, be described as affinity; and our ancestors certainly belonged to that section of the upper classes of the upper past whose constituent parts possessed marked affinity for each other. A particle otherwise composed would have within it a force constantly tending to disruption, and in the long run this tendency to decomposition would prove a decisive disadvantage in the struggle for

existence. And among the survivors new subtle distinctions were soon observable—just as among their successors of the present day there is always an *élite* of the *élite*—owing to the birth of the discriminating faculty. In proportion to the affinity of the elements composing these early beings would be their position in its substance. Those which were the more strongly attracted would be drawn to the centre; those less privileged would stand in a ring outside, getting as near the centre as they could; the unattractive detrimentals would be severely dropped. Thus each of our ancestors was, as one of their wise descendants has discovered of modern man, a microcosm in himself, with satellites in their orbits round his centre. And even as suitable atoms came within the radius of his attraction they took their proper place, and the larger he grew the more attractive he seemed and the ring of outsiders grew closer. Thus, although to the eye of fact our ancestor was still scarcely, if at all, distinguishable from the slime in which he continued to reside, he had made a great stride up the ladder of evolution. He had mastered the secret of assimilation and of growth. For we must note here the wide potential distinction between this form of development and the mere accretion by which minerals increase in bulk. The growth of our ancestors took place by means of absorption and selection of what we would now call food, which was separated into its constituent elements according to their attractiveness, and distributed to the various parts of the body. In other words, our ancestor digested and assimilated his food; and, at that stage, man could do no more. Stones have not learned to do it yet.

The faculty which next calls for notice, though all matter had possessed it from the first, is that of motion. Everything which was attracted to anything else moved toward it; but our ancestor belonged to that fortunate class of beings whose complex attractions were so evenly balanced that he was always drawn whither it was advantageous to be. He was neither too earthy nor too spiritual in his affinities: he was a man of the world, and as such kept himself always in evidence. As he attracted attractive particles to his inside, so was he drawn in the direction where attractive particles were thickest. Thus early was developed

that faculty of mankind during social entertainments to cluster round the bars and supper-tables. Oh! man was getting on! And here it is to be observed that the attraction, we may call it the yearning, of our ancestor for his food proceeded directly from his inside; that is to say, the central part of him, which had the strongest attraction for the stuff he wanted, was the part which drew him toward it. We, his superior descendants, have a brain which polices our actions, and we do not reach after a sandwich with our stomachs. But we need not be proud. Our relatives, the amœba and the star-fish and others, do this thing still, and the habit is one to which we owe much. In default of organs of prehension, mastication, and so on, it was something for our ancestor to be able to reach out, as it were, with *something* for his dinner. Not that, in all probability, he greedily extruded his simple internal arrangements. It sufficed if their tendency was to gravitate toward that margin of his ovoid person near which the food was situated. The rest was simple, for the outer ring-rind (or skin we might call it nowadays) of semi-attractive atoms with which he had clothed himself had no such cohesion as to refuse admittance to a favored morsel. It was against our first parent's claim to very high rank, as rank goes in modern times, that he took in his food at any part of his person; but here, again, the amœba—what evolutionists would have done without the amœba I cannot say—comes to our rescue. The amœba does it, unblushingly, in the glare of this so-called twentieth century.

And here we come to the penultimate triumph of life; namely, the faculty of reproduction. Hitherto the life of the individual was indefinite. The influence of the sun was necessary to produce that equipoise of conflicting attractions—the earliest 'balance of power' known in mundane politics—which enabled our honest ancestor to hold his own among others, as may be seen from the diurnal rotation of our elementary functions. The influence of the moon had much to say in the matter also: witness the lunar periods in the life of many animals. And that we are of the earth, earthy, goes without saying: else we would not be glued to it by our feet all our lives. Those creatures survived (our ancestor among the number) who were able to accommo-

date themselves to the changing conditions created by these conflicting influences. We were like frontier tribes in Central Asia, displaying all kinds of unexpected forms of activity, according as one or another 'sphere of influence' overlapped us. And when I say 'we,' I do not mean that at this period of evolution there were lots of us. All the hopes of humanity were centred in one person, and with all the good-will in the world I cannot distinguish him, our ancestor, from the other dabs of mud around him. I would throw my arms around his neck if I could find him: but he had no neck, and did not appreciably differ from what, in our vulgar modern way, we should call 'sludge' or something like that.

And the first accident which happened to him, although it prepared the way for the publication of Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' would have appeared to his limited vision, if he had had any, in the light of a misfortune. I am inclined to believe that it was at the close of an unusually hot day in spring that he got left high and dry above the high-water mark of the period. Not *very* dry, because everything, including the air, was wet in those days, but still out of his element rather. And it is always this factor of novel, and apparently unsuitable, environment which has brought out the highest qualities of the human race. Driven by necessity he invented—*invenio*, 'I come into,' therefore 'I find out,' therefore 'I invent'—reproduction. Let us think what this means. Hitherto the life of a species, or a genus, or a kingdom, had been the life of the individual. It did not matter how cleverly our ancestor or any of the other persons who might have become the ancestors of beings totally different from ourselves adapted themselves to their surroundings: without reproduction, the world would have been filled only with the original individuals who were once microscopic dabs of mud. All that was needed for everlasting existence was the faculty of adaptation to the various forces of attraction. We see one instance in the successful adaptation of the air to the circumstances of life. The air was a creature, just like our first ancestor—more volatile and lively perhaps, and less severely handicapped in the struggle for existence. And it has made no progress. It goes on attracting suitable elements into itself when it can, and parting with them

when it must; and it has grown to an immense size. It covers the whole earth: but, like the human beings of tropical climes, it has not yet found any incentive to further evolution because it has never been placed in sufficiently difficult circumstances. So far as we know, it is the same air that rose aloft when our ancestor grovelled in the slime ever so long ago. It has remained 'it,' while we have become 'he's' and 'she's.' The water is another creature who has been able to flow along in its old course without interruption, so far as we know: although the glacial epoch may have hit it hard, and the Flood have buoyed it up with foolish hopes of swallowing the whole wide world. It did not reckon with the insignificant creature who, whether in the Ark or by other means, weathered the era of water's dominion, and has emerged triumphant to build bridges and water-mills and ocean-going ships, and now talks of using the 'wasted' strength of water to do all his work for him, turn his machinery, light his house, and provide the force for driving his tricycle. Here we see on a world-wide scale the grand triumph of those who have struggled against difficulties, as in detail we see it also in the victory of Northern European races over the soft and luxurious inhabitants of the 'Sunny South' and tropics.

Well, our ancestor might have had the good, or bad, luck to find himself so adapted to surrounding circumstances that he continued to expand and grow, swallowing everything he had a mind to, until his slimy, shapeless bulk covered what we call continents and oceans, and became in size a worthy rival of the air and the water, and an example to the various minerals cramped down below in their restricted areas. But in that case he would not have been our ancestor, because it was only owing to the fact that he met with an accident in being cast up beyond the reach of ordinary tides that he was compelled to invent reproduction. He may not have seemed happy at first. The air scoffingly passed over his surface and dried his skin: but he took what he wanted, all the same, from the air as it passed. His more fluid portions displayed an unworthy inclination to sink into the ground, but he got something out of the ground too. And when the sun rose next morning, it shone upon something just a little different from anything which it had seen before. Shrivelled

somewhat, and as deplorable as a stranded jelly-fish, our ancestor boldly met the gaze of the sun—for was not he the prospective father of Britons?—and he took what he wanted from the sunlight. So the day passed and the night, and other days and nights to follow, until another high tide came at the full moon and washed over our parent once more. And what happened then? During his long rest between high-water marks he had got stuck too tightly to the ground to leave it again. Some of him had indeed sunk into the crevices between particles of the soil—a habit which the roots of the vegetable kingdom have inherited and improved upon—and held him where he was. But the bulk of him strove to obey loyally the old impulse that used to draw him upward to the sunlight when he was what naturalists would call a free-swimming embryo of his present self. The attraction of food was strong upon him also, and the moon that drew up the tides strained him, too, toward her. Thus for the first time in his life he felt, as Britain felt when the American colonies claimed the right to independence, that he must part with a portion of himself. It stretched upward, and the bond that held them together grew thinner and weaker. His rind—may I call it 'skin'?—assumed an elongated shape, with an hour-glass constriction between the part which held to the earth and the part that would float through the water. At last, with a wrench almost like that of dissolution, it parted; and a fragment of him, small, globular, and free, as once he was himself, rose upward to the sunlight or to bask in the moon's rays. What was left of our ancestor settled down again, contentedly, for he had borne a son. Nor was that the only one. The changing seasons brought him new opportunities of growth, and at favorable periods he cast off in the same way other fragments of himself; and continued doing so to a very great age, until perhaps his great-great-great- and so on grandchildren who had risen in the world would have been ashamed to recognize the simple old fellow, with no organs and no specialized functions whatever, as their ancestor. We are not so proud.

We cannot be certain, of course, that this new power of reproduction was gained by a single individual only, or that evolution had taken place in no other directions. The earth was filled

power and disposition to read been so general; 5, that nowhere has governmental power been more adequate, or more freely exercised, to levy and collect taxes, to raise armies and to disband them, to maintain public order, and to pay off great public debts —national, State, and town; 6, that nowhere have property and well-being been so widely diffused; and 7, that no form of government ever inspired greater affection and loyalty, or prompted to greater personal sacrifices in supreme moments. In view of these solid facts, speculations as to what universal suffrage would have done in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or may do in the twentieth, seem futile indeed. The most civilized nations of the world have all either adopted this final appeal to manhood suffrage, or they are approaching that adoption by rapid stages. The United States, having no customs or traditions of an opposite sort to overcome, have led the nations in this direction, and have had the honor of devising, as a result of practical experience, the best safeguards for universal suffrage, safeguards which, in the main, are intended to prevent hasty public action, or action based on sudden discontents or temporary spasms of public feeling. These checks are intended to give time for discussion and deliberation, or, in other words, to secure the enlightenment of the voters before the vote. If, under new conditions, existing safeguards prove insufficient, the only wise course is to devise new safeguards.

The United States have made to civilization a fourth contribution of a very hopeful sort, to which public attention needs to be directed, lest temporary evils connected therewith should prevent the continuation of this beneficent action. The United States have furnished a demonstration that people belonging to a great variety of races or nations are, under favorable circumstances, fit for political freedom. It is the fashion to attribute to the enormous immigration of the last fifty years some of the failures of the American political system, and particularly the American failure in municipal government, and the introduction in a few States of the rule of the irresponsible party foremen known as "bosses." Impatient of these evils, and hastily accepting this improbable explanation of them, some people wish to depart from the American policy of welcoming immigrants.

In two respects the absorption of large numbers of immigrants from many nations into the American commonwealth has been of great service to mankind. In the first place, it has demonstrated that people who at home have been subject to every sort of aristocratic or despotic or military oppression become within less than a generation serviceable citizens of a republic; and, in the second place, the United States have thus educated to freedom many millions of men. Furthermore, the comparatively high degree of happiness and prosperity enjoyed by the people of the United States has been brought home to multitudes in Europe by friends and relatives who have emigrated to this country, and has commended free institutions to them in the best possible way. This is a legitimate propaganda vastly more effective than any annexation or conquest of unwilling people, or of people unprepared for liberty.

It is a great mistake to suppose that the process of assimilating foreigners began in the last century. The eighteenth century provided the colonies with a great mixture of peoples, although the English race predominated then, as now. When the Revolution broke out, there were already English, Irish, Scotch, Dutch, Germans, French, Portuguese, and Swedes in the colonies. The French were, to be sure, in small proportion, and were almost exclusively Huguenot refugees, but they were a valuable element in the population. The Germans were well diffused, having established themselves in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia. The Scotch were scattered through all the colonies. Pennsylvania, especially, was inhabited by an extraordinary mixture of nationalities and religions. Since steam-navigation on the Atlantic and railroad transportation on the North American continent became cheap and easy, the tide of immigration has greatly increased; but it is very doubtful if the amount of assimilation going on in the nineteenth century has been any larger, in proportion to the population and wealth of the country, than it was in the eighteenth. The main difference in the assimilation going on in the two centuries is this, that in the eighteenth century the newcomers were almost all Protestants, while in the nineteenth century a considerable proportion have been Catholics. One result, however,

of the importation of large numbers of Catholics into the United States has been a profound modification of the Roman Catholic Church in regard to the manners and customs of both the clergy and the laity, the scope of the authority of the priest, and the attitude of the Catholic Church toward public education. This American modification of the Roman Church has reacted strongly on the Church in Europe.

Another great contribution to civilization made by the United States is the diffusion of material well-being among the population. No country in the world approaches the United States in this respect. It is seen in that diffused elementary education which implants for life a habit of reading, and in the habitual optimism which characterizes the common people. It is seen in the housing of the people and of their domestic animals, in the comparative costliness of their food, clothing, and household furniture, in their implements, vehicles, and means of transportation, and in the substitution, on a prodigious scale, of the work of machinery for the work of men's hands. This last item in American well-being is quite as striking in agriculture, mining, and fishing, as it is in manufactures. The social effects of the manufacture of power, and of the discovery of means of putting that power just where it is wanted, have been more striking in the United States than anywhere else. Manufactured and distributed power needs intelligence to direct it: the bicycle is a blind horse, and must be steered at every instant; somebody must show a steam-drill where to strike and how deep to go. So far as men and women can substitute for the direct expenditure of muscular strength the more intelligent effort of designing, tending, and guiding machines, they win promotion in the scale of being, and make their lives more interesting as well as more productive. It is in the invention of machinery for producing and distributing power, and at once economizing and elevating human labor, that American ingenuity has been most conspicuously manifested. The high price of labor in a sparsely settled country has had something to do with this striking result; but the genius of the people and of their government has had much more to do with it. As proof of the general proposition, it suffices merely to mention the telegraph and telephone, the

sewing-machine, the cotton-gin, the mower, reaper, and threshing-machine, the dish-washing machine, the river steamboat, the sleeping-car, the boot and shoe machinery, and the watch machinery. The ultimate effects of these and kindred inventions are quite as much intellectual as physical, and they are developing and increasing with a portentous rapidity which sometimes suggests a doubt whether the bodily forces of men and women are adequate to resist the new mental strains brought upon them. However this may prove to be in the future, the clear result in the present is an unexampled diffusion of well-being in the United States.

These five contributions to civilization—peace-keeping, religious toleration, the development of manhood suffrage, the welcoming of new-comers, and the diffusion of well-being—I hold to have been eminently characteristic of our country, and so important that, in spite of the qualifications and deductions which every candid citizen would admit with regard to every one of them, they will ever be held in the grateful remembrance of mankind. They are reasonable grounds for a steady, glowing patriotism. They have had much to do, both as causes and as effects, with the material prosperity of the United States; but they are all five essentially moral contributions, being triumphs of reason, enterprise, courage, faith, and justice, over passion, selfishness, inertness, timidity, and distrust. Beneath each one of these developments there lies a strong ethical sentiment, a strenuous moral and social purpose. It is for such work that multitudinous democracies are fit.

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BY

E. KAY ROBINSON

FROM this general outline of the organization of our world of to-day, its position, its plans and its problems, we turn now to look more closely at the details. First, we must go back to the earliest problem of all, we must look to our race's very beginning, to the origin of life itself, and of mankind. Our steps fall here on doubtful ground, amid vague mists. We attempt to penetrate through ages immeasurable, through years that perhaps approach the infinite. Science offers herself as our guide and guard; yet even Science is here wavering and uncertain, must soar through these dim regions on wings of the imagination, must answer us with inference and supposition, rather than with definite conclusions, positive and ascertainable facts, such as ordinarily she prefers to dwell among, and from which she gathers all her strength.

It were well also to premise that this backward glance involves no problem of religion. There is no modern churchman who would maintain that suddenly, in an instant of time, man was created out of good, brown dirt. The creative process from which the human body sprang, extended over centuries, over eons of time. The length, the giant reach of this slow process, does not, however, affect the fact of the creation. Science is quick and eager to insist on this. Nor does the long time lessen the wonder of the fact. To many minds, indeed, it does but increase the mystery, the "miracle" of unending patience, of far-sighted purpose, of a wisdom beyond our thought or measure.

But these words are beside the intention of the present address. The duty of religion is with the soul, not with the body; with the future, not with the past; with the purpose of creation, not the physical facts employed in its accomplishment. It is these physical facts which are here imagined and arrayed for us by Mr. E. Kay Robinson, the well-known English scientific writer.

About twenty years ago I was permitted to introduce to readers the man of the future, that mysterious being who will look back across the dim gulf of time upon us, his ancestors, with much of the same incredulous but not unkindly scorn with which we mentally caricature the poor 'Missing Link' in the chain of human genealogy. 'The man of the future,' I then said, 'will be a toothless, hairless, and stiff-limbed being, incapable of extended locomotion, with no divisions between the toes, and priding himself upon various other "developments" which would not at the present time be regarded as improvements.' Much has been written on the subject since then; but the general tendency of essayists is to confirm the view which I had somewhat abruptly expressed, and to agree that the man of the future will hold his place, in the foremost files of time to come, by brain power alone, discarding the animal characteristics of teeth and hair, agility and combativeness, and disdaining the retention of such useless peculiarities as independent toes, each liable to the drawback of corns and chilblains.

It was not easy, however, even in the enthusiasm of youth, surfeited with Darwinism, to feel altogether proud of so maimed a descendant; and as years pass retrospect becomes the more congenial habit of thought. Youth is the age of enthusiasm and curiosity as to the future; for youth has no past of its own, and therefore little sympathy with the past of the world at large. As the vista of years lengthens behind us, however, we fall to counting the milestones of our journey through life, and this draws our eyes to the more distant landscape, with its dim traces of the devious paths trodden by those before us.

Science has not yet thrown her search-lights to the uttermost horizon of that misty landscape, and mortal vision still has limits which prevent us from seeing what the ancestor of humanity

was like before he became an entity. Even the outlines of his earliest being within our scientific ken are a trifle blurred and indistinct. We must therefore be content with the general assurance that the original man, the ancestor of the human race, was what would in modern language be loosely described as a microscopic dab of mud.

There are persons of considerable scientific attainments, still outside lunatic asylums, who cherish the hope of discovering the secret of the beginning of life by witnessing some process of spontaneous generation of microbes in bottled fluid; and other persons of equal or even greater scientific attainments have thought it worth while to conduct elaborate experiments to combat the views of the others. Both alike seem to forget that the microbe of the present day—however simple his organization may appear to the limited power of such microscopes as we already possess, or to the clumsy touch of our chemical analyses—stands, as man himself does, at the end of a long line of progressive development. His family is as ancient as ours; and, like us, he has partly created and partly accommodated himself to the conditions which now prevail upon this planet. He is as much at home as we are in this world of the twentieth century, and on the whole he has succeeded in making himself fairly comfortable. He is, too, the only rival whom we need fear as an enemy. Man will never extinguish the microbe, but the microbe may extinguish man. To expect him spontaneously to generate himself in a bottle of fluid is, then, no less insulting than would be the proposal to build a hermetically sealed town and after a lapse of a certain time expect it to be filled with men and women, or at least babies. If these men of science really desire to see as much of the beginning of life as is possible nowadays, let them take a basin of water, empty their solutions into it, and throw in the empty bottles and corks afterward. Then they will see the beginning of life with the naked eye on the surface of the water in the basin.

For what will they see? The empty bottles and the corks will, without assistance, either attach themselves to the sides of the basin or cluster together in the centre; while those bottles which can get rid of the air inside them will dive to the bottom. When

Newton saw the apple fall, he made a shrewd guess at a great truth; but he did not discover that what he saw was Life itself. He saw the attraction of the earth for the apple, and we call the principle 'gravitation': but if the apple had fallen, like our hypothetical empty bottles, into a basin of water, it would have bobbed up again to the surface, and ultimately have attached itself to the side, unless indeed there had been other objects in the basin, whose company it might have sought by preference. Attraction is, in fact, not only the universal law of life, but it is life itself. So far as those empty bottles and that apple possess individual life and power of action, they display it by forcing their way through the air or the water in order to attach themselves to the object that attracts them most. How nearly this process approaches in appearance sometimes to the highest development of deliberate choice, as we recognize that function in ourselves, may be witnessed by any one curious enough to float, say, a wooden match and a few grains of sawdust in some water. If the water could be kept absolutely motionless it is possible that the separate grains of sawdust and the match might be kept apart indefinitely, each pinned, as it were, to its own spot on the surface of the water by the attraction of the earth, although the water, being still more strongly attracted, would insist upon occupying the nearer place and so keep the wood floating aloft. But in ordinary circumstances the water would sooner or later be disturbed, moving the grains of sawdust hither and thither, until one by one they come into the sphere of attraction of each other or the match or the side of the vessel. It is when they are attracted to the match that the phenomenon is most interesting. There is almost the coyness of courtship in their circling approach, until they are quite close, and then it is by a positive leap that they throw themselves upon the attractive object and remain closely attached to it, insomuch that the water may be rudely disturbed without separating them. This not only looks like life—it is life: and we may see it also in the stone which, falling into a well, does exactly what you or I would do. It obeys the downward attraction of the earth, but at the same time recognizes that of the wall of the well by swerving toward and striking it before reaching the bottom.

Now let us return to our ancestor, the prehistoric dab of mud which retrospective vision dimly discerns seated on the surface of an as yet inchoate world. It would be more correct, perhaps, to say *in* the surface; for it is only with the eye of imagination that we can elevate him above his fellows, and promote him to the status of a distinguishable entity, breaking the sky-line of that distant horizon. We may take him up by the pound with the spade of fancy, and he will slide back into his parent chaos, mere slime. Yet even in the slime of the past there were gradations of rank among its particles. Let us lay down the spade and filter the ooze through the meshes of thought; much—most of it—slides through, intangible and imperceptible to the touch, but some remains. What? Particles of matter. And here we reach the first milestone of human history.

What constituted this prehistoric particle of matter, our penultimate parent, so far as our present family knowledge extends? We may be content with knowing, from our acquaintance with the general law of attraction, that a particle of homogeneous matter large enough to be retained in the meshes of a commonplace mind must be composed of minor atoms sticking together. We have seen how grains of sawdust stick together in the water; we can see how grains of water stick together in a drop at the end of our wet finger; it requires, therefore, no great effort to see how, in the ooze where the first scenes in the drama of human life were played, atoms stuck together and made particles. It does not matter how large or small atoms or particles may be—I use no word in a severely scientific or unintelligible-to-the-vulgar sense—we know that the law of attraction made those, which had attraction for each other and came sufficiently near to each other, stick together. How tightly they adhered does not matter either; the fact that they adhered is sufficient, because it means that they showed *life*, and with the commencement of life commenced their struggle for continued and improved existence, and their upward march toward the top-hatted and kid-gloved style now affected by their descendants.

Viewed across so vast a stretch of time, with its innumerable milestones graduating almost to invisible infinity, the progress our ancestors had so far made may not appear extensive. But

the first step of the journey is the most important; they had made a start and in the right direction. They had individualized themselves among the surrounding slime, and had acquired a new status and new power. The fruit-vender who places the largest strawberries at the top of the basket might plead that he does so in obedience to a natural law: for, other things being equal, it is undeniably the rule in this world of stress and struggle for existence, that the biggest comes to the top. Sometimes other things are not equal, and the biggest sinks by sheer weight, which may be only another phrase for incapacity to rise. The truth of both axioms may be observed by the simple experiment of gently shaking a little mixed bird-seed in a wine-glass. The larger seeds will come to the surface; but the superior size of the stones with which the dishonest seed-merchant has eked out the weight of his wares avails them naught. They can be descried through the glass, sinking ignobly to the bottom, past even the smallest and most insignificant of the seeds. And herein we see repeated the first parting that our ancestors suffered—when one branch of the family by its inert weight had to sink down below and people the interior of the earth with stones and minerals, while the other remained above to cover the surface with life and beauty. From this momentous epoch in our history, when we became the 'upper classes,' we have nothing to do with the struggle for existence of our poor relations, the stones.

Since they parted company with us and came down in the world, they have gone through great trials, and have, like human unfortunates, suffered the extremes of heat and cold—now molten into igneous strata, and now cloven by the frost of glacial epochs. But they have also achieved great things: and there are beauties in gem and crystal, stalactite and ores of rainbow hue, in marbles and alabasters, which still move our minds with the sense of a beauty kindred to the loveliest products of the life—the higher life, as we are justified in regarding it—to which our branch of the family has attained; just as, in India, you may often find the loveliest women in the lowest castes.

We soon forgot our poor relations, however: for one step necessitates another, and the position of our ancestors, in the surface of the slough which the world of the past resembled, sub-

jected them to the inevitable process of knocking against other things and each other whenever natural movements agitated their surrounding slime. In such conditions it was inevitable that they should, like pebbles upon a wave-washed beach, tend to assume a rounded or oval outline; and with the conservatism that is the marked characteristic of the animal and vegetable kingdom this early shape of our common ancestors is retained in the beginning of all life, as in the eggs of birds, reptiles, and insects, and the seeds of plants: while the fact that we and other mammals have left off the habit of laying eggs need not fill us with unseemly progressive pride. Comparative anatomy shows that we are still conservative to the backbone in our allegiance to types that were ours before we had backbones; for even we are oviform in our earliest beginnings. The first triumph, then, of our ancestors was to be able to maintain their position at the top of things, generally by their superior size and what we may call in a prophetic sense their agility, as opposed to the inert weight of their relatives who sank to make the mineral world; and the second was the accidental acquisition of an oval shape, which enabled them to survive the buffetings of their neighbors. But if they imagined that the struggle for existence was finally decided by those two achievements, the subsequent experiences of us, their descendants, show how vastly they were mistaken. In what way, then, did this struggle for existence next spur them on to self-improvement? It is obvious that those were most favorably circumstanced who possessed, in addition to relative size and regularity of outline, a special power of cohesion beyond the ordinary attraction of matter to matter. We see varying degrees of attraction around us every day of our lives: we feel them in the presence of victuals and drink, in the choice of occupations, and above all in the vicinity of the opposite sex. The various forms and degrees of special attraction may, therefore, be described as affinity; and our ancestors certainly belonged to that section of the upper classes of the upper past whose constituent parts possessed marked affinity for each other. A particle otherwise composed would have within it a force constantly tending to disruption, and in the long run this tendency to decomposition would prove a decisive disadvantage in the struggle for

existence. And among the survivors new subtle distinctions were soon observable—just as among their successors of the present day there is always an *élite* of the *élite*—owing to the birth of the discriminating faculty. In proportion to the affinity of the elements composing these early beings would be their position in its substance. Those which were the more strongly attracted would be drawn to the centre; those less privileged would stand in a ring outside, getting as near the centre as they could; the unattractive detrimentals would be severely dropped. Thus each of our ancestors was, as one of their wise descendants has discovered of modern man, a microcosm in himself, with satellites in their orbits round his centre. And even as suitable atoms came within the radius of his attraction they took their proper place, and the larger he grew the more attractive he seemed and the ring of outsiders grew closer. Thus, although to the eye of fact our ancestor was still scarcely, if at all, distinguishable from the slime in which he continued to reside, he had made a great stride up the ladder of evolution. He had mastered the secret of assimilation and of growth. For we must note here the wide potential distinction between this form of development and the mere accretion by which minerals increase in bulk. The growth of our ancestors took place by means of absorption and selection of what we would now call food, which was separated into its constituent elements according to their attractiveness, and distributed to the various parts of the body. In other words, our ancestor digested and assimilated his food; and, at that stage, man could do no more. Stones have not learned to do it yet.

The faculty which next calls for notice, though all matter had possessed it from the first, is that of motion. Everything which was attracted to anything else moved toward it; but our ancestor belonged to that fortunate class of beings whose complex attractions were so evenly balanced that he was always drawn whither it was advantageous to be. He was neither too earthy nor too spiritual in his affinities: he was a man of the world, and as such kept himself always in evidence. As he attracted attractive particles to his inside, so was he drawn in the direction where attractive particles were thickest. Thus early was developed

that faculty of mankind during social entertainments to cluster round the bars and supper-tables. Oh! man was getting on! And here it is to be observed that the attraction, we may call it the yearning, of our ancestor for his food proceeded directly from his inside; that is to say, the central part of him, which had the strongest attraction for the stuff he wanted, was the part which drew him toward it. We, his superior descendants, have a brain which polices our actions, and we do not reach after a sandwich with our stomachs. But we need not be proud. Our relatives, the amœba and the star-fish and others, do this thing still, and the habit is one to which we owe much. In default of organs of prehension, mastication, and so on, it was something for our ancestor to be able to reach out, as it were, with *something* for his dinner. Not that, in all probability, he greedily extruded his simple internal arrangements. It sufficed if their tendency was to gravitate toward that margin of his ovoid person near which the food was situated. The rest was simple, for the outer ring-rind (or skin we might call it nowadays) of semi-attractive atoms with which he had clothed himself had no such cohesion as to refuse admittance to a favored morsel. It was against our first parent's claim to very high rank, as rank goes in modern times, that he took in his food at any part of his person; but here, again, the amœba—what evolutionists would have done without the amœba I cannot say—comes to our rescue. The amœba does it, unblushingly, in the glare of this so-called twentieth century.

And here we come to the penultimate triumph of life; namely, the faculty of reproduction. Hitherto the life of the individual was indefinite. The influence of the sun was necessary to produce that equipoise of conflicting attractions—the earliest 'balance of power' known in mundane politics—which enabled our honest ancestor to hold his own among others, as may be seen from the diurnal rotation of our elementary functions. The influence of the moon had much to say in the matter also: witness the lunar periods in the life of many animals. And that we are of the earth, earthy, goes without saying: else we would not be glued to it by our feet all our lives. Those creatures survived (our ancestor among the number) who were able to accommo-

date themselves to the changing conditions created by these conflicting influences. We were like frontier tribes in Central Asia, displaying all kinds of unexpected forms of activity, according as one or another 'sphere of influence' overlapped us. And when I say 'we,' I do not mean that at this period of evolution there were lots of us. All the hopes of humanity were centred in one person, and with all the good-will in the world I cannot distinguish him, our ancestor, from the other dabs of mud around him. I would throw my arms around his neck if I could find him: but he had no neck, and did not appreciably differ from what, in our vulgar modern way, we should call 'sludge' or something like that.

And the first accident which happened to him, although it prepared the way for the publication of Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' would have appeared to his limited vision, if he had had any, in the light of a misfortune. I am inclined to believe that it was at the close of an unusually hot day in spring that he got left high and dry above the high-water mark of the period. Not *very* dry, because everything, including the air, was wet in those days, but still out of his element rather. And it is always this factor of novel, and apparently unsuitable, environment which has brought out the highest qualities of the human race. Driven by necessity he invented—*invenio*, 'I come into,' therefore 'I find out,' therefore 'I invent'—reproduction. Let us think what this means. Hitherto the life of a species, or a genus, or a kingdom, had been the life of the individual. It did not matter how cleverly our ancestor or any of the other persons who might have become the ancestors of beings totally different from ourselves adapted themselves to their surroundings: without reproduction, the world would have been filled only with the original individuals who were once microscopic dabs of mud. All that was needed for everlasting existence was the faculty of adaptation to the various forces of attraction. We see one instance in the successful adaptation of the air to the circumstances of life. The air was a creature, just like our first ancestor—more volatile and lively perhaps, and less severely handicapped in the struggle for existence. And it has made no progress. It goes on attracting suitable elements into itself when it can, and parting with them

when it must; and it has grown to an immense size. It covers the whole earth: but, like the human beings of tropical climes, it has not yet found any incentive to further evolution because it has never been placed in sufficiently difficult circumstances. So far as we know, it is the same air that rose aloft when our ancestor grovelled in the slime ever so long ago. It has remained 'it,' while we have become 'he's' and 'she's.' The water is another creature who has been able to flow along in its old course without interruption, so far as we know: although the glacial epoch may have hit it hard, and the Flood have buoyed it up with foolish hopes of swallowing the whole wide world. It did not reckon with the insignificant creature who, whether in the Ark or by other means, weathered the era of water's dominion, and has emerged triumphant to build bridges and water-mills and ocean-going ships, and now talks of using the 'wasted' strength of water to do all his work for him, turn his machinery, light his house, and provide the force for driving his tricycle. Here we see on a world-wide scale the grand triumph of those who have struggled against difficulties, as in detail we see it also in the victory of Northern European races over the soft and luxurious inhabitants of the 'Sunny South' and tropics.

Well, our ancestor might have had the good, or bad, luck to find himself so adapted to surrounding circumstances that he continued to expand and grow, swallowing everything he had a mind to, until his slimy, shapeless bulk covered what we call continents and oceans, and became in size a worthy rival of the air and the water, and an example to the various minerals cramped down below in their restricted areas. But in that case he would not have been our ancestor, because it was only owing to the fact that he met with an accident in being cast up beyond the reach of ordinary tides that he was compelled to invent reproduction. He may not have seemed happy at first. The air scoffingly passed over his surface and dried his skin: but he took what he wanted, all the same, from the air as it passed. His more fluid portions displayed an unworthy inclination to sink into the ground, but he got something out of the ground too. And when the sun rose next morning, it shone upon something just a little different from anything which it had seen before. Shrivelled

somewhat, and as deplorable as a stranded jelly-fish, our ancestor boldly met the gaze of the sun—for was not he the prospective father of Britons?—and he took what he wanted from the sunlight. So the day passed and the night, and other days and nights to follow, until another high tide came at the full moon and washed over our parent once more. And what happened then? During his long rest between high-water marks he had got stuck too tightly to the ground to leave it again. Some of him had indeed sunk into the crevices between particles of the soil—a habit which the roots of the vegetable kingdom have inherited and improved upon—and held him where he was. But the bulk of him strove to obey loyally the old impulse that used to draw him upward to the sunlight when he was what naturalists would call a free-swimming embryo of his present self. The attraction of food was strong upon him also, and the moon that drew up the tides strained him, too, toward her. Thus for the first time in his life he felt, as Britain felt when the American colonies claimed the right to independence, that he must part with a portion of himself. It stretched upward, and the bond that held them together grew thinner and weaker. His rind—may I call it 'skin'?—assumed an elongated shape, with an hour-glass constriction between the part which held to the earth and the part that would float through the water. At last, with a wrench almost like that of dissolution, it parted; and a fragment of him, small, globular, and free, as once he was himself, rose upward to the sunlight or to bask in the moon's rays. What was left of our ancestor settled down again, contentedly, for he had borne a son. Nor was that the only one. The changing seasons brought him new opportunities of growth, and at favorable periods he cast off in the same way other fragments of himself; and continued doing so to a very great age, until perhaps his great-great-great- and so on grandchildren who had risen in the world would have been ashamed to recognize the simple old fellow, with no organs and no specialized functions whatever, as their ancestor. We are not so proud.

We cannot be certain, of course, that this new power of reproduction was gained by a single individual only, or that evolution had taken place in no other directions. The earth was filled

with rude variations of types, which were holding their own in the struggle for existence, because the favorable circumstances which gave each of them a start were being incessantly repeated with the changes of days and seasons. But our concern is with our ancestor and his progeny only. These might not have survived, and quite a different being to myself might now be speculating upon the origin of the world's inhabitants, but for the fact that our ancestor's children proved themselves to be true chips of the old block. He had invented reproduction: they responded with 'heredity.'

When the sun rose next day there may have been little or nothing in the appearance of these individuals to mark their immense potential difference from their comrades all around. There was no analytical chemist to examine them and demonstrate that they were composed of exactly the same elements in the same combination as their father; and there were no men of science to draw the conclusion that, when chance threw them into the same situation as that into which he had originally fallen, they would behave exactly as he did. Yet this is what our second ancestor could not help doing. He behaved as his father —the first father in the world—had done; that is to say, he parted with portions of himself and created new creatures in his own likeness. Thus was death vanquished. Hitherto the life of all the types in the world ended with the individual; and although similarity of surrounding circumstances induced uniformity, there was no heredity. Now there had come into the world a creature with the faculty of subdividing, *i.e.*, propagating, itself.

In the lowest orders of animal and plant life—the orders, that is to say, which have advanced least from our common starting-point—we still find this dual form of existence in the shape of a fixed parent with free-swimming young, destined in their turn to become fixed and give birth to free progeny.

At the first glance it might not be thought that much had been gained by this new development; but let us recapitulate. Our ancestor was still not very distinguishable from a dab of mud; but he had acquired the power of

(1) *Attracting or Drawing into his own Substance those Ele-*

ments which had for him the Strongest Affinity—or, as we should say nowadays, which he liked most. Other less potently attracted elements went to form his indurated integument or skin; and yet others, unattracted—or, as we say now, unattractive or innutritious—were rejected altogether. Thus in a rude way he performed the functions which we now carry on by means of specialized organs when we breathe, eat, or drink.

(2) *Moving Upward or Downward or Sideways when it suited him*—by which I do not mean that he exercised any independent volition, such as we think that we ourselves do, when he went hither or thither, but that he obeyed inherited impulses which tended to his advantage. If they had not he would not have inherited them, for they would have so handicapped his ancestors in the struggle for existence that they would not have survived to produce him. The only movements which were perpetuated, therefore, were such as the accidental experience of generations proved to be good for the race; and this remains still the highest aim of all our human actions.

(3) *Reproducing his Kind.*—And upon this accidental acquirement the permanence and improvement of every other gift depended. For by the time that our first ancestor, in the proper hereditary sense, produced, or rather detached, from himself his first oviform offspring, the world was full of what were then the highest types of creatures. That they were not high according to modern ideas may be realized from the fact that each individual had gone through the whole course of evolution up to date in his own person. I should not be writing this article if I had to begin by inventing language; then discovering the truths of science; then bringing out the inventions of printing, paper-making, and the manufacture of ink and machinery; then have to educate the public and induct into their minds the idea that printed matter was worth purchasing; then establish an editor, and finally bring him my article. I should not have got very far into this programme before death would cut short my career. No; many æons ago, in the first feeble sound uttered by one living creature and heard by another, was the germ and natural origin of this published volume. Therefore we must not despise those early contemporaries of our ancestor who inherited nothing

from *their* ancestor and had to do all their own origin of species for themselves. Besides, *de mortuis nil nisi bonum;* and most of them disappeared forever off the face of the earth as our family multiplied, thanks to the subtle advantage which its members possessed of letting bits of themselves start periodically upon life on their own account. As the other creatures broke up or became decomposed for one reason or another, this multiplying type gradually absorbed their elements—'ate them,' we should say now—and each fragment became in turn sufficiently obese to part with more fragments, and so on, until the world was filled with them.

But all this while insensible variations were being introduced into this hereditary type. Infinitely small departures by accident from the original were found to give new generations the slight determining advantage which decides the struggle for existence: and of these, two ultimately survived. One was a type of creature which attracted within itself such elements as were needed for the sustenance of life through infinitely small apertures or pores in its skin, and the other, the bolder type, which drew within it by the same force of attraction other entire creatures, subsequently separating the desired elements from those which were not required.

The first type became the parent of all vegetables, which draw their sustenance in microscopic solution from earth, water, air, or decomposed organisms; and from the second type originated the animal world, which captures its food in the shape of other organized beings, animal or vegetable, and assimilates the parts required for sustenance, rejecting the residuum. With the first type we have no concern here save to notice that it has proved to the advantage of this class to remain usually in a fixed position, in the shape of trees and seaweeds, which draw nourishment from their surroundings, being content with very modest arrangements for the mobility of their offspring, in the shape of spores or seeds.

The second type of creature—the ancestor of the animal kingdom—preferred the life of motion. Some indeed, as corals or sea anemones, retain the stationary habit, and many mollusks attach themselves to fixed spots: but the habit of living upon

organic creatures, while it materially assisted development, necessitated in most cases free motion, either to fresh fields and new pastures or to happier hunting grounds when the old ones were exhausted. And the development of the higher classes of the animal kingdom depended entirely upon the habit of locomotion adopted. They all started from the common accidental device of excrescences protruding beyond the outline of the body, against which floating bodies lodged and were thence absorbed: but in one type the tendency was developed to produce these excrescences impartially on all sides of the body, thus producing ultimately radiate creatures like starfish and polypi, while another type had the advantage, as it has proved, of acquiring the habit of annexing its food 'end on,' so to speak. As ages passed innumerable variations of this type were doubtless produced, but it seems that, again, two only survived. One of these attained mobility and safety—for at a very early period those only began to survive who could protect themselves against the absorptive faculties of their neighbors—in a jointed and hardened integument: while the other type had the joints and the stiffening inside. From the former type have descended all such creatures as worms, woodlice, lobsters, and insects; and with these we have no further concern. Our ancestor belonged to the other type; for he was undoubtedly a person with his stiffening inside, else what should we be doing for backbones? He still lived in the shallows of the vast sea, propelling himself through the water by the waggling of his body; but as ages passed, one member of the family acquired the habit of scrambling over the mud by means of projections, which in succeeding generations were improved into rudimentary limbs, stiffened by lateral prolongations of the stiffening inside. That is why our legs and arms are jointed to our backbones. Perhaps the modern goggle-eyed mudfish, which wabbles and wallows in the slimy mangrove swamps of the East, most nearly reproduces in outline the first great advance made by our ancestors after they had acquired jointed backbones and rudimentary limbs; and though the snakes have dispensed with limbs altogether, and the fishes have modified them to fins, our branch of the family undoubtedly made the wiser choice in attaching less importance to the wag-

gling of their hinder end as a means of progression than to the use of those lateral processes which have become our limbs. The wisdom of the choice may not have been obvious at first; but the blessings of evolution generally come in disguise. Indeed, to the philosopher of those days, had there been one, it might even have seemed that when at an earlier stage our parents neglected the vegetable habit of safely planting themselves upon a suitable spot, they made a serious mistake, and he would have pointed to the striking contrast between the luxuriance of vegetation compared with the struggling life of the crawling creatures at its roots. Even to-day, if it were merely a question of the difference between the mangrove tree and the mudfish which paddles about under its tangled branches, the advantage might not to a casual observer from another planet seem to be all on the side of the mudfish. But we who have also chosen locomotion, and to that end have adopted the system of backbone and limbs, know that, whatever pleasures plants may enjoy, they can know little of the joys of hunting, fighting, and love-making, the trinity of functions which constitute animal 'life.' Indeed, from the animal's point of view the majority of plants might just as well be dead, for all the pleasure which they can have, and yet the only difference between the earliest animal and the earliest plant, children of a common parent, was that they chose different methods of obtaining nutriment.

And at every subsequent parting of the branches of the genealogical tree of humanity we can see how by chance our ancestors always had forced upon them that which was the best for the future. When, for instance, the members of our branch of the family began to crawl about clumsily on dry land, dragging heavy tails after them, how clumsy and foolish they must have appeared in comparison with their cousins who retained aquatic habits and swiftly darted hither and thither through the water with a waggle of the body and sweep of the wide tail! Even when the burden of the tail grew less and the limbs became more prominent and powerful—a transformation which we may see repeated each spring in the development of the frog from the tadpole—how small the advantage would have appeared to a philosopher of the period! Indeed, comparing the types of frog

and crocodile, it is more than likely that he would have given the preference to the saurian. But the highest evolution arises from the successful negotiation of the greatest obstacles; as we may see in the superiority of our hardy Northern races, who have always been compelled to labor in order to live, over the uncivilized inhabitants of luxuriant regions where the problem of livelihood presents no difficulties. So long as monkeys can live like monkeys they will remain monkeys; but the hard struggle for existence may teach them, too, as it has taught us, to acquire new powers in order to escape extinction, and then they will cease to be monkeys, though they will not be men. They parted company from us at the last corner in our difficult journey, and there are no short-cuts to recover lost ground in evolution. And we cannot help feeling sorry for the monkeys, because it really seems as if this particular turning was the only one of real importance since our common ancestor elected by accident to have his stiffening inside instead of outside. Between the eating, fighting, and love-making of the crocodile, the eagle, the lion, or the whale, and that of the monkey, there does not seem much difference; and what other joy in life has he which they have not? He has, in fact, gained nothing by belonging to our branch of the family when we discarded our tails as means of locomotion; retained our four limbs for the purpose of running on the ground instead of flapping two of them like birds; and learned to use our toes for the purpose of grasping. The originator of the monkey family may indeed have considered, if he thought about the matter at all, that our ancestor was much to be pitied when he began to abandon the use of his hind toes in this way, for the greater convenience of a flat foot in running or walking. And no doubt the abandonment was quite involuntary on our part. It may be that our ancestor was driven forth to find his living in a treeless land, where he acquired the habit of running hungrily after the prey on which he was forced to subsist, in place of fruit plucked without effort in the primeval forests. Perhaps it was in some such chase that—possibly in a fit of anger such as baulked monkeys fall into—he seized his first missile and flung it, with the happiest effect, at his escaping dinner. Hence the art of hunting and the use of weapons. And familiarity with the weapon in

time suggested its use as a tool, the earliest application of the tool being doubtless analogous to carving-knife or hammer, to divide a slaughtered animal among the family or to smash through the hard shell of turtle or mollusk. Speech was first evolved by the necessities of combination to guard against enemies: for an animal which had learned to use lethal weapons, missiles, and tools ceased to be dependent upon either his personal agility or powerful teeth for the purposes of offence and defence. It was doubtless by combination that our ancestors excavated their cave fortress; and from the necessities of watch and ward, as well as the constant companionship within, arose the habit of speech, rising from mere signals to action, such as grunts of anger and cries of warning, to notes of encouragement, admonition, approval, and so on. Thence language would naturally develop in the direction of expressing domestic needs and wishes: then communal instructions and words of command, with expressions of assent, dissent, or criticism. Thus by degrees speech was built up, and by combined labor and the communication of ideas man was enabled so to protect and perhaps to fortify his cave dwelling that the species acquired its characteristic of slow development. The young hare, brought forth in a tuft of grass, can see and run as soon as born. The young rabbit, born in a safe burrow, is blind and helpless for days. So cave-dwelling man acquired the habit, which he still possesses, of slower development from birth than any other creature, because in addition to the natural safety of his dwelling he had learned the art of protecting it, by combination and distribution of work, against all enemies. The tool of utility he learned to use as an implement for the adornment of himself and his belongings. He scratched the outlines of the beasts he had slain upon the weapon that slew them; he decked himself and his mate in their spoils. His powerful canine teeth decreased, the useless hair upon his body disappeared, the multiplying problems of his many acquired habits developed his powers of thought; and when he strode forth from his cave and viewed the animal and vegetable world around him, he felt that he was their king. Looking deeper and deeper, year by year, into the mysteries of the world around him, he has learned the 'why' of many things: and the complement of the 'why' is

always the 'because.' And if he follows in thought the trail of the 'because' as far back as his mind will carry him, he comes to a point whence he can dimly discern the outline of his first father, scarcely breaking the horizon of the slimy past, a microscopic dab of mud.

VI

THE ORIGIN OF LIFE

"ITS CHEMICAL CREATION BY SCIENCE"

BY

PROFESSOR JOHN BUTLER BURKE

OF CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

IF the imaging forth of man's origin and development be a marvel of the infinitely great, we approach now a marvel of the infinitely minute. Modern science seeks to create life itself, to understand it as a natural, perhaps a chemical, process, and to set in motion the physical conditions which produce it—produce it through conjunctions and harmonies of atoms, too delicate, too evanescent for sight or for full comprehension. It were well to emphasize this point, for it has been much misunderstood. No scientist pretends to understand life, or, in the broader sense, to create it. He merely imitates; he investigates the conditions from the midst of which life may arise, and seeks to reproduce these so that some day he may see an organism, a being, appear before him, sprung not from preceding life-forms but from inorganic matter.

Perhaps the thing is impossible. We have seen that in Mr. Robinson's address he could not forbear a sarcastic fling at its absurdity. Yet so patient has been the investigation, so fascinating are its aims and its ideas, that no man can afford to shut the question wholly aside when engaged in an effort to understand our day. At the present moment the foremost of the investigators of this subject is Mr. John Butler Burke, who here briefly explains what he and others have accomplished.

The article is in a sense an abridgement of the author's recent elaborate volume upon the same subject. He belongs to the

younger generation of English scientists, being not yet forty. His lectures and investigations have, however, already won him fame, and placed him high among intellectual leaders.

His explanations here are of necessity technical, far more technical than anything else that will appear in this series, and any one not possessed of at least a fair amount of chemical knowledge might better pass over most of the central part of the address, looking only to the opening to see the basis of Mr. Burke's work, and then to the close to learn what the investigator believes as to the result.

THE Editor offers me the opportunity to express my views upon the subject of those researches which have recently so much attracted the attention not merely of the scientific world but even of the world at large. Whether these experiments have the right to command all the interest they have evoked is a question which I myself feel rather diffident to answer. But that they have so aroused the enthusiam of all sorts and conditions of men compels me now to give utterance to what I do and do not think can legitimately be inferred from the facts I have observed; I feel it all the more beholden in me to express my indebtedness for the exceptional appreciation with which my efforts for some time past have been met from friends, and from all quarters. I do not think these experiments prove "spontaneous generation," if by this term is to be understood the appearance of life from the absolutely lifeless. Such a phenomenon, if it has ever taken place, and if it is even taking place around us, cannot, I fear, be proved to the satisfaction of all parties, and certainly not to that of those who have already made up their minds not to accept it. There may be, as they will again and again affirm—no matter to how high a temperature we may get—some secret source of energy. No matter how far we may trace the first beginnings of life, whether it is to the minutest microscopic cells, or to the atom itself, they would still maintain that the problem was not solved, and that in the atom itself is to be found the principle and the source of vital energy, and if this could be carried further they

would fall back upon the electron or even on the æther. In this respect they cannot, strictly speaking, it is true, be met by any contradiction. But their argument is of the nature of a metaphysical objection of the same kind as that which asserts the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul. They admit of no answer, just as they admit of no proof, unless that proof be metaphysical, and unconvincing so far as its scientific aspect goes. I do not wish to be drawn into a quagmire if even in that quagmire I should discover what is true. The risk is too great, and our time is too short. There may be charms in groping in a bog, or in getting muddled, but for my part I prefer to keep out of it, at any rate so far as my investigations go.

By spontaneous generation I mean the development of what we have a right to think is living from that which we have hitherto had a right to think was not. The development of living organisms from inorganic matter would be without question quite a case in point. No doubt that inorganic substance may contain embedded in it some germ, or germs, hitherto unknown, and of a nature quite distinct from any we have yet had reason to regard as living; the substances employed may by their very nature, as it is here claimed—or, more accurately, suggested—have the principle of vital process, in an elementary form, as a part and parcel of their being. It is so with the dynamically unstable substances which of their own account manifest radio-activity. These dynamically unstable bodies have to some extent some of the properties of life—they disintegrate, they decay, in their manifestations of that activity, but although this is merely analogy, and we must remember, as Darwin has well said, "Analogy is a deceitful guide"; still, if that analogy has prescribed or suggested results which have since been verified, its utility should have a greater claim to our attention than to be passed over with indifference and ignored. The products of radio-active bodies manifest not merely instability and decay but growth, subdivision, reproduction, and adjustment of their internal functions to their surroundings, a circumstance which I think will be found to be equivalent to nutrition. Whether we are to regard these products, strictly

speaking, as living things is the point which remains to be decided. We have to define their properties, and we have also to define life.

Now their properties are as simple as they are well known, but before they are recapitulated here it would be well to repeat in outline one or two of the particulars which have led me to take up the line of argument I have ventured to pursue.

By the action of radium upon bouillon, when sterilized so far as such experiments permit, microscopic bodies appear, already more than once described. In the first instance, they are not, as micro-organisms generally, or I should say always, are, more or less of the same size so long as they are of the same kind; ordinary bacilli, provided they are of the same type, are found to be also of the same dimensions. They do not show signs which indicate that they have one and all sprung in a process of continuous growth from ultra-microscopic forms. But this is one of the characteristic features of the products now produced by radium. There can be no question that they spring —that in each case they have sprung—from the invisible, and grown to such a magnitude as to be seen. We find no such indication with ordinary bacteria. If these have not the marks of manufactured articles, they afford at least the signs of not having sprung spontaneously into existence. They bear the stamp of an inheritance of many varying qualities from a long and probably varying line of ancestors, of probably countless generations, which have at last made them what they are. But the "radiobes" undergo many developments. After six or seven days, and at times even less, they develop nuclei; but later still they cease to grow, and then begin to segregate and multiply. These are some of the qualities which have led me to suppose that they are assimilative, and automatic, and not, strictly speaking, lifeless things.

Their growth is no indication of vitality, for crystals not merely grow, but grow to such dimensions that in this point no living microscopic organism has any chance to rival them; they, however, do stop growing at some stage or another, else we should have, as some one has insisted, diamonds as large as Mount Etna or the Himalayas. This, however, does not seem to be the

point; when crystals reach their maximum dimensions, do they then throw off their superfluous particles and disintegrate themselves? In other words, do they show the *cyclic* process, pass into higher forms, and then decay, which is the test and the guarantee of life? There are critics who will criticise without in the least trying to understand. Some indeed are merely literary hacks who pose before the world as judges of everything and anything they can get the chance to talk about. The stoppage of growth at a particular size, and of reproduction by fission or subdivision, and then the total disintegration of the cell, or whatever we may choose to call it, after its steady regular growth up to that point, is not merely suggestive of vitality, but in a certain sense, as it seems, it is vitality itself. It is an indication of self-nutrition and a very clear as well as an assuring one. The subdivision or fission which accompanies the cessation of development in the mechanism of adding to its size, shows the stage when there is a balance between the accumulation of energy and its expenditure. The bodies obtained by M. Stephane Leduc in 1902, by the action of potassium ferrocyanide on gelatine, or by allowing metallic salts to crystallize in gelatine and other colloidal solutions, do not exhibit all these primary or elementary properties of living things; they do not, in fact, manifest more than a resemblance in appearance to the cells or unit-forms of life. Their properties are not sufficient to justify the inference that they are living things, nor even that they possess to any marked extent any of the qualities that are associated with organic matter as it manifests vitality. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the "radiobes" (as I have ventured to designate them), if they are crystals, subdivide by cleavage under the influence of internal strain, as, for instance, South African diamonds are found occasionally to do. It all depends upon the nature of the segregation whether it is like a fission or a cleavage. Photographs show this most distinctly as it occurs within fourteen days or so. The subdivision is clearly not of the nature of a cleavage. Neither is it, as has also been suggested, at all likely that these subdivisions resemble those obtained by Professor Bütschli of Heidelberg, by the action on soluble salts of such substances as olive oil, and the bodies

obtained by emulsion of these bodies in water which behave in some ways, or by their subdivisions, much as if they were elementary forms of living things.

But here again it is upon the nature of the subdivisions that we must rest our assurance as to what these subdivisions mean. The subdivisions are quite different from anything we should expect mere surface tension to effect.

A close examination of the mode of segregation at once shows that the "cell," if so we may call it, becomes divided into segments, much in the same way as ordinary yeast cells are well known to do. A sharp corner, which is not unusual in the part so segregated, seems incompatible with the proposed theory of some overbalance in the force of surface tension over the internal forces which tend to keep the body intact. Many minute bodies subdivide, but they thus subdivide in different ways. And the manner in which they are found to do this is as important, if not far more so, than the mere fact that they do so actually divide. Thus it may again and again be urged that there are many microscopic particles which are known to pass through some of the performances which our "radiobes" also do; but we have no knowledge of any bodies which can do them all except those bodies which we know are living things. If a bacteriologist were told that the objects of his observations were not strictly living things because Bütschli had obtained bodies certainly quite lifeless which could perform many of the actions which his bacteria do—because Leduc had obtained other bodies which possess many other properties which his bacterial bodies have; that Le Bon, Schrön, Quincke, Lehmann, Ostwald, and a host of others had also observed minute so-called liquid and organic bodies, some of which are, accurately speaking, crystals—that therefore microbes must be crystals, he would reply, and very rightly so, that the argument was scarcely valid, and that here, at least, analogy was a deceitful guide. But the argument would not be worse than that of those who would assert that because certain things are not bacteria they therefore must be crystals. It has been suggested that the products of radium and bouillon are like the microscopic crystals described by those already mentioned, and also by

Schenck in his admirable little work which has recently been published.[1] But the bodies there described, some of which I have many times observed, I have never thought of classifying or identifying with the "plastide particles" in bouillon that I have styled "radiobes." The two are totally distinct. One type, the smaller one, behave like bubbles, or, more accurately, like oily drops, possessing no indication whatsoever of an internal structure other than that which we may associate with crystalline forms. The larger ones are much too large, and show no signs of disintegration, but give the beautiful characteristic figures of crystals under the polariscope. Even the comparatively small ones give, to some extent at least, some slight polariscope effects. But they are obviously, to anybody who has seen them, quite different from those which are brought about in the culture medium under the influence of radium. They do not stain—at least I have not found them to do so—as the radium bodies do, and they do not manifest any of the properties which have so attracted our attention with the latter. The two—at least so far as I can judge—are totally distinct—as distinct as coal is from potatoes.

It will be urged—in fact it has been urged—that these bodies, if living, must be the result of imperfect sterilizations, and that the experiments of Pasteur completely proved that when sterilizations are properly carried out life does not spring from lifeless matter. This sounds very simple, very clear, and very forcible. But has it really any bearing on the question as to whether radio-activity can afford the internal energy of vital processes? Pasteur's experiments were on sterilized media not acted upon by sources of activity such as those which now form the subject of discussion. They have nothing whatsoever to do with the question as to whether radio-activity can afford the energy in dynamically unstable groupings placed in suitable surroundings, and which might afford in more complex aggregations the *flux*, so to speak, which constitutes the principle of life. I argue now for possibilities, and I say without fear or hesitation, that, whatever may be the aspect we should take of this conception, the bearing of Pasteur's observations on this point is as remote as it is on the

[1] *Kristallinische Flüssigkeiten und Flüssige Kristalle.*

question whether there are living bodies in Venus or in Mars. It is a matter about which I feel, without misgiving, that Pasteur, Tyndall, and Huxley would have thought as strongly as myself that their efforts had no bearing whatsoever on the point at issue.

Having cleared our minds on the subject of these previous experiments of thirty years ago, we may turn our attention more particularly to these new experiments themselves.

In the course of my previous work on phosphorescence I was induced to try whether the molecular groupings which, it was supposed, were formed during phosphorescence, by exciting sources, could also be produced in other organic bodies, whether they become luminous or not so long as they are similarly acted upon.

The first attempt was to bring about the condensation or formation of a complex aggregate round a nucleus, itself the seat of electro-magnetic disturbances, as in radio-active particles, that might set up an aggregation of molecules, probably of an unstable kind, in its vicinity.

The most promising step to take appeared to be to introduce some radium salt into a tube containing glycerine and then suddenly to cool the liquid by immersion in liquid air.[1] The liquid would thus have every opportunity of condensing round the ions embedded in the glycerine from the radium, and perhaps also the aggregates contemplated would have a similar opportunity of being formed, by the intense electro-magnetic pulses set up, or possibly by some catalytic actions. Crystals of glycer-

[1] These experiments were made at the Cavendish Laboratory in October, 1904, and were exhibited to a host of people in Cambridge at the time. By a coincidence, M. R. Dubois, an eminent physiologist, shortly afterwards stated, in an inaugural address at Lyons last November, that he had observed the production of similar bodies, which he called *vacuolides*, by the action of radium on certain culture media. Up to the time of correcting the proofs of this article he has not, so far as I am aware, made any communication to any scientific journal on the subject. In abstracting my work for the *Revue des Idées*, July 15, 1905, he refers to his speech and proposes to change the name of his vacuolides to *cobes*. He admits they are the same as radiobes.

ine were thus produced, but it was found that the radium was not necessary, the low temperature being sufficient to enable them to form. On being removed from the cooling chamber and allowed to stand at the ordinary temperature of the room, they rapidly disappeared in about five minutes or so.

The experiment was also made with gelatine. Microscopic crystals were thus easily produced by immersion in liquid air, and the outward appearance of the colloid was greatly altered, as it became intensely opaque.

Bouillon, which was carefully sterilized under pressure at a temperature from 130° to 140° with radium for about thirty minutes at a time, was also tried. It was found in this case that after two days a culture was growing on the surface of the gelatine. Moreover, on repeating the experiment it was observed that the *culture* was still formed even when the tube was not frozen.

This was most remarkable, but the obvious explanation appeared to be that the cultures were contaminations and the result of imperfect sterilization. So the experiment was repeated with controls. The result was precisely the same as before, in the tube containing radium, while the control tube showed no sign whatever of contamination. The radium was mixed with the gelatine medium in most of the experiments; in some, however, it was contained in another and smaller tube close to the surface of the gelatine, or in a side tube. In all the experiments which may be regarded as reliable, actual contact seemed to be necessary, although at first it seemed as though the α-rays were sufficient. But in all such cases some of the radium actually got to the gelatine during the process of sterilization.

In the earlier experiments the salt used was the chloride. It was sprinkled on a narrow glass slide over which a thin layer of gum was spread. The cultures were obtained only when the edge of the glass slide came in contact with the gelatine.

On looking up the matter I found that it was a well-known fact that gum acted on gelatine in such a manner as to produce oily drops.[1] Controls with gum alone, however, proved that the two effects were entirely different, the gum globules being confined

[1] See Article "Gum," *Encyclopædia Britannica*. 9th Edition.

chiefly to the surface, disappearing altogether after some days, while the radium effect increased.

Thus it seemed quite clear from these control experiments that the gum was not the cause of the culture-like appearances, while subsequent experiments with pure radium salt proved this beyond doubt.

The next step was to get sub-cultures by inoculation in fresh media. The sub-cultures did not show the slightest signs of growth for nearly six weeks. They then, however, did manifest a tendency towards development, but only to a very small extent.

Thus it is at once evident that the original cultures were not bacteria.

The first experiments were repeated with radium bromide. About $2\frac{1}{2}$ milligrammes of the salt contained in a small glass tube, one end of which was drawn out to a fine point, were introduced into an ordinary test-tube containing bouillon. The test-tube was plugged with cotton-wool in the usual way with such experiments, and then sterilized at a temperature of 130° C. for about thirty minutes at a time. On cooling, as soon as the liquid had coagulated, the fine end of the inner tube containing the radium was broken by means of a wire hook in a side tube. The salt was thus allowed to drop on the surface of the gelatine. After twenty-four hours signs of growth were already visible. On opening the tube and examining the culture microscopically the same results were obtained as previously.

Their appearance is indeed most striking. It is curious, however, that with the bromide the cultures, although produced more rapidly, did not spread far into the interior of the gelatine, as did those due to the chloride.

It is noteworthy that the consistency with which they appear, and their form at each stage of development, are not the least striking feature of their many characteristics. At first their appearance is that of diplococci; yet it will be observed that they are not all of the same size, but vary considerably through a considerable range from 0.3μ[1] to mere specks, as seen in $\frac{1}{12}$

[1] μ is the one-thousandth of a millimetre, or the twenty-five-thousandth of an inch.

inch power. There is an indication of growth and of their having originated from ultra-microscopic particles.

At first they looked like crystals of carbonate of lime, but these are so very much larger and are visible with much lower powers. The latter are insoluble, while the former are soluble in warm water, so that the two cannot be identified. They might have been soluble phosphates, but the considerations which follow indicate that they are highly complicated structures and more like organisms.

The polariscope does not give the figures and changes of color which are the characteristic features of a crystal. There is, however, a left-handed rotation imparted to the gelatine, and one which can easily be detected when the culture has penetrated some distance into the interior, the rotation amounting to several degrees in a centimetre thickness. Thus they appear to be more of the nature of colloided bodies, but like bacteria with an asymmetric structure.

The very minute quantity which could be experimented with rendered it extremely difficult to investigate their chemical composition; but the method of prolonged observation, like the astronomical method in matters over which we have no control, enables us to study their structure and behavior, and to decide the question as to whether they are crystalline or organized and living forms.

Upon this point, however, it is necessary that the use of the word "crystal" should stand for some definite thing. By a crystal I mean an aggregate of symmetrically arranged groups of molecules. Such aggregates are known to grow by piling up, as it were, one on to another. They grow by accretion, not by assimilation, from their environment. Sachs[1] regarded protoplasm as made up of minute crystals, but that seems

[1] *Physiology of Plants*, p. 206. His view that protoplasm is an organized substance consisting of crystalline, doubly refracting molecules (Micellæ) is now generally accepted. In the moist state each of these (Micellæ) is surrounded with an envelope of water in consequence of its powerful attraction. In their dry state they are in mutual contact. This theory of the internal structure of organized bodies was founded by Naegeli.

perhaps to be using the word in a somewhat elastic sense, if protoplasm, a colloid substance, were to be included amongst crystalline bodies.

If colloidal bodies are aggregates of minute crystals, they are, however, not symmetrically arranged crystals, and the aggregate is not isomorphous with the constituent crystals, but on the whole amorphous.

An organism has a structure, a nucleus, and an external boundary or cell-wall, and its vitality may be described as being a continuous process of adjustment between its internal and its external relations.

Now a clear examination of the bodies produced by the action of radium on culture media will enable us to decide under which of these two heads these bodies come.

The earlier stage does not reveal any structure, but later on the existence of a nucleus of a highly organized body is distinctly shown; whilst after a while the segregation effects of growth and development, which it would appear rule crystals out of court, become distinctly marked. In such large bodies a satellite or offspring is usually visible and is suggestive of reproduction.

This subdivision is the most striking thing about them, and a clear idea of its actual nature cannot fully be derived from the photographs. When the body exceeds 3μ there is a tendency for it to divide up, and each part to lead a separate existence.

The growth is from the minutest visible speck to two dots, then a dumb-bell shaped appearance, later more like frog's spawn, and so on through various stages until it reaches a shape largely different from its previous forms, when it divides and loses its individuality, and ultimately becomes resolved into minute crystals, possibly of uric acid. This is a development which no crystal has yet been known to make, and forces upon the mind the idea that they must be organisms; the fact, however, that they are soluble in water seems, on the other hand, to disprove the suggestion that they can be bacteria. But the stoppage of growth and the subdivision at a certain stage of development in such circumstances as these is a clear indi-

cation of the continuous adjustment of internal to external relations of the individual with its surroundings, and thus suggests vitality.

The continuity of structure, assimilation, and growth, and then subdivision, together with the nucleated structure as shown in a few of the best specimens, *suggests that they are entitled to be classed among living things, in the sense in which we use the words*, whether we call them bacteria or not.

As they do not possess all the properties of bacteria, they are not what are understood by this name, and are obviously altogether outside the beaten track of living things. This, however, will not prevent such bodies from coming under the realm of biology, and, in fact, they appear to possess many of the qualities and properties which enable them to be placed in the borderland between crystals and bacteria, organisms in the sense in which we have employed the word, and possibly the missing link between the animate and inanimate. May it not also be the germ which, after countless generations, under gradually changing forms and in suitable environments, has at length evolved into a bacillus at which we gaze and gaze with hopeless wonder and amazement, each time we view it in the microscope to-day?

In their properties they are so like bacteria and yet not of them, nor of crystals, from both of which they differ widely, that they may with advantage, as we have said, be called *Radiobes*, a name at once suggestive both of their nature and their origin.

Thus the gap, apparently insuperable, between the organic and the inorganic world seems, however roughly, to be bridged over by the presence of these radio-organic organisms which at least may give a clew as to the beginning and the end of life, "that vital putrefaction of the dust," to which Dr. Saleeby has recently drawn attention.

Rainey obtained many curious results with salts of lime, but some of his observations may have been due to microbes, as in those days sufficient attention was not paid to the process of sterilization, while crystals of lime would be insoluble in water.

Schenck's crystals, however, can be examined in the polari-

scope, and do not segregate and reproduce as the bodies we are dealing with invariably have been found to do.

May it not be that, among those unknown processes which, as Huxley expected, worked in the "remote prodigious vista of the past," where he could find no record of the commencement of life, the process now considered almost a universal one, of radio-activity, performed those reactions, that we now see taking place in gelatine cultures, slowly and yet spontaneously by virtue of even slightly radio-active bodies?

The earth itself, which is slightly radio-active, should act likewise, and the substances required are the ingredients for the formation of radio-organisms.

The only process taking place in matter which has since then revealed a hidden source of energy, not destroyed by heat, is radio-activity.

Whether the lowliest forms of life—so simple that the simplest amœba as we see it to-day would appear a highly complex form—whether such elementary types have arisen from inorganic matter by such processes as I have described, I know not. May it not be, however, and does it not seem probable, in the light of these experiments, that the recently discovered processes of instability and decay of inorganic matter, resulting from the unexpected source of energy which gives rise to them, are analogous in many ways to the very inappropriately called "vital force" or really vital energy of living mater? For this idea such physiologists as Johannes Müller so devoutly pleaded more than half a century ago. And may they not also be the source of life upon this planet?

Cannot this instability and decay of inorganic matter of atoms of highly complex structure, in suitable environments, be the seat of disturbances, of fermentations, and of metabolisms? The building up and breaking down through *catalytic* actions of great complex aggregates, not merely of *stable* crystalline forms, but of *unstable* dynamical aggregations, imparted by the unstable atom of a radio-active substance to the agglomerated mass?

The results of these investigations of which I have given an account, although not affording an answer to this question, by

giving rise to organisms such as bacteria (for it must be borne in mind that these are the descendants of countless generations, under gradually varying conditions), still afford beyond doubt organic forms of matter, as appears from their structure and behavior, even if they are not crystals or bacteria of the types already known, and place also at our disposal a method of structural organic synthesis, of which the chemist, perhaps, has not hitherto made use with effect.

When working some time ago at the phosphorescent glow in gases, I was led from various considerations to infer that the luminosity was the result of great complex molecular agglomerations produced by the spark. The duration of the life-period, if I might so call it, of those molecular groups is greatly increased by letting them diffuse into another tube through which the spark had not previously been sent.[1]

The effect of glycerine and gelatine on phosphorescent liquids is also known to increase the duration of the luminosity, and this is probably due to diminution of the number of collisions. I thus endeavored to observe the effect upon the phosphorescent molecules by introducing glycerine or gelatine into a vacuum tube, immediately after sending a discharge of electricity through it, while the phosphorescent glow lasted.

If the glycerine or gelatine on being introduced is shaken inside the tube, some of the phosphorescent molecules would be caught by the liquid, which in turn should become phosphorescent. The cyanogen molecules, it was thought, would do this particularly on account of their persistent nature after the passage of the discharge. Bouillon,[2] which had been sterilized with the tube itself before being introduced, was also among the substances employed. The vapor, however, from these substances when in the liquid state was enough to prevent the phosphorescent molecules which could exist at low pressure from persisting, and thus the experiments for the time were dropped.

It seemed to me that the complex molecules of para-cyano-

[1] *Philosophical Magazine*, March, 1901.

[2] In this particular case it was the substance used for cultivating *photogenic micro-cocci*.

gen, unstable, but at the same time persistent and yielding a vast store of energy in their disintegration, might act as nuclei which would in suitable media set up catalytic activity, and thus act as a means of synthesizing complex organic compounds, a method not hitherto employed. It was for this reason that bouillon, of the composition used in the experiments with radium, was employed, since it contained all the constituents of protoplasm, and it seemed at the time quite possible, not to say probable, that the physical properties of the cyanogen molecule, as well as its chemical properties, justified the very shrewd conception of Pflüger, that the molecule of cyanogen is a semi-living thing.

The fundamental difference between living proteid as it constitutes living substance, and dead proteid as it occurs in egg-albumen, is in the self-decomposition of the former and the stable constitution of the latter.

Verworn says: "The starting-point for further consideration is afforded by the fact that of the heterogeneous decomposition products of living proteid such as uric acid, creatin, and, moreover, the nuclein bases, guanin, xanthin, hypoxanthin, and adenin, a part contains cyanogen as a radical, and a part like urea, the most important of all the decomposition products of living proteid, can be produced artificially from cyanogen compounds by a rearrangement of the atoms." "This points strongly," he thinks, "to the probability that living proteid contains the radical cyanogen, and thus differs fundamentally from dead or food proteid." Thus, according to Pflüger, "in the formation of cell substance, *i.e.*, of living proteid out of food proteid, a change in the latter takes place, the atoms of nitrogen going into a cyanogen-like relation with the atoms of carbon, probably with the absorption of a considerable amount of heat." Cyanogen is a radical which contains a vast amount of energy, and, although not to be compared with that of radium compounds, its potential store is nevertheless very great, as appears from thermal investigations. Again, "the idea that it is the cyanogen especially that confers upon the living proteid molecule its characteristic properties is supported especially by many analogies that exist between living proteid and

the compounds of cyanogen. Thus a product of the oxidation of cyanogen, cyanic acid, H.C.N.O., possesses great similarity to living proteid. Pflüger calls attention to the following interesting points of comparison: (1) Both bodies grow by polymerization by chemically combining similar molecules, like chains, into masses; the growth of living substance takes place thus, and in this way also the polymeric $H_nC_nN_nO_n$ comes from cyanic acid, H.C.N.O. (2) Further, both bodies in the presence of water are spontaneously decomposed into carbonic acid and ammonia. (3) Both afford urea by dissociation, *i.e.*, by intramolecular rearrangement, not by direct oxidation. (4) Finally, both are liquid and transparent at low temperatures and coagulate at higher ones; cyanic acid earlier, living proteid later." "Their similarity," says Pflüger, "is so great that I might term cyanic acid a half-living molecule."

Pflüger's analyses have not met, to say the least of it, with widespread recognition. Further experimental confirmation is doubtless necessary before they can be ranked as theory.

The dynamical nature of the cyanogen molecule, however, together with the large store of potential energy it contains, constitutes the resemblance between it and radium compounds, but it must be borne in mind that the internal energy thus manifested by the molecular disintegration is of an entirely different order of magnitude. Nevertheless, there is a sufficient resemblance between the two to utilize each for the purpose of the experiments we have in view. Then the molecule of either might act as a nucleus which should by catalysis, or some other means, set up dynamically unstable groups, which, though not living in the sense that they possessed the n qualities of living proteid, may, by possessing $(n-1)$ of those qualities, be regarded as a mode of life in the sense in which many philosophers have used the word. If cyanogen is a half-living thing, as Pflüger supposed for the reason we have given, it is only natural to try if it would form growths in culture media, and the use of bouillon in my experiments was merely the logical outcome of this conception.

It seems quite beyond hope that even if we had the materials and conditions for producing life in the laboratory we should be

able to produce forms of life as developed as even the simplest amœba, for the one reason, if for no other, that these are the descendants of almost an indefinite series of ancestors. But it is not beyond hope to produce others, more elementary ones, artificially; and the micro-organisms—I think I am justified in calling them such—which form the subject of this article, although not bacteria, still may be looked upon as approximating to these more closely, and certainly regarded as higher in the scale of being than any forms of crystalline or colloid bodies hitherto observed.

VII

THE BIRTH OF CONSCIENCE

"THE MORALITY OF NATURE"

BY

PRINCE KROPOTKIN

IN our own day, the old distinction between scientist and philosopher bids fair to become extinct. Time was when the scientist confined himself to exact experiment and the discovery of the physical laws which underlay his results, while the philosopher took the universe for his province and speculated upon its meaning. Now, however, each invades the other's realm; the scientist theorizes on origin and cause; the philosopher adopts scientific methods. Somewhere in the borderland between the two, lies the following address. It attempts to discover the origin of society, the explanation of altruism, the reason why a man is insufficient for himself and desires the company of others, feels both the joy and suffering of others in addition to his own.

Here again it is obvious that we do but strive to push a little further from us the mystery of our being. Even were the search of science successful, so that she could set her finger on a point and date, and say, here began the social instinct in man, from this it has developed—even then the marvel would stand as it stands now, not in the method of development, but in the fact that this social instinct exists, that it has been created.

Nevertheless, it may be well to caution our readers that in this interweaving of science and philosophy, the scientist is apt to carry through his philosophic excursions the forms of expression, the positiveness of assertion, which belong properly to his experimental work. Hence when, in one of the few essays our series gives of necessity to science, the writer states a fact of the present

time, which he has seen or tried, we may accept him fully; but when from this fact he infers something that occurred æons ago, we must grow cautious. For each positive "is" it were wise to substitute the more modest "seems," for "proves" let us read "suggests," or at the most "makes probable." Scientists themselves would be the readiest to approve this caution. True science has no more deadly enemy than over-sureness. The possibility of lurking error, or of new and unknown causes working to confuse results, is ever in the seeker's mind.

In the present address Darwinism, already introduced to the reader, presents its most recent thoughts, and presents them in the words of one of its most noted exponents. Prince Kropotkin is the most widely known of Russian scientists. He is also a leader in the discussion of social problems. To Americans his career may be less familiar than it is in Europe. Born of a vice-regal family in Russia, he was educated among the pages of the imperial court; but a more vigorous life attracted him, and he became an explorer and geographer amid the wilds of Siberia. Later he took part in the Russian revolutionary movement, and joined the International Working Men's Association (1872). He was imprisoned and escaped, to become an anarchistic leader throughout Europe. As such, he was expelled from Switzerland. Even in republican France he was held three years in prison; and it was not till 1886 that he settled to the more quiet existence of a littérateur *and scientist. In 1900 he published his "Memoirs of a Revolutionist," which has been translated into every leading language; and in 1902 he published his important treatise on "Mutual Aid in Evolution," to which he makes frequent reference below.*

I

THE work of Darwin was not limited to biology only.[1] Already in 1837, when he had just written a rough outline of his theory of the origin of species, he entered in his note-book this significant remark: 'My theory will lead to a new philosophy.'

[1] In his *History of Modern Philosophy* the Danish professor, Harald Höffding, gives an admirable sketch of the philosophical importance of Darwin's work. *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, German translation by F. Bendixen (Leipsic, 1896), Vol. II., p. 487 *et seq.*

And so it did in reality. The application which he made of the idea of evolution to the whole of organic life marked a new era in philosophy; and it led him later on to write a sketch of the development of the moral sense, which opened a new page in ethics. In this sketch so much was done to throw a new light upon the true and efficient cause of the moral feelings, and place the whole of ethics on a scientific basis, that although Darwin's leading ideas may be considered as a further development of those of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, his work represents, nevertheless, a new departure, on the lines faintly indicated by Bacon. It secured, therefore, for its author a place by the side of the other founders of ethical schools, such as Hume, Hobbes, or Kant.

The leading ideas of Darwin's ethics may easily be summed up. In the very first sentences of his essay he states his object in quite definite terms. He begins with a praise of the sense of duty, which he characterizes in the well-known poetical words of Kant: 'Duty! Wondrous thought that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, . . .' etc. And he undertakes to explain this sense of duty, or moral conscience, 'exclusively from the side of natural history'—an explanation, he adds, which no English writer had hitherto attempted to give.[1] That the moral sense should be acquired by each individual separately, during its lifetime, he naturally considers 'at least extremely improbable on the general theory of evolution'; and he derives this sense from the social feelings which are instinctive or innate in the lower animals, and probably in man as well. The origin and the very foundation of all moral feelings Darwin sees 'in the social instincts which lead the animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them'; sympathy being understood here in its proper sense—not as a feeling of commiseration or love, but as a 'fellow-feeling' or 'mutual sensibility'; the fact of being influenced by another's feelings.

This being Darwin's first proposition, his second is that as soon as the mental faculties of a species become highly developed as they are in man, the social instinct will necessarily lead, as every other unsatisfied instinct does, to a sense of dissatisfaction,

[1] *The Descent of Man*, chap. IV.

or even misery, as often as the individual, reasoning about its past actions, sees that in some of them 'the enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither enduring nor leaving behind it a very vivid impression.' For Darwin the moral sense is thus not the mysterious gift of unknown origin which it was for Kant. 'Any animal whatever,' he says, 'endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense, or conscience [Kant's "knowledge of duty"], as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well, developed as in man.

To these two fundamental propositions Darwin adds two secondary ones. After the power of language had been acquired, and the wishes of the community could be expressed, 'the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good would naturally become, in a paramount degree, the guide of action.' However, the effect of public approbation and disapprobation depends entirely upon the development of mutual sympathy. It is because we feel in sympathy with others that we appreciate their opinions; and public opinion acts in a moral direction only where the social instinct is sufficiently strongly developed. This is evidently an important remark, because it refutes those theories of Mandeville and his more or less outspoken eighteenth-century followers, which represented morality as nothing but a set of *conventional* manners. Finally, Darwin mentions habit as a potent factor for framing our conduct. It strengthens the social instinct and mutual sympathy, as also obedience to the judgment of the community.

Having thus stated the substance of his views in four definite propositions, Darwin gives them some further developments. He examines, first, sociability in animals, their love of society, and the misery which every one of them feels if it is left alone; their continual intercourse; their mutual warnings, and the services they render each other in hunting and for self-defence. 'It is certain,' he says, 'that associated animals have a feeling of love for each other which is not felt by non-social adult animals.' They may not much sympathize with each other's pleasures, but cases of sympathy with each other's distress or danger are quite

common, and Darwin quotes a few of the most striking instances. Some of them, such as Saintsbury's blind pelican or the blind rat, both of which were fed by their congeners, have become classical by this time, while several similar illustrations have been added since. 'Moreover, beside love and sympathy,' Darwin continues, 'animals exhibit other qualities connected with social instincts which in us would be called moral,' and he gives a few examples of moral self-restraint in dogs and elephants. Altogether, it is evident that every action in common—and with certain animals it is quite habitual—requires some restraint of the same sort. However, it must be said that Darwin did not treat the subject of sociability in animals and their incipient moral feelings with all the developments which it deserved, in view of the central position which it occupies in his theory of morality.

Considering next human morality, Darwin remarks that although man, such as he now exists, has but few special instincts, he nevertheless is a sociable being who must have retained from an extremely remote period some degree of instinctive love and sympathy for his fellows. These feelings act as an impulsive instinct, which is assisted by reason, experience, and the desire of approbation. 'Thus the social instincts, which must have been acquired by man in a very rude state, and probably even by his ape-like progenitors, still give the impulse for some of his best actions.' The remainder is the result of a steadily growing intelligence and collective education.

It is evident that these views are correct only if we are ready to recognize that the intellectual faculties of animals differ from those of man in degree, but not in their essence. But this is admitted now by most students of comparative psychology; and the attempts which have been made lately to establish 'a gulf' between the instincts and the intellectual faculties of man and those of animals have not attained their end.[1] How-

[1] The incapacity of an ant, a dog, or a cat to make a *discovery*, or to hit upon the correct solution of a difficulty, is not proof of an essential difference between the intelligence of man and that of these animals, because the same want of inventiveness is continually met with in men as well. Like the ant in one of Lubbock's experiments, thousands of men who had not been already familiar with bridges would spend their forces in the effort of crossing a brook or a ravine, before they would try to bridge it. And, on the other hand, the collective intelligence of

ever, it does not follow from this resemblance that the moral instincts developed in different species, and the less so in species belonging to two different classes of animals, should be identical. If we compare insects with mammals, we must never forget that the lines of their development have diverged at a very early period of animal evolution. The consequence was that a deep physiological differentiation between separate portions of the same species took place with the ants, the bees, the wasps, etc., corresponding to a permanent physiological division of labor between their females, their males, and their workers—a division of which there is no trace among mammals. Therefore it seems almost impossible to ask men to judge of the morality of the worker-bees when they kill the males in their hive; and this is why the illustration of Darwin to this effect met with so much hostile criticism. And yet the moral conceptions of man and the actions of insects have so much in common that the greatest ethical teachers of mankind did not hesitate to recommend certain features of the ants and the bees for imitation by man. Their devotion to the group is certainly not surpassed by ours; and, on the other hand—to say nothing of our race wars, or of the occasional exterminations of religious dissidents and political adversaries—the human code of morality has undergone such variations in the course of time as to pass from the exposure of children by savages in years of scarcity, and the 'wound-for-wound and life-for-life' principle of the Decalogue, to the profound respect of everything that lives preached by Bodisatta and the pardon of offences practised by the early Christians. We are thus bound to conclude that while the differences between the morality of the bee and that of man are due to a deep physiological divergence, the striking similarities between the two point, nevertheless, to a community of origin.

The social instinct is thus, in Darwin's opinion, the common stock, out of which all morality originates; and he further

an ant's nest or a beehive—one individual in the thousand hitting upon the correct solution, and the others imitating it—solves difficulties much greater than those upon which the individual ant, or bee, or cat has so ludicrously failed. The bees at the Paris Exhibition, and their devices to prevent being disturbed in their work, or any one of the well-known facts of inventiveness among the bees, the ants, the wolves hunting together, are instances in point.—K.

analyzes this instinct. Unfortunately, scientific animal psychology is still in its infancy, and therefore it is extremely difficult to disentangle the complex relations which exist between the social instinct, properly so-called, and the parental and filial instincts, as well as several other instincts and faculties, such as sympathy, reason, experience, and a tendency to imitation. Darwin felt this difficulty very much, and therefore he expressed himself extremely cautiously. The parental and filial instincts, he suggested, 'apparently lie at the base of the social instincts': and in another place he wrote: 'The feeling of pleasure from society is probably an extension of the parental or filial affections, since the social instinct seems to be developed by the young remaining for a long time with their parents.'

This caution was fully justified, because in other places he pointed out that the social instinct must be *a separate instinct in itself*, different from the others—an instinct which has been developed by natural selection *for its own sake*, as it was useful for the well-being and the preservation of the species. It is so fundamental that when it runs against another instinct, even one so strong as the attachment of the parents to their offspring, it often takes the upper hand. Birds, when the time has come for their autumn migration, will leave behind their tender young, not yet old enough for a prolonged flight, and follow their comrades.

To this striking illustration I may also add that the social instinct is strongly developed with many lower animals, such as the land-crabs, or the Molucca crab[1]; as also with certain fishes, with whom it hardly could be considered as an extension of the filial or parental feelings. In these cases it appears rather as an extension of the *brotherly* or *sisterly* relations, or feelings of *comradeship*, which probably develop each time that a considerable number of young animals, having been hatched at a given place and at a given moment, continue to live together—whether they are with their parents or not. It would seem, therefore, more correct to consider the social and the parental instincts as *two* closely connected instincts, of which the former is perhaps the earlier, and therefore the stronger, and which both go hand in hand in the evolution of the animal world. Both are favored

[1] See *Mutual Aid*, 1903, pp. 11 and 12.

by natural selection, which, as soon as they come into conflict, keeps the balance between the two, for the ultimate good of the species.[1]

The most important point in the ethical theory of Darwin is, of course, his explanation of the moral conscience of man and his sense of remorse and duty. This point has always been the stumbling-block of all ethical theories. Kant, as is known, utterly failed, in his otherwise so beautifully written work on morality, to establish why his 'categorical imperative' should be obeyed at all, unless such be the will of a supreme power. We may admit that Kant's 'moral law,' if we slightly alter its formula, while we maintain its spirit, is a *necessary* conclusion of the human reason. We certainly object to the metaphysical form which Kant gave it; but, after all, its substance is equity, justice. And, if we translate the metaphysical language of Kant into the concrete language of inductive science, we may find points of contact between his conception of the origin of the moral law and the naturalist's view concerning the development of the moral sense. But this is only one-half of the problem. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that 'pure reason,' free from all observation, all feeling, and all instinct, in virtue of its inherent properties, should necessarily come to formulate a law of justice similar to Kant's imperative, and granting that no reasoning being could ever come to any other conclusion, because such are the inherent properties of *reason*—granting all this, and fully recognizing at the same time the elevating character of Kant's moral philosophy, the great question of all ethics remains, nevertheless, in full: 'Why should man obey the moral law, or principle, formulated by his reason?' Or, at least, 'Whence that feeling of obligation which men are experiencing?'

Several critics of Kant's ethical philosophy have already pointed out that it left this great fundamental question unsolved.

[1] In an excellent analysis of the social feeling (*Animal Behaviour*, 1900, pp. 231–232) Professor Lloyd Morgan says: 'And this question Prince Kropotkin, in common with Darwin and Espinas, would probably answer without hesitation that the primæval germ of the social community lay in the prolonged coherence of the group of parents and offspring.' I should only add the words: '*or of the offspring without the parents*,' because this addition would better agree with the above facts, while it also more correctly renders the idea of Darwin.—K.

But they might have added also that Kant himself had recognized his incapacity of solving it. After having thought intensely upon this subject, and written about it for four years, he acknowledged in his *Philosophical Theory of Religion* (Part I., 'Of the Radical Evil of Human Nature,' published in 1792) that he was unable to find the origin of the moral law. In fact, he gave up the whole problem by recognizing 'the incomprehensibility of this capacity, a capacity which proclaims a divine origin' —this very incomprehensibility having to rouse man's spirit to enthusiasm and to strengthen it for any sacrifices which respect to his duty may impose upon him.[1]

Intuitive philosophy having thus acknowledged its incapacity to solve the problem, let us see how Darwin solved it from the point of view of the naturalist. Here is, he said, a man who has yielded to a strong sense of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature; or, he has stolen food from hunger. In both cases he has obeyed a quite natural instinct, and the question is, Why should he feel miserable at all? Why should he think that he ought to have obeyed some other instinct, and acted differently? Because, Darwin replies, in human nature 'the more enduring social instincts conquer the less persistent instincts.' Moral conscience has always a retrospective character; it speaks in us when we think of our past actions; and it is the result of a struggle, during which the less persistent, the less permanent *individual* instinct yields before the more permanently present and the more enduring *social* instinct. With those animals which always live in society 'the social instincts are ever present and persistent.' Such animals are always ready to join in the defence of the group and to aid each other in different ways. They feel miserable if they are separated from the others. And it is the same with man. 'A man who possessed no trace of such instincts would be a monster.' On the other hand, the desire which leads a man to satisfy his hunger or his anger, or to escape danger, or to appropriate somebody's possessions, is in its nature temporary. Its satisfaction is always weaker than the desire itself. And when we think of it in the past, we cannot recall it as vividly as it was

[1] Hartleben's edition of Kant's works, Vol. VI., pp. 143, 144.

before its satisfaction. Consequently, if a man, with a view of satisfying such a desire, has acted so as to traverse his social instinct, and afterward reflects upon his action—which we continually do—he will be driven 'to make a comparison between the impressions of past hunger, vengeance satisfied, or danger shunned at other men's cost, with the almost ever-present instinct of sympathy, and with his early knowledge of what others consider as praiseworthy or blamable.' And once he has made this comparison he will feel 'as if he had been baulked in following a present instinct or habit, and this with all animals causes *dissatisfaction*, or even *misery*.'

And then Darwin shows how the primary promptings of such a conscience, which always 'looks backward, and serves as a guide for the future,' may take the aspect of shame, regret, repentance, or even violent remorse, if the feeling be supported by reflection about the judgment of those with whom man feels in sympathy. Later on, habit will necessarily increase the power of this conscience upon man's actions, while at the same time it will tend to harmonize more and more the desires and passions of the individual with his social sympathies and instincts.[1] Altogether, the great difficulty for ethical philosophy is to explain the first germs of the 'ought'—the appearance of the first whisper of the voice which pronounces that word. If that much has been explained, the accumulated experience of the community and its collective teachings will explain the rest.

We have thus, for the first time, an explanation of the sense of duty on a natural basis. True that it runs counter to the ideas that are current now about animal and human nature; but it is correct. Nearly all ethical writers have hitherto started with the unproved postulate that the strongest of all the instincts of man,

[1] In a foot-note Darwin, with his usual deep insight, makes, however, one exception. 'Enmity, or hatred,' he remarks, 'seems also to be a highly persistent feeling, perhaps more so than any other that can be named. . . . This feeling would thus seem to be innate, and is certainly a most persistent one. It seems to be the complement and converse of the true social instinct' (foot-note 27). This feeling, so deeply seated in animal nature, evidently explains the bitter wars that are fought between different tribes or groups in several animal species and among men. It explains also the existence of two different codes of morality retained till now among civilized nations. But this important and yet neglected subject can better be treated in connection with the development of the idea of justice.—K.

and the more so of animals, is the *self-preservation instinct*, which, owing to a certain looseness of their terminology, they have identified, in man, with self-assertion, or egoism properly speaking. This instinct, which they conceived as including, on the one side, such primary impulses as self-defence, self-preservation, and the very act of satisfying hunger, and, on the other side, such derivative feelings as the longing for domination, greed, hatred, the desire of revenge, and so on—this compound and heterogeneous aggregate of instincts and feelings they represented as an all-pervading and all-powerful force, which finds no contradiction in animal and human nature, excepting in a certain feeling of benevolence or mercy. The consequence of such a view was that, *once human nature was recognized as such*, there obviously remained nothing but to lay a special stress upon the softening influence of those moral teachers who appealed to mercy, borrowing the spirit of their teachings and the impressiveness of their words from a world that lies outside nature—outside and above the world which is accessible to our senses. And if one refused to accept this view, the only alternate issue was to attribute, as Hobbes and his followers did, a special importance to the coercive action of the State, inspired by genial law-givers—which meant, of course, merely to shift the extra-natural inspiration from the religious preacher to the law-maker.

Beginning with the Middle Ages, the founders of ethical schools, for the most part ignorant of nature, to the study of which they preferred metaphysics, had represented the self-assertive instincts of the individual as the very condition of its physical existence. To obey their promptings was considered as *the* law of nature, the neglect of which would lead to a sure defeat and to the ultimate disappearance of the species. Therefore, to combat these egotistic promptings was possible only if man called to his aid the supernatural forces. The triumph of moral principles was thus represented as *a triumph of man over nature*, which he may hope to achieve only with an aid from without, coming as a reward for his humility. They told us, for instance, that there is no greater *virtue*, no greater triumph of the spiritual over the natural, than self-sacrifice for the welfare of our fellow-men. But the fact is that self-sacrifice in the interest

of an ants' nest, for the safety of a group of birds, or the security of a drove of cattle, a herd of antelopes, or a band of monkeys, is *a zoölogical fact of every-day occurrence in Nature*—a fact for which hundreds upon hundreds of animal species require nothing else but natural sympathy with their fellow-creatures, the sensation of full vital energy, and a constant habit of mutual aid. Darwin, who *knew* nature, had the courage boldly to assert that of the two instincts—the social and the individual—it is the former which is the stronger, the more persistent, and the more permanently present. And he was right. The instinct of mutual aid pervades the animal world, because natural selection works for maintaining and further developing it, and pitilessly destroys those species which lose it. In the great struggle for life which every animal species carries on against the hostile agencies of climate, surroundings, and natural enemies, big and small, those species which most consistently carry out the principle of mutual support have the best chance to survive, while the others die out. And the same great principle is confirmed by the history of mankind.

It is most remarkable that in representing the social instinct under this aspect we return, in fact, to what Bacon, the great founder of inductive science, had perceived. In his programme of the work to be done by the next generations with the aid of the inductive method, in *The Great Instauration*, he wrote:

"All things are endued with an appetite for two kinds of good —the one as a thing is a whole in itself, the other as it is a part of some greater whole; and *this latter is more worthy and more powerful than the other, as it tends to the conservation of a more ample form.* The first may be called individual, or self-good, and the latter, good of communion. . . . And thus it generally happens that the conservation of the more general form regulates the appetites." [1]

[1] *On the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*, Book VII. chap. i. We certainly find Bacon's *arguments* in favor of this idea insufficient; but he was only establishing the outlines of a science, which had to be worked out by his followers. In another place he returns to the same idea. He speaks of 'two appetites [instincts] of the creatures,' (1) that of self-preservation and defence, and (2) that of multiplying and propagating, and he adds, 'The latter, which is active, seems *stronger* and more worthy than the former, which is passive.'—K.

It may be asked, of course, whether such a conception agrees with the theory of natural selection, according to which struggle for life, within the species, was considered a necessary condition for the appearance of new species, and for evolution altogether? Having already touched elsewhere upon this question, I will not enter here into its discussion, and will only add the following remark. Immediately after the appearance of Darwin's work on the origin of species we were all inclined to believe that an acute struggle for the means of existence between the members of the same species was necessary for accentuating the variations, and for the development of new species. But the deeper we go into the study of the facts of nature, and realize the *direct* influence of the surroundings for producing *variation in a definite direction*, as also the influence of isolation upon portions of the species separated from the main body in consequence of their migrations, we are prepared to understand 'struggle for life' in a much wider and deeper sense. We see more and more *the group of animals*, acting as a whole, carrying on the struggle against adverse conditions, or against some such an enemy as a kindred species, by means of mutual support within the group, and thus acquiring habits which reduce the struggle, while they lead at the same time to a higher development of intelligence among those who took to mutual support. The above objection falls through in proportion as we advance in our knowledge of the struggle for life.

Nature has thus to be recognized as *the first ethical teacher of man*. The social instinct, innate in men as well as it is in all the sociable animals, is the origin of all ethical conceptions and all the subsequent ethical development.

II

Primitive man lived in close intimacy with animals. With some of them he probably shared the shelters under the rocks, occasionally the caverns, and very often food. Not more than a hundred years ago the natives of Siberia and America astonished our naturalists by their thorough knowledge of the habits of the most retiring beasts and birds; but primitive man stood in still closer relations to the animals, and knew them still better. The wholesale extermination of life by means of forest and prairie fires, poisoned arrows, and the like, had not yet begun; and from the bewildering abundance of animal life which was found by the white settlers when they first took possession of the American continent we may judge of the density of the animal population during the early Post-glacial period. Palæolithic and neolithic man lived closely surrounded by his dumb brothers—just as the shipwrecked crew of Behring lived amidst the multitudes of polar foxes, which were prowling in the midst of their encampments and gnawing at night at the very furs upon which the men were sleeping. Our primitive ancestors lived *with* the animals, in the midst of them. And as soon as they began to bring some order into their observations of nature, and to transmit them to posterity, the animals and their life supplied them with the chief materials for their unwritten encyclopædia of knowledge, as well as for their wisdom, which they expressed in proverbs and sayings. Animal psychology was the first psychology which man was aware of—it is still a favorite subject of talk at the campfires; and animal life, closely interwoven with that of man, was the subject of the very first rudiments of art, inspiring the first engravers and sculptors, and entering into the composition of the most ancient epical traditions and cosmogonic myths.

The first thing which our children learn in natural history is something about the beasts of prey—the lions and the tigers. But the first thing which primitive savages must have learned about nature was that it represents a vast agglomeration of animal clans and tribes: the ape tribe, so nearly related to man, the ever-prowling wolf tribe, the knowing, chattering bird tribe, the ever-busy insect tribe, and so on. For them the animals

were an extension of their own kin—only so much wiser than themselves. And the first vague generalization which men must have made about nature—so vague as to hardly differ from a mere impression—was that the living being and his clan or tribe are inseparable. *We* can separate them—*they* could not; and it seems even doubtful whether they could *think* of life otherwise than within a clan or a tribe.

Such an impression of nature was unavoidable. Among his nearest congeners—the monkeys and the apes—man saw hundreds of species living in large societies, united together within each group by the closest bonds. He saw how they supported each other during their foraging expeditions, how they combined against their common enemies, and rendered each other all sorts of small services, such as the picking of thorns from each other's fur, the nestling together in cold weather, and so on. Of course they often quarrelled, but there was more noise in these quarrels than serious harm, and at times, in case of danger, they displayed the most striking mutual attachment, to say nothing of the strong devotion of the mothers to their young ones, which they have in common with all the animals. Sociability was thus the rule with the monkey tribe; and if there are now two species of big apes, the gorilla and the orang-outang, which are not sociable, and keep in small families only, the very limited sizes of the areas they inhabit are a proof of their being now decaying species—decaying, perhaps, on account of the merciless war which men have waged against them in consequence of the very resemblance between the two species.[1]

Primitive man saw, next, that even among the carnivorous beasts, which live by killing other animals, there is one general and invariable rule: *They never kill each other.* Some of them are very sociable—such are all the dog tribe: the jackals, the dholes or kholzun dogs, the hyenas. Some others prefer to live in small families; but even among these last the more intelligent ones—the lions and the leopards—occasionally join together for hunting, like the dog tribe. And as to those few which lead—nowadays, at least—a quite solitary life in small families, so that even the females with their cubs will often keep separate from the

[1] Several African travellers speak of that enmity and signal its causes.

males, the same general rule of nature prevails among them: they do not kill each other. Even now, when the myriads of ruminants which formerly peopled the prairies have been exterminated, and the tigers live mainly on man's herds, and are compelled, therefore, to keep close to the villages, every one to its own domain—even now the natives of India will tell us that somehow the tigers manage to keep to their separate domains without fighting bloody internecine wars for securing them. Besides, it appears extremely probable that even those few animals which now lead a solitary existence—such as the tigers, the smaller species of the cat tribe (nearly all nocturnal), the bears, the genets, most weasels, the marten tribe, the hedgehog, and a few others—were not always solitary creatures. For some of them we have positive evidence that they remained sociable so long as they escaped extermination by man, and we have reason to believe that nearly all of them were in the same conditions in times past.[1] But even if there always existed a few unsociable species, the fact is that man has always considered them an exception.

The lesson of nature was, thus, that even the strongest beasts are bound to combine. And that man who had witnessed once in his life an attack of wild dogs, or dholes, upon the biggest beasts of prey, certainly realized, once and forever, the irresistible force of the tribal unions, and the confidence and courage with which they inspire every individual. Man made divinities of these dogs, and worshipped them, trying by all sorts of magic to acquire their courage.

In the prairies and the woods our earliest ancestors saw myriads of animals, all living in clans and tribes. Countless herds of red-deer, fallow deer, reindeer, gazelles and antelopes, thousands of droves of buffaloes and legions of wild horses, wild donkeys, quaggas, zebras, and so on, were moving over the boundless plains, peacefully grazing side by side. Even the dreary plateaus had their herds of llamas and wild camels. And when man approached these animals, he soon realized how closely connected all these beings were in their respective droves or herds. Even when they seemed fully absorbed in grazing,

[1] See *Mutual Aid*, chaps. I. and II., and Appendix.

and apparently took no notice of the others, they closely watched each other's movements, always ready to join in some common action. Man saw that all the deer tribe, whether they graze or merely gambol, always keep sentries, which never release their watchfulness and never are late to signal the approach of a beast of prey; he knew how, in case of sudden attack, the males and the females would encircle their young ones and face the enemy, exposing their lives for the safety of the feeble ones; and how, even with such timid creatures as the antelopes, or the fallow deer, the old males would often sacrifice themselves in order to cover the retreat of the herd. Man knew all that, which we ignore or easily forget, and he repeated it in his tales, embellishing the acts of courage and self-sacrifice with his primitive poetry, or mimicking them in his religious tribal dances. Still less could he ignore the great migrations of animals, because be followed them—just as the Chukchi follows still the herds of the wild reindeer, when the clouds of mosquitoes drive them from one place of the Chukchi peninsula to another, or as the Lapp follows the herds of his half-domesticated reindeer in their wanderings, over which he has no control. And if we, with all our book-learning, feel unable to understand how animals scattered over a wide territory can warn each other so as to bring their thousands to a given spot before they begin their march north, south, or west, our ancestors, who considered the animals as beings so much wiser than themselves, saw no difficulty in explaining that intercourse. For them all animals—beasts, birds, and fishes alike—were in continual communication, warning each other by means of hardly perceptible signs or sounds, informing one another about all sorts of events, and thus constituting one vast community, which had its own habits and rules of propriety and good behavior. Even to-day deep traces of that conception of nature survive in the folklore of all nations.

From the populous, animated, and gay villages of the marmots, the prairie dogs, the jerboas, the hamsters, and so on, and from the colonies of that silent sage, the beaver, with which the Post-glacial rivers were thickly studded, primitive man, who himself had begun as a nomad forest-dweller, could learn the advantages of settled life, permanent dwellings, and labor in com-

mon. Even now we can see how the nomad cattle-breeders of Mongolia, whose improvidence is phenomenal, learn from the striped marmot (*Tamias striatus*) the advantages of agriculture and foresight when they plunder quite regularly every autumn the underground galleries of this rodent, and seize its provisions of eatable bulbs. The granaries of many smaller rodents, full of all sorts of eatable seeds, must have given man the first suggestion as to the culture of cereals. In fact, the sacred books of the East contain many an allusion to the foresight and laboriousness of the animals, which are set up as an example to man.

The birds, in their turn—almost every one of their species—gave our ancestors a lesson of the most intimate sociability, of the joys of social life, and its enormous advantages. It certainly did not escape the attention of man that, even among the birds of prey, many species of falcons are extremely sociable, and that even some eagles combine for hunting; while the flocks of kites will sometimes chase the strongest eagle and get hold of its spoil. And they saw, of course, many a time, how the smallest birds, if they are numerous enough, overcome their first terror at the sight of a hawk, and chase it, immensely enjoying this kind of sport.

The nesting associations of aquatic birds, and their unanimity in defending their young broods and eggs, were well known to man. He knew that as soon as he approached the shore of a lake where thousands of birds belonging to different species were nesting, his appearance would be signalled at once; how, the moment he would set his foot upon their grounds, hundreds of birds would circle and fly round him, skim over his face, bewilder him by the flapping of their wings, deafen him by their cries, and often compel him to retreat. Man knew this only too well, for his very existence in the early summer depended upon his capacity to resist such a combined attack of the winged tribe. And then the joy of life in the autumn societies of the bird-youngsters was certainly familiar to people who themselves lived in the woods and by the side of the forest brooks. Who knows if the very idea of wide tribal unions, or, at least, of those great tribal hunts (*abà* with the Mongols, *kadà* with the Tunguses), which are real *fêtes*, lasting a couple of months every autumn, was not suggested by such autumn gatherings of the birds, in which so

many widely different species join together, spending a few hours every day in providing their food, and then chattering and fluttering about the remainder of the time?

Man knew also, of course, the gay play of animals, the sports in which several species delight, the concerts and dances of some others; the flights which certain species perform in the evenings, sometimes with a wonderful art and elaboration; the noisy meetings which are held by the swallows and other migrating birds, for years in succession, on the same spot, before they start on their long journeys south. And how often man must have stood in bewilderment as he saw the immense migrating columns of birds passing over his head for many hours in succession. The 'brute savage' knew and meditated on all these beauties of nature, which we have forgotten in our towns, and which we do not even find in our 'natural history' books, compiled for teaching anything but life; while the narratives of the great explorers —the Humboldts, the Audubons, the Azaras, the Brehms—of which every page was a picture of the real life of nature, are mouldering in our libraries.

In those times the wide world of the running waters and lakes was not a sealed book for man. He was familiar with its inhabitants as well. Even now many semi-savage natives of Africa and Polynesia profess a deep reverence for the crocodile. They consider him a near relative to man—a sort of ancestor. They even avoid naming him in their conversations, and if they must mention him they will say 'the old grandfather,' or use some other word expressing kinship and veneration. The crocodile, they maintain, acts exactly as they themselves do. He will never finally swallow his prey without having invited his relatives and friends to share the food; and if one of his tribe has been killed by man, otherwise than in due and just blood revenge, he will take vengeance upon any one of the murderer's kin. Therefore, if a negro has been eaten by a crocodile, his tribe will take the greatest care to discover the real culprit, and when he has been discovered and killed, they will carefully examine his intestines, in order to make sure that there has been no mistake; but if no proof of the beast's guilt is forthcoming, they will make all sorts of expiatory amends to the crocodile tribe, in order to appease

the relatives of the innocently slaughtered individual, and continue to search for the real culprit. Otherwise the kinsfolk of the former would take revenge. The same belief exists among the Red Indians concerning the rattlesnake and the wolf, and its bearing upon the subsequent development of the idea of justice is self-evident.

The fishes, their shoals, and the ways they play in the transparent waters, exploring them by their scouts before they move in a given direction, must have deeply impressed man from a remote antiquity. Traces of this impression are found in folk-lore in many parts of the globe. Thus, for instance, Dekanawideh, the legendary law-giver of the Five Nations of the Red Indians, who is supposed to have given them the class organization, is represented as having retired first to meditate in contact with nature. He 'reached the side of a smooth, clear, running stream, transparent and full of fishes. He sat down, reclining on the sloping bank, gazing intent into the waters, watching the fishes playing about in complete harmony. . . .' Thereupon he conceived the scheme of dividing his people into gentes and classes, or totems.[1]

Altogether, for the primitive savage, animals are mysterious, problematic beings, possessed of a wide knowledge of the things of nature. They know much more than they are ready to tell us. In some way or another, by the aid of senses much more refined than ours, and by telling to each other all that they notice in their rambles and flights, they know everything, for miles round. And if man has been 'just' toward them, they will warn him of a coming danger, as they warn each other; but they will take no heed of him if he has not been straightforward in his actions. Snakes and birds (the owl is a leader of the snakes), mammals and insects, lizards and fishes—all understand each other, and continually communicate their observations to one another. They all belong to one brotherhood, into which they may, in some cases, admit man.

Inside this vast brotherhood there are, of course, the still closer brotherhoods of beings 'of one blood.' The monkeys,

[1] J. Brant-Sero, 'Dekanawideh,' in *Man*, 1901, p. 166. In other legends the wise man of the tride learns wisdom from the beaver, or the squirrel, or some bird.

the bears, the wolves, the elephants and the rhinoceroses, most ruminants, the hares and most of the rodents, the crocodiles, and so on, perfectly know their own kin, and they will not tolerate any one of their relatives to be slaughtered by man without taking, in one way or another, honest revenge. This conception must have had an extremely remote origin. It must have grown at a time when man had not yet become omnivorous (which I am inclined to think, must have happened during the Glacial period) and had not yet begun to hunt animals for food. However, the same conception has been retained down to the present time. Even now, when a savage is hunting, he is bound to respect certain rules of propriety toward the animals, and he must perform certain expiatory ceremonies after his hunt. Most of these ceremonies are rigorously enacted, even nowadays in the savage clans, especially as regards those species which are considered the allies of man.

It is well known that two men belonging to two different clans or tribes can become brothers by mixing the blood of the two, obtained from small incisions made for that purpose. To enter into such a union was quite habitual in olden times, and we learn from the folklore of all nations, and especially the sagas, how religiously such a brotherhood was observed. But it was also quite habitual for man to enter into brotherhood with some animal. The tales continually mention it. An animal asks a hunter to spare it, and if the hunter accedes to the demand the two become brothers. And then the monkey, the bear, the doe, the bird, the crocodile, or the bee—any one of the sociable animals—will take all possible care of the man-brother in the critical circumstances of his life, sending his or her animal brothers of different tribes to warn him or help him out of a difficulty. And if the warning comes too late, or is misunderstood, and he loses his life, they will all try to bring him back to life, and if they fail they will take the due revenge, just as if the man had been one of their own kin.

When I journeyed in Siberia I was often struck, without understanding it, with the care which my Tungus or Mongol guide would take not to uselessly kill any animal. The fact is that *every life* is respected by a savage, or rather it was before he

came in contact with Europeans. If he kills an animal, it is for food or for clothing; but he does not destroy life, as the whites do, for the mere excitement of the slaughter. True, the Red Indians have done that with the buffaloes; but it was only after they had been for a long time in contact with the whites, and had got from them the rifle and the quick-firing revolver. Of course, there are rascals among the animals—the hyena, for instance, or the shrew-mouse, or the man-eating tiger; but these do not count: they are outlaws. As to the great animal world as a whole, savage children are taught to respect it and to see in it an extension of their own kin.

The idea of 'justice,' conceived at its origin as revenge, is thus connected with observations made on animals. But it appears extremely probable that the idea of reward for 'just' and 'unjust' treatment must also have originated, with primitive mankind, from the idea that animals take revenge if they have not been properly treated by man, and repay kindness with kindness. This idea is so deeply rooted in the minds of the savages all over the world that it may be considered as one of the most primitive conceptions of mankind. Extended from a few animals to all of them, it soon embodied the whole of nature—the trees and the forests, the rivers and the seas, the rocks and the mountains, which are all living. Gradually it grew to be a conception of the great whole, bound together by certain links of mutual support, which watches all the actions of the living beings and, owing to that solidarity in the universe, undertakes the revenge of wrong deeds. It became the conception of the Eumenides and the Moirai of the Greeks, the Parcæ of the Romans, and especially the Karma of the Hindoos. The Greek legend of the cranes of Ibikus, which links together man and birds, and countless Eastern legends, are poetical embodiments of the same conception.

This is what primitive man saw in nature and learned from it. With our scholastic education, which has systematically ignored nature and has tried to explain its most common facts by metaphysical subtleties, we began to forget that lesson. But for our Stone-Age ancestors sociability and mutual aid within the tribe must have been a fact so general in nature, so habitual, and so

common that they certainly could not imagine life under another aspect. The conception of an isolated being is a later product of civilization—an abstraction, which it took ages to develop in the human race. To a primitive man isolated life seems so strange, so much out of the usual course of nature, that when he sees a tiger, a badger, a shrew-mouse, or a kingfisher leading a solitary existence, or when he notices a tree that stands alone, far from the forest, he creates a legend to explain this strange occurrence. He makes no legends to explain life in societies, but he has one for every case of solitude. The hermit, if he is not a sage or a wizard, is in most cases an outcast of animal society. He has done something so contrary to the ordinary run of life that they have thrown him out. Very often he is a sorcerer, who has the command of all sorts of dangerous powers, and has something to do with the pestilential corpses which sow disease in the world. This is why he prowls at night, prosecuting his wicked designs under the cover of darkness. All other beings in nature are sociable, and human thought runs in this channel. Sociable life—that is, *we*, not *I*—is, in the eyes of primitive man, the normal form of life. *It is life itself.* Therefore 'We' must have been the normal form of thinking for primitive man: a 'category' of his understanding, as Kant might have said. And not even 'We,' which is still too personal, because it represents a multiplication of the '*I*'s,' but rather such expressions as 'the men of the beaver tribe,' 'the kangaroo men,' or 'the turtles.' This was the primitive form of thinking, which nature impressed upon the mind of man.

Here, in that identification, or, we might even say, in this absorption of the 'I' by the tribe, lies the root of all ethical thought. The self-asserting 'individual' came much later on. Even now, with the lower savages, the 'individual' hardly exists at all. It is the tribe, with its hard-and-fast rules, superstitions, taboos, habits, and interests, which is always present in the mind of the child of nature. And in that constant, ever-present identification of the unit with the whole lies the substratum of all ethics, the germ out of which all the subsequent conceptions of justice, and the still higher conceptions of morality, grew up in the course of evolution.

VIII

THE SOUL IN BEASTS

"THE GROWTH OF MODERN IDEAS ON ANIMALS"

BY

COUNTESS CESARESCO

IF we accept, or even partly accept, the views of Prince Kropotkin as to the development of men from animals, and as to the nature and extent of our moral debt to the lower orders of life, then indeed the question of the possibility of a soul in the beast becomes of deepest interest. So also does the obverse of the same idea, our treatment of, our duty toward our "brethren of the wild." How many of us have felt urged to lament with Burns:

> *"I'm truly sorry man's dominion,*
> *Has broken nature's social union,*
> *An' justifies that ill opinion,*
> *Which makes thee startle*
> *At me, thy poor, earth-born companion,*
> *An' fellow-mortal."*

It is this side of the question, the humane side, that seems ever uppermost in the mind of the Countess E. Martinengo Cesaresco. She is known throughout the English and Italian races, indeed throughout the world, as a "friend of the creature." She has been active in his service and has written in his favor many times. In the following article, however, she keeps in mind the historic and also the scientific side of her subject, and presents us a summation of the most recent (1907) *thought upon the relation of man and beast.*

THE last age of antiquity was an age of yeast. Ideas were in fermentation; religious questions came to be regarded as "interesting"—just as they are now. The spirit of inquiry took the

place of placid acceptance on the one hand, and placid indifference on the other. It was natural that there should be a rebound from the effort of Augustus to re-order religion on an Imperial, conventional, and unemotional basis. Then, too, Rome, which had never been really Italian except in the sublime previsions of Virgil, grew every day more cosmopolitan: the denizens of the discovered world found their way thither on business, for pleasure, as slaves—the influence of these last not being the least important factor, though its extent and character are not easy to define. Everything tended to foment a religious unrest which took the form of one of those "returns to the East" that are ever destined to recur: the spiritual sense of the Western world became Orientalized. The worship of Isis and Serapis and much more of Mithra proved to be more exciting than the worship of the Greek and Roman gods which represented Nature and law, while the new cults proposed to raise the veil on what transcends natural perception. No doubt the atmosphere of the East itself favored their rapid development; the traveller in North Africa must be struck by the extraordinary frequency with which the symbols of Mithraism recur in the sculpture and mosaics of that once great Roman dependency. Evidently the birthland of St. Augustine bred in the matter-of-fact Roman colonist the same nostalgia for the Unknowable which even now a lonely night under the stars of the Sahara awakes in the dullest European soul. Personal immortality as a paramount doctrine; a further life more real than this one; ritual purification, redemption by sacrifice, mystical union with deity—these were among the un-Roman and even anti-Roman conceptions which lay behind the new, strange propaganda, and prepared the way for the diffusion of Christianity. With the Italian peasants who clung to the unmixed older faith no progress was made till persecution could be called in as an auxiliary.

In such a time it was a psychological certainty that among the other Eastern ideas which were coming to the fore would be those ideas about animals which are roughly classed under the head of Pythagoreanism. The apostles of Christ in their journeys east or west might have met a singular individual who was carrying on an apostolate of his own, the one clear and un-

yielding point of which was the abolition of animal sacrifices. This was Apollonius of Tyana, our knowledge of whom is derived from the biography, in part perhaps fanciful, written by Philostratus in the third century to please the Empress Julia Domna, who was interested in occult matters. Apollonius worked wonders as well attested as those, for instance, of the Russian Father John, but he seems to have considered his power the naturally produced result of an austere life and abstinence from flesh and wine, which is a thoroughly Buddhist or Jaina theory. He was a Theosophist who refrained from attacking the outward forms and observances of established religion when they did not seem to him either to be cruel or else incongruous to the degree of preventing a reverential spirit. He did not entirely understand that this degree is movable, any more than do those persons who want to substitute Gregorian chants for opera airs in rural Italian churches. He did not mind the Greek statues which appealed to the imagination by suggestions of beauty, but he blamed the Egyptians for representing deity as a dog or an ibis; if they disliked images of stone, why not have a temple where there were no images of any kind, where all was left to the inner vision of the worshipper? In which question, almost accidentally, Apollonius throws out a hint of the highest form of spiritual worship.

The keenly intellectual thinkers whom we call the Fathers of the Church saw that the majority of the ideas then agitating men's minds might find a quietus in Christian dogma, which suited them a great deal better than the vague and often grotesque shape they had worn hitherto. But there was a residuum of which they felt an instinctive fear, and peculiar notions about animals had the ill-luck of being placed at the head of these. It could not have been a fortunate coincidence that two of the most prominent men who held them in the early centuries were declared foes of the new faith—Celsus and Porphyry.

When the Church triumphed, the treatise written by Celsus would have been no doubt entirely destroyed like other works of the same sort, had not Origen made a great number of quotations from it for the purpose of confutation. Celsus was no *borné* disputant after the fashion of the Octavius of Minucius,

but a man of almost encyclopædic learning; if he was a less fair critic than he held himself to be, it was less from want of information than from want of that sympathy which is needful for true comprehension. The inner feeling of such a man toward the Christian Sectaries was not nearly so much that of a Torquemada in regard to heretics as that of an old-fashioned Tory upholder of throne and altar toward dissent fifty years ago. It was a feeling of social aloofness.

Yet Celsus wished to be fair, and he had studied religions to enough purpose not to condemn as delusion or untruth everything that a superficial adversary would have rejected at once; for instance, he was ready to allow that the appearances of Christ to His disciples after the Crucifixion might be explained as psychical phenomena. Possibly he believed that truth, not falsehood, was the ultimate basis of all religions, as was the belief of Apollonius before him. In some respects Celsus was more unprejudiced than Apollonius; this can be observed in his remarks on Egyptian zoömorphism; it causes surprise, he says, when you go inside one of the splendid Egyptian temples to find for divinity a cat, a monkey, or a crocodile, but to the initiated they are symbols which under an allegorical veil turn people to honor imperishable ideas, not perishable animals as the vulgar suppose.

It may have been his recondite researches which led Celsus to take up the question of the intelligence of animals and the conclusions to be drawn from it. He only touches lightly on the subject of their origin; he seems to lean toward the theory that the soul, life, mind, only is made by God, the corruptible and passing body being a natural growth or perhaps the handiwork of inferior spirits. He denied that reason belonged to man alone, and still more strongly that God created the universe for man rather than for the other animals. Only absurd pride, he says, can engender such a thought. He knew very well that this, far from being a new idea, was the normal view of the ancient world from Aristotle to Cicero; the distinguished men who disagreed with it had never won more than a small minority over to their opinion. Celsus takes Euripides to task for saying:

"The sun and moon are made to serve mankind."

Why mankind? he asks; why not ants and flies? Night serves them also for rest, and day for seeing and working. If it be said that we are the king of animals because we hunt and catch them or because we eat them, why not say that we are made for them because they hunt and catch us? Indeed, they are better provided than we, for while we need arms and nets to take them and the help of several men and dogs, Nature furnishes them with the arms they require, and we are, as it were, made dependent on them. You want to make out that God gave you the power to take and kill wild animals, but at the time when there were no towns or civilization or society or arms or nets, animals probably caught and devoured men while men never caught animals. In this way, it looks more as if God subjected man to animals than *vice versa*. If men seem different from animals because they build cities, make laws, obey magistrates and rulers, you ought to note that this amounts to nothing at all, since ants and bees do just the same. Bees have their "kings"; some command, others obey; they make war, win battles, take prisoners the vanquished; they have their towns and quarters; their work is regulated by fixed periods; they punish the lazy and cowardly—at least, they expel the drones. As to ants, they practise the science of social economy just as well as we do; they have granaries which they fill with provisions for the winter; they help their comrades if they see them bending under the weight of a burden; they carry their dead to places which become family tombs; they address each other when they meet: whence it follows that they never lose their way. We must conclude, therefore, that they have complete reasoning powers and common notions of certain general truths, and that they have a language and know how to express fortuitous events. If some one, then, looked down from the height of heaven on to the earth, what difference would he see between our actions and those of ants and bees? If man is proud of knowing magical secrets, serpents and eagles know a great deal more, for they use many preservatives against poisons and diseases, and are acquainted with the virtues of certain stones with which they cure the ailments of their young ones, while if men find out such a cure they think they have hit

on the greatest wonder in the world. Finally, if man imagine that he is superior to animals because he possesses the notion of God, let him know that it is the same with many of them; what is there more divine, in fact, than to foresee and to foretell the future? Now for that purpose men have recourse to animals, especially to birds, and all our soothsayers do is to understand the indications given by these. If, therefore, birds and other prophetic animals show us by signs the future as it is revealed to them by God, it proves that they have closer relations with the deity than we; that they are wiser and more loved by God. Very enlightened men have thought that they understood the language of certain animals, and in proof of this they have been known to predict that birds would do something or go somewhere, and this was observed to come true. No one keeps an oath more religiously or is more faithful to God than the elephant, which shows that he knows Him.

Hence, concludes Celsus, the universe has *not* been made for man any more than for the eagle or the dolphin. Everything was created not in the interest of something else, but to contribute to the harmony of the whole in order that the world might be absolutely perfect. God takes care of the universe; it is that which His providence never forsakes, that which never falls into disorder. God no more gets angry with men than with rats or monkeys: everything keeps its appointed place.

In this passage Celsus rises to a higher level than in any other of the excerpts preserved for us by Origen. The tone of irony which usually characterizes him disappears in this dignified affirmation of supreme wisdom justified of itself, not by the little standards of men—or ants. It must be recognized as a lofty conception, commanding the respect of those who differ from it, and reconciling all apparent difficulties and contradictions forced upon us by the contemplation of man and Nature. But it brings no water from the cool spring to souls dying of thirst; it expounds in the clearest way and even in the noblest way the very thought which drove men into the Christian fold far more surely than the learned apologies of controversialists like Origen: the thought of the crushing unimportance of the individual.

The least attentive reader must be struck by the real knowledge of natural history shown by Celsus; his ants are nearly as conscientiously observed as Lord Avebury's. Yet a certain suspicion of conscious exaggeration detracts from the seriousness of his arguments; he strikes one as more sincere in disbelieving than in believing. A modern writer has remarked that Celsus in the second half of the second century forestalled Darwin in the second half of the nineteenth by denying human ascendancy and contending that man may be a little lower than the brute. But it scarcely seems certain whether he was convinced by his own reasoning or was not rather replying by paradoxes to what he considered the still greater paradoxes of Christian theology.

The shadow of no such doubt falls on the pages of the neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry. To them the destiny of animals was not an academic problem, but an obsession. The questions which Heine's young man asked of the waves—"What signifies man? Whence does he come? Whither does he go?"—were asked by them with passionate earnestness in their application to all sentient things. Plotinus reasoned, with great force, that intelligent beast-souls must be like the soul of man, since in itself the essence of the soul could not be different. Porphyry (born at Tyre, A.D. 233), accepting this postulate that animals possess an intelligent soul like ours, went on to declare that it was therefore unlawful to kill or feed on them under any circumstances. If justice is due to rational beings, how is it possible to evade the conclusion that we are also bound to act justly toward the races below us? He who loves all animated nature will not single out one tribe of innocent beings for hatred; if he loves the whole he will love every part, and, above all, that part which is most closely allied to ourselves. Porphyry was quite ready to admit that animals in their own way made use of words, and he mentions Melampus and Apollonius as among the philosophers who understood their language.

Neoplatonism penetrated into the early church, but divested of its views on animal destiny; even the Catholic neoplatonist Boethius, though he was sensitively fond of animals (witness

his lines about caged birds), yet took the extreme view of the hard and fast line of separation, as may be seen by his poem on the "downward head," which he interpreted to indicate the earth-bound nature of all flesh save man. Birds, by the by, and even fishes, not to speak of camelopards, can hardly be said to have a "downward head." Meanwhile, the other manner of feeling, if not of thinking, reasserted its power, as it always will, for it belongs to the primal things. Excluded from the broad road, it came in by the narrow way—the way that leads to heaven. In the wake of the Christian Guru came a whole troop of charming beasts, little less saintly and miraculous than their holy protectors, and thus preachers of the religion of love were spared the reproach of showing an all-unloving face toward creatures that could return love for love as well as most and better than many of the human kind. The saint saved the situation, and the Church wisely let him alone to discourse to his brother fishes or his sister turtle-doves, without inquiring about the strict orthodoxy of the proceeding.[1]

Unhappily the more direct inheritors of neoplatonist dreams were not let alone. A trend of tendency toward Pythagoreanism runs through their different developments from Philo to the Gnostics, from the Gnostics, through the Paulicians, to the Albigenses. It passes out of our sight when these were suppressed in the thirteenth century by the most sanguinary persecution that the world has seen; but before long it was to reappear in one shape or another, and we may be sure that the thread was never wholly lost.

At an early date, in the heart of official Catholicism, an inconsistency appeared which is less easily explained than homilies composed for fishes or hymns for birds; namely, the strange business of animal prosecutions. Without inquiring exactly what an animal is, it is easy to bestow upon it either blessings or curses. The beautiful rite of the blessing of the beasts, which is still performed once a year in many places,

[1] It is the common impression in Rome that the present occupant of the Chair of St. Peter is nearer to the Saints than to the doctors; it does not cause surprise, therefore, though it must cause a great deal of pleasure, to find him recently bestowing his blessing "on all protectors of animals throughout the world."—C.

involves no doctrinal crux. In Corsica the priest goes up to the high mountain *plateaux* where the animals pasture in the summer, and after saying mass in presence of all the four-footed family, he solemnly blesses them and exhorts them to prosper and multiply. It is a delightful scene, but it does not affect the conception of the moral status of animals, nor would that conception be affected by a right-down malediction or order to quit. What, however, can be thought of a regular trial of inconvenient or offending animals, in which great care is taken to keep up the appearance of fair-play to the defendants? Our first impression is that it must be an elaborate comedy; but a study of the facts makes it impossible to accept this theory.

The earliest allusions to such trials that seem to exist belong to the ninth century, which does not prove that they were the first of the kind. One trial took place in 824 A.D. The Council of Worms decided in 868 that if a man has been killed by bees they ought to suffer death, "but," added the judgment, "it will be permissible to eat their honey." A relic of the same order of ideas lingers in the habit some people have of shooting a horse which has caused a fatal accident, often the direct consequence of bad riding or bad driving. The earlier beast trials of which we have knowledge were conducted by laymen, the later by ecclesiastics, which suggests their origin in a folk-practice. A good, characteristic instance began on September 5th, 1370. The young son of a Burgundian swineherd had been killed by three sows which seemed to have feared an attack on one of their young ones. All members of the herd were arrested as accomplices, which was a serious matter to their owners, the inmates of a neighboring convent, as the animals, if convicted, would be burnt and their ashes buried. The prior pointed out that three sows alone were guilty; surely the rest of the pigs ought to be acquitted. Justice did not move quickly in those times; it was on the 12th September, 1379, that the Duke of Burgundy delivered judgment; only the three guilty sows and one young pig (what had *it* done?) were to be executed; the others were set at liberty, "notwithstanding that they had seen the death of the boy without defending him." Were the original ones all alive after nine

years? If so, would so long a respite have been granted them had no legal proceedings been instituted?

An important trial took place in Savoy in the year 1587. The accused was a certain fly. Two suitable advocates were assigned to the insects, who argued on their behalf that these creatures were created before man, and had been blessed by God who gave them the right to feed on grass, and for all these and other good reasons the flies were in their right when they occupied the vineyards of the Commune; they simply availed themselves of a legitimate privilege conforming to divine and natural law. The plaintiffs' advocate retorted that the Bible and common sense showed animals to be created for the utility of man; hence they could not have the right to cause him loss, to which the counsel for the insects replied that man had the right to command animals, no doubt, but not to persecute, excommunicate, and interdict them when they were merely conforming to natural law, "which is eternal and immutable like the divine."

The judges were so deeply impressed by this pleading that, to cut the case short, which seemed to be going against him the Mayor of St. Julien hastened to propose a compromise; he offered a piece of land where the flies might find a safe retreat and live out their days in peace and plenty. The offer was accepted. On June 29th, 1587, the citizens of St. Julien were bidden to the market square by ringing the church bells, and after a short discussion they ratified the agreement, which handed over a large piece of land to the exclusive use of the insects. Hope was expressed that they would be entirely satisfied with the bargain. A right of way across the land was, indeed, reserved to the public, but no harm whatever was to be done to the flies on their own territory. It was stated in the formal contract that the reservation was ceded to the insects in perpetuity.

All was going well, when it transpired that, in the mean time, the flies' advocates had paid a visit to that much-vaunted piece of land, and when they returned they raised the strongest objection to it on the score that it was arid, sterile, and produced nothing. The mayor's counsel disputed this; the land,

he said, produced no end of nice small trees and bushes, the very things for the nutrition of insects. The judges intervened by ordering a survey to find out the real truth, which survey cost three florins. There, alas, the story ends, for the winding up of the affair is not to be found in the archives of St. Julien.

Records of 144 such trials have come to light. Of the two I have described, it will be remarked that one belongs, as it were, to criminal and the other to civil law. The last class is the most curious. No doubt the trial of flies or locusts was resorted to when other means of getting rid of them had failed; it was hoped, somehow, that the elaborate appearance of fair play would bring about a result not to be obtained by violence. We can hardly resist the inference that they involved some sort of recognition or intuition of animals' rights and even of animal intelligence.

Afterward, during the cruel witch mania, not a few cleverly trained animals were put to death on suspicion of diabolical possession, like Bankes' horse, "*Morocco*," whose pretty tricks were mentioned by Shakespeare. It is lucky for the Prussian "Hans" that he lives in a more enlightened age.

In the dawn of modern literature animals played a large, though artificial, part, which must not be quite ignored on account of its artificiality, because in the Bestiaries, as in the Æsopic and Oriental fables from which they were mainly derived, there was an inextricable tangle of observations of the real creature and arbitrary ascription to him of human qualities and adventures. At last they became a mere method for attacking political or ecclesiastical abuses, but their great popularity was as much due to their outer as to their inner sense. There is not any doubt that at the same time floods of Eastern fairy-tales were migrating to Europe, and in these the most highly appreciated hero was always the friendly beast. In a romance of the thirteenth century called *Guillaume de Palerme*, all previous marvels of this kind were outdone by the story of a Sicilian prince who was befriended by a were-wolf!

It is not generally remembered that the Indian or Buddhist view of animals must have been pretty well known in Europe

at least as early as the fourteenth century. The account of the monastery "where many strange beasts of divers kinds do live upon a hill," which Fra Odoric, of Pordenone, dictated in 1330, is a description, both accurate and charming, of a Buddhist animal refuge, and in the version given of it in Mandeville's "Travels," if not in the original, it must have been read by nearly every one who could read, for no book ever had so vast a diffusion as the "Travels" of the elusive Knight of St. Albans.

With the Italian renaissance came the full modern *æsthetic* enjoyment of animals—the admiration of their beauty and perfection, which had been appreciated, of course, long before, but not quite in the same spirit. The all-round gifted Leo Battista Alberti in the fifteenth century took the same critical delight in the points of a fine animal that a modern expert would take. He was a splendid rider, but his interest was not confined to horses; his love for his dog is shown by his having pronounced a funeral oration over him.

We feel that with such men humanity toward animals was a part of good manners. "We owe justice to men," said the intensely civilized Montaigne, "and grace and benignity to other creatures that are capable of it; there is a natural commerce and mutual obligation between them and us." Sir Arthur Helps, speaking of this, called it "using courtesy to animals," and, when one comes to think of it, is not such "courtesy" the particular mark and sign of a man of good breeding in all ages?

The Renaissance brought with it something deeper than a wonderful quickening of the æsthetic sense in all directions; it also brought that spiritual quickening which is the co-efficient of every really upward movement of the human mind. It was to be foreseen that animals would have their portion of attention in the ponderings of the god-intoxicated musers on life and things who have been called the sceptics of the Renaissance. For the proof that they did receive it we have only to turn to the pages of Giordano Bruno: "Every part of creation has its share in being and cognition." "There is a difference, not in quality, but in quantity, between the soul of man,

the animal, and the plant." "Among horses, elephants, and dogs there are single individuals which appear to have almost the understanding of men." "With what understanding the ant gnaws her grain of wheat lest it should sprout in her underground habitations!"

Bruno's prophetic guess, that instinct is inherited habit, might have saved Descartes (who was much indebted to the Nolan) from giving his name an unenviable immortality in connection with the theory which is nearly all that the ignorant know now of Cartesian philosophy. This was the theory that animals are *automata*, a sophism that may be said to have swept Europe, though it was not long before it provoked a reaction. Descartes got this idea from the very place where is was likely to originate, from Spain. A certain Gomez Pereira advanced it before Descartes made it his own, which even led to a charge of plagiarism. "Because a clock marks time and a bee makes honey, we are to consider the clock and the bee to be machines. Because they do one thing better than man and no other thing so well as man, we are to conclude that they have no mind, but that Nature acts within them, holding their organs at her disposal." "Nor are we to think, as the ancients do, that animals speak, though we do not know their language, for, if that were so, they, having several organs related to ours, might as easily communicate with us as with each other."

About this, Huxley showed that an almost imperceptible imperfection of the vocal chord may prevent articulated sounds. Moreover, the click of the bushman, which is almost his only language, is exceedingly like the sounds made by monkeys.

Language, as defined by an eminent Italian man of science, Professor Broca, is the faculty of making things known or expressing them by signs or sounds. Much the same definition was given by Mivart, and if there be a better one, we have still to wait for it. Human language is evolved; at one time man had it not. The babe in the cradle is without it; the deaf mute, in his untaught state, is without it; *ergo*, the babe and the deaf mute cannot feel. Poor babes and poor deaf mutes, should the scientific Loyolas of the future adopt this view!

I do not know if any one has remarked that rural and primitive folk can never bring themselves to believe of any foreign tongue that it is real human language like their own. To them it seems a jargon of meaningless and uncouth sounds.

Chanet, a follower of Descartes, said that he would believe that beasts thought when a beast told him so. By what cries of pain, by what looks of love, have not beasts told men that they thought! Man himself does not think in words in moments of profound emotion, whether of grief or joy. *He cries out* or he *acts*. Thought in its absolutely elementary form is *action*. The mother thinks in the kiss she gives her child. Perhaps God thinks in constellations. I asked a man who had saved many lives by jumping into the sea, "What did you think of at the moment of doing it?" He replied, "You do not think, or you might not do it."

The whole trend of philosophic speculation worthy of the name lies toward unity, but the Cartesian theory would arbitrarily divide even man's physical and sensational nature from that of the other animals. To remedy this, Descartes admitted that man was just as much an automatic machine as other creatures. By what right then does he complain when he happens to have a toothache? Because, says Descartes triumphantly, man has an immortal soul! The child thinks in his mother's womb, but the dog, which after scenting two roads takes the third without demur, sure that his master must have gone that way, this dog is acting "by springs," and neither thinks nor feels at all.

The misuse of the ill-treated word "Nature" cannot hide the fact that the beginning, middle, and end of Descartes' argument rests on a perpetually recurrent miracle. Descartes confessed as much when he said that God *could* make animals as machines, so why should it be impossible that he *had* made them as machines? Voltaire's clear reason revolted at this logic; he declared it to be absurd to imagine that God had given animals organs of feeling in order that they might *not* feel. He would have endorsed Professor Romanes' saying that "the theory of animal automatism which is usually attributed to Descartes can never be accepted by common sense."

On the other hand, while Descartes was being persecuted by the Church for opinions which he did *not* hold, this particular opinion of his was seized upon by Catholic divines as a vindication of creation. Pascal so regarded it. The miraculous element in it did not disturb him. Malebranche said that though opposed by reason it was approved by faith.

Descartes said that the idea that animals think and feel is a relic of childhood. The idea that they do *not* think and feel might be more truly called a relic of that darkest side of perverse childhood, the existence of which we are all fain to forget. Whoever has seen a little child throwing stones at a toad on the highway—and sad because his hands are too small to take up the bigger stones to throw—will understand what I mean. I do not wish to allude more than slightly to a point which is of too much importance to pass over in silence. Descartes was a vivisector; so were the pious people at Port Royal, who embraced his teaching with enthusiasm and liked to hear the howls of the dogs they vivisected. M. Émile Ferrière in his work "L'âme est la fonction du cerveau," sees in the "soul" of beasts exactly the same nature as in the "soul" of man; the difference, he maintains, is one of degree; thought generally inferior, it is sometimes superior to "souls" of certain human groups. Here is a candid materialist who deserves respect. But there is a school of physiologists nowadays which carries on an unflagging campaign in favor of belief in unconscious animal machines which work by springs, while denying that there is a God to wind up the springs, and in conscious human machines, while denying that there is a soul, independent of matter, which might account for the difference. "The wish is father to the thought." *Non ragionam di lor ma guarda e passa.*

The strongest of all reasons for dismissing the machine theory of animals is their variety of idiosyncrasy. It is said that to the shepherd no two sheep look alike; it is certain that no two animals of any kind have the same characters. Some are selfish, some are unselfish, some are gentle, some irretrievably ill-tempered both to each other and to man. Some animals do not show much regret at the loss of their offspring; with others it is manifestly the reverse. Édouard Quinet de-

scribed how on one occasion, when visiting the lions' cage in the Jardin des Plantes, he observed the lion gently place his large paw on the forehead of the lioness, and so they remained, grave and still, all the time he was there. He asked Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, who was with him, what it meant. "Their lion cub," was the answer, "died this morning." "Pity, benevolence, sympathy, could be read on those rugged faces." That these qualities are often absent in sentient beings, what man can doubt? but they are not to be found in the best machine-made animals in all Nuremberg!

One of the first upholders of the idea of legislative protection of animals was Jeremy Bentham, who asked why the law should refuse its protection to any sensitive being? Most people forget the degree of opposition which was encountered by the earlier combatants of cruel practices and pastimes in England. Cobbett made a furious attack on a clergyman who, to his honor, was agitating for the suppression of bull-baiting, "the poor man's sport," as Cobbett called it. That it demoralized the poor man as well as tormented the bull never entered into the head of the inimitable wielder of English prose, pure and undefiled, who took it under his (happily) ineffectual protection. Societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals had, in their day, to undergo almost as much criticism and ridicule in England as they now meet with in some parts of the Continent. Even the establishment of the Dogs' Home in London raised a storm of disapproval, as may be seen by any one who turns over the files of the *Times* for October, 1860. If the friends of humanity persevere, the change of sentiment which has become an accomplished fact in England, will in the end triumph elsewhere.

Unfortunately, humane sentiment, and especially humane practice, do not progress on a level line. As long ago as 1782 an English writer named Soame Jenyns protested against the wickedness of shooting a bear on an inaccessible island of ice, or an eagle on the mountain's top. "We are unable to give life and therefore ought not to take it away from the meanest insect without sufficient reason." What would he say if he came back to earth to find whole species of beautiful winged

creatures being destroyed to afford a more or less barbarous ornament for women's heads?

The "discovery" of Indian literature brought prominently forward in the West the Indian ideas of animals of which the old travellers had given the earliest news. The effect of familiarity with those ideas may be traced in many writers, but nowhere to such an extent as in the works of Schopenhauer, for whom, as for many more obscure students, they formed the most attractive and interesting part of Oriental lore. Schopenhauer cannot speak about animals without using a tone of passionate vehemence which was, without doubt, genuine. He felt the intense enjoyment in observing them which the lonely soul has ever felt, whether it belonged to saint or sinner. All his pessimism disappears when he leaves the haunts of man for the retreats of beasts. What a pleasure it is, he says, to watch a wild animal going about undisturbed! It shows us our own nature in a simpler and more sincere form. "There is only one mendacious being in the world, and that is man. Every other is true and sincere." It strikes me that total sincerity did not shine on the face of a dog which I once saw trotting innocently away, after burying a rabbit he had caught in a ploughed field, near a tree in the hedge—the only tree there was—which would make it easy for him to identify the spot. But about that I will say no more. The German "Friend of the Creature" was indignant at "the unpardonable forgetfulness in which the lower animals have hitherto been left by the moralists of Europe." The duty of protecting them, neglected by religion, falls to the police. Mankind are the devils of the earth, and animals the souls they torment.

Full of these sentiments, Schopenhauer was prepared to welcome unconditionally the Indian conception of the Wheel of Being and to close his eyes to its defects. Strauss, too, hailed it as a doctrine which "unites the whole of Nature in one sacred and mysterious bond"—a bond in which, he goes on to say, a breach has been made by the Judaism and Dualism of Christianity. He might have observed that the Church derived her notions on the subject rather from Aristotle than from Semitic sources.

Schopenhauer came to the conclusion that the ill-treatment of animals arose directly from the denial to them of immortality, while it was ascribed to men. There is and there is not truth in this. When all is said, the humane man always was and always will be human; "the merciful man regardeth the life of his beast." And since people reason to fit their acts rather than act to fit their reasoning, he will even find a motive for his humanity where others find an excuse for the lack of it. Humphry Primatt wrote in 1776: "Cruelty to a brute is an injury irreparable because there is no future life to be a compensation for present afflictions."

Mr. Lecky, in his "History of European Morals," tells of a cardinal who let himself be bitten by gnats because "*we* have heaven, but these poor creatures only present enjoyment!" Could Jaina do more?

Strauss thought that the rising tide of popular sentiment about animals was the direct result of the abandonment by science of the spiritualistic isolation of man from Nature. I suspect that those who have worked hardest for animals in the last half century cared little about the origin of species, while it is certain that some professed evolutionists have been their worst foes. The fact remains, however, that by every rule of logic the theory of evolution *ought* to produce the effect which Strauss thought that it had produced. The discovery which gives its name to the nineteenth century revolutionizes the whole philosophic conception of the place of animals in the Universe.

Lamarck, whom Cuvier so cruelly attacked, was the first to discern the principle of evolution. At one time he held the Chair of Zoölogy at the University of Paris; but the opposition which his ideas met with crushed him in body, though not in soul, and he died blind and in want in 1829, only consoled by the care of an admirable daughter. His last words are said to have been that it is easier to discover a truth than to convince others of it.

An Italian named Carlo Lessona was one of the first to be convinced. He wrote a work containing the phrase, "the intelligence of animals"—which work, by the rule then in force,

had to be presented to the ecclesiastical Censor at Turin to receive his permit before publication. The canon who examined the book fell upon the words above mentioned, and remarked, "This expression, 'intelligence of animals,' will never do!" "But," said Lessona, "it is commonly used in natural history books." "Oh!" replied the canon, "natural history has much need of revision."

The great and cautious Darwin said that the senses, intuitions, emotions, and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient or even sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower animals. "Man, with all his noble qualities, his God-like intellect, still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin. Our brethren fly in the air, haunt the bushes, and swim in the sea." Darwin agreed with Agassiz in recognizing in the dog something very like the human conscience.

Dr. Arnold said that the whole subject of the brute creation was such a painful mystery that he dared not approach it. Michelet called animal life a "sombre mystery," and shuddered at the "daily murder," hoping that in another globe "these base and cruel fatalities may be spared to us." It is strange to find how many men of very different types have wandered without a guide in these dark alleys of speculation. A few of them arrived at, or thought they had arrived at, a solution. Lord Chesterfield wrote that "animals preying on each other is a law of Nature which we did not make and which we cannot undo, for 'if I do not eat chickens my cat will eat mice.'" But the appeal to Nature will not satisfy every one; our whole human conscience is a protest against Nature, while our moral actions are an attempt to effect a compromise. Paley pointed out that the law was not good, since we could live without animal food, and wild beasts could not. He offered another justification, the permission of Scripture. This was satisfactory to him, but he must have been aware that it waives the question without answering it.

Some humane people have taken refuge in the *automata* argument, which is like taking a sleeping-draught to cure a

broken leg. Others, again, look for justice to animals in the one and only hope that man possesses of justice to himself—in compensation after death for unmerited suffering in this life. Leibnitz said that Eternal Justice *ought* to compensate animals for their misfortunes on earth. It is curious to find that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seven or eight small works, written in Latin in support of this thesis, were published in Germany and Sweden. Probably in all the world a number, unsuspectedly large, of sensitive minds has endorsed the belief expressed so well in the lines which Southey wrote on coming home to find that a favorite old dog had been "destroyed" during his absence:

> . . . . . Mine is no narrow creed;
> And He who gave thee being did not frame
> The mystery of life to be the sport
> Of merciless man! There is another world
> For all that live and move—a better one!
> Where the proud bipeds, who would fain confine
> Infinite Goodness to the little bounds
> Of their own charity, may envy thee!

The holders of this "no narrow creed" start with all the advantages from the mere point of view of dialectics. They can boast that they have placed the immortality of the soul on a scientific basis. For truly, it is more reasonable to suppose that the soul is natural than supernatural, a word invented to clothe our ignorance; and, if natural, why not universal?

They have the right to say, moreover, that they and they alone have "justified the ways of God." They alone have admitted all creation that groaneth and travaileth to the ultimate guerdon of the "Love that moves the sun and other stars."

IX

THE FAILURE OF EVOLUTION

"HUMAN SELECTION AND MARRIAGE"

BY

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, LL.D., D.C.L., F.R.S., stands to-day as the father of modern science, the dean of living scholars. An aged man of eighty-four, he is still vigorous and full of thought, still writing for a world which is little likely ever to forget his remarkable entry into fame. It was he who, at the same time as Darwin, worked out the theory of the survival of the fittest. From his far-off exploring station in the Malayan archipelago, Mr. Wallace sent home to Darwin an essay which covered the very ground upon which its recipient was at work. Darwin made public both his own work and Wallace's, and thus the two men shone forth as twin stars of the great new doctrine. It was around Darwin that the attack and defence of evolution centred, and doubtless he proved himself the greater scientist of the two; so that the fame of the dead discoverer has justly outshone the fame of the one still living. Yet science knows few names to equal that of Wallace.

His article here treats the startling question of the failure of his famous doctrine to apply to modern conditions of society, and, in consequence, the possible retrogression of human life and the survival of the unfit. The danger is a real one; it has drawn wide attention of late. Modern pity and charity protect the feeble; modern war and competition destroy the strong. Mr. Wallace finds the remedy in the wisdom of women, in the marriage customs of the future. Whether he is right in this or no, he makes star-

ilingly evident the fact that the old brute law of survival has ceased to operate upon mankind.

In one of my latest conversations with Darwin he expressed himself very gloomily on the future of humanity, on the ground that in our modern civilization natural selection had no play, and the fittest did not survive. Those who succeed in the race for wealth are by no means the best or the most intelligent, and it is notorious that our population is more largely renewed in each generation from the lower than from the middle and upper classes. As a recent American writer well puts it, "We behold the melancholy spectacle of the renewal of the great mass of society from the lowest classes, the highest classes to a great extent either not marrying or not having children. The floating population is always the scum, and yet the stream of life is largely renewed from this source. Such a state of affairs, sufficiently dangerous in any society, is simply suicidal in the democratic civilization of our day." [1]

That the check to progress here indicated is a real one few will deny, and the problem is evidently felt to be one of vital importance, since it has attracted the attention of some of our most thoughtful writers, and has quite recently furnished the theme for a perfect flood of articles in our best periodicals. I propose here to consider very briefly the various suggestions made by these writers, and afterward shall endeavor to show that, when the course of social evolution shall have led to a more rational organization of society, the problem will receive its final solution by the action of physiological and social agencies, and in perfect harmony with the highest interests of humanity.

ARE THE RESULTS OF TRAINING HEREDITARY?

Before discussing the question itself it will be well to consider whether there are in fact any other agencies than some form of selection to be relied on. It has been generally accepted hitherto that such beneficial influences as education, hygiene, and social refinement had a cumulative action, and would of themselves lead to a steady improvement of all civilized races. This view

[1] Hiram M. Stanley in the *Arena*.

rested on the belief that whatever improvement was effected in individuals was transmitted to their progeny, and that it would be thus possible to effect a continuous advance in physical, moral, and intellectual qualities without any selection of the better or elimination of the inferior types. But of late years grave doubts have been thrown on this view, owing chiefly to the researches of Galton and Weismann as to the fundamental causes to which heredity is due. The balance of opinion among physiologists now seems to be against the heredity of any qualities acquired by the individual after birth, in which case the question we are discussing will be much simplified, since we shall be limited to some form of selection as the only possible means of improving the race.

In order to make the difference between the two theories clear to those who may not have followed the recent discussions on the subject, an illustration may be useful. Let us suppose two persons, each striving to produce two distinct types of horse —the cart-horse and the racer—from the wild prairie horses of America, and that one of them believes in the influence of food and training, the other in selection. Each has a lot of a hundred horses to begin with, as nearly as possible alike in quality. The one who trusts to selection at once divides his horses into two lots, the one stronger and heavier, the other lighter and more active, and, breeding from these, continually selects, for the parents of the succeeding generation, those which most nearly approach the two types required. In this way it is perfectly certain that in a comparatively short period—thirty or forty years perhaps—he would be able to produce two very distinct forms, the one a very fair racehorse, the other an equally good specimen of a cart-horse; and he could do this without subjecting the two strains to any difference of food or training, since it *is* by selection alone that our various breeds of domestic animals have in most cases been produced.

On the other hand, the person who undertook to produce similar results by food and training alone, without allowing selection to have any part in the process, would have to act in a very different manner. He should first divide his horses into two lots as nearly as possible identical in all points, and there-

after subject the one lot to daily exercise in drawing loads at a slow pace, the other lot to equally constant exercise in running, and he might also supply them with different kinds of food if he thought it calculated to aid in producing the required effect. In each successive generation he must make no selection of the swiftest or the strongest, but must either keep the whole progeny of each lot, or carefully choose an average sample of each to be again subjected to the same discipline. It is quite certain that the very different kinds of exercise would have some effect on the individuals so trained, enlarging and strengthening a different set of muscles in each, and if this effect were transmitted to the offspring then there ought to be in this case also a steady advance toward the racer and the cart-horse type. Such an experiment, however, has never been tried, and we cannot therefore say positively what would be the result; but those who accept the theory of the non-heredity of acquired characters would predict with confidence that after thirty or forty generations of training without selection, the last two lots of colts would have made little or no advance toward the two types required, but would be practically indistinguishable.

It is exceedingly difficult to find any actual cases to illustrate this point, since either natural or artificial selection has almost always been present. The apparent effects of disuse in causing the diminution of certain organs, such as the reduced wings of some birds in oceanic islands and the very small or aborted eyes of some of the animals inhabiting extensive caverns, can be as well explained by the withdrawal of the cumulative agency of natural selection and by economy of growth, as by the direct effects of disuse. The following facts, however, seem to show that special skill derived from practice, when continued for several generations, is not inherited, and does not therefore tend to increase. The wonderful skill of most of the North American Indians in following a trail by indications quite imperceptible to the ordinary European has been dwelt upon by many writers, but it is now admitted that the white trappers equal and often excel them, though these trappers have in almost every case acquired their skill in a comparatively short period, without any of the inherited experience supposed to belong to the Indian.

Again, for many generations a considerable proportion of the male population of Switzerland has practised rifle-shooting as a national sport, yet in international contests they show no marked superiority over our riflemen, who are, in a large proportion, the sons of men who never handled a gun. Another case is afforded by the upper classes of this country who for many generations have been educated at the universities, and have had their classical and mathematical abilities developed to the fullest extent by rivalry for honors. Yet now, that for some years these institutions have been opened to dissenters whose parents usually for many generations have had no such training, it is found that these dissenters carry off their full share or even more than their share of honors. We thus see that the theory of the non-heredity of acquired characters, whether physical or mental, is supported by a considerable number of facts, while few if any are directly opposed to it. We therefore propose to neglect the influence of education and habit as possible factors in the improvement of our race, and to confine our argument entirely to the possibility of improvement by some form of selection.[1]

PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE RACE

Among the modern writers who have dealt with this question the opinions of Mr. Galton are entitled to be first considered, because he has studied the whole subject of human faculty in the most thorough manner, and has perhaps thrown more light upon it than any other writer. The method of selection by which he has suggested that our race may be improved is to be brought into action by means of a system of marks for family merit, both as to health, intellect, and morals, those individuals who stand high in these respects being encouraged to marry early by state endowments sufficient to enable the young couples to make a start in life. Of all the proposals that have been made tending to the systematic improvement of our race, this is one of the least objectionable, but it is also I fear among the least effective. Its tendency would undoubtedly be to increase the number and to raise the standard of our highest and best men, but it would at the same time leave the bulk of the population unaffected, and

[1] Those who desire more information on this subject should read Weismann's *Essays on Heredity*.

would but slightly diminish the rate at which the lower types tend to supplant or to take the place of the higher. What we want is, not a higher standard of perfection in the few, but a higher average, and this can best be produced by the elimination of the lowest of all and a free intermingling of the rest.

Something of this kind is proposed by Mr. Hiram M. Stanley in his article on "Our Civilization and the Marriage Problem," already referred to. This writer believes that civilizations perish because, as wealth and art increase, corruption creeps in, and the new generations fail in the work of progress because the renewal of individuals is left chiefly to the unfit. The two great factors which secure perfection in each animal race—sexual selection by which the fit are born, and natural selection by which the fittest survive—both fail in the case of mankind, among whom are hosts of individuals which in any other class of beings would never have been born, or, if born, would never survive. He argues that, unless some effective measures are soon adopted and strictly enforced, our case will be irremediable; and, since natural selection fails so largely, recourse must be had to artificial selection. "The drunkard, the criminal, the diseased, the morally weak should never come into society. Not reform, but prevention, should be the cry." The method by which this is proposed to be done is hinted at in the following passages: "In the true golden age, which lies not behind but before us, the privilege of parentage will be esteemed an honor for the comparatively few, and no child will be born who is not only sound in body and mind, but also above the average as to natural ability and moral force"; and again, "The most important matter in society, the inherent quality of the members which compose it, should be regulated by trained specialists."

Of this proposal and all of the same character we may say that nothing can possibly be more objectionable, even if we admit that they might be effectual in securing the object aimed at. But even this is more than doubtful; and it is quite certain that any such interference with personal freedom in matters so deeply affecting individual happiness will never be adopted by the majority of any nation, or if adopted would never be submitted to by the minority without a life-and-death struggle.

Another popular writer of the greatest ability and originality, who has recently given us his solution of the problem, is Mr. Grant Allen. His suggestion is in some respects the very reverse of the last, yet it is, if possible, even more objectionable. Instead of any interference with personal freedom he proposes the entire abolition of legal restrictions as to marriage, which is to be a free contract, to last only so long as either party desires. This alone, however, would have no effect on race-improvement, except probably a prejudicial one. The essential part of his method is that girls should be taught, both by direct education and by the influence of public opinion, that the duty of all healthy and intellectual women is to be mothers of as many and as perfect children as possible. For this purpose they are recommended to choose as temporary husbands the finest, healthiest, and most intellectual men, thus insuring a variety of combinations of parental qualities which would lead to the production of offspring of the highest possible character and to the continual advancement of the race.[1]

I think I have fairly summarized the essence of Mr. Grant Allen's proposal, which, though enforced with all his literary skill and piquancy of illustration, can, in my opinion, only be fitly described by the term already applied to it by one of his reviewers, "detestable." It purports to be advanced in the interests of the children and of the race; but it would necessarily impair that family life and parental affection which are the prime essentials to the well-being of children; while, though it need not necessarily produce, it would certainly favor, the increase of pure sensualism, the most degrading and most fatal of all the qualities that tend to the deterioration of races and the downfall of nations. One of the modern American advocates of greater liberty of divorce, in the interest of marriage itself, thus admirably summarizes the essential characteristics and purport of true marriage: "In a true relation, the chief object is the loving companionship of man and woman, their capacity for mutual help and happiness, and for the development of all that is noblest in each other. The second object is the building up a home and family, a place of rest, peace, security, in which child-life can

[1] See *The Girl of the Future* in *The Universal Review.*

bud and blossom like flowers in the sunshine."[1] For such rest, peace, and security, permanence is essential. This permanence need not be attained by rigid law, but by the influence of public opinion, and, more surely still, by those deep-seated feelings and emotions which, under favorable conditions, render the marriage tie stronger and its influence more beneficial the longer it endures. To me it appears that no system of the relations of men and women could be more fatal to the happiness of individuals, the well-being of children, or the advancement of the race, than that proposed by Mr. Grant Allen.

OBJECTIONS TO ALL THE PRECEDING PROPOSALS

Before proceeding further with the main question it is necessary to point out that, besides the special objections to each of the proposals here noticed, there is a general and fundamental objection. They all attempt to deal at once, and by direct legislative enactment, with the most important and most vital of all human relations, regardless of the fact that our present phase of social development is not only extremely imperfect, but vicious and rotten at the core. How can it be possible to determine and settle the relations of women to men which shall be best alike for individuals and for the race, in a society in which a very large proportion of women are obliged to work long hours daily for the barest subsistence, while another large proportion are forced into more or less uncongenial marriages as the only means of securing some amount of personal independence or physical well-being? Let any one consider, on the one hand, the lives of the wealthy as portrayed in the society papers and, on the other hand, the terrible condition of millions of workers—men, women, and children —and the still more awful condition of those who seek work of any kind in vain, and, seeing their children slowly dying of starvation, are driven in utter helplessness and despair to murder and suicide. Can any thoughtful person admit for a moment that, in a society so constituted that these overwhelming contrasts of luxury and privation are looked upon as necessities, and are treated by the Legislature as matters with which it has practically nothing to do, there is the smallest probability that we can

[1] Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in the *Arena*.

deal successfully with such tremendous social problems as those which involve the marriage tie and the family relation as a means of promoting the physical and moral advancement of the race? What a mockery to still further whiten the sepulchre of modern society, in which is hidden "all manner of corruption," with schemes for the moral and physical advancement of the race!

SOCIAL ADVANCE WILL RESULT IN IMPROVEMENT OF CHARACTER

It is my firm conviction, for reasons which I shall state presently, that, when we have cleansed the Augean stable of our existing social organization, and have made such arrangements that *all* shall contribute their share of either physical or mental labor, and that all workers shall reap the *full* and equal reward of their work, the future of the race will be ensured by those laws of human development that have led to the slow but continuous advance in the higher qualities of human nature. When men and women are alike free to follow their best impulses; when idleness and vicious or useless luxury on the one hand, oppressive labor and starvation on the other, are alike unknown; when all receive the best and most thorough education that the state of civilization and knowledge at the time will admit; when the standard of public opinion is set by the wisest and the best, and that standard is systematically inculcated on the young—then we shall find that a system of selection will come spontaneously into action which will steadily tend to eliminate the lower and more degraded types of man, and thus continuously raise the average standard of the race. I therefore strongly protest against any attempt to deal with this great question by legal enactments in our present state of unfitness and ignorance, or by endeavoring to modify public opinion as to the beneficial character of monogamy and permanence in marriage. That the existing popular opinion is the true one is well and briefly shown by Miss Chapman in *Lippincott's Magazine;* and as her statement of the case expresses my own views, and will, I think, be approved by most thinkers on the subject, I here give it:

"1. *Nature* plainly indicates permanent marriage as the true human relation. The young of the human pair need parental care and supervision for a great number of years.

"2. *Instinct* is strongly on the side of indissoluble marriage. In proportion as men leave brutedom behind and enter into the fulness of their human heritage, they will cease to tolerate the idea of two or more living partners.

"3. *History* shows conclusively that where divorce has been easy, licentiousness, disorder, and often complete anarchy have prevailed. The history of civilization is the history of advance in monogamy, of the fidelity of one man to one woman, and one woman to one man.

"4. *Science* tells the same tale. Physiology and Hygiene point to temperance, not riot. Sociology shows how man, in spite of himself, is ever striving, through lower forms, upward, to the monogamic relation.

"5. *Experience* demonstrates to every one of us, individually, the superiority of the indissoluble marriage. We know that, speaking broadly, marriages turn out well or ill in proportion as husband and wife are—let me not say loving—but loyal, sinking differences and even grievances for the sake of children and for the sake of example."

We have now to consider what would be the probable effect of a condition of social advancement, the essential characteristics of which have been already hinted at, on the two great problems —the increase of population, and the continuous improvement of the race by some form of selection which we have reason to believe is the only method available. In order to make this clear, however, and in order that we may fully realize the forces that would come into play in a just and rational state of society, such as may certainly be realized in the not distant future, it will be necessary to have a clear conception of its main characteristics. For this purpose, and without committing myself in any way to an approval of all the details of his scheme, I shall make use of Mr. Bellamy's clear and forcible picture of the society of the future, as he supposes it may exist in America in little more than a century hence.[1]

The essential principle on which society is supposed to be founded is that of a great family. As in a well-regulated modern family the elders, those who have experience of the labors, the

[1] *Looking Backward.* See specially, chapters vii, ix, xii, and xxv.

duties, and the responsibilities of life, determine the general mode of living and working, with the fullest consideration for the convenience and real well-being of the younger members, and with a recognition of their essential independence. As in a family, the same comforts and enjoyments are secured to all, and the very idea of making any difference in this respect, to those who from mental or physical disability are unable to do so much as others, never occurs to any one, since it is opposed to the essential principles on which a true society of human brotherhood is held to rest. As regards education all have the same advantages, and all receive the fullest and best training, both intellectual and physical; every one is encouraged to follow out those studies or pursuits for which they are best fitted, or for which they exhibit the strongest inclination. This education, the complete and thorough training for a life of usefulness and enjoyment, continues in both sexes till the age of twenty-one (or thereabouts), when all alike, men and women, take their place in the lower ranks of the industrial army in which they serve for three years. During the latter years of their education, and during the succeeding three years of industrial service, every opportunity is given them to see and understand every kind of work that is carried on by the community, so that at the end of the term of probation they can choose what department of the public service they prefer to enter. As every one—men, women, and children alike—receive the same amount of public credit—their equal share of the products of the labor of the community, the attractiveness of various pursuits is equalized by differences in the hours of labor, in holidays, or in special privileges attached to the more disagreeable kinds of necessary work, and these are so modified from time to time that the volunteers for every occupation are always about equal to its requirements. The only other essential feature that it is necessary to notice for our present purpose is the system of grades, by which good conduct, perseverance, and intelligence in every department of industry and occupation are fully recognized, and lead to appointments as foremen, superintendents, or general managers, and ultimately to the highest offices of the state. Every one of these grades and appointments is made public; and as they constitute the only

honors and the only differences of rank, with corresponding insignia and privileges, in an otherwise equal body of citizens, they are highly esteemed, and serve as ample inducements to industry and zeal in the public service.

At first sight it may appear that in any state of society whose essential features were at all like those here briefly outlined, all the usual restraints to early marriage as they now exist would be removed, and that a rate of increase of the population unexampled in any previous era would be the result, leading in a few generations to a difficulty in obtaining subsistence, which Malthus has shown to be the inevitable result of the normal rate of increase of mankind when all the positive as well as the preventive checks are removed. As the positive checks—which may be briefly summarized as war, pestilence, and famine—are supposed to be non-existent, what, it may be asked, are the preventive checks which are suggested as being capable of reducing the rate of increase within manageable limits? This very reasonable question I will now endeavor to answer.

NATURAL CHECKS TO RAPID INCREASE

The first and most important of the checks upon a too rapid increase of population will be the comparatively late average period of marriage, which will be the natural result of the very conditions of society, and will besides be inculcated during the period of education, and still further enforced by public opinion. As the period of systematic education is supposed to extend to the age of twenty-one, up to which time both the mental and physical powers will be trained and exercised to their fullest capacity, the idea of marriage during this period will rarely be entertained. During the last year of education, however, the subject of marriage will be dwelt upon, in its bearing on individual happiness and on social well-being, in relation to the welfare of the next generation and to the continuous development of the race. The most careful and deliberate choice of partners for life will be inculcated as the highest social duty; while the young women will be so trained as to look with scorn and loathing on all men who in any way wilfully fail in their duty to society—on idlers and malingerers, on drunkards and liars, on the selfish, the

cruel, or the vicious. They will be taught that the happiness of their whole lives will depend on the care and deliberation with which they choose their husbands, and they will be urged to accept no suitor till he has proved himself to be worthy of respect by the place he holds and the character he bears among his fellow-laborers in the public service.

Under social conditions which render every woman absolutely independent, so far as the necessaries and comforts of existence are concerned, surrounded by the charms of family life and the pleasures of society, which will be far greater than anything we now realize when *all* will possess the refinements derived from the best possible education, and all will be relieved from sordid cares and the struggle for mere existence, is it not in the highest degree probable that marriage will rarely take place till the woman has had three or four years' experience of the world after leaving college—that is, till the age of 25, while it will very frequently be delayed till 30 or upward? Now Mr. Galton has shown, from the best statistics available, that if we compare women married at 20 with those married at 29, the proportionate fertility is about as 8 to 5. But this difference, large as it is, only represents a portion of the effect on the rate of increase of population caused by a delay in the average period of marriage. For when the age of marriage is delayed the time between successive generations is correspondingly lengthened; while a still further effect is produced by the fact that the greater the average age of marriage the fewer generations are alive at the same time, and it is the combined effect of these three factors that determines the actual rate of increase of the population.[1]

But there is yet another factor tending to check the increase of population that would come into play in a society such as we have been considering. In a remarkable essay on the *Theory of Population*, Herbert Spencer has shown, by an elaborate discussion of the phenomena presented by the whole animal kingdom, that the maintenance of the individual and the propagation of the race vary inversely, those species and groups which have the shortest and most uncertain lives producing the greatest number

[1] See *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development*, p. 321; and *Hereditary Genius*, p. 353.

of offspring; in other words, individuation and reproduction are antagonistic. But individuation depends almost entirely on the development and specialization of the nervous system, through which, not only are the several activities and co-ordinations of the various organs carried on, but all advance in instinct, emotion, and intellect is rendered possible. The actual rate of increase in man has been determined by the necessities of the savage state, in which, as in most animal species, it has usually been only just sufficient to maintain a limited average population. But with civilization the average duration of life increases and the possible increase of population under favorable conditions becomes very great, because fertility is greater than is needed under the new conditions. The advance in civilization as regards the preservation of life has in recent times become so rapid, and the increased development of the nervous system has been limited to so small a portion of the whole population, that no general diminution in fertility has yet occurred. That the facts do, however, accord with the theory is indicated by the common observation that highly intellectual parents do not as a rule have large families, while the most rapid increase occurs in those classes which are engaged in the simpler kinds of manual labor. But in a state of society in which all will have their higher faculties fully cultivated and fully exercised throughout life, a slight general diminution of fertility would at once arise, and this diminution added to that caused by the later average period of marriage would at once bring the rate of increase of population within manageable limits. The same general principle enables us to look forward to that distant future when the world will be fully peopled, in perfect confidence that an equilibrium between the birth and death rates will then be brought about by a combination of physical and social agencies, and the bugbear of over-population become finally extinct.[1]

HOW NATURAL SELECTION WILL IMPROVE THE RACE

There now only remains for consideration the means by which, in such a society, a continuous improvement of the race

[1] See *A Theory of Population deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility.*

could be brought about, on the assumption that for this purpose education is powerless as a direct agency, since its effects are not hereditary, and that some form of selection is an absolute necessity. This improvement I believe will certainly be effected through the agency of female choice in marriage. Let us, therefore, consider how this would probably act.

It will be generally admitted that, although many women now remain unmarried from necessity rather than from choice, there are always a considerable number who feel no strong inclination to marriage, and who accept husbands to secure a subsistence or a home of their own rather than from personal affection or sexual emotion. In a society in which women were all pecuniarily independent, were all fully occupied with public duties and intellectual or social enjoyments, and had nothing to gain by marriage as regards material well-being, we may be sure that the number of the unmarried from choice would largely increase. It would probably come to be considered a degradation for any woman to marry a man she could not both love and esteem, and this feeling would supply ample reasons for either abstaining from marriage altogether or delaying it till a worthy and sympathetic husband was encountered. In man, on the other hand, the passion of love is more general, and usually stronger; and as in such a society as is here postulated there would be no way of gratifying this passion but by marriage, almost every woman would receive offers, and thus a powerful selective agency would rest with the female sex. Under the system of education and of public opinion here suggested there can be no doubt how this selection would be exercised. The idle and the selfish would be almost universally rejected. The diseased or the weak in intellect would also usually remain unmarried; while those who exhibited any tendency to insanity or to hereditary disease, or who possessed any congenital deformity would in hardly any case find partners, because it would be considered an offence against society to be the means of perpetuating such diseases or imperfections.

We must also take into account a special factor hitherto, I believe, unnoticed in this connection, that would in all probability intensify the selection thus exercised. It is well known that females are largely in excess of males in our existing popula-

tion, and this fact, if it were a necessary and permanent one, would tend to weaken the selective agency of women, as it undoubtedly does now. But there is good reason to believe that it will not be a permanent feature of our population. The births indicate a natural tendency in the opposite direction, since they always give a larger proportion of males than females, varying from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 per cent. But boys now die so much more rapidly than girls that when we include all under the age of five the numbers are nearly equal. For the next five years the mortality is nearly the same in both sexes; then that of females preponderates up to 30 years of age, then up to 60 that of men is the larger, while for the rest of life female mortality is again greatest. The general result is that at the ages of most frequent marriage—from 20 to 35—females are between 8 and 9 per cent. in excess of males. But during the ages from 5 to 35 we find a wonderful excess of male deaths from two preventible causes—"accident" and "violence." For a recent year the deaths from these causes in England and Wales was as follows:—

Males (5 to 35 years)	4,158
Females (5 to 35 years)	1,100

Here we have an excess of male over female deaths in one year of 3,058, all between the ages of 5 and 35, a very large portion of which is no doubt due to the greater risks run by men and boys in various industrial occupations, in sport, and in war. In a state of society in which the bulk of the population were engaged in industrial work, and were all social equals, it is quite certain that almost all these deaths would be prevented, thus bringing the male population more nearly to an equality with the female. But there are also many unhealthy employments in which men are exclusively or more largely engaged, such as the grinders of Sheffield, and many others; and many more men have their lives shortened by labor in unventilated workshops, to say nothing of the loss of life at sea and in war. When the lives of all its citizens are accounted of equal value to the community, no one will be allowed to suffer from such preventible causes as these; and this will still further reduce the mortality of men as compared with that of women. On the whole, then, it seems highly probable that in the society of the future the supe-

rior numbers of males at birth will be maintained throughout life, or, at all events, during what may be termed the marriageable period. This will greatly increase the influence of women in the improvement of the race. Being a minority they will be more sought after, and will have a real choice in marriage, which is rarely the case now. This actual minority being further increased by those who, from the various causes already referred to, abstain from marriage, will cause considerable numbers of men to remain permanently unmarried, and as these will consist very largely, if not almost wholly, of those who are the least perfectly developed either mentally or physically, the constant advance of the race in every good quality will be insured.

This method of improvement, by elimination of the worst, has many advantages over that of securing the early marriages of the best. In the first place it is the direct instead of the indirect way, for it is more important and more beneficial to society to improve the average of its members by getting rid of the lowest types than by raising the highest a little higher. Exceptionally great and good men are always produced in sufficient numbers, and have always been so produced in every phase of civilization. We do not need more of these so much as we need less of the weak and the bad. This weeding-out system has been the method of natural selection, by which the animal and vegetable worlds have been improved and developed. The survival of the fittest is really the extinction of the unfit. In nature this occurs perpetually on an enormous scale, because, owing to the rapid increase of most organisms, the unfit which are yearly destroyed form a large proportion of those that are born. Under our hitherto imperfect civilization this wholesome process has been checked as regards mankind; but the check has been the result of the development of the higher attributes of our nature. Humanity—the essentially *human* emotion—has caused us to save the lives of the weak and suffering, of the maimed or imperfect in mind or body. This has to some extent been antagonistic to physical and even intellectual race-improvement; but it has improved us morally by the continuous development of the characteristic and crowning grace of our human as distinguished from our animal nature.

In the society of the future this defect will be remedied, not by any diminution of our humanity, but by encouraging the activity of a still higher human characteristic—admiration of all that is beautiful and kindly and self-sacrificing, repugnance to all that is selfish, base, or cruel. When we allow ourselves to be guided by reason, justice, and public spirit in our dealings with our fellow-men, and determine to abolish poverty by recognizing the equal rights of all the citizens of our common land to an equal share of the wealth which all combine to produce—when we have thus solved the lesser problem of a rational social organization adapted to secure the equal well-being of all, then we may safely leave the far greater and deeper problem of the improvement of the race to the cultivated minds and pure instincts of the men, and especially of the Women of the Future.

X

THE LATEST KNOWLEDGE

"SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION AND PROGRESS"

BY

IRA REMSEN

PRESIDENT OF JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

HAVING traced the thoughts of science as they apply to man, as they enable us to understand the progress and perhaps the origin of our race, we are ready now to turn to the latest achievements of the investigators, to question what they are doing for us to-day, and what they hope and promise to do for us to-morrow. The recent developments of science have been, as we all know, marvellous. Has it "reached its term"? Or does it see opening before it a future even more brilliant than its past? To guide us in this question, we need, not the vague enthusiasm of the dreamer, but the practical analysis and calm judgment of the expert. Let us therefore seek for information from one among the foremost of our American authorities.

The following address was delivered by President Remsen before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, of which distinguished body he was made president in 1903. Dr. Remsen has been professor of chemistry at Johns Hopkins University for over thirty years, and since 1902 has been president of that celebrated institution. It is however not so much to his high official position as to his valuable research work that Dr. Remsen owes his noteworthy place among the leaders of modern science.

THE LATEST KNOWLEDGE

At the weekly services of many of our churches it is customary to begin with the reading of a verse or two from the Scriptures for the purpose, I suppose, of putting the congregations in the proper state of mind for the exercises which are to follow. It seems to me that we may profit by this example, and accordingly I ask your attention to Article 1 of the Constitution of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which reads thus: "The objects of the association are, by periodical and migratory meetings, to promote intercourse between those who are cultivating science in different parts of America, to give stronger and more general impulse and more systematic direction to scientific research, and to procure for the labors of scientific men increased facilities and a wider usefulness."

The first object mentioned, you will observe, is "to promote intercourse between those who are cultivating science in different parts of America"; the second is "to give a stronger and more general impulse and more systematic direction to scientific research"; and the third is "to procure for the labors of scientific men increased facilities and a wider usefulness." Those who are familiar with the history of the association are well aware that it has served its purposes admirably, and I am inclined to think that those who have been in the habit of attending its meetings will agree that the object which appeals to them most strongly is the promotion of intercourse between those who are cultivating science. Given this intercourse and the other objects will be reached as a necessary consequence, for the intercourse stimulates thought, and thought leads to work, and work leads to wider usefulness.

While in 1848, when the association was organized and the constitution was adopted, there was a fair number of good scientific investigators in this country, it is certain that in the half-century that has passed since then the number of investigators has increased very largely, and naturally the amount of scientific work done at present is very much greater than it was at that time. So great has been the increase in scientific activity during recent years, that we are apt to think

that by comparison scientific research is a new acquisition. In fact there appears to be an impression abroad that in the world at large scientific research is a relatively new thing, for which we of this generation and our immediate predecessors are largely responsible. Only a superficial knowledge of the history of science is necessary, however, to show that the sciences have been developed slowly, and that their beginnings are to be looked for in the very earliest times. Everything seems to point to the conclusion that men have been always engaged in efforts to learn more and more in regard to the world in which they find themselves. Sometimes they have been guided by one motive and sometimes by another, but the one great underlying motive has been the desire to get a clearer and clearer understanding of the universe. But besides this there has been the desire to find means of increasing the comfort and happiness of the human race.

A reference to the history of chemistry will serve to show how these motives have operated side by side. One of the first great incentives for working with chemical things was the thought that it was possible to convert base metals like lead and copper into the so-called noble metals, silver and gold. Probably no idea has ever operated as strongly as this upon the minds of men to lead them to undertake chemical experiments. It held control of intellectual men for centuries, and it was not until about a hundred years ago that it lost its hold. It is very doubtful if the purely scientific question, whether one form of matter can be transformed into another, would have had the power to control the activities of investigators for so long a time; and it is idle to speculate upon this subject. It should, however, be borne in mind that many of those who were engaged in this work were actuated by a desire to put money in their purses—a desire that is by no means to be condemned without reserve, and I mention it not for the purpose of condemning it, but to show that a motive that we sometimes think of as peculiarly modern is among the oldest known to man.

While the alchemists were at work upon their problems, another class of chemists were engaged upon problems of

an entirely different nature. The fact that substances obtained from various natural sources and others made in the laboratory produce effects of various kinds when taken into the system, led to the thought that these substances might be useful in the treatment of disease. Then, further, it was thought that disease itself is a chemical phenomenon. These thoughts, as is evident, furnish strong motives for the investigation of chemical substances, and the science of chemistry owes much to the work of those who were guided by these motives.

And so in each period as a new thought has served as the guide we find that men have been actuated by different motives, and often one and the same worker has been under the influence of mixed motives. Only in a few cases does it appear that the highest motives alone operate. We must take men as we find them, and we may be thankful that on the whole there are so many who are impelled by one motive or another, or by a mixture of motives to take up the work of investigating the world in which we live. Great progress is being made in consequence and almost daily we are called upon to wonder at some new and marvellous result of scientific investigation. It is quite impossible to make predictions of value in regard to what is likely to be revealed to us by continued work, but it is safe to believe that in our efforts to discover the secrets of the universe, only a beginning has been made. No matter in what direction we may look we are aware of great unexplored territories, and even in those regions in which the greatest advances have been made it is evident that the knowledge gained is almost insignificant as compared with that which remains to be learned. But this line of thought may lead to a condition bordering on hopelessness and despondency, and surely we should avoid this condition, for there is much greater cause for rejoicing than for despair. Our successors will see more, and see more clearly than we do, just as we see more and see more clearly than our predecessors. It is our duty to keep the work going without being too anxious to weigh the results on an absolute scale. It must be remembered that the ab-

solute scale is not a very sensitive instrument, and that it requires the results of generations to affect it markedly.

On an occasion of this kind it seems fair to ask the question, What does the world gain by scientific investigation? This question has often been asked and often answered, but each answer differs in some respects from the others, and each may be suggestive and worth giving. The question is a profound one, and no answer that can be given would be satisfactory. In general it may be said that the results of scientific investigation fall under three heads—the material, the intellectual, and the ethical.

The material results are the most obvious and they naturally receive the most attention. The material wants of man are the first to receive consideration. They can not be neglected. He must have food and clothing, the means of combating disease, the means of transportation, the means of producing heat, and a great variety of things that contribute to his bodily comfort and gratify his æsthetic desires. It is not my purpose to attempt to deal with all of these and to show how science is helping to work out the problems suggested. I shall have to content myself by pointing out a few of the more important problems, the solution of which depends upon the prosecution of scientific research.

First, the food problem. Whatever views one may hold in regard to that which has come to be called "race suicide," it appears that the population of the world is increasing rapidly. The desirable places have been occupied. In some parts of the earth there is such a surplus of population that famines occur from time to time, and in other parts epidemics and floods relieve the embarrassment. We may fairly look forward to the time when the whole earth will be overpopulated, unless the production of food becomes more scientific than it now is. Here is the field for the work of the agricultural chemist, who is showing us how to increase the yield from a given area, and, in case of poor and worn-out soils, how to preserve and increase their fertility. It appears that the methods of cultivating the soil are still comparatively crude, and more and more thorough investigation of the processes

involved in the growth of plants is called for. Much has been learned since Liebig founded the science of agricultural chemistry. It was he who pointed out some of the ways by which it is possible to increase the fertility of a soil. Since the results of his investigations were given to the world, the use of artificial fertilizers has become more and more general.

But it is one thing to know that artificial fertilizers are useful, and it is quite another thing to get them. At first bone dust and guano were chiefly used. Then as these became dearer, phosphates, and potassium salts from the mineral kingdom came into use.

At the Fifth International Congress for Applied Chemistry, held at Berlin, Germany, in 1903, Dr. Adolph Frank, of Charlottenburg, gave an extremely interesting address on the subject of the use of the nitrogen of the atmosphere for agriculture and the industries, which bears upon the problem that we are dealing with. Plants must have nitrogen. At present this is obtained from the great beds of saltpetre found on the west coast of South America—the so-called Chili saltpetre—and also from the ammonia abtained as a by-product in the distillation of coal, especially in the manufacture of coke. The use of Chili saltpetre for agricultural purposes began about 1860. In 1900 the quantity exported was 1,453,000 tons, and its value was about $60,000,000. In the same year the world's production of ammonium sulphate was about 500,000 tons, of a value of somewhat more than $20,000,000. Of these enormous quantities about three-quarters finds application in agriculture. The use of these substances, especially of saltpetre, is increasing rapidly. At present it seems that the successful cultivation of the soil is dependent upon the use of nitrates, and the supply of nitrates is limited. Unless something is done we may look forward to the time when the earth, for lack of proper fertilizers, will not be able to produce as much as it now does, and meanwhile the demand for food is increasing. According to the most reliable estimations, indeed, the saltpetre beds will be exhausted in thirty or forty years. Is there a way out? Dr. Frank shows that there is. In the air there is nitrogen for all. The plants

can make only a limited use of this directly. For the most part it must be in some form of chemical combination, as, for example, a nitrate of ammonia. The conversion of atmospheric nitrogen into nitric acid would solve the problem, and this is now carried out. But Dr. Frank shows that there is another, perhaps more economical, way of getting the nitrogen into a form suitable for plant food. Calcium carbide can now be made without difficulty, and is made in enormous quantities by the action of a powerful electric current upon a mixture of coal and lime. This substance has the power of absorbing nitrogen from the air, and the product thus formed appears to be capable of giving up its nitrogen to plants, or, in other words, to be a good fertilizer. It is true that this subject requires further investigation, but the results thus far obtained are full of promise. If the outcome should be what we have reason to hope, we may regard the approaching exhaustion of the saltpetre beds with equanimity. But, even without this to pin our faith to, we have the preparation of nitric acid from the nitrogen and oxygen of the air to fall back upon.

While speaking of the food problem, a few words in regard to the artificial preparation of foodstuffs. I am sorry to say that there is not much of promise to report upon in this connection. In spite of the brilliant achievements of chemists in the field of synthesis, it remains true that thus far they have not been able to make, except in very small quantities, substances that are useful as foods, and there is absolutely no prospect of this result being reached within a reasonable time. A few years ago Berthelot told us of a dream he had had. This has to do with the results that, according to Berthelot, are to be brought about by the advance of chemistry. The results of investigations already accomplished indicate that, in the future, methods will perhaps be devised for the artificial preparation of food from the water and carbonic acid so abundantly supplied by nature. Agriculture will then become unnecessary, and the landscape will not be disfigured by crops growing in geometrical figures. Water will be obtained from holes three or four miles deep in the earth,

and this water will be above the boiling temperature, so that it can be used as a source of energy. It will be obtained in liquid form after it has undergone a process of natural distillation, which will free it from all impurities, including, of course, disease germs. The foods prepared by artificial methods will also be free from microbes, and there will be, consequently, less disease than at present. Further, the necessity for killing animals for food will no longer exist, and mankind will become gentler and more amenable to higher influences. There is, no doubt, much that is fascinating in this line of thought, but whether it is worth following, depends upon the fundamental assumption. Is it at all probable that chemists will ever be able to devise methods for the artificial preparation of foodstuffs? I can only say that to me it does not appear probable in the light of the results thus far obtained. I do not mean to question the probability of the ultimate synthesis of some of those substances that are of value as foods. This has been already accomplished on a small scale, but for the most part the synthetical processes employed have involved the use of substances which themselves are the products of natural processes. Thus, the fats can be made, but the substances from which they are made are generally obtained from nature and are not themselves synthetical products. Emil Fischer has, to be sure, made very small quantities of sugars of different kinds, but the task of building up a sugar from the raw material furnished by nature—that is to say, from carbonic acid and water—presents such difficulties that it may be said to be practically impossible.

When it comes to starch, and the proteids which are the other chief constituents of foodstuffs, the difficulties are still greater. There is not a suggestion of the possibility of making starch artificially, and the same is true of the proteids. In this connection it is, however, interesting to note that Emil Fischer, after his remarkable successes in the sugar group and the uric-acid group, is now advancing upon the proteids. I have heard it said that at the beginning of his career he made out a programme for his lifework. This included the solution

of three great problems. These are the determination of the constitution of uric acid, of the sugars, and of the proteids. Two of these problems have been solved. May he be equally successful with the third! Even if we should be able to make a proteid, and show what it is, the problem of the artificial preparation of foodstuffs will not be solved. Indeed, it will hardly be affected.

Although science is not likely, within periods that we may venture to think of, to do away with the necessity of cultivating the soil, it is likely to teach us how to get more out of the soil than we now do, and thus put us in a position to provide for the generations that are to follow us. And this carries with it the thought that, unless scientific investigation is kept up, these coming generations will be unprovided for.

Another way by which the food supply of the world can be increased is by relieving tracts of land that are now used for other purposes than the cultivation of foodstuffs. The most interesting example of this kind is that presented by the cultivation of indigo. There is a large demand for this substance, which is plainly founded upon æsthetic desires of a somewhat rudimentary kind. Whatever the cause may be, the demand exists, and immense tracts of land have been and are still, devoted to the cultivation of the indigo plant. Within the past few years scientific investigation has shown that indigo can be made in the factory from substances, the production of which does not for the most part involve the cultivation of the soil. In 1900, according to the report of Dr. Brunck, managing director of the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik, the quantity of indigo produced annually in the factory would, if grown from plants, "require the cultivation of an area of more than a quarter of a million acres of land (390 square miles) in the home of the indigo plant (India)." Dr. Brunck adds: "The first impression which this fact may be likely to produce is that the manufacture of indigo will cause a terrible calamity to arise in that country; but, perhaps not. If one recalls to mind that India is periodically afflicted with famine, one ought not, without further consideration, to cast aside the hope that it might be good fortune for that country

if the immense areas now devoted to a crop which is subject to many vicissitudes and to violent market changes, were at last to be given over to the raising of breadstuffs and other food products." "For myself," says Dr. Brunck, "I no not assume to be an impartial adviser in this matter, but, nevertheless, I venture to express my convictions that the government of India will be rendering a very great service if it should support and aid the progress, which will in any case be irresistible, of this impending change in the cultivation of that country, and would support and direct its methodical and rational execution."

The connection between scientific investigation and health is so frequently the subject of discussion that I need not dwell upon it here. The discovery that many diseases are due primarily to the action of microscopic organisms that find their way into the body and produce the changes that reveal themselves in definite symptoms, is a direct consequence of the study of the phenomenon of alcoholic fermentation by Pasteur. Everything that throws light upon the nature of the actions of these microscopic organisms is of value in dealing with the great problem of combating disease. It has been established in a number of cases that they cause the formation of products that act as poisons and that the diseases are due to the action of these poisons. So also, as is well known, investigation has shown that antidotes to some of these poisons can be produced, and that by means of these antidotes the diseases can be controlled. But more important than this, is the discovery of the way in which diseases are transmitted. With this knowledge it is possible to prevent the diseases. The great fact that the death rate is decreasing stands out prominently and proclaims to humanity the importance of scientific investigation. It is, however, to be noted in this connection that the decrease in the death rate compensates to some extent for the decrease in the birth rate, and that, if an increase in population is a thing to be desired, the investigations in the field of sanitary science are contributing to this result.

The development of the human race is dependent not alone

upon a supply of food, but upon a supply of energy in available forms. Heat and mechanical energy are absolutely essential to man. The chief source of the energy that comes into play is fuel. We are primarily dependent upon the coal supply for the continuation of the activities of man. Without this, unless something is to take its place, man is doomed. Statistics in regard to the coal supply and the rate at which it is being used have so frequently been presented by those who have special knowledge of this subject, that I need not trouble you with them now. The only object in referring to it is to show that, unless by means of scientific investigation man is taught new methods of rendering the world's store of energy available for the production of heat and of motion, the age of the human race is measured by the extent of the supply of coal and other forms of fuel. By other forms of fuel I mean, of course, wood and oil. Plainly, as the demand for land for the production of foodstuffs increases, the amount available for the production of wood must decrease, so that wood need not be taken into account for the future. In regard to oil, our knowledge is not sufficient to enable us to make predictions of any value. If one of the theories now held in regard to the source of petroleum should prove to be correct, the world would find much consolation in it. According to this theory petroleum is not likely to be exhausted, for it is constantly being formed by the action of water upon carbides that in all probability exist in practically unlimited quantity in the interior of the earth. If this be true, then the problem of supplying energy may be reduced to one of transportation of oil. But given a supply of oil and, of course, the problem of transportation is solved.

What are the other sources of practical energy? The most important is the fall of water. This is being utilized more and more year by year, since the methods of producing electric currents by means of the dynamo have been worked out. There is plainly much to be learned before the energy made available in the immediate neighborhood of the waterfall can be transported long distances economically, but advances are being made in this line, and already factories that

have hitherto been dependent upon coal are making use of the energy derived from waterfalls. The more rapidly these advances take place the less will be the demand for coal, and if there were enough waterfalls conveniently situated, there would be no difficulty in furnishing all the energy needed by man for heat or for motion.

It is a fortunate thing that, as the population of the earth increases, man's tastes become more complex. If only the simplest tastes prevailed, only the simplest occupations would be called for. But let us not lose time in idle speculations as to the way this primitive condition of things would affect man's progress. As a matter of fact his tastes are becoming more complex. Things that are not dreamed of in one generation become the necessities of the next generation. Many of these things are the direct results of scientific investigation. No end of examples will suggest themselves. Let me content myself by reference to one that has of late been the subject of much discussion. The development of the artificial dye-stuff industries is extremely instructive in many ways. The development has been the direct result of the scientific investigation of things that seemed to have little, if anything, to do with this world. Many thousands of workmen are now employed, and many millions of dollars are invested, in the manufacture of dye-stuffs that were unknown a few years ago. Here plainly the fundamental fact is the æsthetic desire of man for colors. A colorless world would be unbearable to him. Nature accustoms him to color in a great variety of combinations, and it becomes a necessity to him. And his desires increase as they are gratified. There seems to be no end to development in this line. At all events, the data at our disposal justify the conclusion that there will be a demand for every dye that combines the qualities of beauty and durability. Thousands of scientifically trained men are engaged to work in the effort to deliver new dyes to meet the increasing demands. New industries are springing up, and many find employment in them. As a rule, the increased demand for labor caused by the establishment of these industries is not offset by the closing up of other industries. Certainly it is

true that scientific investigation has created large demands for labor that could hardly find employment without these demands.

The welfare of a nation depends to a large extent upon the success of its industries. In his address as president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sir Norman Lockyer quotes Mr. Chamberlain thus: "I do not think it is necessary for me to say anything as to the urgency and necessity of scientific training. . . . It is not too much to say that the existence of this country as the great commercial nation depends upon it. . . . It depends very much upon what we are doing now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, whether at its end we shall continue to maintain our supremacy or even equality with our great commercial and manufacturing rivals." In another part of his address, Sir Norman Lockyer says: "Further, I am told that the sum of £24,000,000 is less than half the amount by which Germany is yearly enriched by having improved upon our chemical industries, owing to our lack of scientific training. Many other industries have been attacked in the same way since, but taking this one instance alone, if we had spent this money fifty years ago, when the Prince Consort first called attention to our backwardness, the nation would now be much richer than it is, and would have much less to fear from competition."

But enough on the purely material side. Let us turn to the intellectual results of scientific investigation. This part of our subject might be summed up in a few words. It is so obvious that the intellectual condition of mankind is a direct result of scientific investigation, that one hesitates to make the statement. The mind of man cannot carry him much in advance of his knowledge of the facts. Intellectual gains can be made only by discoveries, and discoveries can be made only by investigation. One generation differs from another in the way it looks at the world. A generation that thinks the earth is the centre of the universe differs intellectually from one that has learned the true position of the earth in the solar system, and the general relations of the solar system to other similar systems that make up the universe. A genera-

tion that sees in every species of animal and plant evidence of a special creative act differs from one that has recognized the general truth of the conception of evolution. And so in every department of knowledge, the great generalizations that have been reached through the persistent efforts of scientific investigators are the intellectual gains that have resulted. These great generalizations measure the intellectual wealth of mankind. They are the foundations of all profitable thought. While the generalizations of science belong to the world, not all the world takes advantage of its opportunities. Nation differs from nation intellectually, as individual differs from individual. It is not, however, the possession of knowledge that makes the efficient individual and the efficient nation. It is well known that an individual may be very learned and at the same time very inefficient. The question is, what use does he make of his knowledge? When we speak of intellectual results of scientific investigation, we mean not only accumulated knowledge, but the way in which this knowledge is invested. A man who simply accumulates money, and does not see to it that this money is carefully invested, is a miser, and no large results can come from his efforts. While, then, the intellectual state of a nation is measured partly by the extent to which it has taken possession of the generalizations that belong to the world, it is also measured by the extent to which the methods by which knowledge is accumulated have been brought into requisition and have become a part of the equipment of the people of that nation. The intellectual progress of a nation depends upon the adoption of scientific methods in dealing with intellectual problems. The scientific method is applicable to all kinds of intellectual problems. We need it in every department of activity. I have sometimes wondered what the result would be if the scientific method could be employed in all the manifold problems connected with the management of a government. Questions of tariff, of finance, of international relations would be dealt with much more satisfactorily than at present if the spirit of the scientific method were breathed into those who are called upon to deal with these questions. It is plain, I think, that the higher the in-

tellectual state of a nation the better will it deal with all the problems that present themselves. As the intellectual state is a direct result of scientific investigation, it is clear that the nation that adopts the scientific method will in the end outrank both intellectually and industrially the nation that does not.

What are the ethical results of scientific investigation? No one can tell. There is one thought that in this connection I should like to impress upon you. The fundamental characteristic of the scientific method is honesty. In dealing with any question science asks no favors. The sole object is to learn the truth, and to be guided by the truth. Absolute accuracy, absolute fidelity, absolute honesty are the prime conditions of scientific progress. I believe that the constant use of the scientific method must in the end leave its impress upon him who uses it. The results will not be satisfactory in all cases, but the tendency will be in the right direction. A life spent in accordance with scientific teachings would be of a high order. It would practically conform to the teachings of the highest types of religion. The motives would be different, but so far as conduct is concerned the results would be practically identical. I need not enlarge upon this subject. Unfortunately, abstract truth and knowledge of facts and of the conclusions to be drawn from them do not at present furnish a sufficient basis for right living in the case of the great majority of mankind, and science cannot now, and I do not believe it ever can, take the place of religion in some form. When the feeling that the two are antagonistic wears away, as it is wearing away, it will no doubt be seen that one supplements the other, in so far as they have to do with the conduct of man.

What are we doing in this country to encourage scientific investigation? Not until about a quarter of a century ago can it be said that it met with any encouragement. Since then there has been a great change. Up to that time research was sporadic. Soon after, it became almost epidemic. The direct cause of the change was the establishing of courses in our universities for the training of investigators somewhat

upon the lines followed in the German universities. In these courses the carrying out of an investigation plays an important part. This is, in fact, the culmination of the course. At first there were not many following these courses, but it was not long before there was a demand for the products. Those who could present evidence that they had followed such courses were generally given the preference. This was especially true in the case of appointments in the colleges, some colleges even going so far as to decline to appoint any one who had not taken the degree of doctor of philosophy, which is the badge of the course that involves investigation. As the demand for those who had received this training increased, the number of those seeking it increased at least in the same proportion. New universities were established and old ones caught the spirit of the new movement, until from one end of the country to the other centres of scientific activity are now found, and the amount of research work that is done is enormous compared with what was done twenty-five or thirty years ago. Many of those who get a taste of the work of investigation become fascinated by it and are anxious to devote their lives to it. At present, with the facilities for such work available, it seems probable that most of those who have a strong desire and the necessary industry and ability to follow it find their opportunity somewhere. There is little danger of our losing a genius or even one with fair talent. The world is on the lookout for them. The demand for those who can do good research work is greater than the supply. To be sure the material rewards are not as a rule so great as those that are likely to be won by the ablest members of some other professions and occupations, and as long as this condition of affairs continues to exist there will not be so many men of the highest intellectual order engaged in this work as we should like to see. On the other hand, when we consider the great progress that has been made during the last twenty-five years or so, we have every reason to take a cheerful view of the future. If as much progress should be made in the next quarter century, we shall, to say the least, be able to compete with the foremost nations of the world in scientific in-

vestigation. In my opinion this progress is largely dependent upon the development of our universities. Without the opportunities for training in the methods of scientific investigation there will be but few investigators. It is necessary to have a large number in order that the principle of selection may operate. In this line of work, as in others, many are called, but few are chosen.

Another fact that is working advantageously to increase the amount of scientific research done in this country is the support given by the government in its different scientific bureaus. The Geological Survey, the Department of Agriculture, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the National Bureau of Standards, and other departments are carrying on a large amount of excellent scientific work, and thus helping most efficiently to spread the scientific spirit throughout the land.

Finally, two exceedingly interesting experiments in the way of encouraging scientific investigation are now attracting the attention of the world. I mean, of course, the Carnegie Institution, with its endowment of $10,000,000, and the Rockefeller Institute, devoted to investigations in the field of medicine, which will no doubt be adequately endowed. It is too early to express an opinion in regard to the influence of these great foundations upon the progress of scientific investigation. As both will make possible the carrying out of many investigations that would otherwise probably not be carried out, the chances of receiving valuable results will be increased. The danger is that those who are responsible for the management of the funds will be disappointed that the results are not at once of a striking character, and that they will be tempted to change the method of applying the money before those who are using it have had a fair chance. But we who are on the outside know little of the plans of those who are inside. All signs indicate that they are making an earnest effort to solve an exceedingly difficult problem, and all who have the opportunity should do everything in their power to aid them.

XI

OUR COUNTRY

"THE MAKING OF THE NATION"

BY

WOODROW WILSON

PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

WE have traced humanity back to its vague sources, we have invoked the aid of the chief leaders of present-day science to tell us not only what they are achieving now, but what they believe as to the development of the primal instincts of the race. We have endeavored to look upon ourselves as science looks upon us, calmly, analytically, comprehensively. Let us escape for a moment from this unemotional atmosphere, let us turn from consideration of the race, the animal, as a mass, and begin the more direct and human study of the individual. And first, for man in general we will substitute American man. Through what special process has he, the woodsman, the pioneer, the colonizer of three centuries ago, become the intellectual, wide-reaching, business-like worker of to-day? What changing influences have worked upon his mind and body, upon his surroundings and his government? What, in short, has built up "our country"?

To guide us here we seek the aid of our foremost contemporary historian, Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton since 1902, and author of the noteworthy "History of the American People." The following article was originally published in the Atlantic Monthly, *and is here reprinted by permission of the editors and with the approval of President Wilson. The broad patriotism of the author saves from all sectional spirit an analysis which might easily have become partisan. There is weakness in our government, of the occasional evil results of*

which we have all been painfully aware. Dr. Wilson's keen thought points out its source.

THE making of our own nation seems to have taken place under our very eyes, so recent and so familiar is the story. The great process was worked out in the plain and open day of the modern world, statesmen and historians standing by to superintend, criticise, make record of what was done. The stirring narrative runs quickly into the day in which we live; we can say that our grandfathers builded the government which now holds so large a place in the world; the story seems of yesterday, and yet seems entire, as if the making of the republic had hastened to complete itself within a single hundred years. We are elated to see so great a thing done upon so great a scale, and to feel ourselves in so intimate a way actors in the moving scene.

Yet we should deceive ourselves were we to suppose the work done, the nation made. We have been told by a certain group of our historians that a nation was made when the federal Constitution was adopted; that the strong sentences of the law sufficed to transform us from a league of States into a people single and inseparable. Some tell us, however, that it was not till the war of 1812 that we grew fully conscious of a single purpose and destiny, and began to form policies as if for a nation. Others see the process complete only when the civil war struck slavery away, and gave North and South a common way of life that should make common ideals and common endeavors at last possible. Then, when all have had their say, there comes a great movement like the one which we call Populism, to remind us how the country still lies apart in sections: some at one stage of development, some at another; some with one hope and purpose for America, some with another. And we ask ourselves, Is the history of our making as a nation indeed over, or do we still wait upon the forces that shall at last unite us? Are we even now, in fact, a nation?

Clearly, it is not a question of sentiment, but a question of fact. If it be true that the country, taken as a whole, is at

one and the same time in several stages of development—not a great commercial and manufacturing nation, with here and there its broad pastures and the quiet farms from which it draws its food; not a vast agricultural community, with here and there its ports of shipment and its necessary marts of exchange; nor yet a country of mines, merely, pouring their products forth into the markets of the world, to take thence whatever it may need for its comfort and convenience in living —we still wait for its economic and spiritual union. It is many things at once. Sections big enough for kingdoms live by agriculture, and farm the wide stretches of a new land by the aid of money borrowed from other sections which seem almost like another nation, with their teeming cities, dark with the smoke of factories, quick with the movements of trade, as sensitive to the variations of exchange on London as to the variations in the crops raised by their distant fellow-countrymen on the plains within the continent. Upon other great spaces of the vast continent, communities, millions strong, live the distinctive life of the miner, have all their fortune bound up and centred in a single group of industries, feel in their utmost concentration the power of economic forces elsewhere dispersed, and chafe under the unequal yoke that unites them with communities so unlike themselves as those which lend and trade and manufacture, and those which follow the plough and reap the grain that is to feed the world.

Such contrasts are nothing new in our history, and our system of government is admirably adapted to relieve the strain and soften the antagonism they might entail. All our national history through our country has lain apart in sections, each marking a stage of settlement, a stage of wealth, a stage of development, as population has advanced, as if by successive journeyings and encampments, from east to west; and always new regions have been suffered to become new States, form their own life under their own law, plan their own economy, adjust their own domestic relations, and legalize their own methods of business. States have, indeed, often been whimsically enough formed. We have left the matter of boundaries to surveyors rather than to statesmen,

and have by no means managed to construct economic units in the making of States. We have joined mining communities with agricultural, the mountain with the plain, the ranch with the farm, and have left the making of uniform rules to the sagacity and practical habit of neighbors ill at ease with one another. But on the whole, the scheme, though a bit haphazard, has worked itself out with singularly little friction and no disaster, and the strains of the great structure we have erected have been greatly eased and dissipated.

Elastic as the system is, however, it stiffens at every point of national policy. The federal government can make but one rule, and that a rule for the whole country, in each act of its legislation. Its very constitution withholds it from discrimination as between State and State, section and section; and yet its chief powers touch just those subjects of economic interest in which the several sections of the country feel themselves most unlike. Currency questions do not affect them equally or in the same way. Some need an elastic currency to serve their uses; others can fill their coffers more readily with a currency that is inelastic. Some can build up manufactures under a tariff law; others cannot, and must submit to pay more without earning more. Some have one interest in a principle of interstate commerce; others, another. It would be difficult to find even a question of foreign policy which would touch all parts of the country alike. A foreign fleet would mean much more to the merchants of Boston and New York than to the merchants of Illinois and the farmers of the Dakotas.

The conviction is becoming painfully distinct among us, moreover, that these contrasts of conditions and differences of interest between the several sections of the country are now more marked and emphasized than they ever were before. The country has been transformed within a generation, not by any creations in a new kind, but by stupendous changes in degree. Every interest has increased its scale and its individual significance. The "East" is transformed by the vast accumulations of wealth made since the civil war—transformed from a simple to a complex civilization, more like the

Old World than like the New. The "West" has so magnified its characteristics by sheer growth, every economic interest which its life represents has become so gigantic in its proportions, that it seems to Eastern men, and to its own people also, more than ever a region apart. It is true that the "West" is not, as a matter of fact, a region at all, but, in Professor Turner's admirable phrase, a stage of development, nowhere set apart and isolated, but spread abroad through all the far interior of the continent. But it is now a stage of development with a difference, as Professor Turner has shown,[1] which makes it practically a new thing in our history. The "West" was once a series of States and settlements beyond which lay free lands not yet occupied, into which the restless and all who could not thrive by mere steady industry, all who had come too late and all who had stayed too long, could pass on, and, it might be, better their fortunes. Now it lies without outlet. The free lands are gone. New communities must make their life sufficient without this easy escape—must study economy, find their fortunes in what lies at hand, intensify effort, increase capital, build up a future out of details. It is as if they were caught in a fixed order of life and forced into a new competition, and both their self-consciousness and their keenness to observe every point of self-interest are enlarged beyond former example.

That there are currents of national life, both strong and definite, running in full tide through all the continent from sea to sea, no observant person can fail to perceive—currents which have long been gathering force, and which cannot now be withstood. There need be no fear in any sane man's mind that we shall ever again see our national government threatened with overthrow by any power which our own growth has bred. The temporary danger is that, not being of a common mind, because not living under common conditions, the several sections of the country, which a various economic development has for the time being set apart and contrasted, may struggle for supremacy in the control of the government, and that we may learn by some sad experience that there is not even

[1] See *American Historical Review*, Vol. I., p. 71.

yet any common standard, either of opinion or of policy, underlying our national life. The country is of one mind in its allegiance to the government and in its attachment to the national idea; but it is not yet of one mind in respect of that fundamental question, What policies will best serve us in giving strength and development to our life? Not the least noteworthy of the incidents that preceded and foretokened the civil war was, if I may so call it, the sectionalization of the national idea. Southern merchants bestirred themselves to get conventions together for the discussion, not of the issues of polities, but of the economic interests of the country. Their thought and hope were of the nation. They spoke no word of antagonism against any section or interest. Yet it was plain in every resolution they uttered that for them the nation was one thing and centred in the South, while for the rest of the country the nation was another thing and lay in the North and Northwest. They were arguing the needs of the nation from the needs of their own section. The same thing had happened in the days of the embargo and the war of 1812. The Hartford Convention thought of New England when it spoke of the country. So must it ever be when section differs from section in the very basis and method of its life. The nation is to-day one thing in Kansas, and quite another in Massachusetts.

There is no longer any danger of a civil war. There was war between the South and the rest of the nation because their differences were removable in no other way. There was no prospect that slavery, the root of these differences, would ever disappear in the mere process of growth. It was to be apprehended, on the contrary, that the very processes of growth would inevitably lead to the extension of slavery and the perpetuation of radical social and economic contrasts and antagonisms between State and State, between region and region. A heroic remedy was the only remedy. Slavery being removed, the South is now joined with the "West," joined with it in a stage of development, as a region chiefly agricultural, without diversified industries, without a multifarious trade, without those subtle extended nerves which come with all-around economic development, and which make

men keenly sensible of the interests that link the world together, as it were into a single community. But these are lines of difference which will be effaced by mere growth, which time will calmly ignore. They make no boundaries for armies to cross. Tide-water Virginia was thus separated once from her own population within the Alleghany valleys—held two jealous sections within her own limits. Massachusetts once knew the sharp divergences of interest and design which separated the coast settlements upon the Bay from the restless pioneers who had taken up the free lands of her own western counties. North Carolina was once a comfortable and indifferent "East" to the uneasy "West" that was to become Tennessee. Virginia once seemed old and effete to Kentucky. The "great West" once lay upon the Ohio, but has since disappeared there, overlaid by the changes which have carried the conditions of the "East" to the Great Lakes and beyond. There has never yet been a time in our history when we were without an "East" and a "West," but the novel day when we shall be without them is now in sight. As the country grows it will inevitably grow homogeneous. Population will not henceforth spread, but compact; for there is no new land between the seas where the "West" can find another lodgment. The conditions which prevail in the ever-widening "East" will sooner or later cover the continent, and we shall at last be one people. The process will not be a short one. It will doubtless run through many generations and involve many a critical question of statesmanship. But it cannot be stayed, and its working out will bring the nation to its final character and rôle in the world.

In the mean time, shall we not constantly recall our reassuring past, reminding one another again and again, as our memories fail us, of the significant incidents of the long journey we have already come, in order that we may be cheered and guided upon the road we have yet to choose and follow? It is only by thus attempting, and attempting again and again, some sufficient analysis of our past experiences, that we can form any adequate image of our life as a nation, or acquire any intelligent purpose to guide us amidst the rushing move-

ment of affairs. It is no doubt in part by reviewing our lives that we shape and determine them. The future will not, indeed, be like the past; of that we may rest assured. It cannot be like it in detail; it cannot even resemble it in the large. It is one thing to fill a fertile continent with a vigorous people and take possession of its treasures; it is quite another to complete the work of occupation and civilization in detail. Big plans, thought out only in the rough, will suffice for the one, but not for the other. A provident leadership, a patient tolerance of temporary but unavoidable evils, a just temper of compromise and accommodation, a hopeful industry in the face of small returns, mutual understandings, and a cordial spirit of coöperation are needed for the slow, intensive task, which were not demanded amidst the free advances of an unhampered people from settlement to settlement. And yet the past has made the present, and will make the future. It has made us a nation, despite a variety of life that threatened to keep us at odds among ourselves. It has shown us the processes by which differences have been obliterated and antagonisms softened. It has taught us how to become strong, and will teach us, if we heed its moral, how to become wise, also, and single-minded.

The colonies which formed the Union were brought together, let us first remind ourselves, not merely because they were neighbors and kinsmen, but because they were forced to see that they had common interests which they could serve in no other way. "There is nothing which binds one country or one State to another but interest," said Washington. "Without this cement the Western inhabitants can have no predilection for us." Without that cement the colonies could have had no predilection for one another. But it is one thing to have common interests, and quite another to perceive them and to act upon them. The colonies were first thrust together by the pressure of external danger. They needed one another, as well as aid from over-sea, as any fool could perceive, if they were going to keep their frontiers against the Indians, and their outlets upon the Western waters from the French. The French and Indian war over, that press-

ure was relieved, and they might have fallen again apart, indifferent to any common aim, unconscious of any common interest, had not the government that was their common master set itself to make them wince under common wrongs. Then it was that they saw how like they were in polity and life and interest in the great field of politics, studied their common liberty, and became aware of their common ambitions. It was then that they became aware, too, that their common ambitions could be realized only by union; not single-handed, but united against a common enemy. Had they been let alone, it would have taken many a long generation of slowly increased acquaintance with one another to apprise them of their kinship in life and interests and institutions; but England drove them into immediate sympathy and combination, unwittingly founding a nation by suggestion.

The war for freedom over, the new-fledged States entered at once upon a very practical course of education which thrust its lessons upon them without regard to taste or predilection. The Articles of Confederation had been formulated and proposed to the States for their acceptance in 1777, as a legalization of the arrangements that had grown up under the informal guidance of the Continental Congress, in order that law might confirm and strengthen practice, and because an actual continental war commanded a continental organization. But the war was virtually over by the time all the reluctant States had accepted the Articles; and the new government had hardly been put into formal operation before it became evident that only the war had made such an arrangement workable. Not compacts, but the compulsions of a common danger, had drawn the States into an irregular cooperation, and it was even harder to obtain obedience to the definite Articles than it had been to get the requisitions of the unchartered Congress heeded while the war lasted. Peace had rendered the makeshift common government uninteresting, and had given each State leave to withdraw from common undertakings, and to think once more, as of old, only of itself. Their own affairs again isolated and restored to their former separate importance, the States could no longer spare

their chief men for what was considered the minor work of the general Congress. The best men had been gradually withdrawn from Congress before the war ended, and now there seemed less reason than ever why they should be sent to talk at Philadelphia, when they were needed for the actual work of administration at home. Politics fell back into their old localization, and every public man found his chief tasks at home. There were still, as a matter of fact, common needs and dangers scarcely less imperative and menacing than those which had drawn the colonies together against the mother country; but they were needs and perils of peace, and ordinary men did not see them; only the most thoughtful and observant were conscious of them: extraordinary events were required to lift them to the general view.

Happily, there were thoughtful and observant men who were already the chief figures of the country—men whose leadership the people had long since come to look for and accept—and it was through them that the States were brought to a new common consciousness, and at last to a real union. It was not possible for the several States to live self-sufficient and apart, as they had done when they were colonies. They had then had a common government, little as they liked to submit to it, and their foreign affairs had been taken care of. They were now to learn how ill they could dispense with a common providence. Instead of France, they now had England for neighbor in Canada and on the Western waters, where they had themselves but the other day fought so hard to set her power up. She was their rival and enemy, too, on the seas; refused to come to any treaty terms with them in regard to commerce; and laughed to see them unable to concert any policy against her because they had no common political authority among themselves. She had promised, in the treaty of peace, to withdraw her garrisons from the Western posts which lay within the territory belonging to the Confederation; but Congress had promised that British creditors should be paid what was due them, only to find that the States would make no laws to fulfil the promise, and were determined to leave their Federal

representatives without power to make them; and England kept her troops where they were. Spain had taken France's place upon the farther bank of the Mississippi and at the great river's mouth. Grave questions of foreign policy pressed on every side, as of old, and no State could settle them unaided and for herself alone.

Here was a group of commonwealths which would have lived separately and for themselves, and could not; which had thought to make shift with merely a "league of friendship" between them and a Congress for consultation, and found that it was impossible. There were common debts to pay, but there was no common system of taxation by which to meet them, nor any authority to devise and enforce such a system. There were common enemies and rivals to deal with, but no one was authorized to carry out a common policy against them. There was a common domain to settle and administer, but no one knew how a Congress without the power to command was to manage so great a property. The Ordinance of 1787 was indeed bravely framed, after a method of real statesmanship; but there was no warrant for it to be found in the Articles, and no one could say how Congress would execute a law it had had no authority to enact. It was not merely the hopeless confusion and sinister signs of anarchy which abounded in their own affairs—a rebellion of debtors in Massachusetts, tariff wars among the States that lay upon New York Bay and on the Sound, North Carolina's doubtful supremacy among her settlers in the Tennessee country, Virginia's questionable authority in Kentucky—that brought the States at last to attempt a better union and set up a real government for the whole country. It was the inevitable continental outlook of affairs as well; if nothing more, the sheer necessity to grow and touch their neighbors at close quarters.

Washington had been among the first to see the necessity of living, not by a local, but by a continental policy. Of course he had a direct pecuniary interest in the development of the Western lands—had himself preëmpted many a broad acre lying upon the far Ohio, as well as upon the nearer western

slopes of the mountains—and it is open to any one who likes the sinister suggestion to say that his ardor for the occupancy of the Western country was that of the land speculator, not that of the statesman. Everybody knows that it was a conference between delegates from Maryland and Virginia about Washington's favorite scheme of joining the upper waters of the Potomac with the upper waters of the streams which made their way to the Mississippi—a conference held at his suggestion and at his house—that led to the convening of that larger conference at Annapolis, which called for the appointment of the body that met at Philadelphia and framed the Constitution under which he was to become the first President of the United States. It is open to any one who chooses to recall how keen old Governor Dinwiddie had been, when he came to Virginia, to watch these same Western waters in the interests of the first Ohio Company, in which he had bought stock; how promptly he called the attention of the ministers in England to the aggressions of the French in that quarter, sent Washington out as his agent to warn the intruders off, and pushed the business from stage to stage, till the French and Indian war was ablaze, and nations were in deadly conflict on both sides of the sea. It ought to be nothing new and nothing strange, to those who have read the history of the English race the world over, to learn that conquests have a thousand times sprung out of the initiative of men who have first followed private interests into new lands like speculators, and then planned their occupation and government like statesmen. Dinwiddie was no statesman, but Washington was; and the circumstance which it is worth while to note about him is, not that he went prospecting upon the Ohio when the French war was over, but that he saw more than fertile lands there—saw the "seat of a rising empire," and, first among the men of his day, perceived by what means its settlers could be bound to the older communities in the East alike in interest and in polity. Here were the first "West" and the first "East," and Washington's thought mediating between them.

The formation of the Union brought a real government

into existence, and that government set about its work with an energy, a dignity, a thoroughness of plan, which made the whole country aware of it from the outset, and aware, consequently, of the national scheme of political life it had been devised to promote. Hamilton saw to it that the new government should have a definite party and body of interests at its back. It had been fostered in the making by the commercial classes at the ports and along the routes of commerce, and opposed in the rural districts which lay away from the centres of population. Those who knew the forces that played from State to State, and made America a partner in the life of the world, had earnestly wanted a government that should preside and choose in the making of the nation; but those who saw only the daily round of the countryside had been indifferent or hostile, consulting their pride and their prejudices. Hamilton sought a policy which should serve the men who had set the government up, and found it in the funding of the debt, both national and domestic, the assumption of the Revolutionary obligations of the States, and the establishment of a national bank. This was what the friends of the new plan had wanted, the rehabilitation of credit, and the government set out with a programme meant to commend it to men with money and vested interests.

It was just such a government that the men of an opposite interest and temperament had dreaded, and Washington was not out of office before the issue began to be clearly drawn between those who wanted a strong government, with a great establishment, a system of finance which should dominate the markets, an authority in the field of law which should restrain the States and make the Union, through its courts, the sole and final judge of its own powers, and those who dreaded nothing else so much, wished a government which should hold the country together with as little thought as possible of its own aggrandizement, went all the way with Jefferson in his jealousy of the commercial interest, accepted his ideal of a dispersed power put into commission among the States —even among the local units within the States—and looked to see liberty discredited amidst a display of federal power.

When the first party had had their day in the setting up of the government and the inauguration of a policy which should make it authoritative, the party of Jefferson came in to purify it. They began by attacking the federal courts, which had angered every man of their faith by a steady maintenance and elaboration of the federal power; they ended by using that power just as their opponents had used it. In the first place, it was necessary to buy Louisiana, and with it the control of the Mississippi, notwithstanding Mr. Jefferson's solemn conviction that such an act was utterly without constitutional warrant; in the second place, they had to enforce an arbitrary embargo in order to try their hand at reprisal upon foreign rivals in trade; in the end, they had to recharter the national bank, create a national debt and a sinking fund, impose an excise upon whiskey, lay direct taxes, devise a protective tariff, use coercion upon those who would not aid them in a great war—play the rôle of masters and tax-gatherers as the Federalists had played it—on a greater scale, even, and with equal gusto. Everybody knows the familiar story: it has new significance from day to day only as it illustrates the invariable process of nation-making which has gone on from generation to generation, from the first until now.

Opposition to the exercise and expansion of the federal power only made it the more inevitable by making it the more deliberate. The passionate protests, the plain speech, the sinister forecasts, of such men as John Randolph aided the process by making it self-conscious. What Randolph meant as an accusation, those who chose the policy of the government presently accepted as a prophecy. It was true, as he said, that a nation was in the making, and a government under which the privileges of the States would count for less than the compulsions of the common interest. Few had seen it so at first; the men who were old when the government was born refused to see it so to the last; but the young men and those who came fresh upon the stage from decade to decade presently found the scarecrow look like a thing they might love. Their ideal took form with the reiterated suggestion; they began to hope for what they had been bidden

to dread. No party could long use the federal authority without coming to feel it national—without forming some ideal of the common interest, and of the use of power by which it should be fostered.

When they adopted the tariff of 1816, the Jeffersonians themselves formulated a policy which should endow the federal government with a greater economic power than even Hamilton had planned when he sought to win the support of the merchants and the lenders of money; and when they bought something like a third of the continent beyond the Mississippi, they made it certain the nation should grow upon a continental scale which no provincial notions about state powers and a common government kept within strait bounds could possibly survive. Here were the two forces which were to dominate us till the present day, and make the present issues of our politics: an open "West" into which a frontier population was to be thrust from generation to generation, and a protective tariff which should build up special interests the while in the "East," and make the contrast ever sharper and sharper between section and section. What the "West" is doing now is simply to note more deliberately than ever before, and with a keener distaste, this striking contrast between her own development and that of the "East." That was a true instinct of statesmanship which led Henry Clay to couple a policy of internal improvements with a policy of protection. Internal improvements meant in that day great roads leading into the West, and every means taken to open the country to use and settlement. While a protective tariff was building up special industries in the East, public works should make an outlet into new lands for all who were not getting the benefit of the system. The plan worked admirably for many a day, and was justly called "American," so well did it match the circumstances of a set of communities, half old, half new: the old waiting to be developed, the new setting the easy scale of living. The other side of the policy was left for us. There is no longer any outlet for those who are not the beneficiaries of the protective system, and nothing but the contrasts it has created remains to mark its triumphs.

Internal improvements no longer relieve the strain; they have become merely a means of largess.

The history of the United States has been one continuous story of rapid, stupendous growth, and all its great questions have been questions of growth. It was proposed in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that a limit should be set to the number of new members to be admitted to the House of Representatives from States formed beyond the Alleghanies; and the suggestion was conceived with a true instinct of prophecy. The old States were not only to be shaken out of their self-centred life, but were even to see their very government changed over their heads by the rise of States in the Western country. John Randolph voted against the admission of Ohio into the Union, because he held that no new partner should be admitted to the federal arrangement except by unanimous consent. It was the very next year that Louisiana was purchased, and a million square miles were added to the territory out of which new States were to be made. Had the original States been able to live to themselves, keeping their own people, elaborating their own life, without a common property to manage, unvexed by a vacant continent, national questions might have been kept within modest limits. They might even have made shift to digest Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, and the great commonwealths carved out of the Northwest Territory, for which the Congress of the Confederation had already made provision. But the Louisiana purchase opened the continent to the planting of States, and took the processes of nationalization out of the hands of the original "partners." Questions of politics were henceforth to be questions of growth.

For a while the question of slavery dominated all the rest. The Northwest Territory was closed to slavery by the Ordinance of 1787. Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, took slavery almost without question from the States from which they were sprung. But Missouri gave the whole country view of the matter which must be settled in the making of every State founded beyond the Mississippi. The slavery struggle, which seems to us who are near it to occupy so great a space in the field of our affairs, was, of course, a struggle

for and against the extension of slavery, not for or against its existence in the States where it had taken root from of old—a question of growth, not of law. It will some day be seen to have been, for all it was so stupendous, a mere episode of development. Its result was to remove a ground of economic and social difference as between section and section which threatened to become permanent, standing forever in the way of a homogeneous life. The passionate struggle to prevent its extension inevitably led to its total abolition; and the way was clear for the South, as well as the "West," to become like its neighbor sections in every element of its life.

It had also a further, almost incalculable effect in its stimulation of a national sentiment. It created throughout the North and Northwest a passion of devotion to the Union which really gave the Union a new character. The nation was fused into a single body in the fervent heat of the time. At the beginning of the war the South had seemed like a section pitted against a section; at its close it seemed a territory conquered by a neighbor nation. That nation is now, take it roughly, that "East" which we contrast with the "West" of our day. The economic conditions once centred at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburg, and the other commercial and industrial cities of the coast States are now to be found, hardly less clearly marked, in Chicago, in Minneapolis, in Detroit, through all the great States that lie upon the Lakes, in all the old "Northwest." The South has fallen into a new economic classification. In respect of its stage of development it belongs with the "West," though in sentiment, in traditional ways of life, in many a point of practice and detail, it keeps its old individuality, and though it has in its peculiar labor problem a hinderance to progress at once unique and ominous.

It is to this point we have come in the making of the nation. The old sort of growth is at an end—the growth by mere expansion. We have now to look more closely to internal conditions, and study the means by which a various people is to be bound together in a single interest. Many differences will pass away of themselves. "East" and "West" will come together by a slow approach, as capital accumulates where

now it is only borrowed, as industrial development makes its way westward in a new variety, as life gets its final elaboration and detail throughout all the great spaces of the continent, until all the scattered parts of the nation are drawn into real community of interest. Even the race problem of the South will no doubt work itself out in the slowness of time, as blacks and whites pass from generation to generation, gaining with each removal from the memories of the war a surer self-possession, an easier view of the division of labor and of social function to be arranged between them. Time is the only legislator in such a matter. But not everything can be left to drift and slow accommodation. The nation which has grown to the proportions almost of the continent within the century, lies under our eyes, unfinished, unharmonized, waiting still to have its parts adjusted, lacking its last lesson in the ways of peace and concert. It required statesmanship of no mean sort to bring us to our present growth and lusty strength. It will require leadership of a much higher order to teach us the triumphs of coöperation, the self-possession and calm choices of maturity.

Much may be brought about by a mere knowledge of the situation. It is not simply the existence of facts that governs us, but consciousness and comprehension of the facts. The whole process of statesmanship consists in bringing facts to light, and shaping law to suit, or, if need be, mould them. It is part of our present danger that men of the "East" listen only to their own public men, men of the "West" only to theirs. We speak of the "West" as out of sympathy with the "East": it would be instructive once and again to reverse the terms, and admit that the "East" neither understands nor sympathizes with the "West"—and thorough nationalization depends upon mutual understandings and sympathies. There is an unpleasant significance in the fact that the "East" has made no serious attempt to understand the desire for the free coinage of silver in the "West" and the South. If it were once really probed and comprehended, we should know that it is necessary to reform our currency at once, and we should know in what way it is necessary to reform it; we should know that a new protective tariff only marks with a

new emphasis the contrast in economic interest between the "East" and the "West," and that nothing but currency reform can touch the cause of the present discontents.

Ignorance and indifference as between section and section no man need wonder at who knows the habitual courses of history; and no one who comprehends the essential soundness of our people's life can mistrust the future of the nation. He may confidently expect a safe nationalization of interest and policy in the end, whatever folly of experiment and fitful change he may fear in the mean while. He can only wonder that we should continue to leave ourselves so utterly without adequate means of formulating a national policy. Certainly Providence has presided over our affairs with a strange indulgence, if it is true that Providence helps only those who first seek to help themselves. The making of a nation has never been a thing deliberately planned and consummated by the counsel and authority of leaders, but the daily conduct and policy of a nation which has won its place must be so planned. So far we have had the hopefulness, the readiness, and the hardihood of youth in these matters, and have never become fully conscious of the position into which our peculiar frame of government has brought us. We have waited a whole century to observe that we have made no provision for authoritative national leadership in matters of policy. The President does not always speak with authority, because he is not always a man picked out and tested by any processes in which the people have been participants, and has nothing often but his office to render him influential. Even when the country does know and trust him, he can carry his views no further than to recommend them to the attention of Congress in a written message which the Houses would deem themselves subservient to give too much heed to. Within the Houses there is no man, except the Vice-President, to whose choice the whole country gives heed; and he is chosen, not to be a Senator, but only to wait upon the disability of the President, and preside meanwhile over a body of which he is not a member. The House of Representatives has in these latter days made its Speaker its political leader as well as its parliamentary

moderator; but the country is, of course, never consulted about that beforehand, and his leadership is not the open leadership of discussion, but the undebatable leadership of the parliamentary autocrat.

This singular leaderless structure of our government never stood fully revealed until the present generation, and even now awaits general recognition. Peculiar circumstances and the practical political habit and sagacity of our people for long concealed it. The framers of the Constitution no doubt expected the President and his advisers to exercise a real leadership in affairs, and for more than a generation after the setting up of the government their expectation was fulfilled. Washington was accepted as leader no less by Congress than by the people. Hamilton, from the Treasury, really gave the government both its policy and its administrative structure. If John Adams had less authority than Washington, it was because the party he represented was losing its hold upon the country. Jefferson was the most consummate party chief, the most unchecked master of legislative policy, we have had in America, and his dynasty was continued in Madison and Monroe. But Madison's terms saw Clay and Calhoun come to the front in the House, and many another man of the new generation, ready to guide and coach the President rather than to be absolutely controlled by him. Monroe was not of the calibre of his predecessors, and no party could rally about so stiff a man, so cool a partisan, as John Quincy Adams. And so the old political function of the presidency came to an end, and it was left for Jackson to give it a new one—instead of a leadership of counsel, a leadership and discipline by rewards and punishments. Then the slavery issue began to dominate politics, and a long season of concentrated passion brought individual men of force into power in Congress—natural leaders of men like Clay, trained and eloquent advocates like Webster, keen debaters with a logic whose thrusts were as sharp as those of cold steel like Calhoun. The war made the Executive of necessity the nation's leader again, with the great Lincoln at its head, who seemed to embody, with a touch of genius, the very character of the race itself. Then reconstruction came—under whose leader-

ship who could say?—and we were left to wonder what, henceforth, in the days of ordinary peace and industry, we were to make of a government which could in humdrum times yield us no leadership at all. The tasks which confront us now are not like those which centred in the war, in which passion made men run together to a common work. Heaven forbid that we should admit any element of passion into the delicate matters in which national policy must mediate between the differing economic interests of sections which a wise moderation will assuredly unite in the ways of harmony and peace! We shall need, not the mere compromises of Clay, but a constructive leadership of which Clay hardly showed himself capable.

There are few things more disconcerting to the thought, in any effort to forecast the future of our affairs, than the fact that we must continue to take our executive policy from presidents given us by nominating conventions, and our legislation from conference committees of the House and Senate. Evidently it is a purely providential form of government. We should never have had Lincoln for President had not the Republican convention of 1860 sat in Chicago, and felt the weight of the galleries in its work—and one does not like to think what might have happened had Mr. Seward been nominated. We might have had Mr. Bryan for President, because of the impression which may be made upon an excited assembly by a good voice and a few ringing sentences flung forth just after a cold man who gave unpalatable counsel had sat down. The country knew absolutely nothing about Mr. Bryan before his nomination, and it would not have known anything about him afterward had he not chosen to make speeches. It was not Mr. McKinley, but Mr. Reed, who was the real leader of the Republican party. It has become a commonplace among us that conventions prefer dark horses—prefer those who are not tested leaders with well-known records, to those who are. It has become a commonplace among all nations which have tried popular institutions, that the actions of such bodies as our nominating conventions are subject to the play of passion and of chance. They meet to do a single thing—for the platform is really left to a committee—and upon that one thing all intrigue centres. Who that has witnessed them

will ever forget the intense night scenes, the feverish recesses, of our nominating conventions, when there is a running to and fro of agents from delegation to delegation, and every candidate has his busy headquarters—can ever forget the shouting and almost frenzied masses on the floor of the hall when the convention is in session, swept this way and that by every wind of sudden feeling, impatient of debate, incapable of deliberation? When a convention's brief work is over, its own members can scarcely remember the plan and order of it. They go home unmarked, and sink into the general body of those who have nothing to do with the conduct of government. They cannot be held responsible if their candidate fails in his attempt to carry on the Executive.

It has not often happened that candidates for the presidency have been chosen from outside the ranks of those who have seen service in national politics. Congress is apt to be peculiarly sensitive to the exercise of executive authority by men who have not at some time been members of the one House or the other, and so learned to sympathize with members' views as to the relations that ought to exist between the President and the federal legislature. No doubt a good deal of the dislike which the Houses early conceived for Mr. Cleveland was due to the feeling that he was an "outsider," a man without congressional sympathies and points of view—a sort of irregular and amateur at the delicate game of national politics as played at Washington; most of the men whom he chose as advisers were of the same kind, without Washington credentials. Mr. McKinley, though of the congressional circle himself, repeated the experiment in respect of his cabinet in the appointment of such men as Mr. Gage and Mr. Bliss and Mr. Gary. Members resent such appointments; they seem to drive the two branches of the government further apart than ever, and yet they grow more common from administration to administration.

These appointments make coöperation between Congress and the Executive more difficult, not because the men thus appointed lack respect for the Houses or seek to gain any advantage over them, but because they do not know how to deal with them—through what persons and by what cour-

tesies of approach. To the uninitiated Congress is simply a mass of individuals. It has no responsible leaders known to the system of government, and the leaders recognized by its rules are one set of individuals for one sort of legislation, another for another. The Secretaries cannot address or approach either House as a whole; in dealing with committees they are dealing only with groups of individuals; neither party has its leader—there are only influential men here and there who know how to manage its caucuses and take advantage of parliamentary openings on the floor. There is a master in the House, as every member very well knows, and even the easy-going public are beginning to observe. The Speaker appoints the committees; the committees practically frame all legislation; the Speaker, accordingly, gives or withholds legislative power and opportunity, and members are granted influence or deprived of it much as he pleases. He of course administers the rules, and the rules are framed to prevent debate and individual initiative. He can refuse recognition for the introduction of measures he disapproves of as party chief; he may make way for those he desires to see passed. He is chairman of the Committee on Rules, by which the House submits to be governed (for fear of helplessness and chaos) in the arrangement of its business and the apportionment of its time. In brief, he is not only its moderator, but its master. New members protest and write to the newspapers; but old members submit—and indeed the Speaker's power is inevitable. You must have leaders in a numerous body—leaders with authority; and you cannot give authority in the House except through the rules. The man who administers the rules must be master, and you must put this mastery into the hands of your best party leader. The legislature being separated from the executive branch of the government, the only rewards and punishments by which you can secure party discipline are those within the gift of the rules—the committee appointments and preferences: you cannot administer these by election; party government would break down in the midst of personal exchanges of electoral favors. Here again you must trust the Speaker to organize and choose, and your only party leader is your moderator.

He does not lead by debate; he explains, he proposes nothing to the country; you learn his will in his rulings.

It is with such machinery that we are to face the future, find a wise and moderate policy, bring the nation to a common, a cordial understanding, a real unity of life. The President can lead only as he can command the ear of both Congress and the country—only as any other individual might who could secure a like general hearing and acquiescence. Policy must come always from the deliberations of the House committees, the debates, both secret and open, of the Senate, the compromises of committee conference between the Houses; no one man, no group of men, leading; no man, no group of men, responsible for the outcome. Unquestionably we believe in a guardian destiny! No other race could have accomplished so much with such a system; no other race would have dared risk such an experiment. We shall work out a remedy, for work it out we must. We must find or make, somewhere in our system, a group of men to lead us, who represent the nation in the origin and responsibility of their power; who shall draw the Executive, which makes choice of foreign policy and upon whose ability and good faith the honorable execution of the laws depends, into cordial coöperation with the legislature, which, under whatever form of government, must sanction law and policy. Only under a national leadership, by a national selection of leaders, and by a method of constructive choice rather than of compromise and barter, can a various nation be peacefully led. Once more is our problem of nation-making the problem of a form of government. Shall we show the sagacity, the open-mindedness, the moderation, in our task of modification, that were shown under Washington and Madison and Sherman and Franklin and Wilson, in the task of construction?

XII

"PATRIOTISM AND POLITICS"

BY

HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL GIBBONS

CHIEF PRELATE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AMERICA

PRESIDENT WILSON has shown us the steps by which our country has become the mighty and happy land it is. Let us look now to the spirit which has made it great, to the patriotism which has guided and inspired its advance. Let us, moreover, consider this patriotism in no idle mood of joy, or pride, or self-gratulation. Rather must we study thoughtfully the means by which love of country has been roused in the past. We must seek the root of the emotions from which so fair a flower blooms; we must examine the meaning of this inspiring power which we have all seen in action, this undeniable spiritual force. We must aim to find why God implanted it in the heart of man. If in this search we become convinced of patriotism's high worth, we must then question what dangers threaten it, what means shall be taken to preserve it and to stimulate it to yet greater strength of inspiration in the coming years.

For this search, less simple than perchance it seems, let us accept the guidance of that distinguished prelate who stands at the head of the Roman Catholic Church in America. However widely many of us may differ from Cardinal Gibbons in matters of religious faith, yet his pure, strong, simple life has won him the respect of all. His steady influence in "Americanizing" the Catholic Church marks him as a friend of liberty. And his ever-widening fame guarantees that any written word of his will be filled full with a broad knowledge, a high wisdom, and a practical common-sense.

"PATRIOTISM AND POLITICS"

I HAVE no apology to make for offering some reflections on the political outlook of the nation; for my rights as a citizen were not abdicated or abridged on becoming a Christian prelate, and the sacred character which I profess, far from lessening, rather increases, my obligations to my country.

In answer to those who affirm that a churchman is not qualified to discuss politics, by reason of his sacred calling, which removes him from the political arena, I would say that this statement may be true in the sense that a clergyman as such should not be a heated partisan of any political party; but it is not true in the sense that he is unfitted by his sacred profession for discussing political principles. His very seclusion from popular agitation gives him a vantage-ground over those that are in the whirlpool of party strife, just as they, who have never witnessed Shakespeare's plays performed on the stage, are better qualified to judge of the genius of the author and the literary merit of his productions than they who witness the plays amid the environment of stage scenery.

It is needless to say that I write not merely as a churchman, but as a citizen; not in a partisan, but in a patriotic, spirit; not in advocacy of any particular party, but in vindication of pure government. There is a moral side to most political questions; and my purpose here is to consider the ethical aspect of politics, and the principles of justice by which they should be regulated.

Every man in the Commonwealth leads a dual life—a private life under the shadow of the home, and a public life under the ægis of the State. As a father, a husband, or a son, he owes certain duties to the family; as a citizen, he owes certain obligations to his country. These civic virtues are all comprised under the generic name, patriotism.

Patriotism means love of country. Its root is the Latin word *patria*, a word not domesticated in English. The French have it in *patrie;* the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic races have it literally translated in Fatherland. "Fatherland," says Cicero, "is the common parent of us all: *Patria est communis omnium nostrum parens.*"[1] It is the parental home extended, the

[1] See Cicero's *De Finibus*, III., p. 19.

family reaching out to the city, the province, the country. Hence, with us Fatherland and Country have come to be synonymous. Country in this sense comprises two elements, the soil itself, and the men who live thereon. We love the soil in which our fathers sleep—*terra patrum, terra patria*, the land in which we were born. We love the men who as fellow-dwellers share that land with us. When, not long ago, Dom Pedro, the exiled Emperor of Brazil, died in Paris, he was laid to his last sleep on Brazilian soil, which he had carried away with him for that very purpose. Let a citizen from Maine meet a citizen from California on the shores of the Bosphorus or on the banks of the Tiber, they will, at once, forget that at home they dwelt three thousand miles apart. State lines are obliterated, party differences are laid aside, religious animosities, if such had existed, are extinguished. They warmly clasp hands, they remember only that they are fellow-American citizens, children of the same mother, fellow-dwellers in the same land over which floats the star-spangled banner.

Patriotism implies not only love of soil and of fellow-citizens, but also, and principally, attachment to the laws, institutions, and government of one's country; filial admiration of the heroes, statesmen, and men of genius, who have contributed to its renown by the valor of their arms, the wisdom of their counsel, or their literary fame. It includes, also, an ardent zeal for the maintenance of those sacred principles that secure to the citizen freedom of conscience, and an earnest determination to consecrate his life, if necessary, *pro aris et focis* (in defence of altar and fireside), of God and Fatherland. Patriotism is a universal sentiment of the race:

> "Breathes there the man with soul so dead
> Who never to himself hath said,
> 'This is my own, my native land!'"

A certain philosophical school has taught that love of country has its origin in physical comfort. *Ibi patria ubi bene.* But is it not true that one's country becomes dear in proportion to the sufferings endured for it? Have not the sacrifices of our wars developed the patriotism of the American? In fact, it is the most suffering and persecuted races that are endowed

with the deepest patriotism. We may even go so far as to say that the rougher the soil, the harsher the climate, the greater the material privations of a land, the more intense is the love of its inhabitants for it. Witness the Irish peasant. And are not the Swiss in their narrow valleys and on their steep mountain-sides, the Scotch on their rugged Highlands the classic models of patriotism? Nay, the Eskimo, amid the perpetual snows that hide from his eyes every green spot of earth, loves his home nor dreams of a fairer.

Patriotism is not a sentiment born of material and physical well-being; it is a sentiment that the poverty of country and the discomforts of climate do not diminish, that the inflictions of conquest and despotism do not augment. The truth is, it is a rational instinct placed by the Creator in the breast of man. When God made man a social being, He gave him a sentiment that urges him to sacrifice himself for his family and his country, which is, as it were, his larger family. "Dear are ancestors, dear are children, dear are relatives and friends; all these loves are contained in love of country."[1]

The Roman was singularly devoted to his country. *Civis Romanus sum* (I am a citizen of Rome) was his proudest boast. He justly gloried in being a citizen of a republic conspicuous for its centuries of endurance, for the valor of its soldiers, for the wisdom of its statesmen and the genius of its writers. One of its greatest poets has sung: "It is sweet and honorable to die for one's country."[2] So execrable was the crime of treason regarded, that the traitor not only suffered extreme penalties in this life, but he is consigned after death by Virgil to the most gloomy regions of Tartarus.[3]

Love of country shows itself in the citizen by the observance of law and the good use of political rights; and in those that, for the time being, govern, by justice and disinterestedness in their administration. Ministers of religion manifest their patriotism, not only as citizens, but also as spiritual teachers and

[1] Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est. (Cicero, De Off., I., 17.)

[2] Dulce et decorum pro patria mori. (Horace, B. III., Ode II.)

[3] See Virgil's *Æneid*, Book VI.

leaders of the people, by inculcating the religious, moral, and civic virtues, and by prayer to the throne of God for the welfare of the land. "I desire, therefore," wrote St. Paul to his disciple Timothy, "first of all that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men; for kings and for all that are in high station, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all piety and chastity; for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour."[1]

The Catholic Church in our country is not unmindful of this duty. A prayer composed by Archbishop Carroll to beg Heaven's blessing on the land and its rulers, a masterpiece of liturgical literature, is recited every Sunday at the solemn service in some parts of the United States, and notably in the Cathedral at Baltimore, in which the custom has never ceased since it was introduced by Baltimore's first Archbishop over one hundred years ago.

To the soldier, patriotism has inspired the most heroic deeds of courage and self-sacrifice. The victories of Debora, Judith, and Gedeon, achieved for God and country, are recorded with praise in Sacred Scripture.

The stand of Leonidas in the pass of Thermopylæ with his three hundred Spartans against the million Persians of Xerxes; the boldness of his answer to the Oriental monarch's summons to lay down arms, "Let him come and take them"; the recklessness of his reply to the threat that so numerous were his foes that the very heavens would be darkened by their arrows, "'Tis well. We shall fight in the shade"; the fierce battle; the fall of almost all the Grecian heroes; the total defeat of the Persian host—are commonplaces of history, are themes of the schoolroom. That day ranks among the great days of the world. Had Xerxes triumphed, Europe had become Asiatic, and the trend of history had been changed.

The three calls of Cincinnatus to the Dictatorship from the solitude and cultivation of his Sabine farm, his three triumphs over the enemies of the Republic, kindled not in his breast the fire of political ambition. When the foe was repelled and his country needed him no longer, he laid down the

[1] See Timothy, II., 1–3.

sword of command for the plough, left "the pomp and circumstance" of the camp for the quiet of his rural homestead, like him whose grave hallows the hillside of Mount Vernon—two notable instances of patriotism, making men great in peace no less than in war. Need I recall to my readers Regulus, Horatius Cocles, Brutus, the first consul, whose heroic and patriotic deeds have been the exultant theme of the classic authors of Rome?

Patriotism finds outward and, so to say, material expression, in respect for the flag that symbolizes the country, and for the chief magistrate who represents it. Perhaps it is only when an American travels abroad that he fully realizes how deep-rooted is his love for his native country. The sentiment of patriotism, which may be dormant at home, is aroused and quickened in foreign lands. The sight of an American flag flying from the mast of a ship in mid-ocean or in some foreign port awakes unwonted emotion and enthusiasm.

The interest which an American feels in a presidential election, or in any other important domestic event, is intensified when he is abroad. When I was travelling through the Tyrol, in 1880, I had a natural desire to find out who had been nominated for the Presidency; but in that country news travels slowly. On reaching Innspruck, I learned that Mr. Garfield was the nominee. I got my information from an American student buried in the cloisters of a seminary, to whom the outside world was apparently dead. I never discovered, and I dare say his professors never knew, how he obtained his information. But the news was correct.

Americans are in the habit of visiting Rome every year in large numbers. The greater part of them on their arrival instinctively repair to the American College. Perhaps, the name of the college attracts them; perhaps, also, the consciousness that they will hear their mother-tongue. And when they enter its portals, where they are always sure to find a warm welcome from the genial rector, their eyes are gladdened by the familiar features of the "Father of his Country."

Love of country, as I have described it, which is fundamentally an ethical sentiment, and which was such in all nations, even before Christian Revelation was given to the world, and

which is such to-day among nations that have not heard the Christian message, is elevated, ennobled, and perfected by the religion of Christ. Patriotism in non-Christian times and races has inspired heroism even unto death. We do not pretend that Christian patriotism can do more. But we do say that Christianity has given to patriotism, and to the sacrifices it demands, nobler motives and higher ideals.

If the virtue of patriotism was held in such esteem by pagan Greece and Rome, guided only by the light of reason, how much more should it be cherished by Christians, instructed as they are by the voice of Revelation! The Founder of the Christian religion has ennobled and sanctified loyalty to country by the influence of His example and the force of His teaching.

When St. Peter was asked by the tax-collector whether his Master should pay the tribute money or not, he replied in the affirmative, and the penniless Master wrought a miracle to secure the payment of the money, though He was exempt from the obligation by reason of His poverty and his divine origin; for if the sons of kings are free from taxation, as Christ Himself remarked on that occasion, the Son of the King of kings had certainly a higher claim to exemption.

The Herodians questioned Jesus whether or not it was lawful to pay tribute to Cæsar. By this question they sought to ensnare Him in His words. . If He admitted the obligation, He would have aroused the indignation of the Jews, who deemed it unlawful to pay tribute to a Gentile and idolatrous ruler. If, on the other hand, He denied the obligation, He would have incurred the vengeance of Rome. He made this memorable reply, which silenced His adversaries: "Render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and to God the things which are God's."

The Apostles echo the voice of their Master. "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God. Therefore, he who resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they who resist, purchase for themselves damnation. Render, therefore, to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor."[1] "Be ye subject to

[1] Romans, XIII.

every authority for God's sake, whether to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of those who do well."[1] This short sentence, "There is no authority but from God," has contributed more effectually to the stability of nations and to the peace and order of society than standing armies and all the volumes ever written on the principles of government. It ennobles obedience to constituted authority by representing it, not as an act of servility to man, but of homage to God. It sheds a halo around rulers and magistrates by holding them up to us as the representatives of God. It invests all legitimate laws with a divine sanction by an appeal to our conscience.

If the Apostles and the primitive Christians had so much reverence for the civil magistrates in whose election they certainly had no voice; and if they were so conscientious in observing the laws of the Roman Empire, which often inflicted on them odious pains and disabilities, how much more respect should the American citizen entertain for the civil rulers in whose election he actively participates! With what alacrity should he fulfil the laws which are framed solely for his peace and protection and for the welfare of the Commonwealth!

The deification of the State in pagan times rested on a principle contrary to reason, and exacted sacrifices destructive of the moral worth of the citizen. The State absorbed the individual. It was held to be the proprietor and master of the citizen, who was only an instrument in its hand, to be used, cast aside, or broken at will. Christianity knows how to conciliate patriotism with the exigencies of man's personal dignity. Social perfection, or civilization, is in that form of government that secures to its members the greater facility for pursuing and attaining their end in life. That is the Christian notion of the State, and the American also, as laid down in the Declaration of Independence. It is stated therein that government is for the citizen, to secure to him his inalienable rights—that is to say, rights that are his and are inalienable by virtue of the supreme end marked out for him by the Creator.

Again, unlike pagan civilization, which despised the for-

cigner as a barbarian and a foe, Christian and American civilization sees its ideal in that universal charity revealed to the world by Christ, who came to teach the brotherhood of all men in the Fatherhood of the One God. Patriotism and cosmopolitism are not incompatible in the Christian. They find a model in the religious order, in the Catholicity and unity of the Church. And even in the political order, the United States offers a miniature picture of the brotherly federation of nations —forty-five sovereign States, sovereign and independent as to their internal existence, yet presenting to the rest of the world a national unity in the federal government.

And, indeed, when we reflect on the happiness and manifold temporal blessings which our political institutions have already conferred, and are destined in the future to confer, on millions of people, we are not surprised that the American citizen is proud of his country, her history, and the record of her statesmen.

Therefore, next to God, our country should hold the strongest place in our affections. Impressed, as we ought to be, with a profound sense of the blessings which our system of government continues to bestow on us, we shall have a corresponding dread lest these blessings should be withdrawn from us. It is a sacred duty for every American to do all in his power to perpetuate our civil institutions and to avert the dangers that threaten them.

The system of government which obtains in the United States is tersely described in the well-known sentence, "A government of the people, by the people, for the people"; which may be paraphrased thus: Ours is a government in which the people are ruled by the representatives of their own choice, and for the benefit of the people themselves.

Our rulers are called the servants of the people, since they are appointed to fulfil the people's wishes; and the people are called the sovereign people, because it is by their sovereign voice that their rulers are elected.

The method by which the supreme will of the people is registered is the ballot-box. This is the oracle that proclaims their choice. This is the balance in which the merits of the

candidates are weighed. The heavier scale determines at once the decision of the majority and the selection of the candidate.

And what spectacle is more sublime than the sight of ten millions of citizens determining, not by the bullet, but by the ballot, the ruler that is to preside over the nation's destinies

> "A weapon that comes down as still
> As snowflakes fall upon the sod;
> But executes a freeman's will,
> As lightning does the will of God:
> And from its force nor doors nor locks
> Can shield you: 'tis the ballot-box."

But the greatest blessings are liable to be perverted. Our Republic, while retaining its form and name, may degenerate into most odious tyranny; and the irresponsible despotism of the multitude is more galling, because more difficult to be shaken off, than that of the autocrat.

History is philosophy teaching by example. A brief review of the Roman Republic and the causes of its downfall will teach us a useful lesson. The Republic prospered so long as the citizens practised simplicity of life, and the civil magistrates administered even-handed justice. Avarice and ambition proved its ruin.[1] The avarice of the poor was gratified by the bribery of the rich; and the ambition of the rich was fed by the votes of the poor.

In the latter days of the Republic bribery and corruption were shamefully practised. Marius was elected to the consulship by the purchase of votes and by collusion with the most notorious demagogues. Pompey and Crassus secured the consulship by intimidation, though neither of them was legally qualified for that office. The philosophy of Epicuris, introduced during the last years of the Republic, hastened the moral and mental corruption of Rome. The loss of the political autonomy of Greece, which preceded that of Rome, may be traced to the same cause. To the early Romans the oath was sacred, and perjury a detestable crime. We find in a letter of

[1] Primo pecuniæ, deinde imperii cupido crevit; ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere. (Sallust.) Catalin. C. X.

Cicero to Atticus a curious incident that shows how far the politicians of his day had departed from former standards.

"Memmius," he writes, "has just made known to the Senate an agreement between himself and an associate candidate for the consulship on the one hand, and the two consuls of the current year on the other." It appears that the two consuls agreed to favor the candidacy of the aspirants on the following terms: The two aspirants bound themselves to forfeit to the consuls four hundred thousand sesterces if they failed to produce in favor of the consuls three augurs who were to swear that in their sight and hearing the Plebs (though such was not the fact) had voted the law *Curiate*, a law that invested the consuls with full military powers; and also if they failed to produce two ex-consuls who were to swear that in their presence the Senate had passed and signed a certain decree regulating the provinces of each consul, though such was not the fact.[1] What a crowding of dishonesty in this one transaction! Can the worst kind of American politics furnish the match of this slate gotten up regardless of truth and oath?

Cato failed to be elected consul, although eminently worthy of that dignity, because he disdained to purchase the office by bribes. Cæsar had so far debauched the populace with flattery and bribes, and the soldiers with pensions, that his election to the office of chief pontiff and consul was easily obtained.

During the Empire, elections were usually a mere formality. Bribery was open and unblushing. Toward the end of the second century the Empire was publicly sold at auction to the highest bidder. Didius Julianus, a rich senator, obtained the prize by the payment of $620 to each soldier of the Prætorian guard. But he was executed after a precarious and inglorious reign of sixty-six days.

The history of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire should be a salutary warning to us. Our Christian civilization gives us no immunity from political corruption and disaster. The oft-repeated cry of election frauds should not be treated with indifference; though, in many instances, no doubt, it is the

[1] Book IV., Letter XVIII

empty charge of defeated partisans against successful rivals, or the heated language of a party press.

But after all reasonable allowances are made, enough remains of a substantial character to be ominous. In every possible way, by tickets insidiously printed, by "colonizing," "repeating," and "personation," frauds are attempted, and too often successfully, on the ballot. I am informed by a trustworthy gentleman that, in certain localities, the adherents of one party, while proof against bribes from their political opponents, will exact compensation before giving their votes even to their own party candidates. The evil would be great enough if it were restricted to examples of this kind, but it becomes much more serious when large bodies of men are debauched by the bribes or intimidated by the threats of wealthy corporations.

But when the very fountains of legislation are polluted by lobbying and other corrupt means; when the hand of bribery is extended, and not always in vain, to our municipal, state, and national legislators; when our law-makers become the pliant tools of some selfish and greedy capitalists, instead of subserving the interests of the people—then, indeed, patriotic citizens have reason to be alarmed about the future of our country. The man who would poison the wells and springs of the land is justly regarded as a human monster, as an enemy of society, and no punishment could be too severe for him. Is he not as great a criminal who would poison and pollute the ballot-box, the unfailing fount and well-spring of our civil freedom and of our national life?

The Ark of the Covenant was held in the highest veneration by the children of Israel. It was the oracle from which God communicated His will to the people. Two cherubim with outstretched wings were placed over it as sacred guardians. Oza was suddenly struck dead for profanely touching it. May we not, without irreverence, compare the ballot-box to the ancient Ark? Is it not for us the oracle of God, because it is the oracle of the people? God commands us to obey our rulers. It is through the ballot-box that our rulers are proclaimed to us; therefore, its voice should be accepted as the voice of God. Let justice and truth, like twin cherubs, guard this sacred in-

strument. Let him who lays profane hands upon it be made to feel that he is guilty of a grievous offence against the stability of government, the peace of society, and the majesty of God.

Our Saviour, filled with righteous indignation, seizes a scourge and casts out of the Temple those that bought and sold in it, and overturns the tables of the money-changers, saying: "My house is a house of prayer, but you have made it a den of thieves." The polling booth is a temple, in which the angel of justice holds the scales with an even hand. The political money-changer pollutes the temple by his iniquitous bargains. The money-changer in Jerusalem's Temple trafficked in doves; the electioneering money-changer traffics in human beings.

Let the minister of justice arise, and, clothed with the panoply of authority, let him drive those impious men from the temple. Let the buyers and sellers of votes be declared infamous; for they are trading in our American birthright. Let them be cast forth from the pale of American citizenship and be treated as outlaws.

I do not think the punishment too severe when we consider the enormity and far-reaching consequences of their crime. I hold that the man who undermines our elective system is only less criminal than the traitor who fights against his country with a foreign invader. The one compasses his end by fraud, the other by force.

The privilege of voting is not an inherent or inalienable right. It is a solemn and sacred trust, to be used in strict accordance with the intentions of the authority from which it emanates.

When a citizen exercises his honest judgment in casting his vote for the most acceptable candidate, he is making a legitimate use of the prerogatives confided to him. But when he sells or barters his vote, when he disposes of it to the highest bidder, like a merchantable commodity, he is clearly violating his trust and degrading his citizenship.

The enormity of the offence will be readily perceived by pushing it to its logical consequences:

First. Once the purchase of votes is tolerated or condoned or connived at, the obvious result is that the right of suffrage becomes a solemn farce. The sovereignty is no longer vested in the people, but in corrupt politicians or in wealthy corporations; money instead of merit becomes the test of success; the election is determined, not by the personal fitness and integrity of the candidate, but by the length of his own or his patron's purse; and the aspirant for office owes his victory, not to the votes of his constituents, but to the grace of some political boss.

Second. The better class of citizens will lose heart and absent themselves from the polls, knowing that it is useless to engage in a contest which is already decided by irresponsible managers.

Third. Disappointment, vexation, and righteous indignation will burn in the breasts of upright citizens. These sentiments will be followed by apathy and despair of carrying out successfully a popular form of government. The enemies of the Republic will then take advantage of the existing scandals to decry our system and laud absolute monarchies. The last stage in the drama is political stagnation or revolution.

But, happily, the American people are not prone to despondency or to political stagnation, or to revolution outside of the lines of legitimate reform. They are cheerful and hopeful, because they are conscious of their strength; and well they may be, when they reflect on the century of ordeals through which they have triumphantly passed. They are vigilant, because they are liberty-loving, and they know that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." They are an enlightened and practical people; therefore are they quick to detect and prompt to resist the first inroads of corruption. They know well how to apply the antidote to the political distemper of the hour. They have the elasticity of mind and heart to rise to the occasion. They will never suffer the stately temple of the Constitution to be overthrown, but will hasten to strengthen the foundation where it is undermined, to repair every breach, and to readjust every stone of the glorious edifice.

In conclusion, I shall presume to suggest, with all deference,

a brief outline of what appear to me the most efficient means to preserve purity of elections and to perpetuate our political independence.

Many partial remedies may be named. The main purpose of these remedies is to foster and preserve what may be called a Public Conscience. In the individual man, conscience is that inner light which directs him in the knowledge and choice of good and evil, that practical judgment which pronounces, over every one of his acts, that it is right or wrong, moral or immoral. Now, this light and judgment which directs man in the ordinary personal affairs of life, must be his guide also in the affairs of his political life; for he is answerable to God for his political, as well as his personal, life.

The individual conscience is an enlightenment and a guide; and it is itself illumined and directed by the great maxims of natural law and the conclusions which the mind is constantly deducing from those maxims. Now, is there not a set of maxims and opinions that fulfil the office of guides to the masses in their political life?

The means which I propose are:

First. The enactment of strict and wholesome laws for preventing bribery and the corruption of the ballot-box, accompanied with condign punishment against the violators of the law. Let such protection and privacy be thrown around the polling booth that the humblest citizen may be able to record his vote without fear of pressure or of interference from those that might influence him. Such a remedy has already been attempted, with more or less success, in some States by the introduction of new systems of voting.

Second. A pure, enlightened, and independent judiciary to interpret and enforce the laws.

Third. A vigilant and fearless press that will reflect and create a healthy public opinion. Such a press, guided by the laws of justice and the spirit of American institutions, is the organ and the reflection of national thought, the outer bulwark of the rights and liberties of the citizen against the usurpations of authority and the injustice of parties, the speediest and most direct castigator of vice and dishonesty. It is a duty of the

citizens of a free country not only to encourage the press, but to coöperate with it; and it is a misfortune for any land when its leading men neglect to instruct their country and act on public opinion through this powerful instrument for good.

Fourth. The incorporation into our school system of familiar lessons embodying a history of our country, a brief sketch of her heroes, statesmen, and patriots, whose civic virtues the rising generation will thus be taught to emulate. The duties and rights of citizens, along with reverence for our political institutions, should likewise be inculcated, as Dr. Andrews, President of the University of Nebraska, recommended some years ago. There is danger that the country whose history is not known and cherished will become to the masses only an abstraction, or, at best, that it will be in touch with them only on its less lovable side, the taxes and burdens it imposes. Men lost in an unnatural isolation, strangers to the past life of their nation, living on a soil to which they hold only by the passing interests of the present, as atoms without cohesion, are not able to realize and bring home to themselves the claims of a country that not only *is*, but that was before them, and that will be, as history alone can teach, long after them.

Fijth. A more hearty celebration of our national holidays.

The Hebrew people, as we learn from Sacred Scripture, were commanded to commemorate by an annual observance their liberation from the bondage of Pharaoh and their entrance into the Promised Land. In nearly all civilized countries there are certain days set apart to recall some great events in their national history, and to pay honor to the memory of the heroes who figured in them. The United States has already established three national holidays. The first is consecrated to the birth of the "Father of his Country"; the second, to the birth of the nation; and the third is observed as a day of Thanksgiving to God for His manifold blessings to the nation. On those days, when the usual occupations of life are suspended, every citizen has leisure to study and admire the political institutions of his country, and to thank God for the benedictions that He has poured out on us as a people. In contemplating

these blessings, we may well repeat with the Royal Prophet: "He hath not done in like manner to every nation, and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them."

If holidays are useful to those that are to the manor born, they are still more imperatively demanded for the foreign population, which is constantly flowing into our country, and which consists of persons who are strangers to our civil institutions. The annually recurring holidays will create and develop in their minds a knowledge of our history and admiration for our system of government. It will help, also, to mould our people into unity of political faith. By the young, especially, are holidays welcomed with keen delight; and as there is a natural, though unconscious, association in the mind between the civic festivity and the cause that gave it birth, their attachment to the day will extend to the patriotic event or to the men whose anniversary is celebrated.

Sixth. The maintenance of party lines is an indispensable means for preserving political purity. One party watches the other, takes note of its shortcomings, its blunders and defects; and it has at its disposal the means for rebuking any abuse of power on the part of the dominant side, by appealing to the country at the tribunal of the ballot-box. The healthiest periods of the Roman Republic were periods of fierce political strife. The citizens of Athens were not allowed to remain neutral. They were compelled to take sides on all questions of great public interest. Not only was every citizen obliged to vote, but the successful candidate was bound to accept the office to which he was called, and to subordinate his taste for private life to the public interests.

England owes much of her greatness and liberty to the active and aggressive vigilance of opposing political camps. Political parties are the outcome of political freedom. Parties are not to be confounded with factions. The former contend for a principle, the latter struggle for a master.

To jurists and statesmen these considerations may seem trite, elementary, and commonplace. But, like all elementary principles, they are of vital import. They should be kept prominently in view before the people, and not obscured in a

maze of wordy technicalities. They are landmarks to guide men in the path of public duty, and they would vastly contribute to the good order and stability of the Commonwealth if they were indelibly stamped on the heart and memory of every American citizen.

XIII

AMBITION

"THE CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS"

BY

DR. MAX NORDAU

MAX SIMON NORDAU stands to-day among the leading philosophers and literary men of the world. He is of Hebrew origin, was born in Budapesth, and educated there as a physician. Persecutions directed at his race and faith drove him from Hungary, and for over a quarter century he has resided in Paris, the centre which has drawn to itself so many noted literary men. Dr. Nordau early became known as a novelist and playwright, and in 1893 his celebrated work "Degeneration" drew upon him the attention of the entire world. Medical men were as interested as philosophers by this grim, though probably exaggerated, pointing out of the symptoms of degeneracy in modern life. Since then works of more or less similar character, such as "The Drones Must Die," have kept the author prominently before the public.

The present discourse by Dr. Nordau displays the same keenness of analysis, the same monumental honesty, and the same irrefutable logic as his longer works. To turn from Nordau contemptuously as a mere pessimist is childish folly. Rather we should look to him in admiration as what he is, the stern physician who does not hesitate to search the illnesses of society. With his keen scalpel he lays bare each evil, not from a mere morbid curiosity as to the progress of disease, but in anxiety to understand and cure. It is for us to aid him in his efforts, or at least to heed his warning of the danger, and, for ourselves, beware.

AMBITION

I

The reader in these latter days is accustomed to the sight of diagrams which show him in what an extraordinary measure everything has developed in the last quarter or half century: the output of coal and iron; baldness; the population of countries and towns; the wealth of individuals and communities; the range of guns and the consumption of soap; the length of railways and the salaries of tenors; the circulation of newspapers, the average length of life, and the number of divorces. There is something, however, on which we never obtain statistics, although it has developed to a greater extent than any other, and that is ambition.

It has become a commonplace that the great impulse to all human effort is hunger and love. This statement is true only regarding a certain phase of civilization. The daily bread and the woman are the aim of the toil and struggle of man so long as he has not raised himself much over the level of animality. On a higher degree of development a third stimulus comes into play, in many men the strongest of all—Ambition. People desire to shine, to become famous; they desire to be admired, envied, imitated. Everybody strives to rise above the others, to overtake all competitors in the race of life, to win the first prize. Formerly the feudal organization of society created hard-and-fast limits to the cravings of the individual. The low-born, the poor man, could not hope to lift himself much above the level on which the accident of his birth had placed him. His boldest dreams never carried him beyond the extreme limits of his caste. The democratic transformation of the peoples has changed this. The emancipation of the individual is in some countries complete and in others nearly so. Birth and extraction are no longer obstacles. Energy and talent, but of course smartness and unscrupulousness also, are keys to every door. Forces now have full play, free from the fetters of prejudice. "Quo non ascendam," cries in Dionysian intoxication every youngster who enters the arena of life, to take up the struggle for existence.

Nowhere is ambition so general and so boundless as in

America. This is natural, for nowhere is the individual so highly differentiated as in America, nowhere is he so full of inborn energy, so rich in initiative, resource, optimism, and self-confidence; nowhere is he so little tethered by pedantry, and nowhere are people so willing to recognize the value of a brilliant personality, however this may find expression.

To this it must be added, that in America the instances in which men have risen from the most humble beginnings to the most fabulous destinies, are more numerous and striking than anywhere else. A Lincoln who develops from a woodcutter into a President; a Mr. Schwab who at twenty years earned a dollar a day and at thirty-five has a salary of a million; a Mr. Carnegie who as a youth did not know where to find a shilling to buy primers, and as a man in mature life does not know how to get rid reasonably and usefully of his three hundred million dollars, must suggest to every woodcutter, every "buttons," every factory apprentice with the scantiest elementary schooling, the idea that it only depends on himself to tread in the footsteps of a Lincoln, a Mr. Schwab, or a Mr. Carnegie, and to reach the goal that these celebrities have attained.

The Horatian *Aurea mediocritas* has nowhere so few partisans as in America. "Everybody ahead" is the national motto. I suppress intentionally the second half of the smart sentence. The universal ideal of the American people seems to be success. The dream of success feeds the fancy of the child, hypnotizes the youth, gives the man temerity, tenacity, and perseverance, and only begins to become a matter of indifference under the sobering influence of advanced age.

Success, however, is but one of those vague words which mean nothing definite, but which, like "freedom" or "progress," are mere recipients filled by everybody with a different content. A well-known exercise in experimental psychology consists in asking a number of persons to indicate what images emerge in their consciousness when an abstract term is suddenly pronounced in their presence. In this manner we succeed in distinguishing the concrete elements out of which an abstract notion is composed.

If one were to ask a number of Americans what they imag-

ine by success, one would evidently receive very different answers. Many would reply: Success means money. To be successful is synonymous with owning a palace, a yacht, a private Pullman car, with eating off gold plate, having the most expensive box in the Opera House, buying one's wife the largest diamonds in the market and one's daughter an English duke, or astonishing the world by the price of one's pictures, the number of one's pairs of trousers, and the amount of one's stakes at poker.

This is, of course, the coarsest view of wealth. It does not go beyond the most brutal selfishness and the mental horizon of an illiterate publican. Men of higher intellectual and moral attainment who hunt after wealth dream of making a nobler use of their gold. They desire to found universities and libraries, create museums, put up public monuments, assist talent, reward genius, to be the providence of the poor and the sick, and spread faith. In the one case as in the other, one is greedy for money on account of the power it incarnates, the power to satisfy low appetites or nobler aspirations, provoking whims or philanthropic sympathies, to gall one's fellow-men, or to be of use to them.

For others, success means the esteem of their fellow-countrymen. They do not desire to present them with money, they desire to give them the work of their brains. They see themselves as popular orators, as admired administrators, politicians, legislators. They dream of enthusiastic receptions by cheering crowds, of electoral victories, and of holding offices from mayor of their native place to President of the United States.

Yet another category understand success in one shape only, as fame. To be known to the whole world—to find that one's name is a household word with all people of education—what "consummation devoutly to be wish'd!" a goal which seems higher and more comprehensive than that of the millionaire or the public man. For with fame, so at least those believe who strive for it, goes also pecuniary reward, and the respect and admiration of one's fellow-men.

II

To weigh the moral and material value of these various forms of success, one against the other, is clearly not easy.

There exists no common measure for them. Their proportional estimation depends upon the conception of the world and life, the temperament, the coarser or finer soul-fibre of the person estimating them. It is emphatically a case for the application of the classic fable of the stork and the fox who invite each other to a meal. The fox can naturally do nothing with the long narrow pitcher of the stork, while the latter is equally helpless with the broad shallow dish of the fox. It all depends on whether one has a muzzle or a long bill.

It will probably be most difficult to come to an agreement regarding the value of the ideal of those for whom success takes the form of a mountain of gold, because not many people have the moral courage to deal with the problem sincerely; in their hearts they probably all value wealth, but it is considered low-minded and vulgar to admit this, while it seems noble and superior to make a show of despising money.

Now to despise money is very foolish, as it means to despise force, and force is the essence of the universe. Money in itself is nothing and means nothing. It is a mere symbol. It is a conventional representation of the whole of civilization. It virtually includes everything that up to this hour man has created with his many-sided mental and bodily efforts; what he has wrested from Nature in a struggle of giants of thousands of years, and has brought to a form suitable for human needs. Whoever boasts that he despises money, boasts that he despises the pictures of Leonardo and Velasquez, the statues of Michael Angelo, Carpeaux and Paul Dubois, the view on the north Italian lakes, the gulf of Naples and the giants of the Alps, the voice of De Reszke and Patti, the violin playing of Joachim and Sarasate, the wisdom of Mr. Herbert Spencer, the science of Lord Kelvin, and the inventiveness of Edison. For all these one can procure with money. That money can also be expended in vulgar fashion is not the fault of the money, but of those who spend it in a vulgar fashion.

At bottom one cannot blame the young man who, when he starts out on the race of life, makes as his goal the milliards of a Carnegie or a Rockefeller. He can think out for himself a good or a bad, a wise or a foolish, a useful or a harmful employ of them, and according to his choice will his ambition be attractive or repulsive.

It is true that a father, a tutor, a friend of even moderate wisdom only, will never advise the young man to make the conquest of milliards the task of his life. The prospects of passing the winning-post as victor are extremely unfavorable, the probabilities that in the struggle for excessive wealth he will lose his health, his peace of mind, his better self, perhaps his very life, are very great. The possession of the milliard may be a happiness; the earning of the milliard is certainly a work which peremptorily excludes every idea of happiness. The road to the milliard leads through all the circles of Dante's *Inferno*. Supposing the goal to be the paradise, the traveller arrives there in a condition which leaves him but little capacity for enjoying its bliss. The milliardaire who lives on a daily pint of milk of the value of six cents, and who in vain exhausts all the resources of human invention in striving to obtain a few hours of sleep, has become a common type in modern fiction, and I believe the portrait is true to life.

Providence has happily arranged that trees do not reach the heavens. Great wealth can only be gained from man. It is never the prize of solitary contemplation or secluded work at the desk in the cosey study. One must go to seek it in the market place, among the crowd. One must handle, outdo, overcome, or crush innumerable people. One must be more clever, have more will power, or be more artful than other men. This presupposes qualities which are not possessed by one man in a million. The young apprentice millionaire, when he is not a fool, soon sees that he is not cut in the material from which milliardaires are made. He calculates that on the whole there is no business which pays so little as the chase after the milliard, he abandons the race in time, before he breaks down, and devotes his energies to aims which are closer at hand, and reaches, not the fabulous milliards, but probably an honest competence.

The ambition to conquer a prominent situation in public life can be better encouraged. It is from its nature more moral than that for the mere possession of money. It is by definition social. The efforts it necessitates are compatible with health and happiness. It is true that here also we have the broad road and the narrow path. One can, in order to gain popularity, appeal to the bad instincts of the crowd as well as to the good. One may be the cad, parasite, and corrupter of the people, or its stern educator, warner, and critic. One can arrive at the Capitol through Tammany Hall or by heroism on Cuban battlefields. Whoever is not an incurable pessimist will at least admit the possibility that honesty, firmness of character, sound common sense, public spirit, sympathy with one's fellow-man, a little geniality, and a little gift of the gab, will sufficiently designate the possessor of these qualities, which are not over rare, even in their happy assemblage, to the esteem and confidence of his neighbors to assure him a reasonable, if perhaps not phenomenal, success in public life. The greater the number of citizens who have this kind of ambition, the better for the community; for their fruitful emulation, when it is controlled by a well-developed public sense of morality, strengthens the national solidarity, and recruits constantly precious forces for the work of the commonweal. In the struggle for success of this order, disappointment is not probable, for if the competitors are many, so also are the prizes. Cæsar preferred to be the first in the village rather than the second in Rome. Now to be first in Rome is difficult enough, but the alternative leaves Cæsar the choice of 50,000 situations.

The thirst for fame seems to be the most ideal ambition. It is the most foolish of all. In no case is the appearance so different from the reality as in the case of celebrity. To him who does not possess it, it seems the sum total of all that is splendid. He who, according to the general opinion of his contemporaries, possesses it, sees that it contains much more bitterness than satisfaction, and that it is not worth either a night's sleep or a day's effort.

To nothing can the "vanity of vanities" of the preacher

be so well applied as to celebrity. Dante devoted to it the *Terzina:—*

> "Non è 'l mondan rumor altro ch'un fiato
> Del vento ch' or vien quinci ed or vien quindi,
> E cambia nome perche cambia lato."

"World-renown is nothing but a break of wind, which blows sometimes from here, sometimes from there, and takes another name because it comes from another direction."

All that Falstaff said of honor, which replaces no lost limb and brings no dead to life, holds good of fame. What real use, what tangible advantage does it bring the celebrated man? His name is familiar to the world, but often enough the people who know it have no precise idea of the reason why they know it, and of the signification of the name.

Sir Richard Wallace presented the Parisians with some hundreds of public fountains. They are, as is meet, known as "Wallace Fountains," and have rendered his name a familiar sound to the man in Parisian streets. A reporter once overheard the following dialogue between two Paris workmen: "Old Wallace is dead!" "What old Wallace?" "You know quite well what Wallace, the man who made his fortune in fountains."

Fualdès is another name celebrated throughout France. It is that of a man who was cruelly murdered in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This tragic occurrence gave rise to a ballad which still lives in the mouth of the people. Let any one ask the average Frenchman if he knows Fualdès. Out of a hundred thus asked, ninety-nine will answer, "Fualdès? Certainly! the famous murderer!"

The visiting lady of a Sunday-school asked the children, "Do you know what a poet is?" "Yes," answered a dozen voices. "Give me a name." "Shakespeare." "Very good; now do you know what Shakespeare wrote?" General silence, finally broken by a clear voice, "The Bible, mum."

What does the celebrated man personally experience from his fame? He receives daily a bushel of letters, asking him for autographs, the minority of them with stamps for reply, many insufficiently prepaid, some not prepaid at all. Unknown

persons honor him with confidential requests for assistance. Interviewers force their way in on him when he is obliged to work or when he would like to rest, bother him with indiscreet questions, and put idiotic replies in his mouth. Everybody claims the right to take up his time with undesired visits or egotistical letters, and he makes himself active, deadly foes, when he does not answer their letters or receive the visits.

Authors send him more books than he could get through in ten lifetimes entirely devoted to reading, and expect from him an exhaustive judgment, with his reasons for forming it. If he puts off the bore with a few non-compromising phrases, without opening the work, he is soon found out, and denounced as a hypocrite and a liar. If he frankly declares that he has no time for books which do not lie within his speciality, then he gets the name of being an ill-mannered boor and narrow-minded pedant. Every imbecile thinks it his duty to give his opinion about him, and many of these imbeciles put their opinion in print. People who also desired to become famous, but who, strange to say, have not become so, revenge themselves on him by spreading libellous anecdotes about him, and these anecdotes naturally find a greater number of people to repeat them and believe them, according to his degree of celebrity. If it gives him pleasure that the newspapers should occupy themselves with him, his enjoyment will be marred by his observing that the murderer of the day is given more space than the poet of the century. Czolgosz was, I believe, more spoken of in the Press in fourteen days than Tolstoi in a decade.

The flattering conviction that his fame reaches to the confines of the globe is supposed to indemnify the celebrated man for all these personal inconveniences. But to what humiliations he exposes himself if he tries personally to test his degree of fame! People have always believed that the best-known name of the nineteenth century was that of Napoleon I. One day, however, Prince Napoleon, "Plon Plon," came meditatively to his palace and said to the guests awaiting him, among whom were Sainte-Beuve and Renan, that he had just had a

conversation under the arcades of the Palais Royal with a woman born and brought up in Paris who had never heard the name of Napoleon and had no notion of who he was.

III

It is exactly for this imaginary value, for fame, which neither offers the individual the tangible satisfactions of excessive wealth nor the community the advantage of the ambitious struggle for civic honors, that the most passionate greed exists.

This is easy to understand. The law of the least resistance explains the phenomenon.

The young man on the threshold of active life, who desires to become famous, naturally strikes upon the idea to try it by writing a book. He will become an author and win laurels with his pen. This requires the minimum of working capital and allows him to cling longest to subjective illusions.

Should the ambitious young man try for fame in a public career, he will soon be convinced that success cannot be attained by him if he has not the necessary qualities. He will fail at the polls; people will refuse to listen to his public speeches; he will return empty-handed from the hunt for office. That will, if he is at all capable of forming a judgment, open his eyes, and he will cease an effort which he is forced to see has no prospect of success.

Should he desire to become a milliardaire, every-day life will rapidly make it clear to him whether or not he has anything to hope for in this field. He will know at any minute the exact amount of his cash box. He will know what he is worth. Figures speak loudly and clearly, and they will tell him if his efforts are bearing fruit or not. We meet, it is true, people down at heel and out at elbow who are always on the track of phantom-like millions, but these poor fools are the laughing-stocks of their acquaintances. Men, too, are not too scarce who have actually climbed to the summit of the gold mountain, but have been hurled headlong down, to lie at the foot with broken limbs. These keep to the end of their lives the hope

of once more reaching the top, and the memory of their short moment of glory makes them incapable of a sober comprehension of their position. They belong to the most lamentable victims of the battle of life.

The man, on the contrary, who hopes to win fame with the pen can for a very long time, perhaps forever, waste his strength and his time without being forced to the admission that he has failed to find the proper way. In order to create an immortal masterpiece, all that is required is some paper, ink, and a pen. This represents a starting capital of say ten cents. So much even the poor street arab can find. It is true that to the writing material something must be added—Genius. But this the ambitious youth believes he possesses. He therefore sits down and writes. The work will probably turn out to his satisfaction; for the less talent a man has, the more mild is his judgment of his efforts. Who is to open his eyes to the worthlessness of his work? His friends, if he finds them ready to listen to, or read, his elucubrations, will say to him, "That is trash." He will at once reply, "Pearls before swine." He will find no publisher. This only will depress him, but will not open his eyes, as he will mentally enumerate all the anecdotes of masterworks which were refused with contempt by a dozen publishers, until the thirteenth printed it reluctantly, thereby acquiring fame and fortune.

Let us assume the book is not so very bad, only mediocre; it is printed and comes on the market. The critics silence it to death—"Naturally, the conspiracy of silence!". The critic gives it a notice and says frankly that it would have been better left unwritten, without any loss to anybody and with distinct advantage to the author and publisher—"The critics are asses." The public refuses to buy the book—"They are fools; they are not ripe for my art or my wisdom." Thus can an author go for a whole lifetime, from failure to failure, without comprehending that the cause lies in himself. His self-consciousness resists every attack like an adamantine rock. He is clothed in armor, impenetrable to reality, by his illusions. He will die in the conviction that he was an unrecognized genius, and that posterity will accord to him the

justice that was refused to him by the blindness of his contemporaries.

The number of these unhappy people is counted in the world by the hundreds of thousands. Their useless life work represents a waste of energy of the worst kind. Had they no ambition, they would probably be of economic and moral value for themselves and the community. Had they not this passion for fame, they would probably in every walk of life meet with that moderate success which spells happiness. Whoever should find a means to convince this army of deluded dreamers that in the struggle in which they have engaged victory is a rare exception, and when it is really achieved has only an imaginary value, would be one of the greatest benefactors of mankind.

IV

Literary ambition has one side to which I would like to draw special attention. It not only requires but the smallest capital, it seems also to impose the smallest measure of discipline. Any other work seems more jealous and tyrannical than literary work. I have already said that for a masterpiece of literature a sheet of paper, a pen, and some ink suffices. This paper one can write upon at any time and in any place, in the garret or on the bench in the public promenade, by day or by night. The temptation is great to regard literary occupation as something that one can carry on as a by-occupation, in the pauses of work, in the night hours, on Sundays and holidays. How many young people get the idea of trying literature because the attempt costs nothing. It is so inviting to gamble for fame without the game requiring any stake. Every other occupation in which one hopes to achieve success demands peremptorily the whole man. One must devote body and soul to it, give up to every minute of one's time and every thought of one's brain. Did it ever occur to any one to found a great Trust in his leisure moments, or to stand, by way of an amateur sport, for a post as senator or governor? Everybody knows he can do nothing else when he does this, and if he is not rich and does not soon achieve success, he will

speedily enough abandon an occupation which brings nothing in and hinders him earning his living by more remunerative work.

Literature, on the contrary, seems suitable for a by-occupation; it seems an excellent plan for the utilization of time-offals. It brings the apprentice, the beginner, no return, but it also costs him nothing. It generously permits the poor man, who has nothing but his time, his ambitions, and his hopes, to earn the indispensable by some prosaic work, and to content himself with such spare time as he can find after the paid labor. It is a tempting thought for an impecunious but energetic youth that want of means is not a hindrance to the achieving of literary fame. He proudly proclaims, "I work by day to earn my bread, and by night to win fame."

The formula is, however, a delusion. The sooner he gives it up, the better it will be for him who has selected it as his rule of life. The most ordinary common sense should teach everybody that it is quite hopeless with half one's strength and during the hours of fatigue after a long day's work to try to win prizes in a career that is open to every one, which for that reason is the most crowded, and where the competition is the keenest and most pitiless that can be imagined. In a horse-race a difference of half a pound may be decisive for the victory. A sleepless night would deprive a Derby favorite of all chance. In every sporting competition the greatest care is taken that the competitors are in the very best form and not handicapped by any fatigue, any preoccupation, any indisposition. But the same young man who would never dream of competing for a championship in some athletic sport after a day's work for his daily bread, because he knows that it would be ridiculous to measure himself against a trained, fresh, professional competitor, if he is not himself in equally good condition, will not hesitate under the same predisposition to take up the struggle for a literary prize.

A lady of society once asked Newton how he had made his famous discovery of the law of gravitation. Sir Isaac answered, "By constantly thinking of it, madam." That is, together with inborn talent, the secret of each intellectual

achievement. The inspiration comes, perhaps, suddenly, though this is in no way proved, for it is likely, even probable, that the possible sudden irruption of an idea of genius into consciousness was preceded by a may-be long preparatory work below the threshold of consciousness, on which the usual occupation of the mind may have exercised great influence. But inspiration is not everything. In a literary work the working out is quite as important, and the elaboration, in order to be perfect, demands all the concentration of which one is capable, all attention, all freshness of brain; in short, according to Sir Isaac Newton's formula, "constant thinking of it."

It is imaginable that a man who by day earns his bread by any kind of work may devote, with good results, a portion of his nights to acquiring education. Even this double activity of course is harmful to health, but if it does not last too long and is not too recklessly overdone, it need not necessarily destroy it. The memory retains what it can. If a man is too fatigued by his day's work or too preoccupied, he will not profit by night study. One must linger longer over a page of a book; it requires months to learn things which one with a fresh, well-concentrated, well-rested brain would acquire in weeks or days. The goal will be later and more painfully reached, but it can be reached, and, once one possesses the knowledge, no one can perceive that it was acquired in hours which should have been devoted to sleep.

There are enough examples of successful men who work for their daily bread by day and study by night. George Smith, born in 1840, was an engraver who earned 48s. a week. He had to engrave the plates for Sir Henry Rawlinson's great work on Assyriology. This work interested him. He had the daring idea of studying the Assyrian language and cuneiform writing. He did this in the night and in his leisure moments with superhuman application, and with the result that after two years' work, at the age of twenty-six, he was appointed to a position in the Assyrian Department of the British Museum, and soon after became world-famous as the discoverer and decipherer of the cuneiform version of the biblical story of the Flood.

He died of the plague at Aleppo, when only thirty-six years old.

Another and not less characteristic case is that of Michael Faraday. This great scientist, who lived from 1791 to 1867, was at twenty-two years old a poor ignorant bookbinder, who earned perhaps 30s. a week. He had a consuming thirst for knowledge and no means of stilling it. He greedily devoured the books given him to bind, acquired bit by bit some elements of knowledge, and obtained, by means of it, admission to a physical laboratory, where his genius could freely develop itself.

Similar, only reversed, is the case of the celebrated Professor of Clinical Medicine in the Paris Faculty, J. Jaccoud. In addition to his gift for medicine he had a pretty talent for the violin. He obtained a place in an orchestra, played half the night in the theatres and at balls, earned in this fashion perhaps 200 francs a month, and was able to study medicine by day.

It is, however, one thing to learn, something different to create. The memory still continues to serve after a long, trying day's work; the creative force of the imagination cannot then possibly be at its height. With a tired brain one learns more slowly, but one learns; one creates not slower, but weaker, worse, or not at all. It does not alter the quality of knowledge that one acquired it under peculiar difficulties; the quality of a literary work is incurably deteriorated by being conceived and carried out by an exhausted brain. I have been able to give examples of scientists who worked by day for bread and by night for knowledge, and it would be easy to add to these other similar cases. I know, however, no single example where a man after the daily work for bread has produced in the night hours a work which achieved fame.

This affirmation needs being qualified on one point only. Short lyrical poems could, under such circumstances, as a matter of exception, be successfully composed, because in this case the inspiration is everything, and the elaboration demands less material work than a novel, a drama, or a great essay. The few men who, by amateur work in the night after their

professional work by day, have acquired fame in literature are all lyric poets. I may name the New York Ghetto-poet Morris Rosenfeld, who by day worried himself as tailor in a sweating-shop for a pittance, and at night composed songs in Jewish jargon of deep emotion, which endeared him to all who understand this jargon. Johanna Ambrosius, a simple East Prussian peasant woman, looked after her household, did her duty as wife and mother of a numerous family, and made use of her rare hours of leisure to write poems. Her verses had on their publication great success. It is true that this is to be ascribed more to a sentimental interest in the fate of the poetess than to the value of the poems themselves.

Other examples which one might cite prove nothing. Hans Sachs was a famous poet without ceasing to be a shoemaker. But then, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a handicraft had, according to the German saying, "a golden bottom," and Hans Sachs was sufficiently well-to-do to have as much time to spare for writing poetry as he desired. John Bunyan first began to write when he had laid aside the tinker's tools and lived by his preaching. *The Pilgrim's Progress* is the work of a man who, while he was writing his book, thought of nothing else. Robert Burns had, as a farmer, spare time in the winter months, apart from the fact that a lyrical genius can compose a short song while he is driving the plough. The barber Jasmin (1798–1864), the well-known Provençal poet, really handled the razor, scissors, and comb less than the pen, and it was shrewd *coquetterie* on his part that he still kept his barber's shop when, in fact, he was nothing else but a professional writer.

It is not the night work of itself that is incompatible with good literary work. Schiller, when he was in full swing, wrote the whole night through in spite of the great harm it did his health, and Lord Byron preferred to compose at night in company with a bottle of brandy. But these men had no different day occupation to distract them. They had no other idea in their heads, day and night, but their work.

Only by means of this complete concentration is success possible. Good literary work suffers no other occupation

beside it. Whoever is so poor that he must earn his bread by subaltern labor will seek in vain to pursue fame in the night hours. He will not achieve celebrity, but will certainly endanger his health and shorten his life.

In every other field overwork only harms the worker. In the field of literature it harms the work. In ancient time it was already a reproach when a critic remarked that a book smelt of the oil of the midnight lamp. When to the smell of that oil is added that of the sweat of a heterogeneous day-worker, the book will be completely unpalatable.

XIV

OUR PAST

"THE LESSON OF THE PAST"

BY

MAURICE MAETERLINCK

THE materialist, as represented by Nordau, looks to the material, and life seems shallow. The idealist sees in it a deeper meaning and a greater worth. Maurice Maeterlinck, the well-known Belgian writer, has been called a mystic, and the word has led some over-busy folk to dismiss him from mind as an idle dreamer; yet he is held by many critics to be the most valuable of living philosophers. It has been said of him that he bids fair to increase "the world's permanent stock of wisdom." There have been few men in any one century for whom this high claim could be made.

Let us then approach with Maeterlinck the heights of meditation. Here is no scientific measuring of material things, but an attempt to grasp the meaning of things immeasurable, to readjust our ways of thinking and our entire plane of thought. What is said here is true. It is more than true, it is divinely inspiring, encouraging, and resurrecting. It is such a word as the prophets gave to man. To dismiss it with an idle, scurried reading, such as one gives the latest novel, is a folly that reacts upon the reader. To meditate and ponder well upon its thought may mean a revolution in a gloomy life, a reformation in a wasted one.

I

OUR past stretches behind us in long perspective. It slumbers on the far horizon like a deserted city shrouded in mist. A few peaks mark its boundary, and soar predominant into the air; a few important acts stand out, like towers, some with

the light still upon them, others half ruined and slowly decaying beneath the weight of oblivion. The trees are bare, the walls crumble, and shadow slowly steals over all. Everything seems to be dead there, and rigid, save only when memory, slowly decomposing, lights it for an instant with an illusory gleam. But apart from this animation, derived only from our expiring recollections, all would appear to be definitely motionless, immutable forever; divided from present and future by a river that shall not again be crossed.

In reality it is alive; and, for many of us, endowed with a profounder, more ardent life than either present or future. In reality this dead city is often the hotbed of our existence: and in accordance with the spirit in which men return to it shall some find all their wealth there, and others lose what they have.

II

Our conception of the past has much in common with our conception of love and happiness, destiny, justice, and most of the vague but therefore not less potent spiritual organisms that stand for the mighty forces we obey. Our ideas have been handed down to us ready-made by our predecessors; and even when our second cousciousness wakes, and, proud in its conviction that henceforth nothing shall be accepted blindly, proceeds most carefully to investigate these ideas, it will squander its time questioning those that loudly protest their right to be heard, and pay no heed to the others close by, that as yet, perhaps, have said nothing. Nor have we, as a rule, far to go to discover these others. They are in us and of us: they wait for us to address them. They are not idle, notwithstanding their silence. Amid the noise and babble of the crowd, they are tranquilly directing a portion of our real life; and as they are nearer the truth than their self-satisfied sisters, they will often be far more simple, and far more beautiful too.

III

Among the most stubborn of these ready-made ideas are those that preside over our conception of the past, and render it a force as imposing and rigid as destiny; a force that indeed

becomes destiny working backward, with its hand outstretched to the destiny that burrows ahead, to which it transmits the last link of our chains. The one thrusts us back, the other urges us forward, with a like irresistible violence. But the violence of the past is perhaps more terrible, and more alarming. One may disbelieve in destiny. It is a god whose onslaught many have never experienced. But no one would dream of denying the oppressiveness of the past. Sooner or later its effect must inevitably be felt. Those even who refuse to admit the intangible, will credit the past, which their finger can touch, with all the mystery, the influence, the sovereign intervention whereof they have stripped the powers that they have dethroned; thus rendering it the almost unique and therefore more dreadful god of their depopulated Olympus.

IV

The force of the past is indeed one of the heaviest that weigh upon men and incline them to sadness. And yet there is none more docile, more eager to follow the direction we could so readily give, did we but know how best to avail ourselves of this docility. In reality, if we think of it, the past belongs to us quite as much as the present, and is far more malleable than the future. Like the present, and to a much greater extent than the future, its exsistence is all in our thoughts and our hand controls it; nor is this only true of our material past, wherein there are ruins that we perhaps can restore; it is true also of the regions that are closed to our tardy desire for atonement, it is true above all of our moral past, and of what we consider to be most irreparable there.

V

"The past is past," we say, and it is false: the past is always present. "We have to bear the burden of our past," we sigh; and it is false; the past bears our burden. "Nothing can wipe out the past"; and it is false: the least effort of will sends present and future travelling over the past, to efface whatever we bid them efface. "The indestructible,

irreparable, immutable past!" And that is no truer than the rest. In those who speak thus it is the present that is immutable, and knows not how to repair. "My past is wicked, it is sorrowful, empty," we say again: "As I look back I can see no moment of beauty, of happiness, or love: I see nothing but wretched ruins. . . ." And that is false; for you see precisely what you yourself place there at the moment your eyes rest upon it.

VI

Our past depends entirely upon our present, and is constantly changing with it. Our past is contained in our memory, and this memory of ours, that feeds on our heart and brain, and is incessantly swayed by them, is the most variable being in the world, the least independent, the most impressionable. Our chief concern with the past, that which truly remains and forms part of us, is not what we have done or the adventures that we have met with, but the moral reactions bygone events are producing within us at this very moment, the inward being that they have helped to form; and these reactions, whence there arises our sovereign, intimate being, are wholly governed by the manner in which we regard past events, and vary as the moral substance varies that they encounter within us. But with every step in advance that our feelings or intellect takes will come a change in this moral substance, and then, on the instant, the most immutable facts, that seemed to be graven forever on the stone and bronze of the past, will assume an entirely different aspect, will return to life and leap into movement, bringing us vaster and more courageous counsels, dragging memory aloft with them in their ascent; and what was once a mass of ruin, mouldering in the darkness, becomes a populous city whereon the sun shines again.

VII

We have an arbitrary fashion of establishing a certain number of events behind us. We relegate them to the horizon of our memory, and having set them there we tell ourselves that they form part of a world in which the united efforts of

all mankind could not wipe away a tear or cause a flower to raise its head. And yet, while admitting that these events have passed beyond our control, we still, with the most curious inconsistency, believe that they have full control over us. Whereas the truth is that they can only act upon us to the extent in which we have renounced our right to act upon them. The past asserts itself only in those whose moral growth has ceased; then, and not till then, does it truly become redoubtable. From that moment we have indeed the irreparable behind us and the weight of what we have done lies heavy upon our shoulders. But so long as the life of our mind and character flows uninterruptedly on, so long will the past remain in suspense above us; and, as the glance may be that we send toward it, will it, complaisant as the clouds Hamlet showed to Polonius, adopt the shape of the hope or fear, the peace or disquiet, that we are perfecting within us.

VIII

No sooner has our moral activity weakened than accomplished events rush forward and assail us; and woe to him who opens the door and permits them to take possession of his hearth! Each one will vie with the other in overwhelming him with the gifts best calculated to shatter his courage. It matters not whether our past has been happy and noble, or lugubrious and criminal, the danger shall be no less if we permit it to enter, not as an invited guest, but like a parasite settling upon us. The result will be either sterile regret or impotent remorse, and remorse and regrets of this kind are equally disastrous. In order to draw from the past what is precious within it—and most of our wealth is there—we must go to it at the hour when we are strongest, most conscious of mastery; enter its domain and make choice there of what we require, discarding the rest, and commanding it never to cross our threshold without our order. Like all things that only can live at the cost of our spiritual strength, it will soon learn to obey. At first, perhaps, it will endeavor to resist. It will have recourse to artifice and prayer. It will try to tempt us,

to cajole. It will drag forward frustrated hopes and joys that are gone forever, broken affections, well-merited reproaches, expiring hatred and love that is dead, squandered faith and perished beauty; it will thrust before us all that once had been the marvellous essence of our ardor for life; it will point to the beckoning sorrows, decaying happiness, that now haunt the ruin. But we shall pass by without turning our head; our hand shall scatter the crowd of memories, even as the sage Ulysses, in the Cimmerian night, with his sword prevented the shades—even that of his mother, whom it was not his mission to question—from approaching the black blood that would for an instant have given them life and speech. We shall go straight to the joy, the regret or remorse, whose counsel we need; or to the act of injustice it behooves us scrupulously to examine, in order either to make reparation, if such still be possible, or that the sight of the wrong we did, whose victims have ceased to be, is required to give us the indispensable force that shall lift us above the injustice it still lies in us to commit.

IX

Yes, even though our past contain crimes that now are beyond the reach of our best endeavors, even then, if we consider the circumstances of time and place and the vast plane of each human existence, these crimes fade out of our life the moment we feel that no temptation, no power on earth, could ever induce us to commit the like again. The world has not forgiven—there is but little that the external sphere will forget or forgive—and their material effects will continue, for the laws of cause and effect are different from those which govern our consciousness. At the tribunal of our personal justice, however—the only tribunal which has decisive action on our inaccessible life, as it is the only one whose decrees we cannot evade, whose concrete judgments stir us to our very marrow—the evil action that we regard from a loftier plane than that at which it was committed, becomes an action that no longer exists for us save in so far as it may serve in the future to render our fall more difficult; nor has it the right to lift its head again

except at the moment when we incline once more toward the abyss it guards.

Bitter, surely, must be the grief of him in whose past there are acts of injustice whereof every avenue now is closed, who is no longer able to seek out his victims and raise them and comfort them. To have abused one's strength in order to despoil some feeble creature who has definitely succumbed beneath the blow, to have callously thrust suffering upon a loving heart, or merely misunderstood and passed by a touching affection that offered itself—these things must of necessity weigh heavily upon our life, and induce a sorrow within us that shall not readily be forgotten. But it depends on the actual point our consciousness has attained whether our entire moral destiny shall be depressed or lifted beneath this burden. Our actions rarely die; and many unjust deeds of ours will therefore inevitably return to life some day to claim their due and start legitimate reprisals. They will find our external life without defence; but before they can reach the inward being at the centre of that life they must first listen to the judgment we have already passed on ourselves; and in accordance with the nature of that judgment will the attitude be of these mysterious envoys, who have come from the depths where cause and effect are established in eternal equilibrium. If it has indeed been from the heights of our newly acquired consciousness that we have questioned ourselves, and condemned, they will not be menacing justiciaries whom we shall suddenly see surging in from all sides, but benevolent visitors, friends we have almost expected; and they will draw near us in silence. They know in advance that the man before them is no longer the guilty creature they sought; and instead of coming to us charged with ideas of hatred, revolt, and despair, with punishments that degrade and kill, they will flood our heart with thought and contrition that ennoble, purify, and console.

X

The manner in which we are able to recall what we have done or suffered is far more important than our actual sufferings or deeds. This is one of the many features—all governed

by the amount of confidence and zeal we possess—that distinguish the man who is happy and strong from him who weeps and will not be comforted. No past, viewed by itself, can seem happy; and the privileged of fate, who reflect on what remains of the happy years that have flown, have perhaps more reason for sorrow than the unfortunate ones who brood over the dregs of a life of wretchedness. Whatever was one day, and now is no longer, makes for sadness; above all, whatever was very happy and very beautiful. The object of our regrets—whether these revolve around what has been or what might have been—is therefore more or less the same for all men, and their sorrow should be the same. It is not, however; in one case it will reign uninterruptedly, whereas in another it will only appear at very long intervals. It must therefore depend on things other than accomplished facts. It depends on the manner in which men will act on these facts. The conquerors in this world—those who waste no time setting up an imaginary irreparable and immutable athwart their horizon, those who seem to be born afresh every morning in the world that forever awakes anew to the future—these know instinctively that what appears to exist no longer is still existing intact, that what appeared to be ended is only completing itself. They know that the years time has taken from them are still in travail; under their new master, obeying the old. They know that their past is forever in movement; that the yesterday which was despondent, decrepit, and criminal, will return full of joyousness, innocence, youth in the track of to-morrow. They know that their image is not yet stamped on the days that are gone: that a decisive deed, or thought, will suffice to break down the whole edifice; that however remote or vast the shadow may be that stretches behind them, they have only to put forth a gesture of gladness or hope for the shadow at once to copy this gesture, and, flashing it back to the remotest, tiniest ruins of early childhood even, to extract unexpected treasure from all this wreckage. They know that they have retrospective action on all bygone deeds; and that the dead themselves will annul their verdicts in order to judge afresh a past that to-day has transfigured and endowed with new life.

They are fortunate who find this instinct in the folds of their cradle. But may the others not imitate it who have it not; and is not human wisdom charged to teach us how we may acquire the salutary instincts that nature has withheld?

XI

Let us not lull ourselves to sleep in our past: and if we find that it tends to spread like a vault over our life, instead of incessantly changing beneath our eye: if the present grow into the habit of visiting it, not like a good workman repairing thither to execute the labors imposed upon him by the commands of to-day, but as a too passive, too credulous pilgrim content idly to contemplate beautiful, motionless ruins—then, the more glorious, the happier, that our past may have been, with all the more suspicion should it be regarded by us.

Nor should we yield to the instinct that bids us accord it profound respect, if this respect induce the fear in us that we may disturb its nice equilibrium. Better the ordinary past, content with its befitting place in the shadow, than the sumptuous past which claims to govern what has travelled out of its reach. Better a mediocre, but living, present, which acts as though it were alone in the world, than a present which proudly expires in the chains of a marvellous long ago. A single step that we take at this hour toward an uncertain goal is far more important to us than the thousand leagues we covered in our march toward a dazzling triumph in the days that were. Our past had no other mission than to lift us to the moment at which we are, and there equip us with the needful experience and weapons, the needful thought and gladness. If, at this precise moment, it take from us and divert to itself one particle of our energy, then, however glorious it may have been, it still was useless, and had better never have been. If we allow it to arrest a gesture that we were about to make, then is our death beginning; and the edifices of the future will suddenly take the semblance of tombs.

More dangerous still than the past of happiness and glory is the one inhabited by overpowering and too dearly cherished phantoms. Many an existence perishes in the coils of a fond

recollection. And yet, were the dead to return to this earth, they would say, I fancy, with the wisdom that must be theirs who have seen what the ephemeral light still hides from us: "Dry your eyes. There comes to us no comfort from your tears; exhausting you, they exhaust us also. Detach yourself from us, banish us from your thoughts, until such time as you can think of us without strewing tears on the life we still live in you. We endure only in your recollection; but you err in believing that your regrets alone can touch us. It is the things you do that prove to us we are not forgotten and rejoice our manes: and this without your knowing it, without any necessity that you should turn toward us. Each time that our pale image saddens your ardor, we feel ourselves die anew, and it is a more perceptible, irrevocable death than was our other; bending too often over our tombs, you rob us of the life, the courage and love, that you imagine you restore.

"It is in you that we are: it is in all your life that our life resides; and as you become greater, even while forgetting us, so do we become greater too, and our shades draw the deep breath of prisoners whose prison door is flung open.

"If there be anything new we have learned in the world where we are, it is, first of all, that the good we did to you when we were, like yourselves, on the earth, does not balance the evil wrought by a memory which saps the force and the confidence of life."

XII

Above all, let us envy the past of no man. Our own past was created by ourselves, and for ourselves alone. No other could have suited us, no other could have taught us the truth that it alone can teach, or given the strength that it alone can give. And whether it be good or bad, sombre or radiant, it still remains a collection of unique masterpieces the value of which is known to none but ourselves; and no foreign masterpiece could equal the action we have accomplished, the kiss we received, the thing of beauty that moved us so deeply, the suffering we underwent, the anguish that held us enchained, the love that wreathed us in smiles or in tears. Our past is

ourselves, what we are and shall be; and upon this unknown sphere there moves no creature, from the happiest down to the most unfortunate, who could foretell how great a loss would be his could he substitute the trace of another for the trace which he himself must leave in life. Our past is our secret promulgated by the voice of years: it is the most mysterious image of our being, over which Time keeps watch. The image is not dead: a mere nothing degrades or adorns it: it can still grow bright or sombre, can still smile or weep, express love or hatred; and yet it remains recognizable forever in the midst of the myriad images that surround it. It stands for what we once were, as our aspirations and hopes stand for what we shall be; and the two faces blend that they may teach us what we are.

Let us not envy the facts of the past, but rather the spiritual garment that the recollection of days long gone will weave around the sage. And though this garment be woven of joy or of sorrow, though it be drawn from the dearth of events or from their abundance, it shall still be equally precious; and those who may see it shining over a life shall not be able to tell whether its quickening jewels and stars were found amid the grudging cinders of a cabin or upon the steps of a palace.

No past can be empty or squalid, no events can be wretched; the wretchedness lies in our manner of welcoming them. And if it were true that nothing had happened to you, that would be the most astounding adventure that any man ever had met with; and no less remarkable would be the light it would shed upon you. In reality the facts, the opportunities and possibilities, the passions, that await and invite the majority of men, are all more or less the same. Some may be more dazzling than others; their attendant circumstances may differ, but they differ far less than the inward reactions that follow; and the insignificant, incomplete event that falls on a fertile heart and brain will readily attain the moral proportions and grandeur of an analogous incident which, on another plane, will convulse a whole people.

He who should see, spread out before him, the past lives of a multitude of men, could not easily decide which past he

himself would wish to have lived, were he not able at the same time to witness the moral results of these dissimilar and unsymmetrical facts. He might not impossibly make a fatal blunder: he might choose an existence overflowing with incomparable happiness and victory, that sparkle like wonderful jewels; while his glance might travel indifferently over a life that appeared to be empty, whereas it was truly steeped to the brim in serene emotions and lofty, redeeming thoughts, whereby, though the eye saw nothing, that life was yet rendered happy among all. For we are well aware that what destiny has given and what destiny holds in reserve can be revolutionized as utterly by thought as by great victory or great defeat. Thought is silent: it disturbs not a pebble on the illusory road we see; but at the crossway of the more actual road that our secret life follows will it tranquilly erect an indestructible pyramid; and thereupon, suddenly, every event, to the very phenomena of Earth and Heaven, will assume a new direction.

In Siegfried's life it is not the moment when he forges the prodigious sword that he is most important, or when he kills the dragon and compels the gods from his path, or even the dazzling second when he encounters love on the flaming mountain; but indeed the brief instant wrested from eternal decrees, the little childish gesture when one of his hands, red with the blood of his mysterious victim, having chanced to draw near his lips, his eyes and ears are suddenly opened: he understands the hidden language of all that surrounds him, detects the treachery of the dwarf who represents the powers of evil, and learns in a flash to do that which had to be done.

XV

ART

"THE WHAT AND THE HOW IN ART"[1]

BY

WILLIAM DEAN HOWELLS

IF art might be dismissed as a mere means of amusement, a source of relaxation to be the sport of leisure hours, it would have no place in our discussion here. But art, as the great artists have understood it, as the world is beginning to understand it, is not a pleasant playing with colors or with sounds or words; it is an effort to give the highest, truest expression to whatever is pure and fair within us. Looked at in this light, art becomes assuredly one of the important aspects of life. The one all-important aspect, it has seemed to some geniuses, a Beethoven, or a Michelangelo! And though most of us may refuse to go so far in our artistic devotion, yet it is evident that in seeking to understand modern life we must pause for a moment to examine into the meaning of art, its aims and hopes, and its relationship to life in general. It is this study which is here essayed by Mr. Howells, William Dean Howells, who has been aptly termed the dean of American letters, whose novels and whose critical works have won him the respect and admiration of all readers. The following essay, previously published by Messrs. Harper & Brothers in their volume "Literature and Life," is here reproduced by consent of the publishers and with the special permission of Mr. Howells. It is accompanied by an address from M. de Maulde, the well-known French critic, in which he discusses the use of art in daily and especially in feminine life, the aims and means of art and woman being made clear as a Frenchman sees them.

[1] Copyright 1902 by Harper & Brothers.

ART

One of the things always enforcing itself upon the consciousness of the artist in any sort is the fact that those whom artists work for rarely care for their work artistically. They care for it morally, personally, partially. I suspect that criticism itself has rather a muddled preference for the what over the how, and that it is always haunted by a philistine question of the material when it should, æsthetically speaking, be concerned solely with the form.

I

The other night at the theatre I was witness of a curious and amusing illustration of my point. They were playing a most soul-filling melodrama, of the sort which gives you assurance from the very first that there will be no trouble in the end, but everything will come out just as it should, no matter what obstacles oppose themselves in the course of the action. An overruling Providence, long accustomed to the exigencies of the stage, could not fail to intervene at the critical moment in behalf of innocence and virtue, and the spectator never had the least occasion for anxiety. Not unnaturally there was a black-hearted villain in the piece; so very black-hearted that he seemed not to have a single good impulse from first to last. Yet he was, in the keeping of the stage Providence, as harmless as a blank cartridge, in spite of his deadly aims. He accomplished no more mischief, in fact, than if all his intents had been of the best; except for the satisfaction afforded by the edifying spectacle of his defeat and shame, he need not have been in the play at all; and one might almost have felt sorry for him, he was so continually baffled. But this was not enough for the audience, or for that part of it which filled the gallery to the roof. Perhaps he was such an uncommonly black-hearted villain, so very, very cold-blooded in his wickedness that the justice unsparingly dealt out to him by the dramatist could not suffice. At any rate, the gallery took such a vivid interest in his punishment that it had out the actor who impersonated the wretch between all the acts, and hissed him throughout his deliberate passage across the stage before the curtain. The hisses were

not at all for the actor, but altogether for the character. The performance was fairly good, quite as good as the performance of any virtuous part in the piece, and easily up to the level of other villanous performances (I never find much nature in them, perhaps because there is not much nature in villany itself; that is, villany pure and simple); but the mere conception of the wickedness this bad man had attempted was too much for an audience of the average popular goodness. It was only after he had taken poison, and fallen dead before their eyes, that the spectators forbore to visit him with a lively proof of their abhorrence; apparently they did not care to "give him a realizing sense that there was a punishment after death," as the man in Lincoln's story did with the dead dog.

II

The whole affair was very amusing at first, but it has since put me upon thinking (I like to be put upon thinking; the eighteenth-century essayists were) that the attitude of the audience towards this deplorable reprobate is really the attitude of most readers of books, lookers at pictures and statues, listeners to music, and so on through the whole list of the arts. It is absolutely different from the artist's attitude, from the connoisseur's attitude; it is quite irreconcilable with their attitude, and yet I wonder if in the end it is not what the artist works for. Art is not produced for artists, or even for connoisseurs; it is produced for the general, who can never view it otherwise than morally, personally, partially, from their associations and preconceptions.

Whether the effect with the general is what the artist works for or not, he does not succeed without it. Their brute liking or misliking is the final test; it is universal suffrage that elects, after all. Only, in some cases of this sort, the polls do not close at four o'clock on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, but remain open forever, and the voting goes on. Still, even the first day's canvass is important, or at least significant. It will not do for the artist to electioneer, but if he is beaten he ought to ponder the causes of his defeat, and

question how he has failed to touch the chord of universal interest. He is in the world to make beauty and truth evident to his fellow-men, who are as a rule incredibly stupid and ignorant of both, but whose judgment he must nevertheless not despise. If he can make something that they will cheer, or something that they will hiss, he may not have done any great thing, but if he has made something that they will neither cheer nor hiss, he may well have his misgivings, no matter how well, how finely, how truly he has done the thing.

This is very humiliating, but a tacit snub to one's artist-pride such as one gets from public silence is not a bad thing for one. Not long ago I was talking about pictures with a painter, a very great painter, to my thinking; one whose pieces give me the same feeling I have from reading poetry; and I was excusing myself to him with respect to art, and perhaps putting on a little more modesty than I felt. I said that I could enjoy pictures only on the literary side, and could get no answer from my soul to those excellences of handling and execution which seemed chiefly to interest painters. He replied that it was a confession of weakness in a painter if he appealed merely or mainly to technical knowledge in the spectator; that he narrowed his field and dwarfed his work by it; and that if he painted for painters merely, or for the connoisseurs of painting, he was denying his office, which was to say something clear and appreciable to all sorts of men in the terms of art. He even insisted that a picture ought to tell a story.

The difficulty in humbling one's self to this view of art is in the case with which one may please the general by art which is no art. Neither the play nor the playing that I saw at the theatre when the actor was hissed for the wickedness of the villain he was personating was at all fine; and yet I perceived, on reflection, that they had achieved a supreme effect. If I may be so confidential, I will say that I should be very sorry to have written that piece; yet I should be very proud if, on the level I chose and with the quality I cared for, I could invent a villain that the populace would have out and hiss for his surpassing wickedness. In other words, I think it a thousand pities whenever an artist gets so far away from the

general, so far within himself or a little circle of amateurs, that his highest and best work awakens no response in the multitude. I am afraid this is rather the danger of the arts among us, and how to escape it is not so very plain. It makes one sick and sorry often to see how cheaply the applause of the common people is won. It is not an infallible test of merit, but if it is wanting to any performance, we may be pretty sure it is not the greatest performance.

III

The paradox lies in wait here, as in most other human affairs, to confound us, and we try to baffle it, in this way and in that. We talk, for instance, of poetry for poets, and we fondly imagine that this is different from talking of cookery for cooks. Poetry is not made for poets; they have enough poetry of their own, but it is made for people who are not poets. If it does not please these, it may still be poetry, but it is poetry which has failed of its truest office. It is none the less its truest office because some very wretched verse seems often to do it.

The logic of such a fact is not that the poet should try to achieve this truest office of his art by means of doggerel, but that he should study how and where and why the beauty and the truth he has made manifest are wanting in universal interest, in human appeal. Leaving the drama out of the question, and the theatre, which seems now to be seeking only the favor of the dull rich, I believe that there never was a time or a race more open to the impressions of beauty and of truth than ours. The artist who feels their divine charm, and longs to impart it, has now and here a chance to impart it more widely than ever artist had in the world before. Of course, the means of reaching the widest range of humanity are the simple and the elementary, but there is no telling when the complex and the recondite may not universally please. The art is to make them plain to every one, for every one has them in him. Lowell used to say that Shakespeare was subtle, but in letters a foot high.

The painter, sculptor, or author who pleases the polite only has a success to be proud of as far as it goes, and to be ashamed of that it goes no further. He need not shrink from giving pleasure to the vulgar because bad art pleases them. It is part of his reason for being that he should please them, too; and if he does not it is a proof that he is wanting in force, however much he abounds in fineness. Who would not wish his picture to draw a crowd about it? Who would not wish his novel to sell five hundred thousand copies, for reasons besides the sordid love of gain which I am told governs novelists? One should not really wish it any the less because chromos and historical romances are popular.

Sometime, I believe, the artist and his public will draw nearer together in a mutual understanding, though perhaps not in our present conditions. I put that understanding off till the good time when life shall be more than living, more even than the question of getting a living; but in the mean time I think that the artist might very well study the springs of feeling in others; and if I were a dramatist I think I should quite humbly go to that play where they hiss the villain for his villany, and inquire how his wickedness had been made so appreciable, so vital, so personal. Not being a dramatist, I still cannot indulge the greatest contempt of that play and its public.

ART IN DAILY LIFE

BY

R. DE MAULDE

Many people think that life cannot be filled better than by whirl and excitement. Tell me frankly, does this lend charm to life? Life is what it is; why should we kill ourselves in painting its stucco? It would often be doing us a service were some one to show us the ridiculous side of a crowd of obligations and ambitions in which we consume ourselves, vainly. To do this thing or that because "everybody does it,"

to know everybody, to take the present time by the forelock, to think everybody's thoughts, to see what every one sees, to eat the fashionable kickshaws and suffer from the fashionable complaint, to reel under the prodigious exertion of doing nothing—truly a fine object in life, this: the life of a circus horse or a squirrel. The world will regard us with admiration maybe; but the physician before whom we presently collapse after our surfeit will treat us as degenerates.

He will tell us to quit Paris and fly to the sea or the mountains. Stuff! 'tis not the air of Paris that is unwholesome; what is unwholesome is its moral atmosphere. Still, I do find it a little hard to understand how a Parisian, constantly beset by risks so various, can reach manhood limb-whole, unmaimed. To be alive—that is the marvel.

And many persons, amid these futile activities, pass life by after all without touching it. Who they were is never known; you see only their gestures. In sooth, there must be many serious people among the clowns at the fair, judging by the number of clowns and fribbles among serious people.

Not a few of the grave men I happen to meet, lawyers, bankers, men of business, are not really men at all; they are merely lawyers, bankers, men of business. Is this happiness!

Mr. Rockefeller, the petroleum king, has fallen into a melancholy. Like Charles V., he desires to abdicate; but this dream is still to him a fresh source of trouble and sorrow, for he seeks a mortal of fit mould and temper to wield the sceptre in his stead, and, though he scours two hemispheres, this mortal is nowhere discoverable.

Will it astonish you, Madam, if I avouch that this rage of unrest has set its mark upon some of your sex? Would not you yourself think it a slight on your reputation if you were even suspected of being a stay-at-home? Conversation—writing,—what outworn, antiquated things! You fling out your words, your notes, in the style of a tradesman's list or a telegram; you are seen in the paddock or the polo-field, on charitable committees, in presidential chairs; since man is master, you think you are winning a place among the engulfing sex by adopting mannish modes wholesale.

The most charming of women will cut, at least, but a poor figure as a man; and I cannot, in truth, see what there is in the spectacle of the masculine hurly-burly to attract women who might well live in quietness. To be endlessly getting and spending, to turn all things to laughter and take nothing seriously, to be altogether insensible—oh, a fine philosophy! With all his wealth and titles and decorations, many a man comes to crawling on all-fours, and even finds exceeding comfort in his proneness, like the good soul who, being changed into a swine by the enchantress Circe, refused point-blank to resume his former features. But all our restless strivings represent in reality nothing but a varnish of egotism, wherefore we cannot desire a woman to take pleasure in them. Moreover, she would have to force her nature to attain an egotism so perfect. Such egotism is very rare among you, ladies; and often, after the loss of those you love has driven you within your last entrenchments, it happens that Death comes, rather than Forgetfulness.

Shall we at least find joy in the happiness of doing nothing?

I recognize that, for some women, there is a measure of practical wisdom in remaining idle. Unaccustomed to anything that can be called work, constrained often to periods of enforced idleness, they prefer to avoid all serious undertakings, last their activity prove mere bungling.

This attitude of mind is familiar also to many men, if they have an income however small, or merely the hope of espousing one. They tell themselves that work brings worry, breeds jealousy and envy: ignorance has its art—the art of shining inexpensively; and all you have to do for the decoration you covet is to unveil a statue in honor of some philosopher conveniently deceased. Meanwhile, it is so pleasant a sensation, so conducive to the peace and order of your country, to smoke your cigar without one thought, one desire, one aspiration!

So pleasant! But stay, my dear sir, let me deal fairly with you: you are always doing something, even though it be only smoking, hunting, reading the newspaper, emitting your political views, riding, eating, digesting. Only, these occu-

pations are useless to your neighbors. It is very lucky, you will admit, that all men do not profess the same principles of ideal parasitism, for then who would give you to eat?

If we could but hug the assurance that wretchedness belongs of right to the poor, and glory to the rich, we might beseech the poor to batten on the odors exhaled from your kitchens. But no; uselessness seeks to foist itself as a mark of distinction; and vanity, often more ravenous than hunger, excites violent social strictures, especially among workmen of some intelligence, and sufficiently well off already to have an inkling of what luxury means.

Unhappily, our progress in material things serves only to develop this sense of luxury, by establishing on all sides contacts purely material. Money, and money alone, classifies the passengers on the railway; we all become mere parcels, some in wadding, others not. We are estimated by the weight of our money, though that is commonly a cause of moral feebleness, or at least of torpor. Will social happiness, any more than personal happiness, be found in this glorification of material indolence and the aristocracy of pleasure? It seems not, judging by the jealousy that devours our whole society, from top to bottom. There is endless talk of solidarity, fraternity; that is the court dress of the present day, as were formerly wigs and knee-breeches. But never was egotism so intolerant; never, consequently, was the tedium of life so grievous.

Men mightily deceive themselves by indulging all their life long the dream of an easy time—retirement from business, quiet days of fishing, and so on; seeking a path to this happiness by way of a life of inelastic limitations. Our life is either whirl or stagnation. To the women who do nothing, as well as to all these mechanical gentlemen, to those who are enamoured of the world, and to persons flourishing and waxing fat, may I present the woman of my dreams? She has formed the habit of living so actively on the joys and sorrows of others, she has sustained, encouraged, helped others so often, shared so many fears and hopes, seen so much of birth and death, lived so full of life, that beneath her blanching hair her heart finds it impossible to retire from the service. It grows and

grows. Her activity, always fruitful, brings forth ever more and more. A clear proof that there must be a special secret.

II

Art has for its aim perfection, the augmentation of our sensibility to physical objects. Contact with the True and the Useful being often void of charm, whether because the Beautiful passes "out of range," as hunters say, or because the ugly presses upon us somewhat too closely, art consists in creating for one's self a nest, a little sanctuary, an environment that one can love, and in presenting to us by their softer sides the things with which contact is inevitable.

Therefore a woman's art consists in drawing from the most modest occupations a ray of beauty and of love; and the surest means of discovering such in those is to put it there.

A gross error of our time is an æsthetic error. The belief is current that there are things which are necessarily artistic, which make you an artist from head to heel as soon as you touch them, and other things which can never be artistic. People rush to the first, and eschew the others. They fancy themselves to be artists by the mere fact of their handling a chisel or a brush instead of a plough; a governess, be she ever such a goose, thinks herself a superior person. In reality there are some things to which art is applied, and other things to which it is not applied. The art of life consists in living steadily, without perturbations, in doing honestly that for which we were born, and in doing it with love.

I cannot forget, for example, the singular impression produced upon me, in a corner of the old hospital of Bruges, where Memlinc worked, by a group of Beguines scraping carrots, and murmuring their prayers the while. I was leaving the place with a band of tourists, my eyes filled with beauty, my heart haunted by the exquisite visions of Memlinc; these placid women, not one of whom raised her head at so commonplace an event as a stranger passing, wholly absorbed, as they were, in blending the love of God with the fulfilment of His laws, well reflected the sentiment of the painter, the

living ray of grace. I seemed to see around them a glamour of art.

Take a woman who, from an entirely different point of view, showed the same instinct for finding loveliness in common things—the celebrated Madame Roland.

"The drying of her grapes and plums, the garnering of her nuts and apples, the due preparation of her dried pears, her broods of hens, her litters of rabbits, her frothing lye, the mending of her linen, the ranging of her napery in its lofty presses—all these were objects of her personal, unstinted, unremitting care, and gave her pleasure. She was present at the village merrymakings and took her place among the dancers on the green. The country people from miles around sought her aid for sick friends whom the doctors had given up. She ranged the fields on foot and horseback to collect simples, to enrich her herbarium, to complete her collections, and would pause in delight before tufts of violets bordering the hedgerows bursting with the first buds of spring, or before the ruddy vine-clusters tremulous in the autumn breeze; for her, everything in meadow and wood had voices, everything a smile." [1]

When a woman has armed herself with this special force of beauty, she has done much. It only remains for her to nourish and propagate it; her life is a permanent work of art; around her an atmosphere is naturally created in which all things solicit and give play to our noblest sentiments. Ah! this art is no chimera, no vain or useless thing; it is the very nursery of life. Even in a cottage it smiles upon the wayfarer, offering flowers to his view, teaching him the graciousness and the necessity of joy. M. Guyau defines the artist as "he who, simple even in his profound accomplishment, preserves in the gaze of the world a certain freshness of heart, and (so to say) a perpetual novelty of sensation." That is the impression that a woman should produce around her, and no tremendous exertion is needed, since the first rule is frankness and simplicity. Luxury tends to be hurtful. It is useless to go far afield, to ferret out recondite styles, to complicate, to love the affected, the rare, the eccentric, the languid. Let the house

[1] O. Gréard.

be a living and well-ordered place, where the accessory does not take precedence of the essential, where every object has its own place and its specific character. Breathe into all things a sentiment of unity, and also, as far as possible, of spaciousness and comfort.

In the country, respect the ancient dwelling, even though a little dilapidated—the old walls, the old furniture, the old avenue, the old church. Try to feel in presence of a living personality. A house is a book in stone, and, if you will, you may give to everything a soul, even to stones. Allow your own life freely to enter and pervade this ancient home. Irregularities in structure, recent additions, are all cries of existence. Something of your own soul thus cleaves to all these walls. Is it not true that the architect of a building, the painter of a fresco, the carver of an arabesque, have left upon their work some fragments of their souls? Their thoughts hover about the walls. The voice of a singer causes the composer's soul to live again in us; the painter, the sculptor, speak to us, serve us as mentors. I also, in these pages, shall leave some fragments of my soul, with the hope that in the shadow of my thought some one perchance may pray and love.

III

Rich or poor, do not crowd your walls; set on them merely a living and friendly note, something that is a final revelation of yourself, an element of life—a pretty water-color, a fine engraving. Is not this a thousand times better than a vulgar glitter, or even than tapestries? It is you, your thought, that you must stamp on these walls! Thereby you extend and fortify your personal action. What recks it me whether I find this or that object in your drawing-room? Am I stepping into a photographer's studio, or into a museum? It is you that I want to see. And, to tell the truth, I do not think it very delightful to see above your head your own portrait, the portraits of your husband and children. The end of portraiture is to replace the absent; besides, the painter or engraver strikes me too forcibly as interposing between you and me,

and as indicating almost brutally how I am to understand you. What would happen, I wonder, if I should admire the imitation more than the original?

I would rather divine you, come to know you, in my own fashion, as the secret unity among your belongings grows upon me. If the visitor on entering perceives no discordant element; if his eye, wandering presently towards the chimney-piece or some other salient point, rests on a beautiful head enhaloed, as it were, with Christian sentiment and ideals, or on a beautiful Greek statue, calm, dignified, in no wise labored or strained, natural in pose and expression; at once he is at ease, his confidence is already won.

Presently his glance will range afield; he will perceive some fine early Italian master, adorable in its artlessness, crowded with ardent ideas, and fragrant with noble aspirations; or if you are touched with the unrest of life, if needs you must plumb the mysterious and the unknown, you will have made room for some Vincian vision; or maybe for the clever and superficial gayeties of the French school, or the admirable warmth and freedom of some of our landscape painters.

Many people indulge a taste for small canvases, because these will hang anywhere, go with anything, form part of the furniture, and suggest no manner of problem—cowsheds to wit, scoured miraculously clean, interiors all spick and span, kettles athrob, alive; or watery meadow-lands, with gray trees and gray water, and clouds fretted, or far stretched-out, or close-packed, or flocculent. These do not tire the brain, they offend no one, except that, from the house-decorator's point of view, they are often of too superior a workmanship.

Rembrandt is the divinity of shade, the antipodes of the Italian expansiveness. In an impenetrable cloud he dints a spot of gold, which proves to be a drunkard, a beggar, a melancholy wight, a rotund Boniface, a needy soul, or a Jew from Amsterdam or Batignolles; or possibly himself.

There are also the Gargantuesque old Flemish masters, with their phenomenal processions, their banquets open to the world, bubbling over with gayety and life.

It seems to me that in matters of art one should say *Raca!*

to nothing; every æsthetic impression has some use. And I really do not see the utility of a dispute like that which has been wrangled over for ages, about the relative importance of form and substance. Certainly there are features that are accidental, and others that are essential; you will choose according to your taste. The arts of design have no title to govern your soul; it is your part to govern and make use of them. Do you prefer to invoke an image, or a thought? Do you wish to surround yourself with the brutalities of so-called Truth, or with suggestions, forms which efface themselves in the interests of impressions or ideas? Do you love beauty of form, exact outlines, well-defined contours, or a broad effect, a surface whose lines are lost in the ambient shade? These are questions for yourself to answer. Good tools are those which suit you best. It is not the mission of painter or sculptor to reproduce a scene with mathematical precision; a photographer would do this better; the artist's part is to be of service to you, to furnish you with the elements of the art of life. Indeed, it is the distinguishing mark of the artist that he singles out and segregates, in a crowd, in a landscape, the one choice object; upon this he fastens, he is alive to all its manifold nuances, and the charm is so great that around this object he sees nought but gloom.

The æsthetic object does you the delightful service of supplementing your own visions, and of compassing you about with ideas. You do not inquire what it is, but what it expresses; the cleverest of still-life pictures, like those to be seen in Italian houses, would give you but a very superficial pleasure. You need support, not illusions; this marble, as no one knows better than yourself, is marble; but it speaks to you.

Only, the message of art needs to be properly directed. To catch its accents, or to make them heard, one must impart to it something of one's own. How wonderfully the meaning of things, even their most precise intellectual meaning, varies for us, day by day, through distraction or a change of mood! If our mind wanders when we read a book, the loveliest thoughts glide over us as though over marble. A lady who had been stirred to enthusiasm by a somewhat mediocre book wrote

asking me to recommend another which would produce the same effect. I told her first to fill herself with the same enthusiasm, and then to take down from her shelves any book she pleased. One day, subdued to our mechanism, we pass on like blind men; the next, if our hearts are moved and our spirits satisfied, we feel suggestion to the full, and go so far as to see, in a phrase or a picture, ideas which the author never dreamed of putting there.

Let us not, then, be anxious to crowd our rooms with beautiful things; far better to display things few in number, but high in worth, adapted to their surroundings, and performing in some sort the office of the conductor of an orchestra.

To enforce this reflection, it is enough to mention the irritating effect produced by certain museums. The genus "collection"—that is the rock to shun! All these hapless canvases, torn from their luminous, hallowed, intimate, unique places, are there exhibited high and dry in philosophic desolation, rootless, forlorn. At ten o'clock you have to don the freshness of spirit necessary to enjoy them, and doff it on the stroke of four or five, according to the season. Instead of entering a gallery with heart at rest, and seeing in the sanctuary the objects of worship, you pull it to pieces, compare it with the canons, and puzzle out a needless meaning. Some good souls criticise the subject, others its treatment and technique; and the keepers stroll about or doze in a corner. What a crime to despoil streets and palaces and churches, the very tombs, for the sake of ranging such labels in a row! This is art as officialdom knows it.

In a room of great simplicity, a single work, adapted to its surroundings, and excellently interpreting a woman's tastes, renders us a wholly different service. This is no corpse to anatomize. You contemplate a thing that is loved, and a radiance floods the place; you forget, if only for a moment, the offences of life. And I maintain that the poorest woman in the world, if she has confidence in beauty, will always be able thus to fill her home with light; she can always place in it some flowers or a photograph.

IV

You may furnish your rooms in a higher sort by adorning your chairs with beings who speak and act. In referring to these familiar beings as furniture I mean no harm, but simply imply that they are no friends of yours, but merely accessories, persons who sink their own ideas and tastes, Madam, to assist your art with theirs.

In this category, musicians probably hold the first place. Indeed, music plays a much higher rôle in æstheticism than the manual arts, a rôle scarcely inferior to that of the intellectual arts. Like the latter, it has (so to say) no substance, appealing solely to the feelings; whether we will or no, it rarely fails to take possession of us, though merely by tangled sensations; it catches us as in a web, and does with us what it will; it moves us, lulls us to sleep, stimulates us. It derives its effects from the relations of tone, whether with neighboring tones on the scale, or with the singer and the listener. A small thing in itself, it is yet of capital importance; all life, all motion even, produces sound, from the wind and the sea upwards; and recourse has ever been had to sound for the purpose of touching men.

Beggars and the blind have always sung, as they do to this day; song has ever been employed to console the afflicted, to hearten soldiers on the march, even to soothe physical pain.

With very good reason, then, do women regard music as their own peculiar sphere. Thus, at the epoch of the Renaissance, in the heyday of their influence, they adopted musical attributes in their portraits; these were, so to speak, their sceptres.

Does it beseem a woman to aim higher, and to seek to create around her a real atmosphere of philosophy, history, science, poetry—in short, an intellectual atmosphere? Yes, and no. If she is so reliant on her own wit and ascendancy as to make all the personages she gathers but garniture for her soul or faithful radiators of her glory, mere apostles of her influence, yes. But no, if she has any fear of being absorbed by her surroundings and reduced to the level of a landlady.

It is often said that salons are things of the past, and the fact is lamented; in truth there are no salons now, and there never will be again, because, what with the ambitions and pretensions of men, the necessities of their careers, the obligations of the struggle for life, the present age knows little of the delight of allowing itself to be embodied or summed up in a woman. A drawing-room very soon becomes a sort of exchange for literary or sporting affairs, or the like. This does not imply that, for their own purposes, women should neglect intellectual resources; but it will certainly be recognized that real courage is needed if they are to rise superior to tittle-tattle, talk of stocks or the stable, the stuff they read, the things they hear. Happy are the societies where one can still enjoy life, and think! Happy the man who, like Monsieur Jourdain, makes prose without knowing it!

Yet, without holding a salon, women may still exercise in intellectual matters a guiding influence truly indispensable. Instead of allowing themselves to fall a prey to puffery, claptrap, or scandal, why should they not, on the contrary, treat as personal enemies the men who only use their undoubted talents to sport with them, to flaunt everywhere their nudities, to show off the slaves of their pleasure?—why smile upon scribblers, geniuses of Montmartre and the Latin Quarter? It is self-constituted slavery to bow incessantly at the feet of fashion. Always the fashion! A play is bad. Don't go to see it, and tell people so. A poem is a medley of unintelligible catchwords, a rigmarole of sonorous nothings; have the courage to say that it defies comprehension and that your mind loves lucidity! We all need our courage: this is yours. Nobody wants you to shoulder a rifle; you are asked to read or not to read, to see or not to see. If need be, effect a grand spring-cleaning! You alone can destroy the literature of the music-hall and the casino, the trashy novelettes, that ravage the meanest hamlets worse than alcohol. Is this courage beyond your strength? Do you fancy yourself compelled, because it is a free country, to fuddle yourself on the vile rinsings retailed a few steps away from your dwelling? Why then do you nourish your spirit on things that no one would dare to retail

in the open air? Nobody would suggest that you should pass your life in preaching; a light or even a fatuous remark is not likely to offend. But for pity's sake insist that people wash their hands before entering your doors. Many a great personage whom you invite to dinner and make much of would be wearing a livery and displaying his calves in your entrance-hall if he had remained an honest man. Dare to face and to praise things that are true and serious. Diffuse their fragrance around you. You are responsible for the books that lie about on your table.

What a power you would have at command if you acted resolutely in the interests of beauty! The whole world would lay down its arms at your feet. The sentiment of the Beautiful is so strong! "To fathom the dreams of poets is the true philosophy," said a philosopher. "The mind of the savant stops at phenomena; the soul of the poet essays a higher flight, his inward vision pierces to the heart of reality. If the final knowledge is that which attains, not the surface, but the foundations of being, the poet's method is the true one."

Wherefore, surround yourself at any rate with men who have the taste for rendering life musical; in your conversations encourage clear, clean, warm images, refinements of sentiment rather than tricks of style; spread abroad an air of gayety, polish, and, above all, reverence. Your door is not that of a church, but neither is it that of a market.

Some women have too much belief in men of distinction, or so reputed; they imagine them upon a higher plane than they really are, and, especially, more difficult to reach. The majority of them, foolish or eminent, obscure or famous, reck little of grand sentiments, and are satisfied with a modicum of illusion or suggestion; they are led by means quite infantile, provided they are carried out of themselves.

Have you *sometimes* pondered our extraordinary facility for self-detachment, whenever we perform an act of imagination —if we are reading a novel, for instance? We delight in being duped; we want to see and hear everything, we fancy ourselves present at scenes where the novelist himself declares no one was present. Thus, as has been said by a very witty

writer, we identify ourselves so thoroughly with the adventures of Pierre Loti that on the day when the Academy received into its bosom M. Julien Viaud, naval officer, the whole assembly, though so fastidiously select, thought they were really beholding M. Loti.

The art of the novelist consists in riveting us to what he depicts. M. Loti, for instance, to whom I have just referred, has admirably painted the sea, but he has not sought to exalt it to a level with us; he has lent to it neither ideas nor will, sadness nor ecstasies; but he has marvellously felt and caused us to feel the solemnity of its multitudinous and changeless life, its invincible weight, its aimless perturbation, and it is in this way that he has so powerfully impressed us.

Well, your art is similar. You need not trouble about your merits or ours, but solely about the effect you can produce on us who love to be duped. Acknowledge this as a guiding principle; for it is easier to regulate illusions than realities.

Finally, we must clearly envisage the precise duty of women, which is to develop their natural gifts, and boldly to adopt the virtues in which men are lacking.

They are the instrument of life, one might almost say the magic cauldron of life. They set all its elements in fermentation. To transform and to impart is their whole concern. Scarcely have they opened their eyes upon the world but they must needs have a doll to cherish, and tend, and fondle. And they continue thus cherishing, tending, fondling, unless life warps their nature. "Their machinery," as Rousseau said, "is admirable for assuaging or exciting the passions." Theirs is a treasure that grows richer in the spending. Even from a physiological point of view, they exhibit a marvellous power of endurance. They are not armed for attack; the finest natured are the strongest; their chords answer wonderfully to all appeals of sentiment; they love money with resignation, but glory intoxicates them; they live on a glance, a breath of kindness; their enthusiasm is contagious, and they shed around them the youth and freshness of life. So, without intention or effort, they are constantly bestowing their very selves, they clothe all things with their own enthusiasm. Science

they vindicate by the noble fruits they obtain from it; from thorns they cause roses to spring forth, and these roses in their turn they cultivate, giving them an added beauty and fragrance, and fresh blossoms all the season round. Excellent gardeners of the world! Their rôle no doubt has varied with the circumstances and needs of different times; but the urgent necessities of the present time serve only to accentuate it and bring it into higher relief. The ignorance and weakness of women work more real mischief than the ignorance and weakness of men. The passive virtues no longer avail for governing; active virtues are the need of to-day.

In olden days, if men loved the king, it was because he belonged to them all, and represented something indispensable to every society, a person with no private interests, but wholly devoted to the interest of the public. Furthermore, he had no possessions entirely his own, not even a park, not even his palace. Now, daring as the idea may appear, let us say that women also can only reign on condition of communizing their souls. Otherwise, they will lose all influence, even with their sons. A woman comes short of essential duties if she stops at bemoaning the evils of the times and playing patroness to good little schoolboys, instead of learning for herself and revealing to others what the evils of the times really are, of drawing out the manhood slumbering within us, and giving it new graces. She bears the burden of human joy. And a woman of intelligence and leisure has, in this particular, duties more complicated than she who milks the cows or who minds the poultry.

She must think and love by her own energy, instead of bearing in her heart a thousand undeveloped sentiments. Her husband and her friends hunt, speculate, work, make havoc of their lives. Even so; she has no right to do the same. If she does not redeem men when she can, surely it is she who ruins them!

No difficulty will discourage her if she first fully realizes that she possesses all that is needful for success, and then sets her responsibilities in a clear light.

She will sometimes make mistakes; enthusiasm itself, the deli-

cious art of giving things charm, has its perils, carrying one away into the unreal, opening a loophole for illusion, day-dreams, prejudices, fictions. What matters it, so long as the tree is vigorous? Would you fell a superb poplar because you noticed upon it some sprigs of mistletoe?

A woman may also go astray in point of vanity. That is a pretty common folly (even among men), and very provoking when it is shown in questions of etiquette or dress. But why should we not agree that there is a noble, an excellent form of vanity, which consists in being thoroughly acquainted with the things one can love, rejoicing in the apostleship one exercises, and securing success therein by cultivating diligence, refinement, considerateness, industry, persuasiveness? Where is the harm?

But we need not dwell on these fears. The special goal of a woman's life, that in which it is distinguished from the life of men, is manifest; it is the great things, the things to be loved, the things which do not "pay." Man serves money. You make it your servant, ladies, and you must aim higher, at the things that are not bought and sold; attachments, real friendships—those are your speculations. Be faithful to your aim. In faithfulness is redemption.

A moment! As I bow to you, I seem to see on my wall, in place of a modern paper, a grand fresco of long ago, an exquisite symbol of your reign: the Angel from Heaven, kneeling in humble adoration before the spotless Motherhood, proclaiming that from your devotion shall proceed the welfare of mankind. The scene is simple and sweet, the color serene: a closed room, a curtain hanging, barely a glimpse of the sky.

XVI

ART AND MORALITY

BY

FERDINAND BRUNETIÈRE

FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY]

IT is not the purpose of this series to attack or to condemn. It seeks rather to understand, and to uphold. Yet there are some errors so obtrusive that one can only advance by pushing them aside, so blatant that the busy man is apt to accept them as being established when really they are merely being shouted. Such an error we here confront. The high mission of art, its intimate relation with much that is noblest in life, has perhaps been brought home to each of us by the words of Mr. Howells and Mr. DeMaule; while closely allied with this broad general question of the purpose of art is the problem, much discussed in present days, of art's relation to morality. Now, it has been shouted at us that no such relation exists—as though anywhere in all this universe any object could stand isolated, untouching and untouched by its surroundings! On the other hand, some men have thought that the whole deep subject of morality is perhaps best approached through its relationship to art.

We in this country are sometimes accused of being too "Puritan" a people, and of being, like our English cousins, too heavily "of the earth." Hence it is perhaps as well that we should here listen to the word of a continental European, some leading man of letters known to and respected by us all. Such a man is, or alas, was, Ferdinand Brunetière, who died last fall. He was one of the "Forty Immortals," the Royal Academy of France; he was acknowledged the foremost critic of our day; and he was

well known, in America as well as Europe, as a lecturer of rare grace and power. The following address was delivered by him in Paris under the auspices of the Société des Conférences; and the present translation was made for the Living Age, *of Boston, is covered by its special copyright, and is here used by the courteous permission of its editors. M. Brunetière's dissection of the principles of art must prove to a layman both instructive and interesting; his outlook on morality may be of even wider value.*

Ladies and Gentlemen:—

In order that I may not surprise any one, and also that I may secure to myself the benefit of my frankness, I will tell you at the very beginning that, in this lecture, I purpose to be long, tiresome, obscure, and commonplace withal. And, in truth, the fault will not be entirely in me, but in the subject I have chosen: Morality in Art, or rather, Art and Morality, a trite subject, as you know; for since the time of Plato, at least, it has been the common ground of conversation in academies, salons, studios, schools; and in spite, or rather because, of its banality it is a subject both complex and difficult.

I say because of its triteness; and indeed one of the great mistakes we make in regard to "commonplaces" is believing them easy to deal with. We have no doubt that the easiest thing in the world to-day is to be, or seem to be, original; and the means thereto have become so simple! We simply have to maintain the opposite of what people around us think; to say of charity, for example, that there is no need to practise it—and that is what a whole school is teaching—to say of justice that there is no need to administer it; to say of patriotism that it is a prejudice of another age; and twenty paradoxes of the same nature. This is a sure way of astonishing, of cheaply shocking, one's readers or hearers, and to-day it is the A B C of the art of the paragrapher and of the platform lecturer.

In these days intellectuality merely consists in thinking the opposite of other people! But, on the other hand, to think like everybody else; to seek solid reasons and precise reasons that are those of almost all reasonable people or of all cultivated people, to confirm people, as need be perhaps, in what the

learned Professor Lombroso has called their misoneism—and which is only a wise distrust of novelty—to tell them there are ideas, old ideas, without which the life of humanity cannot do any more than without bread; in a word, to communicate to them the rare courage, the unusual audacity, of not wishing, at any price, to appear more "advanced" than their times—that, ladies and gentlemen, yes, that is a difficult undertaking, that is a hazardous undertaking: and that is what I would try to do to-day.

I

You know the problem, and I have only to remind you of the terms in which it is stated. If we are to believe the artists in this matter, at least certain of the artists, and the greater number of the critics, or æsthetes, but specially the journalists, Art, great Art, Art with a capital A, would transform, would transmute into pure gold everything it touches, would sublimate it, so to speak; and would make a thing to be admired out of a thing obscene or most atrocious. Do not some call this a means of purgation?

> "There's not a monster bred beneath the sky,
> But, well disposed by art, may please the eye."

Pascal said the same thing, but in a far more Jansenist manner, when he wrote: "What a vanity is painting, which attracts our admiration by the imitation of things which we do not admire in reality." You see that I am keeping my promise, and one could scarcely bring forward more familiar quotations.

Illustrious examples, moreover, confirm, or seem to confirm, the sentence of Pascal and the verses of Boileau. We admire in good faith, we credit ourselves with good taste for admiring, under Greek names, Venuses which we would not dare to name in French; and if we strip (I well know it is a sacrilege), but if we do really strip the subject of Corneille's "Rodogune" or of Racine's "Bajazet," for example, of the prestige of poetry, which transfigures them; if we reduce both of them to the essence of the fable which sustains them, what will remain of

them but two intrigues of the harem, which would be all very well in their place in the annals of crime and indecency.[1]

Yet we are told, neither "Bajazet" nor "Rodogune," especially, are works which we can tax as immoral. In seizing on these intrigues, the poet—and it is his privilege—has transformed their nature. That man would be condemned, he would be disqualified, who, in the presence of the goddesses of Praxiteles, felt emotions other than those of the most chaste and disinterested admiration. The fact is, we are further told, the artist or the poet has lifted us above what is instinctive or animal in us; they have performed this miracle by placing us—how, is not very well known, by a secret known only to them—in a sphere where the gross excitements of sense are unknown; they have freed us from ourselves (you know the theory of the liberating power of art, that of the "purgation of the emotions," and I need only to allude to it in passing[2]); and we have entered with them into the region of supreme calm and of divine repose.

> La Mort peut disperser les univers tremblans,
> Mais la Beauté flamboie, et tout renait en elle,
> Et les mondes encore roulent sous ses pieds blancs.[3]

That is not my opinion.

And first, if this were the place to produce texts, I should not be embarrassed to prove that Greek sculpture—I mean that of the great epoch—fell short of that character of ideal purity that we are accustomed to attribute to it. It is pagan; and we must remember that when we speak of it! And paganism is not here or there, the religion of Jupiter or that of Venus, the mysteries of Eleusis or the Thesmophoria, but simply, and in a word, the adoration of the energies of nature. Here custom makes us blind; but in order to see clearly, think what the

[1] It is well known that Racine's boldness in the choice of his subjects, as in his freedom of observation and in the detail of his style, has long before equalled or surpassed the most audacious liberty that romanticism could imagine at a later time.—B.

[2] See Hegel's *Aesthetik*, and Schopenhauer on the æsthetics of poetry in *The World as Will and Idea*

[3] "Death may shatter the trembling universe; but Beauty's torch ever flames aloft, and all things revive, and the worlds once more roll on beneath her white feet."

amours of the chief gods—Europa, Danaë, Leda, Semele, Ganymede—have become with an Ovid, for example, or with very great painters, a Michael Angelo, a da Vinci, a Correggio, a Veronese; and more generally, all those voluptuous fictions which, after having furnished the materials of classic art, have come to their end in the terrible games in the amphitheatre. Ask yourselves, in another art and in another order of ideas, whether—when we come from seeing this "Bajazet" or this "Rodogune" played, of which I was speaking just now—whether the impression which we carry from it has not something of mingled estrangement, of suspicious estrangement?

On this point there is a confession of Diderot which you will find quite eloquent, and which will show, too, how this creator of "art criticism" admired the "Antiope" by Correggio.[1] Alas! gentlemen, Corneille, the great Corneille, is not always moral: And I mean by that that I would not be sure of the quality of the soul formed in the school of his "heroism" alone. It would be lacking in what Shakespeare has so finely called "the milk of human kindness."

I continue, ladies and gentlemen, to say trite things, exceedingly trite things, things even worthy of Mrs. Grundy, and what would the case be if I wished to take my examples from music instead of from painting, sculpture, or poetry? But this is the most banal of all these things—I mean that, of which you are all secretly, though perhaps without knowing it, most certainly convinced; yet which is most difficult to prove. It is that these examples have nothing that need astonish us if in every form or every species of art there is, as principle or germ, a furtive immorality. Note that I am not speaking of inferior forms of art; of the café-concert song, for example, of the vaudeville, or of the dance. Of the dance! Yes, I know that David danced before the ark, and we hear every day much talk of hieratic dances, of sacred dances, of martial dances. There is also the danse du ventre; and I should not be at all surprised if some grave author should find it symbolic. But symbolic or expressive of what? That is the point; and no one else will pretend that it is expressive of decency or modesty. "How

[1] "Salon de 1761," and Letter to Mlle. Voland, 17th Aug., 1759.

much there is to a minuet!" said a famous dancing master. Why, certainly, but how much of what? For, certainly the opera ballet may have all sorts of qualities—qualities that I myself may have the weakness not to despise: that they have not the quality of elevating the mind is something of which I am certain! Neither has a café-concert song, nor a vaudeville.

But since this is not what we ask of them, I will not insist. That would be to make myself ridiculous! Let us take the highest things. I speak to you of great art, of the greatest art: it is in the notion of great art that I say a germ of immorality is enveloped; and it is here that I am going to become wearisome. Of, rather, not yet, ladies and gentlemen; that will be presently; for I must first of all tell you of the memorable exploit of M. Taine, the most glorious of his exploits, and the one which most eloquently testifies that in him sincerity of research and uprightness of character did not yield to brilliancy of talent.

He began, as you know—in conforming with his intention of finding an objective foundation for critical judgments, and thus of rescuing the works of literature and art from the caprice of particular opinions—by taking the attitude which I will not call indifferent or uninterested, but impartial and impersonal, which is that of the zoölogist before the animal or of the botanist with regard to the plant. When the zoölogist studies the habits of the hyena or of the antelope, of the jackal or of the dog, and when the botanist describes to us the rose or the *Datura stramonium*, the belladonna or "the sacred blade which gives us bread," you know they always use the same patient method, and we do not see them angry with the ferocious beast or the poisonous plant. We do not find them changing either tone or composure of mind with their subject. Taine tried to imitate them, and for a moment he could believe that he had succeeded; when, as yet knowing only France and England, on his appointment as professor of æsthetics in the École des Beaux-Arts, he visited Italy. That was a revelation. The difference between the best, the mediocre, and the worst, that difference, that sense of difference, to which the spirit of system so easily blinds us in literature, because words express ideas and because we have a leaning toward ideas that resemble our own, how-

ever feebly they may be expressed—this difference which we do not always appreciate in music, because music is a kind of science as well as an art, and especially because our judgments do not anywhere depend more on the state of our nerves than in music—this, on the other hand, stands out clearly in painting, in sculpture; and Taine was forcibly struck by it.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is why, when he began those celebrated lectures on "The Production of the Work of Art," on "Art in Italy," "Art in Holland," "Art in Greece," on "The Ideal in Art"—certainly, with the work of Eugene Fromentin on "The Early Masters," and some rare writings of M. Guillaume, the most remarkable things which art criticism has produced in our times[1]—that is why it appeared to him necessary to classify, to judge works, to establish "scales of values"—what is more pedantically called an æsthetic criterion—in order to judge them. And where did he find this criterion, gentlemen, after having long sought for it, where did he find it, he, the pupil of Condillac and of Hegel, the theorist and philosopher of the impassibility of criticism, whose most serious reproach to the Cousins and Jouffroys was that of trying to bring everything to the "moral point of view"? What is the sign by which he declared that the most elevated in the museum of masterpieces can be recognized?

It is by what he calls "the degree of beneficence in the character."

And what, then, are the works he places highest in the heaven of art—he, I repeat, the theorist of naturalism, whose deeper sympathies all went, in spite of himself, to the manifestations of force and violence? Now it is "Polyeucte," "le Cid," "les Horace," it is "Pamela," "Clarissa," "Grandison," it is "Mauprat," "François le Champi," "La Mare au Diable," it is "Hermann and Dorothea," it is Goethe's "Iphigenia," it is Tennyson with his "Idylls of the King." Who, in very truth, would have suspected it only three or four years before, when he wrote his "History of English Literature," and when,

[1] Fromentin in painting and M. Eugene Guillaume in sculpture (see his essay on Michael Angelo) have added to Taine's criticism what it lacked on the side of "technique."—B.

with an energy of style which at times resembled a gymnastic feat, he glorified, in the drama of Shakespeare or in the poetry of Byron, the splendid villany of Don Juan or of Iago?

I do not discuss these judgments, gentlemen; I do not deny any of them to-day; I do not speak to you of the reservations they permit, and of the principal ones which the author himself has made. But I see in them an instructive testimony—a presumption, if you like—for what I was saying to you just now: that is, that the art which has only itself as an object, the art which does not care for the quality of the characters it expresses; the art, in a word, which does not take account of the impressions which it is capable of making on the senses or of exciting in the mind, that art, however great in the artist, I do not say is inferior (that is another question), but I say that it necessarily tends to immorality. I am now going to try to give you the reasons for this.

II

There is one reason which, if I am not mistaken, is as clear as noon-day; and which is that every form of art, in order to reach the mind, is obliged to have recourse to the mediation, not only of the senses, but of the pleasure of the senses. No painting but must first of all be a joy to the eye! No music but must be a pleasure to the ear! No poetry but must be a caress! And that very thing, we may remark in passing, is one of the reasons for the changes in fashion and taste. The works exist; and whether good or bad, they remain what they are. We like them or we do not like them! They do not change in character; the "Iliad" is always the "Iliad," Raphael's "School of Athens" is always the "School of Athens." But the senses become refined, or rather they are sharpened; they become more subtle and more exacting; they require, in order to experience the same quantity of pleasure, a greater amount of excitation. As has been well observed, "la Dame Blanche," "le Pre-aux-Clercs," and so many other operas we to-day call out-of-date—although their representation once was profitable to dozens of theatres in Germany—these works doubtless gave to our fathers the same kind of pleasure as "Carmen," for example, or "Die Meistersinger," gives us. It is because their less practised ears were less exacting.

Have you never asked yourselves at times whence comes the scorn it is fashionable, in the last few years, to show toward Raphael's painting? Independently of the element of snobbery which is certainly mixed with it—and which consists in people thinking that this gives them the air of connoisseurs—it is because after the lapse of fifty years our eyes have learned to enjoy color far more intensely than formerly. The sense for color, which, as you know, has had a long history, and the increasing complexity of which in the progress of time we can follow, seems to have profited by what the sense of design and form has lost. And we delight in reds or blues, yellows or greens to-day, as such, demanding only vigor or delicacy. Perhaps this, too, is the reason, or one at least, for the development of landscape. The chief factor of landscape is light or color, a pleasure purely sensuous, or primarily sensuous, which it affords us; and do not the very words we use to admire, for example, a canvas by Corot indicate it, when we speak of the calm, of the freshness, of the melancholy, which we breathe there? All that is not only sensed, but sensuous; and I do not think I need support this point any further.

But there result from this, ladies and gentlemen, several consequences; and thus it is that we see—I say, in history—that when art is left to itself and seeks its principle only in itself—poetry, music, or painting—it degenerates into a mass of artifices to stir up sensuality. Then no one asks of it anything more; it itself no longer thinks of anything but of pleasing, and of pleasing at any price, by every means; and it literally changes from a leader or from a guide, into a kind of go-between. That is the only name which fits it when I think of the close of the eighteenth century, of the novels of Duclos and of Crébillon the younger, of that of Laclos: "les Liaisons dangereuses"; of the sculpture of Clodion; of the painting of Boucher, of Fragonard; of the libertine engravings of so many dandies; of that furor of eroticism which disgraces not only the "Poesies" of Parny, but even those of André Chenier.

Let us be bold enough to confess it; all this art which is so praised to us, which is still celebrated, all this art, in all its forms, was, for nearly half a century, scarcely anything but a

perpetual incentive to debauch; and do you think that, although it be called elegant, debauchery is any the less dangerous? As for me, I believe it is far more so!

Here is something graver still. At heart, when they are not devoid of all moral sense, these Fragonards or these Crébillons cannot but know that they ply a shameful trade. But the seduction of form sometimes works in a more subtle and insidious fashion, for which the artist or the public can scarcely themselves account, and of which the effects are more disastrous; for while corrupting the principle of art there is the appearance of respecting it; *optimi corruptio pessima.* When an exaggerated importance, not to say an importance which ignores all else, is attributed to the form, then it is that there results, from this very importance, what an Italian critic, writing of the decadence of Italian art, has justly called "the difference to the content."[1] That is when the painter, Correggio or Titian, with the same hand, as skilful, as caressing, as licentious, but as sure, with which he yesterday painted a "Madonna" or an "Assumption," to-day paints, warm and amber on a dark background, the nudity of a courtesan. It is when a Montesquieu, with the same pen with which he has thrown on paper a sketch of the "Spirit of Law," writes the "Persian Letters" or the "Temple de Gnide." Or better still, it is when relaxation is taken after writing a "Stabat" by writing the music of a ballet. For, what, indeed, do the things we say matter? What must be considered is the manner of saying them! Form is everything, the basis is nothing, if it is not the pretext or occasion for form. And, as this striving, as this care, as this passion for form never fails to lead to new effects; as the qualities lost are, or seem to be, replaced by others; as the execution becomes more masterly or more skilful, it cannot at first be seen where that leads to. That, ladies and gentlemen, leads directly to dilettanteism; and dilettanteism is the death both of all art and of all morality.

Oh, certainly, I know very well I speak like a barbarian, not to say like one possessed; at all events, like an iconoclast; and you are used to see something else in dilettanteism. Dilet-

[1] Francesco de Sanctis, "Storia della Letterature Italiana."

tanteism, I know, for the most of those who profess it and glory in it, for the most of those who are in sympathy with it, means independence of mind, liberty, diversity, superiority of taste; it means absence of prejudices; it is the faculty of comprehending everything. But, gentlemen, is it also the faculty of excusing everything? For, indeed, we who believe in anything, and who have what are called "principles"—you know that that means to-day that we are limited on all sides—can any one imagine that, when we adopt, when we maintain, an opinion, we have not seen the reasons for the contrary opinion, or the difficulties of the one we adopt? Alas! there is not a critic or historian worthy of the name who does not argue against his tastes, who does not combat his own pleasures, who does not harden himself against the things that attract him. But dilettanteism is nothing but an incapacity for taking sides, an enfeeblement of the will, when it is not a clouding of the moral sense; and—on the most favorable supposition—a tendency, eminently immoral, to make of the beauty of things the measure of their absolute value.

When art comes to that—and it necessarily comes to that whenever it seeks its end only in itself or in what is emphatically called the realization of pure beauty—I once more repeat, it is not only art which is ruined: it is morality, or, if you want something more precise, it is society, which has made an idol of it. We have a memorable example of this in the Italy of the fifteenth and of the sixteenth centuries, assuredly one of the most corrupt societies of history, according to the admission of all historians; the Italy of all these tyrants to whom we seem to have pardoned everything because they have had triumphal mythologies painted in fresco on the walls and ceilings of their palaces; or because the daggers they buried in the breasts of their victims were marvellously carved by a Benvenuto Cellini. And do you know whence is this corruption, gentlemen? Precisely from this idolizing of art, or, if you prefer it, from the subordination of every part of public and private life to art and its demands. An excellent critic has said:

"The Italians of the Rennaissance, under the sway of the fine arts, sought after form, and satisfied themselves with

rhetoric. Therefore we condemn their moral disquisitions and their criticisms as the flimsy playthings of intellectual voluptuaries. Yet the right way of doing justice to these stylistic trifles is to regard them as products of an all-embracing genius for art, in a people whose most serious enthusiasms were æsthetic. . . . If the methods of science may be truly said to regulate our modes of thinking at the present time, it is no less true that, during the Rennaissance, art exercised a like controlling influence."

Note, ladies and gentlemen, this last comparison; we shall return to it in a little while. Penetrated with the idea of the "beautiful," Italy went so far as to find it in crime. It recognized in a crime well done, boldly conceived, skilfully executed, and audaciously avowed, merits and analogues to those she applauded in her works of art. Why is that? You see why, perhaps. It is in distinguishing and dividing the invisible, in separating the inseparable, in dissociating the form from the substance; it is in placing in the execution all the merit of art. As long as this tendency found its counterpoise in the sincerity of the religious, moral, social, or political sentiment, it gave to the world the masterpieces which you know, from the "Divine Comedy" to the decoration of the Sistine. But according as the tendency was able to develop freely, the decadence of art was seen to commence, followed by the decadence of morality. That is a first-class proof, in my opinion—a proof by the facts, a proof by history—that every form of art contains a principle of immorality, and there is another in the fact that it is obliged to address the mind only by the mediation of the pleasure of the senses, of which art must exercise a wise mistrust, the chief part of which will be never to seek its end in itself.

It is to that, you know, that people have tried to answer, in giving as its end the imitation of nature; and as regards this, I begin by declaring that two things are equally certain: that we are cured of dilettanteism or of virtuosity only by returning to the imitation of nature; and the other is that if the imitation of nature is not, perhaps, the end of art, it is at least the principle. "All rules," said a great painter, "have been made only to aid

us in placing ourselves before nature, and thus to teach us to see it better"; and a great poet has said before him:

> "Nature is made better by no mean,
> But nature makes that mean; so, over that art
> Which you say adds to nature, is an art
> That nature makes."

But what is this nature which it is a question of imitating? How, in what measure, ought we to imitate it? If we feel in us any temptation to correct it, or, as is said, to perfect it, ought we to yield to it? And how, in short, have morals or morality accommodated themselves? I mean, how, in fact and in history, have they accommodated themselves to that recommendation and that principle?

I will not examine, gentlemen, whether nature is always beautiful, or whether it is never so. The question would take us too far afield. Truly, I, for my part, will freely say that if colors are not in objects, but in our eye (and that is proven), the proof would have greater validity for that relative and changing quality which is called "Beauty." Plato has said, or rather has been made to say, that "the beautiful is the splendor of the true"; and I admire Plato; none the less, this is an example of one of these immortal blunders which we piously transmit from generation to generation. If we only take the trouble to try to understand ourselves, there is no "beauty" in a geometrical theorem, nor in a chemical law, or at least the beauty shines in it only with a mild brilliance, modest and timid. There is beauty, in the human sense of the word, only in those very general laws that are, properly speaking, hypotheses rather than laws, and of which I do not wish to speak disparagingly, because it may be that the search for them is the very end, the highest end, of science. But, on the other hand, we might easily show that there have been some very great mistakes. But, I repeat, and without wishing to examine the question, ugliness as well as beauty is in nature; and you know, we all know, some artists who have seen it alone. The romanticists have even made the representation of the ugly an essential part of their æsthetics—and it certainly is not on this point that contemporary naturalism has disavowed them.

What is still more certain, and what is especially important to us to-day, is that, beautiful or ugly, nature is not "good"; and I scarcely need to maintain this point, since the Schopenhauers, the Darwins, the Vignys, have firmly established it. Do not let us needlessly complicate matters, and do not let us embarrass ourselves with metaphysical complications. If the first need of a creature is "to preserve its being," nature, you know well enough, has, as it were, surrounded us with snares, and we cannot make a movement without running the risk of perishing by it. Life is spent in learning to live, and no sooner have we succeeded in it than we die. Does the living console us, and can we say, with the poet,

> "Mais la nature est là, qui invite et qui t'aime
> Plonge-toi dans son sein qu'elle t'ouvre toujours"?[1]

Her "bosom" is rather a stepmother's; and her indifference to us is equalled only by her lack of regard for all that we call by the name of good or bad.

> "On me dit une mère et je suis une tombe,
> Mon hiver prend vos morts comme son hecatombe,
> Mon printemps ne sent pas vos adorations."[2]

Let us go still further, gentlemen; nature is immoral, thoroughly immoral, I may say immoral to such a degree that everything moral is, in a sense, and especially in its origin, in its first principle, only a reaction against the lessons or counsels that nature gives us.[3] *Vitium hominis, natura pecus*, I believe St. Augustine has said; there is no vice of which nature does not give us the example, nor any virtue from which she does not dissuade us. This is the empire of brute force and unchained instincts, neither moderation nor shame, neither pity nor compassion, neither charity nor justice; all species are armed against one another, *in muua funera;* all passions aroused, every individual ready to oppose every other—that is the spectacle that nature offers us; and if we imitate it, who does not see and who does

[1] "But nature is ever there, inviting thee and loving thee; plunge into her bosom, ever open for thee."

[2] "They call me a mother, and I am a tomb; my winter takes your dead as its hecatomb; my spring does not listen to your worships."

[3] I have tried to show this in a brochure, "La Moralité de la Doctrine Evolutive"

not understand what humanity would become in so doing? Plunge us into nature! Why, gentlemen, if we were not careful, that would be to plunge us into animality; and that is what has not been understood by certain who are inviting us to take "nature" only for a guide in all things—that they were inviting us to go back again over the very steps of history and civilization. We have become men, and can become more so each day only by detaching ourselves from nature, and by trying to institute in the midst of it "an Empire within an Empire."

Shall I add to this that it is not always true? That is what I ought to do if I keep myself narrowly within the bounds of my subject. Nature has its failures, it has its exceptions, it has its monstrosities. If we are to attach a precise meaning to the words, which will make us understand, it is not "natural" to be blind or a hunchback; and that is what so many artists readily forget. They also forget that

"Some thoughts may be too strong to be believed."

We see examples of it every day. Every day there happens the reality that resembles a fiction, and, on the other hand, the fiction that one would take for a reality. It is even a commonplace with novelists to say that they invent nothing that reality does not surpass. . . . But all these considerations are purely æsthetic, and to-day I am interested in the relations between morality and art.

Now you see that they are of such a nature that, as we have just now seen, immorality may be engendered in the very seduction of the form; so in the same way it is always to be feared lest it may also result from a too faithful imitation. Examples of this are innumerable in the history of painting, and especially of literature. But, as I should compromise myself if I here invoked the memory of the "Tales" of La Fontaine, or of his "Fables," it is the author of "Andromaque" and of "Bajazet" that I shall ask to offer me his repentance. For, indeed, when this great man, in the maturity of life and genius, not yet having reached forty—that is, the age at which Molière had just begun to write[1]—abandoned the stage, what sentiments do you think

[1] Racine, born 1639, renounced the stage, 1677. Molière, born 1622, presented the "Précieuses Ridicules," 1659.

dictated his conduct? He was afraid of himself, afraid of the truth of the paintings he had made; of the terrible fidelity with which he had rendered what is most natural in the passions; of the justification that he had found for their excess in their conformity to instinct; and that is why from that moment his life was nothing but one long expiation for the errors of his genius. Let us regret it if we will! But let us not have minds so narrow as to be astonished at it; nor especially to blame the poet for it; and let us consider that at this very moment there is an example of this very thing in him who was in his hour the illustrious novelist of "War and Peace," and of "Anna Karenina." You will find the proof of this in the work "What is Art?" in which he wages the same warfare as I do to-day—and if this endeavor appears only ordinary in a critic, or in a historian of ideas, so much the worse for those who did not understand how heroic it is in a novelist.

In that work he brings to light a final cause of that immorality which we can look upon as inherent in the very principle of art. I mean a condition which seems to be imposed on the artist, and which consists, in order to assure his originality, not precisely in his cutting himself off from the society of other men, and shutting himself in his "ivory tower," but in his distinguishing himself from the crowd. La Bruyère has excellently said, "If we always listened to criticism there is not a work that would not be completely founded on it"; and he was right. Painter, poet, sculptor, or musician, if the originality of the artist is to feel, by the same things, sensations different from other men, it would seem that one of his cares should be not to let them in any way become "banal," and consequently it would seem that this right of separation from the crowd cannot be denied him. But to what dangers at all times, and especially at a time like ours, does not the application of this principle lead?

By it, humanity is divided into two kinds of men: "Artists," who make art, and the "Philistines," the "Bourgeois," who do not make it, or who do not understand it as the "artists" do, or who do not like the same art as they. In this connection, recall Flaubert in his "Correspondence," or the Goncourts in

their "Journal." It has been said, and I hasten to subscribe to it, "What love, what passion, what religion for their art!" And, in truth, that is admirable! But also what ignorance, what thoughtlessness for all that is not art and their art; what scorn of their contemporaries, of the "Messrs. Dumas, Augier, Feuillet," of all the novels that are not "Madame Bovary," of all the comedies that are not "Henriette Maréchal"! Evidently all of us—we who believe that there may be something else in life than art—in their eyes we are all only simple Bouvards or frightful Peceuchets. We are the crowd, and the crowd is always to be despised.

"I believe that the crowd, the flock, will always be fateful. In so far as the people do not bow before the mandarins, in so far as the Academy of Sciences will not take the place of the Pope, society to its very roots will be only a lot of sickenin ghumbugs."

I do not stop over the strangeness of the phrase—which would be worthy of a place on the wall of the editor's office—but you see the sentiment! I do not even reply that if it is by works that we must ultimately test doctrines, we can conceive of a more useful employment in life than writing "Paradise Artificiel," "Tentations de Saint-Antoine," "Faustin," and "Fille Elsa." But I ask you, gentlemen, whether the consequence of the doctrine is not to make art consist in what is most inhuman and most foreign to our occupations, our cares, our anxieties!

Not that for this reason the authors repel praises or admiration. "Money is always good," said an Emperor; and our "Artists" think that from whatever hand it may come, admiration is always good to take and to retain if possible. Only, if, in the midst of these praises, any misunderstanding arises between the artist and the public, it is always the public that is in the wrong; and let us render this justice to the artists; they think it a matter of honor to aggravate the misunderstanding. Ah, but we are reproached for our harshness of manner! Well, we will be still more harsh, and we will elevate our very lack of feeling into a principle of art. Ah, but we are told that they claim from us emotion and feeling! Well, then we will take shelter in our indifference and coldness! What

do we care for the miseries of humanity! "The crowd is always hateful!" We are the mandarins, before whom you must bow! To others the business of justice and charity! As for us, we are busy with art; that is, we are pounding colors and we are cadencing phrases. We are noting sensations, and we are producing artificial ones to note! We are doing "artistic writing," and if we are not admired it is so much the worse for our contemporaries! But it is all the better for us, for he who does not understand us judges himself; and the incomprehensibility of our invention is simply a proof of our superiority. It pleases us to be misunderstood.

Thus it is that people bury themselves in a proud self-satisfaction; and that would not matter if it did not entail the monopolizing of the attention by a coterie! But what I hate about these paradoxes—and without taking into account the fact that they do nothing less than cut art off from its communications with life—is that they are eminently and insolently aristocratic. A little indulgence, O great artists, and permit us to be men! Yes, permit us to believe that there is something else in the world as important as pounding colors or cadencing phrases! Do not imagine that we are made for you, and that for six thousand years humanity has travailed, has labored, has suffered, only to establish your mandarinate. We could do without you much more easily than without many other things! And you yourselves, after all, how, on what, in what conditions would you live if the incessant toil of these Bouvards, whom you despise, and of these Pecuchets, for whom you have nothing but ironies sufficiently cruel, did not assure you the security of your leisure, the peace of your meditations, a public to admire you, and, I may even say, your daily bread?

III

Whither does this discourse tend, ladies and gentlemen, and what are the conclusions I wish to draw from it? That art, as has been said of love, is mixed, especially in our time, "with a host of things with which it has no more to do than the Doge has with what is done in Venice." Of course, and, for that matter, nothing need hinder a picture dealer or a book pub-

lisher from being a true "artist." That has been seen more than once in history. The studio of more than one great painter in Italy or in Flanders has often been nothing more than a manufactory of cartoons or of canvases, and two of the rare surviving works of our eighteenth century, "Manon Lescaut" and "Gil Blas," were, as was then said, made for the publisher. No, it is not the love of lucre that is the worst enemy of art.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not mean, either, that the artist or the writer ought to metamorphose themselves into moral preachers. There are sermonizers and moralists for that, whose purpose or trade it is. Whatever admiration I have for Richardson, that is what prevents me from speaking of "Clarissa Harlowe" with the declamatory enthusiasm of Diderot, and still more from daring to place his "Pamela" or his "Grandison" so high in the history of art as you have seen that Taine has placed them. We must try not to confuse anything!

But, as I have tried to show you, if every form of art, so far as it is a pleasure of the senses, and in so far as it is an imitation and consequently an apology for nature, and, again, in so far as it develops in the artist this ferment of egotism which is a part of his individuality—if every form of art, when thus left to itself, runs the inevitable risk of "demoralizing" or of "dehumanizing" a soul, then we must premise, in the first place, that art has not all the liberties. "Stop, my child," said Montesquieu to his daughter, whom he found reading the "Persian Letters," "stop; that is a book of my youth that is not made for yours"; and I have told you that in my opinion it was not to become a convert that Racine abandoned the theatre, but that he believed he ought to become a convert because he had written plays, or rather because he was the creator of his plays, the father of Hermione, of Roxane, and of Phèdre. As for the aged Corneille, he did not feel the need of becoming a convert. Why so? For a very simple and sufficiently evident reason! Because in his old age, as in the morning of his glory, he was convinced that Rodrigue had done right in avenging Don Diègue's honor; that Horace was excusable for having hurled in Camille's teeth the curses she spewed forth against Rome; that Polyeucte was to be praised for having overthrown the idols,

and for having preferred the conversion of Paulina to the tranquillity of their amours. He did not become a convert, because he believed that he never excited other than generous and noble passions, even if he thought more than once of depicting base or sanguinary ones. He did not become a convert, because, as Taine told you just now, he believed that he, "whose hand had sketched the soul of the great Pompey," worked only for the exaltation of the "Will"; and of all the human faculties, will, real will, is at once the rarest of things, and the thing of which men have always thought the most, first, because it is the rarest, and then because it is the real cause of personal and social progress.

This is the same thing as saying, in the second place, that if the end of art is not to move the passions or to tickle the senses, neither can it be complete, and narrow itself in any way within itself. There are several ways of interpreting the theory of "art for art's sake," and on this point, as on all, it is only a matter of coming to an agreement; and unfortunately that is most frequently what people do not want to do. But if the theory of "art for art's sake" consists in seeing in art only art itself, I know of nothing more false, and I have tried to tell you why. Art has its object and its end outside of and beyond itself; and if that object is not exactly moral, it is social, which, for that matter, is the same thing. Whether we are painters or poets, we are not allowed to forget that we are men; and in return for the society of men we must give the means of propaganda or of action, which we hold from them alone. Do you remember in this connection, or do you know, that page of Alexandre Dumas? I say "do you know"; for you will not find it in all the editions of his plays, but only in that which is called the "Edition des Comédiens":

"What has made the dramatic poets great, what has most ennobled the stage, are the subjects which at first sight seemed absolutely incompatible with the habits of the stage or of the public. Thus we cannot be told, 'Stop here or there.' All that is man and woman belongs to us, not only in the relations of these two creatures between themselves by the sentiments and the passions, but in their isolated or collective relations

with all kinds of occurrences, of customs, of ideas, of powers, of social, moral, political, and religious laws, which, in turn, produce their action on them."

That, certainly, might be better said; and I sometimes fear, gentlemen, that, one or two pieces aside, imperfection of form will draw the drama of Alexandre Dumas into oblivion; but you understand sufficiently well what he means, and I assent to it entirely. Art has a social function, and its true morality is the conscientiousness with which it discharges this function.

You will tell me that this formula is vague, and I acknowledge it. If it were not vague, if it had the precision of a geometrical formula or of a medical prescription (are medical prescriptions so very precise?) we should no longer be dealing with art, or criticism, or history, but with science. Let us leave the learned in their laboratories, and let us not imagine that we can find the secret of genius or moral law in the bottom of a retort. But for that, ladies and gentlemen, you must give me your attention for a moment longer.

There is scarcely any doctrine more widely diffused among us than that of "the relativity of knowledge." But what exactly does it mean? That is what many people do not seem to know who none the less profess belief in it; and you see how it can be reclothed with meaning.

To say that everything is relative may mean that nothing is false and nothing is true, but everything is possible; everything therefore is probable; and each of us becomes "the measure of all things," as the ancient sophist taught; all opinions have worth, and the only difference between them is the manner of expressing them. I do not pause, gentlemen, over this interpretation.

But in the second place, to say that everything is relative may mean that everything depends, not only for each of us individually, but for man in general, the species, on the constitution of its organs, and that, if we had our cranium made otherwise, or if we had six senses, for example, in place of five, or four dimensions in place of three, the universe would appear to us under an aspect entirely different from that which we know. Bodies would be revealed to us by other qualities; we

should perceive in them what we do not now perceive, unknown forms and nameless colors. It is very possible and I readily believe it! But I know nothing about it, nor does any one else; and besides it does not matter. If in another planet bodies have *n* plus 1 dimensions instead of three, how can that affect us as long as we know nothing about it, and when there are only three on this earth? What does it matter to us that the color of the flower or the taste of the fruit is in our eye, or in our palate, provided that the rose is always red and the orange is always scented? Do you feel yourselves humiliated or chagrined by it?

But there is a third way of understanding the relativity of knowledge, and the best, which is—as Pascal said, and also both Comte and Kant—that "all things being causes and caused, aiding and aided," a thing can be exactly defined only by its relations to another thing. Each of you is seated in his place in this room. But how can I give an idea of it to any one outside? That will be done only in beginning by describing the arrangement of the room, of the seats, my situation, the left chair, the right chair, that at the back, that at the front, and ten, twenty, other details. In other words, every object is relative to an infinity of others with which it stands in relations more or less constant, and moreover, according to their nature, more or less complex to determine. Or, again, and in general philosophical terms if you wish, everything is entangled in a system of relations from which its character results; and that is what Pascal meant when he added to the other part of the phrase which I have just recalled to you: "I hold it impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole, as it is to know the whole without knowing the parts." If we knew only Racine's "Thébaide," just think what a strange idea we should have of his genius; and how badly we should know it if we did not know who preceded and followed him! A certain knowledge of the "Cid" and of "Polyeucte" thus forms a part of the very definition of "Andromaque" or of "Phèdre," and that definition, in turn, needs to be completed by some knowledge of "Zaïre" and of "Mérope." We know Racine truly only when we know him in his relation to Voltaire and Corneille, and all

these in their relation to Shakespeare or to Euripides, and all in relation to a certain idea of tragedy, which still other relations determine.

If we put ourselves at this point of view, we perceive, gentlemen, that the definition of art is thus relative to the definition of other social functions, to which it holds, or ought to hold, determinate relations; or if you prefer, it appears that, like religion, like science, like tradition, art is a force, the use of which cannot be regulated by itself and by itself alone. These forces must be balanced among themselves in a well-ordered society; and none among them can establish its absolute domination over the others without harm, and sometimes disaster, resulting therefrom. If it is religion that gains the day and subordinates tradition, science, and art, the history of the Papacy of the middle ages is there to tell us of the grandeurs, but also of the dangers of theocracy. If it is tradition, custom, superstitious respect for the past, which make themselves masters of consciences, and consequently of actions, it seems to me—I dare not say more—but it seems to me that the example of China emerges from the shade at this moment to teach us, with its advantages of stability, the dangers of immobility. If art in its turn seizes the entire life, in order to govern it, it may indeed flatter the imagination of some dilettantes; but we have looked closely at this matter just now, and the Italy of the Renaissance, to which I can add the Greece of the decadence, is there to prove to us that the danger is not any less. I would say freely it is greater still, or as great, when we give over, as has been tried in our days, to positive and experimental science the work of directing or ordering existence. On the contrary, gentlemen, the great epochs of history are precisely those in which these forces have been placed in equilibrium—and such have been, in France chiefly—the great years of the seventeenth century, or the early years of our own.

Does the realization of that equilibrium depend on the will of men? And are we able at every moment of the period to prevent one of the forces from advancing in excess of the other? For my part, gentlemen, I believe we can. I believe that, if we wish, we can maintain the authority of tradition against the

craze of novelty. I believe that it depends only on ourselves to prevent even religion from encroaching on the liberty of scientific research. I believe that we can stem, check, prevent science from overstepping the limits of its own domain. And I also believe that—just as science is characterized by a sort of moral indifferentism,[1] so art, as I have tried to show you, is characterized on its part by an unconscious tendency to immorality—we can, if we will, annul these effects, not only without harming it, but in directing it to its proper object. But will would be needed; and unhappily we live in a time when—to give meaning to an old distinction that might be thought very subtle and very vain and which profound philosophers have denied—the failure, or rather the enfeeblement, of the will has perhaps no equal except in the increasing intensity of the desires.

[1] See the brochures: "Science et Religion," "Education et Instruction," and "La Moralité de la Doctrine Evolutive."

XVII

WOMAN

"MARRIAGE CUSTOMS AND THEIR MORAL VALUE"

BY

ELIZABETH S. DIACK

AND

WILLIAM LILLY

SECRETARY OF THE CATHOLIC UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN

CLOSE allied to the question of morality in general, comes the question of woman in her relation to life and to man. We face the narrower problem first, her relation to the man. For historic information our readiest appeal is to the well-known English authoress upon the subject, Elizabeth Stitchell Diack. She outlines for us "the woman of the past" as her confrère, Mr. Robinson, has outlined the man. Aiming then to carry our study up to the present day, we present briefly the thought of Mr. Lilly. The Hon. William S. Lilly, M.A., J.P., is a Roman Catholic; in fact his long service as secretary to the Catholic Union of Great Britain, a post which he has held since 1874, enables him in some sort to speak officially for the Catholics of England, as Cardinal Gibbons has already spoken to us for those of America. Moreover, it is well that on this serious question of marriage we should listen to the views of the Catholic body among our contemporaries.

Matrimony, once apparently the most firmly established and settled of human institutions, begins in these inquisitive and skeptic days to find itself no longer unquestioned. Its security is assailed; its wisdom is doubted; nay, its very morality is held open to dispute. Trial marriages and "ten-year periods" are discussed with an openness that a single decade ago would have been impossible.

Under these circumstances the Catholic Church should have a hearing; for it is an established fact that during many centuries that church has been the most emphatic and insistent of the opponents of divorce. In reading Mr. Lilly's presentation of the moral aspects of the question, it were well also to turn back (address IX) and note how these are reinforced by Mr. Wallace's analysis of the same subject from its scientific side.

Among the primitive nations of the world woman was commonly regarded as a chattel or slave—a creature existing and originally created merely to minister to the wants of man. The Egyptians alone treated her with respect and consideration.

In Ancient Egypt monogamy was practised, although it was not enjoined by law. There is no evidence of the existence of a marriage ceremony, but the marriage contract secured to the wife certain rights, one of which was that of complete control over her husband, who promised to yield her implicit obedience! Nearness of relationship was no barrier to wedlock, the union of brother with sister being quite common.

Women, both married and unmarried, participated with the men in all the pleasures of social intercourse. They took part in the public festivals, shared in banquets, drove out in their chariots, and made pleasure excursions on the Nile. At banquets the guests were entertained chiefly with music and dancing. Singing was also an esteemed accomplishment, and the more solid part of their education must have been attended to, as women often held important offices in the priesthood. They presided at birth and officiated as mourners at death and burial.

Ladies of rank occupied their spare moments in embroidery and in the cultivation of flowers, of which they were passionately fond, and which were lavishly used on all festive occasions. Women of the humbler classes were employed in spinning, and in the rural districts in tending cattle and sheep, and in carrying water—the heavier employments being left to the men.

This halcyon state of affairs lasted only during the days of Egypt's greatness; during the period of her decline her daughters were fearfully downtrodden and degraded. The hardest manual labor was assigned to them, and they suffered cruel punishments for the crimes of their fathers, husbands, or brothers,

as the case might be. Sometimes they were publicly beaten with sticks, at others thrown into dungeons or sent to work at the mines, where the miseries they endured were so great that, as the old historian tells us, they longed for death as far preferable to life.

In Babylonia, and also in Persia, woman was a mere chattel of man. She had no rights, and was supposed to have no feelings. Assyrian maidens had no voice in the disposal of themselves in marriage. Those of marriageable age were once a year collected and brought together into one place, there to be sold to the highest bidders. The most beautiful were offered for sale first, and these were eagerly competed for by the wealthy men of the community desirous of marrying. With the money obtained for the beauties, the plain and deformed ones were dowered, so that they, too, might obtain husbands, they being given to the men who offered to take the smallest sums. Each purchaser was obliged to give security for the due fulfilment of the marriage contract—marriage being a condition of purchase—and for the public acknowledgment of his newly acquired wife. If a pair found on coming together that they could not live amicably the husband could return his purchase and receive back his money, but the wife who repudiated her husband was condemned to be drowned. Womanly purity was discountenanced by the Babylonians, and woman's life was held in light esteem. During a period of revolt thousands of women were massacred by their own nearest relatives, merely to save the provisions which otherwise they would have required.

In Ancient Greece the position of woman varied in the different eras and in the different states. In the renowned State of Sparta women were regarded as instruments for the production of strong, robust citizens for the State, and great care was taken that they should be well developed physically. They were from their earliest youth allowed the utmost liberty, and were exercised in running, wrestling, and boxing, accomplishments which they displayed in the public games at the theatre. Scantily clad, so as to allow perfect freedom of motion, and crowned with flowers, they also took part in the religious ceremonies, and sang and danced at the national festivals. On ordinary, as on festive occasions, the dress of the Spartan

women was of the simplest description. A woollen robe loose at one side, and fastening with clasps over the shoulder, was the attire of maidens, while married women wore also an upper garment and a veil. The wearing of embroidery, gold, and precious stones was restricted to prostitutes.

When they married, which, according to Plutarch, was not till they had arrived at maturity, they were always well dowered. We are told by the same writer that the Spartan bride was dressed "in man's clothes," and had her hair "cut close to the skin." Her troth was plighted, not to her husband, but to the State, and patriotism seems to have been a leading sentiment in her bosom. For some time after her marriage the wife continued to reside with her parents, seeing her husband but occasionally, by stealth, and disguised in masculine apparel. Specially beautiful women were allowed to have several husbands, and so lightly was the marriage tie regarded that a man could, if he chose, give away his wife without any legal process whatever. Indeed, it was considered rather a meritorious action for him to do so. Heiresses were at the disposal of the king, who, without consulting either themselves or their parents, bestowed them upon the poorest citizens, that the wealth of the nation might be equally distributed among all classes.

During the frequent absences of their warlike lords the Spartan women had entire control of their households and their affairs. So much power did they enjoy in comparison with other women of the time, that a foreign lady on one occasion said to Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas, "You of Lacedæmon are the only women in the world that rule the men," whereat the Spartan quickly retorted, "We are the only women that bring forth men."

In other parts of Greece women led lives of strict seclusion. They seem to have scarcely been allowed to leave their own apartments, which were always situated in the back, and commonly in the upper part of the house, so as to insure the utmost privacy. Young girls had to ask permission to go from one part of the house to another, and the reputation of a newly married woman was in danger if she were seen out of doors. When she became a mother she enjoyed a little more freedom,

though only during her husband's pleasure, for those of a jealous temperament kept their wives in close confinement. By the laws of Solon women were prohibited from leaving home with more than three changes of clothing and a certain allowance of provisions, or a basket of more than a cubit's length. Neither were they permitted to appear in the streets at night, save in a chariot and preceded by torch-bearers. It is said that those strict laws were framed in order to check the depravity of the daughters of Athens, but it was not only to the peregrinations of women that the laws of the great Athenian extended, but to all the details of daily life, including even eating and drinking.

The ordinary employments of women, apart from their domestic duties, were spinning, weaving, embroidery, and other kinds of needlework. Instruction in these mechanical arts seems to have been all the education they received—all that was considered necessary or fitting for them. "She is the best woman," says Thucydides, "of whom least is said either of good or evil."

An orphan heiress was compelled by law to marry her next-of-kin, in order to keep the property in the family. When, however, she had married prior to the death of her father, she could, at his decease, be taken from her husband and given to her relative along with her estate, the bond of wedlock, as in Sparta, being somewhat loosely regarded and quite easily dissolved.

As in Sparta, too, a man could give away his wife either for a time, or permanently, as he desired. It was by no means the most depraved or the meanest of mankind who exercised this strange privilege, Socrates and Pericles being among the number.

During the golden age of Athens, when the ashes of her illustrious law-giver had long been at rest in his native isle (for Solon was an Athenian but by adoption), the daughters of the classic city enjoyed more freedom than they had done in earlier days. Husbands when they went from home often took their wives along with them, but from a moral point of view it was not always the best of society into which they were thus introduced. The house of the celebrated Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, was a favorite resort of even the wisest and highest

cultured of the citizens of Athens. This remarkable woman was noted, not only for her beauty, but for her talents, and for the elevation to which she had attained in learning. The unfortunate class to which she belonged was then the only class of women in Athens that enjoyed freedom and culture. Whether from a desire to heighten their charms by means of a knowledge of "divine philosophy," or from a genuine love of learning, many of them frequented the schools and the company of philosophers and studied mathematics and other sciences. Their personal beauty often made them the chosen models of painters and sculptors, and the themes of licentious poets, and, as we have already said, Aspasia, who was at their head, wielded such a powerful influence over even their best and wisest men that they resorted to her house as to a lecture-room, accompanied by their wives. They evidently wished the latter to profit by the learned and brilliant conversation of the gifted courtesan, who at least had taught them that the life of ignorance and seclusion to which they doomed their women was that which was least calculated to develop their mental powers and render them congenial companions. The corrupt condition of society, however, may be inferred from the fact that such women occupied a prominent, almost a leading, position in it, and, indeed, at this period, the golden age of Grecian art and literature, learning, luxury, and vice were equally dominant in "the eyes and light of Greece," as her panegyrists called Athens.

"In the brave days of old" the Roman patriarch could, with the sanction of the law, throw his daughter into a dungeon, deprive her of food, lash her with the scourge, sell her as a slave, or slay her with the sword. When she married, her husband assumed over her the same power. She could, like the Grecian woman, inherit either the whole or a part of her father's estate; but whatever property she possessed, or whatever right of inheritance, was at marriage passed over to her husband. She could be divorced for drinking wine, or even for having in her possession the keys of any place in which it was kept. A wife could, however, be divorced almost at pleasure, provided that her dowry was returned along with her. For a considerable period a woman was forbidden by law to wear a garment of various colors, to have personal ornaments weighing more than

half an ounce of gold, and to drive in a chariot within a mile of the city. In those early days the women were employed in cooking, spinning, weaving, and sewing.

When the Romans became rich in the usual way, by plundering their neighbors, the laws relative to woman's dress and recreation were repealed; the domestic duties were relegated to slaves, and the Roman matron blossomed into a lady of fashion.

There were "blue-stockings" as well as "belles," however, among the ladies of ancient Rome. The speech of Hortensia against the unjust taxation of women, delivered before the three assassins who governed Rome during the second triumvirate, is mentioned admiringly by Cicero, and her courage must have been as great as her eloquence, since no man could be found to undertake the perilous task. In another of Italia's cities it is evident that the "new woman" was in existence at a very early date. One of the inscriptions found among the ruins of Pompeii shows that women were put forward by women as candidates for seats on the board of magistrates, but whether successful or not in gaining the coveted office is not recorded. Honored, however, above all other women were the vestals, to whose care were committed the sacred relics upon which the safety of the city was supposed to depend. Often they were the custodians of wills and other important documents, and enjoyed many privileges denied to ordinary mortals.

The usual accomplishments of the Roman maiden were music and dancing. During the Empire, however, ladies were skilled in fencing, boxing, and wrestling, and often appeared in the amphitheatre as competitors for the prize. They appeared there more frequently, however, as spectators of the bloody gladiatorial combats in which unfortunate slaves, unhappy captives, or not less unhappy criminals were butchered to make a Roman holiday. Cruelty, gluttony, and even drunkenness had become prominent traits in the character of the Roman lady of those latter days, and those ugly vices are apt to obscure the virtues of the simple matrons, the pure-minded Lucretias of early Rome.

Among the ancient Germanic tribes women were regarded with peculiar reverence, and were commonly treated as the

equals, sometimes as the superiors, of men. They were believed to be recipients of messages from the gods, and, like the rhapsodists of Greece, they were the repositories of the unwritten history of the race, the reciters of the poems in which were commemorated the stories of the tribal heroes. The "wise women," who were carefully set apart from the rest, were believed to be endowed with the power of lifting the veil of the future and learning the decrees of fate, and so were often consulted as oracles. Others were supposed to be gifted with supernatural powers, because of their allegiance to malignant divinities. The daughters of kings and princes were often priestesses, but what were their official duties it is difficult to say. We are told by Tacitus that the priests settled disputes, awarded and inflicted punishments, and attended the armies to battle.

Both sexes were remarkable for their conjugal fidelity, monogamy being practised except in the case of royalty, the possession of more than one wife being a purely regal privilege. The marriage ceremony in those primitive times was exceedingly simple, consisting chiefly of the interchange of presents in the presence of the friends assembled for the feast. Says Tacitus, "To the husband the wife gives no dowry, but the husband to the wife." The present of the bride, he continues, "consisted of oxen, horses, and arms to intimate to her that she was to share in the toils and dangers of her husband as well as in his pleasures." This it was customary for her to do, for the wife of the ancient German was her husband's companion and counsellor in time of peace and his comrade in time of war.

Of the male sex, he says, "those who are bravest and most warlike among them never do any work or mind any business, but, when they are not engaged in war or hunting, spend their whole time in loitering and feasting, committing the management of their houses, lands, and all their affairs to their women, old men, and children." This custom, which to the Roman seemed so strange and so contemptible, was doubtless but a relic of the earlier mother age, when woman was not the dependent of, but the teacher and ruler of, man. Students of German mythology claim that from woman proceeded agriculture, medicine, tradition, and family life—from man, warfare

and hunting. Long before the father had become a member of the family group, the mother reigned supreme in the den, teaching to her children the knowledge she had acquired in her efforts to provide for herself and offspring. For a long period such property as there was descended through the mother, and the management of the houses, lands, and all the affairs pertaining to them was in all likelihood due, not to the indolence of the men, but to the fact that woman had not entirely given place to man as head of the household.

The social customs which prevailed among the ancient Britons were in many respects similar to those of Germany. Both Germans and Britons lived in the semi-promiscuous fashion which seems to have led the Romans to form such a low estimate of their morals. Their houses consisted of but one apartment, which was shared by men, women, and children, who during the night rested on one continuous bed of rushes. This mode of life must have seemed exceedingly barbarous to the civilized, luxurious Romans, but that the wives of the Britons were held in common, as is stated by Julius Cæsar, is, we consider, extremely doubtful. The treatment of Cartismandna, the adulterous queen of the Brigantes, whom her indignant subjects obliged to vacate the throne in favor of her injured husband, tends to induce the belief that they did not so lightly look upon the marriage bond, and that monogamy was practised by all classes of society. In Wales, however, wedlock was by no means indissoluble. There a man could divorce his wife upon very slight pretext, and a wife could separate from her husband for such a slight cause as a disagreeable breath. By the laws of Hoel Dda, who was a prince of that country in the tenth century, a man was allowed to give his wife three blows with a stick upon any part of the body except the head if she committed adultery, if she squandered his means, if she pulled his beard, or "called him opprobrious names," but if the beating were more severe or for any more trifling reason, he was fined.

It is difficult to determine what was the exact status of woman in every part of Britain in that olden time. By the law of regal succession a British king was succeeded by his daughter or by his widow, if he left no son. It was in this way that the famous Boadicea became Queen of the Iceni.

In the ordinary ranks of life a man's property was at his death divided equally among his sons. What share was apportioned to his daughters is not quite clear. Among the Saxons on the Continent it was customary for the daughters to receive a smaller share than their brothers. In like manner the laws of Wales in the tenth century decreed that a daughter receive but half as much as falls to her brother of their father's inheritance. There is, however, a law of King Canute from which it appears that sons and daughters were made equal, as they may have been in even earlier times.

Although the British woman was in many cases legally recognized as the equal of man, she was by no means considered fit to be her own guardian, but during her whole life was in the care of one of the opposite sex. While unmarried she was, of course, under the control of her father. At his death her brother took his place, or, if she had none, her nearest male relative. The women who had no relations fell to the guardianship of the king. A married woman was under the legal control of her husband, provided that she had been married with the consent of her previous guardian, whose authority could not be taken from him without his consent. His compliance was usually gained by means of ample presents, sometimes so ample that it became necessary to pass a law fixing the amount for people of all ranks. The value of the presents varied not only according to the rank, but according to the condition of the woman, only half as much being paid in the case of a widow as was paid for a maiden of the same rank. The man who married without the consent of his bride's guardian had no legal authority over his wife nor any of her possessions, and had to suffer various severe penalties for his crime (*mundbreach*), for such it was reckoned.

Marriage was celebrated with a great deal of festivity, although the ceremony was, like that of the Germans, of the simplest description. Among the guests were included all relatives within the third degree. Each guest was expected to give a present to the bride and bridegroom, and the latter also received a present from the guardian of the bride. This "faderfium" was all the dowry which the husband received with his wife. On the morning after the marriage the bridegroom had

to retaliate by presenting a valuable gift to his wife. This "morgaengife" (morning gift) became her own separate property, to which she had exclusive right.

The ancient British woman appears to have been as fond of dress as were her Continental sisters, the women of Gaul. Boadicea is described by Dio as wearing a short tunic of thick woollen cloth, over which was a long mantle reaching nearly to the ground. Massive gold ornaments were worn by both sexes, the gold chains of Caractacus and of Boadicea being thought worthy of special mention by the Roman historians. Luxuriant tresses were also esteemed "a thing of beauty," and the golden hair of the ill-fated Queen of the Iceni is said to have floated far down over her armor when engaged in battle. Indeed, it is evident, from all that we can learn of the women of the remote past, that they did not differ so widely from the women of the present day as the lapse of time would lead us to expect, and that, apart from outward circumstances, they were women "in all things like as we are."

MARRIAGE AND MODERN CIVILIZATION

BY

W. S. LILLY

"A person is a man endowed with a civil status" (*civili statu præditus*) was the definition of Latin jurisprudence. And this was the conception of personality which Christianity found in the Roman Empire, and transformed. Far other was its teaching as to personality. Christianity revealed human nature to itself, exhibiting man as self-conscious, self-determined, morally responsible; as by his very nature invested with rights inalienable and imprescriptible, and encompassed with correlative duties; as lord of himself in the sacred domain of conscience, and accountable there only to Him whose perpetual witness conscience is. This was, in fact, a new principle of individuality. The individual of the later Roman jurisprudence was the citizen, just as the individual among the Germanic invaders of the decadent Empire was the member of the tribe. Slaves were regarded as mere things. Christianity vindicated the moral and spiritual freedom of men as men, proclaimed their universal brotherhood, and insisted that before their Creator and Judge, rich and poor, bond and free, meet together in the essential equivalence of human personality. Victor Hugo's picturesque saying is literally true—truer even than he realized: "The first Tree of Liberty was that Cross on which Jesus Christ offered Himself in sacrifice for the liberty, equality, and fraternity of mankind."

So much as to the root idea of modern civilization: the idea of differentiating it from all other civilizations: the idea of human personality. "*Tu homo, tantum nomen si te scias*" ("How great, O man, is the name thou bearest, if thou only knewest!") said St. Augustine. But by this revelation of the dignity of human nature—I might say the sanctity, *homo res sacra homini*—the weaker half of humanity benefited far more than the stronger half. The proclamation of the spiritual equality of woman with man in the new order—"In Jesus

Christ there is neither male nor female"—notwithstanding her natural subjection to him economically, brought about what may well appear the most wonderful part of the great change due to the influence of Christianity. The estate of woman in the Roman Empire has been pithily expressed by one of the most recent, and not the least authoritative, of its historians. "She was degraded in her social condition," writes Merivale, "because she was deemed unworthy of moral consideration; and her moral consideration, again, sank lower and lower precisely because her social condition was so degraded." Among the Jews—and we must never forget that Christianity first came before the world as a Jewish sect—her place was no higher; indeed it was lower. Divorce was practised by the Hebrews to an extent unknown even in the lowest decadence of imperial Rome. The text in Deuteronomy authorizing a man to put away his wife if he found in her some blemish (*aliquam fœditatem*, as the Vulgate has it) was interpreted most liberally by the Rabbis. Any cause of offence was sufficient, according to Hillel: for example, if a woman let the broth burn; and Akiva lays it down that a man might give his wife a bill of divorcement if he could find a better-looking spouse. Polygamy, too, was at the least tolerated, if it was not largely practised; indeed, it still survives among the Jews of the East, and did not disappear among those dwelling in the West until the prohibitory law of Rabbi Gershom ben Jehudah was passed in the Synod of Worms (A.D. 1020).

But Christianity did more than merely vindicate the personality of woman. It protected her personality by what a learned writer has well called "the new creation of marriage." There are few things in history more astonishing—we may say, in the strictest sense, miraculous—than the fact, for fact it is, that a few words spoken in Syria two thousand years ago by a Jewish peasant, "despised and rejected of men," brought about this vast change, which has wrought so much to purify and ennoble modern civilization; surely an emphatic testimony to the truth of the Evangelist's assertion: "He knew what was in man." De Wette remarks, with his usual judiciousness. "Christ grounds wedlock on the original interdependence (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of the two sexes, established by God,

and lays it down that, as one cannot exist without the other, the inseparability of their union should follow. This union is, indeed, the work of man; but it takes place, and ever should take place, through an inner tendency (*Drang*), proceeding from the original interdependence of the sexes, through *love*. The separation, on the other hand, . . . [of those who thus come together] takes place through human arbitrariness (*Willkür*), or through lusts and passions which unfairly or inconsistently annul what was ordained in conformity with the original law of Nature" ("was dem ursprünglichen Naturgesetze gemäss gestiftet war").

This is the Magna Charta of woman in modern civilization: this lifelong union of two equal personalities; this gift of one woman to one man as *adjutorium simile sibi*, a help like unto him—"not like to like, but like to difference"; a union, a gift, consecrated by religion and made holy matrimony. But I may observe in passing, Christianity did even more than this to secure the position of feminine humanity in that new order of society which it was to mould. Soon—how soon the Catacombs bear witness—the type of womanhood idealized in the Virgin Mother assumed a prominent place in the devotions of the faithful; and as this idea germinated in the Christian consciousness, Mary received a worship inferior only to that offered to her Son. The conception presented by the Madonna would have been foolishness to the antique Greeks, and Romans too. It was a stumbling-block to the Jews, contemptuous of the daughters of her who figures so poorly in the account received by them "of man's first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree." The Christian Church, from the earliest times, delighted to think of Mary as the second Eve, who had undone the work of the first, and had brought life instead of death into the world, *mutans Evæ nomen;* changing the name of the temptress into the "Ave" of the angelic salutation. And when a thousand years had passed away, and chivalry arose, the "all but adoring love" of Christians for her, powerfully stimulated the quasi-religious veneration paid in the Middle Ages to the graces of feminine nature, a veneration which, striking a note before unheard in the world, has inspired the highest poetry of modern civilization. Such was the influence exercised on the

place of her sex in the new order of society by "the Mother of fair love, and fear, and knowledge, and holy hope." "Born of a woman" is the true account of the modern home, with its refined and elevating influences. That is the characteristic specially marking off the Christian family from the other families of the earth. It is founded on woman, not on man.

We must, however, remember that the conception of matrimony, which was so powerfully to affect modern civilization—for that is my immediate theme—was not fully and firmly established for centuries. Lotze excellently observes: "The relation of Christianity toward the external condition of mankind was not that of a disturbing and subversive force. But it deprived evil of all justification for permanent continuance . . . when the spirit of Christian faith made itself felt in the relations of life." The Church at the beginning accepted, generally, the marriage customs prevailing in the Roman Empire. The Christian bride, like her pagan sisters, wore the long white robe with the purple fringe, the yellow veil, the girdle which the bridegroom was to unloose. The ring, the coronation—still retained in the Eastern Church—the joining of hands, continued to beautify the nuptial rite for the votaries of the new faith. But for them it was hallowed by a prayer of benediction, offered by a bishop or priest; and, sometimes, by the Eucharistic Sacrifice. Again, the Church, like the Roman legists, recognizes the essence of marriage as residing in the free consent of the man and woman contracting it. But from the first she regarded it as something more than a contract—as a state of life divinely ordained for ends of the natural order, but hallowed by a supernatural significance into an august mystery of religion. And therefore she utterly rejected the view which she found prevalent in the Roman Empire, that, as it had been contracted by mutual consent, so by mutual consent it might be dissolved. From the first she insisted upon its permanency as well as upon its unity.[1] So much is absolutely certain. But was it possible

[1] And a second marriage, after the death of either, was regarded with much disfavor, as it still is in the Greek Church. Athenagoras calls it "a decent adultery"; Clement of Alexandria, "fornication." St. Gregory Nazianzen, while conceding to the bigamist "pardon and indulgence," terms a third marriage "iniquity," and pronounces that he who exceeds that number is "manifestly bestial." St. Jerome allows that

for this sacrosanct bond to be dissolved in its essential character? It is quite clear that the early Church never held as lawful the remarriage of either husband or wife during the lifetime of either, if separated for any other cause than adultery. It is equally clear that on the question whether, if adultery did invalidate the bond, both the innocent and the guilty party, or either of them, might remarry, the Church gave no certain sound for long centuries. The balance of authority among her weightiest teachers is against all such remarriage. But they are divided in opinion; nay, some of the greatest of them waver in their judgment, inclining now to one side, now to the other. Gradually the loftier and sterner view of the Christian concept was apprehended in the West, and maintained by the Roman Pontiffs,[1] though not till the opening Middle Ages was the absolute indissolubility of marriage, when once rightly contracted, save by the death of one of the contracting parties, firmly established in the canon law. It is the doctrine set forth by Gratian, whose *Decretum* (A.D. 1140), a work of supreme authority, is the basis of the *Corpus Juris Canonici;* and from his time to our own it has been universally accepted throughout the Catholic Church.

It is a true saying that a man is formed at the knees of his mother. The kind of men found in a civilization depends upon the kind of women found in it. The ethos of society—what Burke called "the moral basis"—is determined by women. And their goodness or badness, as our very language bears witness, depends upon their purity. That is the root of all feminine virtues, and the source of a people's genuine greatness. Renan's saying is so true as to be almost a truism: "La force d'une nation c'est la pudeur de ses femmes." And the great

those who contract more than one marriage may remain in the Church, but on sufferance only, and likens them to the unclean beasts in Noah's ark.

[1] Even so late as A.D. 726 Pope Gregory the Second, in a letter to St. Boniface, while recommending that a man whose wife's health forbade conjugal intercourse should not marry again, left him free to do so provided he maintained her. Gratian remarks that this concession "is altogether opposed to the sacred canons; nay, even to the Evangelical and Apostolic doctrine." It is certainly opposed to the view taken by all Gregory's successors in the Roman See, and, so far as we know, by all his predecessors.

bulwark of woman's chastity is the absolute character of matrimony.

We owe, then, to the severe teaching of the Catholic Church that institution of indissoluble monogamy which, more than anything else, marks off our modern civilization from all other civilizations. It is matter of history, over which we need not linger, how unflinchingly the Catholic Church[1] has upheld the integrity of that institution throughout the ages. Nor need we examine the arguments adduced by her divines in support of it. I may, however, make an observation on the criticism to which one of those arguments is manifestly open. Theological writers, when maintaining that indissoluble monogamy is divinely instituted—and surely with reason, for it issues from the divinely ordained nature of things in their ethical relations—have been confronted with the obvious difficulty presented by the practice of Hebrew patriarchs and kings, of acknowledged sanctity, with whom they claimed solidarity. Their favorite expedient for meeting this difficulty is the hypothesis that a Divine dispensation for polygamy was granted to the human race from the time of the flood associated with that familiar figure of our childhood, the Noachian ark, and was revoked by Christ. It is objected that they do not disclose the manner in which this stupendous indulgence was proclaimed to mankind, or explain why knowledge of its summary cancellation was withheld from the countless millions affected thereby. The objectors do not understand that theological fictions, like legal, have their proper office in certain stages of social evolution, as necessary stepping-stones on which our race rises to higher things.

But, as a matter of fact, the institution of marriage in our modern civilization rests, not on argument, but on authority. The nations to which the Catholic Church taught the doctrine of Christ did not heckle their teacher; they received her as the prophet of God, and believed her on her bare word. The great

[1] It cannot be too emphatically stated that, in the Catholic Church, divorce, in the modern sense of the word—the dissolution of the marriage bond—is never granted, and is never recognized. The common phrase, "the divorce of Henry the Eighth," has given rise to much popular misapprehension. It was not a divorce, as the term is now understood, but a declaration of nullity, which Henry the Eighth sought, and the Holy See refused.

religious revolution of the sixteenth century is congruously termed Protestanism. Its imitators differed widely upon a great many matters. But Henry the Eighth and Luther, Calvin and Zwingli, Knox and Münzer, however varying their private judgments in things theological, were all agreed in protesting against the authority of the Pope, and in substituting for it their own. And when the authority of the Apostolic See was cast off, much of the doctrine and discipline which it upheld was mutilated. The doctrine and discipline of marriage did not escape this fate. In England, indeed, though the schism arose from the refusal of the Sovereign Pontiff to prostitute Christian matrimony to the lust of a tyrant, the institution itself was left intact.[1] This, it may be observed in passing, was by no means due to Cranmer. His own history, perhaps, sufficiently explains his aversion from the Catholic doctrine of marriage. At all events, it is abundantly clear that he was as willing to relax the nuptial bond for the world in general as to cancel it for his master. The legislation on divorce which he proposed to substitute, in the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*, for the Catholic law might have satisfied even Luther, whose practice is sufficiently indicated by his own marriage, and by the dispensation for polygamy given by him to the Landgrave Philip of Hesse.

The earlier generations of the Lutheran sect appear to have followed its founder's views concerning the relations of the sexes *haud passibus æquis*. From the first, indeed, it allowed divorce for adultery and malicious desertion, as did also the sect founded by Calvin. But it was not until the eighteenth century that the dissolution of the matrimonial tie was accorded by Protestant consistories for such reasons as "uncongeniality," "irreconcilable enmity," and the like. In fact, as Protestantism developed, the pronouncements of its pundits concerning the bond of marriage became laxer. Nor was this laxity confined to its more rationalistic forms. Even the greatest of the Puritans, John Milton, in that masterpiece of eloquence, erudition, and invective, *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, "pushes the

[1] In theory, but not in practice. Between the Reformation and the establishment of the Divorce Court (A.D. 1857) many marriages were dissolved by Act of Parliament, the Anglican bishops not protesting and in some cases expressly consenting.

Protestant license," to borrow the phrase of his editor, very far. The position which he sets himself to establish is "that indisposition, unfitness, and contrariety of mind, arising from a cause in nature unchangeable, hindering and ever likely to hinder the main benefits of conjugal society, which are solace and peace, is a greater reason of divorce than natural frigidity, especially if there be no children, and that there be mutual consent."

This was, substantially, the position taken by the publicists of the French Revolution—the second Act in that great European drama which opened with the Protestant Reformation. Of course the foulness which they preached in their crusade against Christianity would have been rejected with horror by Milton's God-fearing soul. Purity they regarded as "a new disease brought into the world by Christ"; modesty as "a virtue fastened on with pins"; holy matrimony as "a superstitious servitude." And their legislation, when they obtained the power to legislate, was the faithful expression of these opinions. Their great "reform" was to reduce marriage to a civil contract, terminable by the consent of the contracting parties. Other grounds of divorce enumerated by their law of 1792 were insanity, desertion, absence, emigration, and incompatibility of temper on the allegation of either husband or wife. The measure seems to have been successful beyond the expectation of its authors. During the twenty-seven months following its enactment six thousand marriages were dissolved in Paris alone, and in the year 1797 the divorces actually outnumbered the marriages. Duval, in his *Souvenirs Thermidoriens*, tells us:

"People divorced one another with the least provocation; nay, they divorced without any provocation, and with no more ado than they would have made for an expedition to gather lilacs in the meadows of Saint-Gervais, or to eat cherries at Montmorency. The husband had a mistress, and was tired of his wife; the wife had a lover, and desired nothing better than to be rid of her husband. They informed one another of the state of the case, set out together for the city hall, acquainted the mayor that they could no longer bear each other, and on the same day, or the next, the divorce was granted for incompatibility of temper. And the children—what became of them?

What did it matter? The spouses were free from one another; the most important thing was achieved. Moreover, it was not rare, on account of the ease with which marriages could be dissolved, to find couples who had been divorced five or six times in as many months. Occasionally very ludicrous things happened. Once two couples acted after the manner of La Fontaine's *Troqueurs*, that is to say, they arranged an exchange of husband and wife among themselves: and the two couples were on such good terms that the double-wedding breakfast was held at their joint expense."

The Napoleonic Code somewhat curbed this bestiality, and, at the Restoration, the old Catholic marriage legislation was reinstated in France. But the Third Republic has reënacted divorce by the law of the 27th of July, 1884, carried by the persistent endeavors of M. Naquet, a measure which, though going beyond the corresponding legislation in England, is less licentious than the law of the First Republic.

The French Revolution is the immediate source of a number of sophisms concerning man and society which have worked their way into popular favor throughout Europe during the last century, and now tyrannize as shibboleths. They are, one and all, underlain by that spurious individualism which is of the essence of Rousseau's teaching, and which the Revolution, happily described by Burke as "an armed doctrine," endeavored to translate into fact. The atomism, real or imaginary, of certain unstable tribes in the lowest stages of civilization, was for Rousseau the true ideal of the family. It is a false ideal; but it is the ideal which so-called Liberalism has persistently endeavored to realize. There can be no doubt that the attack on the permanency of marriage throughout Europe, which has already been crowned with so much success, is an outcome of this ideal—an ideal essentially anarchic. When the Divorce Court was established in England, that sagacious publicist Le Play—whose writings, I fear, are hardly known in this country—saw in it "a symptom of the decline of public morality; "elle affaiblit," he observed, "dans l'esprit de la nation le principe de l'ordre supérieur." But, of course, what has been accomplished here by the opponents of indissoluble marriage, falls far short of their achievements elsewhere. In Germany,

"insuperable aversion" is recognized as a ground for divorce; so is "hopeless insanity," or "malignant inconsistency," or "quarrelsomeness," or "a disorderly mode of life," or "drunkenness," or "extravagance." In Sweden, "hatred, ill-will, prodigality, drunkenness, or a violent temper" suffices. The Protestants of Austria may divorce one another for "violent dislike." In Switzerland, "marriage relations greatly strained" are recognized as a valid reason for dissolving the marriage. But in the last-mentioned country a still further "reform" is desired by the party of "progress," and an appeal, by way of referendum, to the "yea and no of general ignorance" is contemplated, with a view of legalizing divorce whenever "a profound disorganization" of such relations occurs.

The American courts take a very liberal view of cruelty. It appears that they have granted divorce to a petitioning wife on this ground when her husband "did not wash himself, thereby inflicting great mental anguish on her"; when "he accused her sister of stealing, thereby sorely wounding her feelings"; when, "after twenty-seven years of marriage, he said: 'You are old and worn out; I do not want you any longer'"; when "he would not cut his toenails, and she was scratched severely every night"; when "he persisted in the use of tobacco, thereby aggravating sick headaches, to which she was subject." A petitioning husband, on the other hand, has obtained from them the dissolution of his marriage for such instances of cruelty as the following: when "his wife pulled him out of bed by the whiskers"; when "she upbraided him, and said: 'You are no man at all,' thereby causing him mental suffering and anguish"; when "she refused to keep his clothes in repair, and even to cook, and never sewed on his buttons"; when "she struck him a violent blow with her bustle."

This is the condition into which the institution of marriage has already come in modern civilization. And the causes to which this is due are yet working, and with ever-increasing activity. Materialism, disguised and undisguised, is the fashionable philosophy of the day.[1] It is fatal to the idea of human personality, and, consequently, to the spiritual prerogatives of

[1] For the proof of this statement I must refer the reader to Chapter I. and to the Appendix in my work *On Right and Wrong*.

woman. It means to her, as Dean Merivale has well observed in his striking *Lectures on the Conversion of the Northern Nations*, from which I quoted in an earlier portion of this paper, "a fall from the consideration she now holds among us." It means that she must "descend again to be the mere plaything of man, the transient companion of his leisure hours, to be held loosely, as the chance gift of a capricious fortune."

Such transient companionship, such loose holding, appear to many careful observers the substitute for Christian marriage which will be found in the world as Christianity becomes generally discredited; a consummation which they deem imminent. To quote at length even the more considerable of contemporary publicists who have expressed this view, would take me far beyond my present limits. I can here cite only a very few words from three of them. Mr. Karl Pearson, in his learned and able work, *The Ethic of Free Thought*, writes: "Legalized life monogamy is, in human history, a thing but of yesterday; and no unprejudiced person can suppose it a final form. A new sex relationship will replace the old. Both as to matter and form it ought to be a pure question of taste, a simple matter of agreement between the man and woman." Mr. Pearson, in his most suggestive volume, *National Life and Character*, holds that as "the religion of the State" replaces Christianity, which he thinks it is swiftly and surely doing, it will be "impossible to maintain indissoluble marriage," and "the tie between husband and wife" will "come to be easily variable, instead of permanent." Similarly, Mr. H. G. Wells, in the singularly interesting *Anticipations*, with which he has just favored the world, deems it "impossible to ignore the forces making for a considerable relaxation of the institution of permanent monogamous marriage in the coming years," and holds it "foolish not to anticipate and prepare for a state of things when not only will moral standards be shifting and uncertain, admitting of physiologically sound *ménages* of very variable status, but also when vice and depravity, in every form that is not absolutely penal, will be practised in every grade of magnificence, and condoned."

I own I think this prognostication of the return of modern civilization to "the morals of the poultry yard" well warranted

by the signs of the times. It rests, indeed, upon the assumption that the revolution in the relations of the sexes, steadily progressing since the destruction of the religious unity of Europe, will continue unchecked. Whether that assumption is correct "only the event will teach us, in its hour." Of course we must not forget that human affairs seldom advance for very long in a straight line. "Inest in rebus humanis quidam circulus." The future rarely corresponds with the forecasts of even the wisest. Still, as we look around the world, it is impossible not to recognize the strength of the forces which militate against marriage. I know well that we cannot count reason among them. The human reason, properly disciplined and correctly exercised, is capable of ascertaining the ethical principles necessary to enable man to arrive at his natural ideal—the harmonious development of all his powers in a complete and consistent whole. And from these principles is derived the true norm of matrimony so well expressed by the great jurisconsult of ancient Rome: "Conjunctio maris et feminæ est consortium omnis vitae; divini et humani juris communicatio." A state of life involving the fusion of two personalities, and fraught with consequences most momentous to both, and to society, its unity and indissolubility issue from the nature of things in their ethical relations.

The only real witness in the world for the absolute character of holy matrimony is the Catholic Church. And whether men will hear, or whether—as seems more likely—they will forbear, she warns them that to degrade indissoluble marriage to a mere dissoluble contract, to a mere regulation of social police, to a mere material fact governed by the animal, not the rational, nature, will be to throw back modern civilization to that wallowing in the mire from which she rescued it.

XVIII

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

"THE ESSENTIAL EQUALITY OF MAN AND WOMAN"

BY

FRANCES POWER COBBE

AND

WILLIAM K. HILL

DISMISSING the moral side of the problem of woman in her relations with man, we turn now to its practical aspect. What is woman's position in the world to-day, and what is it like to be in the immediate future? This, in every public woman's mind, hurls us at once upon the question of woman suffrage, or "universal suffrage" as many of its advocates prefer to call it. Any vehemently argued issue is perhaps better understood by viewing it from a distance; and so we have purposely dealt with this agitated theme, not as it presents itself to any one of its supporters in America, but as it strikes our English cousins. Frances Power Cobbe has long been a leading name among woman suffragists. A granddaughter of Archbishop Cobbe, of Dublin, Miss Cobbe early became a leader in religious circles, and in her own career has exemplified the principles for which she stands, being widely known as a lecturer, an author, and a journalist. The following address was first delivered by her before the Ladies' Club in Clifton.

Lest her view of the matter might be thought one-sided we supplement it with a discussion by a "mere man," who approaches the subject in its broader aspect. Going beyond "suffrage" Mr. Hill inquires as to the equalities and inequalities of the sexes, mental, moral, and physical. He even attempts to strike a scientific balance and deduce results.

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

THERE are two sides from which we may regard the woman-suffrage demand: the *Justice* of it and the *Expediency* of it.

I am one of those who would always place the former in the foreground, for I believe with Cicero that "nothing is right because it is expedient, but it is expedient because it is right." When we have ascertained the righteousness of any line of action, public or private, we may be pretty sure that, in God's world, it will turn out sooner or later to have been the expedient course; if not in the lower sense and connected with our baser interests, yet in the higher, connected with those in which the happiness and honor of human life consist.

Now as regards the Justice of the claim of women to the franchise, we must of course admit at starting that the whole idea of representative government is a modern one, and that the abstract idea of justice—what Kant would call "a Law fit for Law Universal"—is difficult of application to it. We might have lived still under a government at any stage between a Greek democracy, where every man has his own representative in the market-place, and a Russian autocracy, where the Autocrat may say like Louis XIV., *L'état c'est moi.* But as we stand now in the twentieth century in England, it would seem that (*where men are concerned*) two principles are almost universally accepted as just—namely, that those who are called on to obey the laws should have a voice in making them; and that those who pay taxes should have a voice in their expenditure.

These two principles, I remark, are almost universally accepted as just, *for men.* Very few people will refuse to admit that they are so. But why then, I ask, are they not to be held just likewise, and equally, where women are concerned? We too are called upon to obey the laws. Why should not we have a voice in making them? We too (alas!) are called upon to pay taxes. Why should not we have a word to say about their expenditure? This is our contention. That what is just for the *gander* would also be just for the *goose!* At least the *onus* of proving that it is not so lies with our opponents.

Of course the real origin and still existing source of this failure of justice is the old, old story of the subjection of the weak to the strong—the inevitable, and (not blamable) omnip-

otence of men in times when Might made Right; and a natural survival of the old state of masculine overbearing under happier and softer conditions, in the minds both of men and women. It is an *idée fixe* with both sexes that men should rule, and women be ruled. But now, surely, the time has come when the problem may be regarded dispassionately and without prejudice by both parties, and the question pressed home: Why, if it be just to give *men*, who have to obey the laws and pay taxes, a voice in making the laws and expending the taxes, is it not also just to give the same voice to women who have to do both, the same as they?

I apprehend that very few, even of the sternest opponents of our claims, will attempt to dispute them on these abstract grounds of justice *pur et simple*. But they will say that, where public interests are concerned, other things must be taken into consideration beside abstract and theoretic justice; and that the weakness of women renders them by nature unfit to take part in government or public affairs; that their inclusion in the constituencies would *water down* the political life of the nation and weaken the constitution; and that there are other objects to which their whole attention should be given—namely, to housekeeping and baby-rearing.

Now let us face this argument from the inferiority of women frankly. It *is* true! Women, on the whole, *are* intellectually as well as physically less strong than men. That is, if we set up almost any standard of ability or genius or erudition, we shall find a good many more men than women attain to it. The highest standard of all no woman has ever yet reached; and accordingly we have been contemptuously taunted with the question:

> "Where is your *Hamlet*, your *Macbeth*,
> Your soul-wrought victories?"

"*Nowhere*," I cheerfully answer, unless poor Sappho (whom Aristotle ranks alongside of Homer and Æschylus) attained it; and *her* works (all the nine books save a few fragments!) men have, unfortunately, managed to lose. I have also recently learned that many of the hymns in the Rig Veda are by female Rishis. That these are absolutely Divine is the

belief of all Brahmins. I possess an idol of Brahma the Creator, which represents him as holding the four Vedas in his four hands, and reading them with his four heads. Think of the chief God of the Trimurti reading a woman's writing![1]

But now arises the question: Has the possession of genius sufficient to write "Hamlet" and "Macbeth" anything to do with the exercising of the voting power in the United Kingdom as at present constituted?

If it be so, then the whole Celtic population would be justly disfranchised, for there has never been a Celtic Shakespeare, or Homer, or Dante, or Milton, any more than there has been a woman of the same exalted intellectual rank. But if no one would dream of urging this deficiency against a good Scotch, Welsh, or Irish farmer as a reason why he should not cast a vote for the candidate he prefers at his county election, is it not ridiculous to use it as a reason for refusing the same franchise to us women? The same argument applies in the still higher field of philosophy. There has never been a female Plato or Kant. But neither has there been a Celtic Plato or Kant.

There would be some fairness in arguments on this line if some intellectual test, high or low, were made the condition of ability to vote for a member of Parliament. In that case it might be a proportionately small number of women who would reach it. But there would be *some;* and that would end the injustice of the present state of things.

But admitting frankly the inferiority of our sex as regards great epics and tragedies and systems of philosophy, we must here put in a pertinent question: Whether women have proved themselves likewise inferior in *that* gift—power, faculty—whatever we may call it, which alone concerns the question in hand? *Are* women bad politicians, bad administrators, incapable naturally of understanding and guiding aright our ship of state? I will tell my reasons for urging this question.

I possess at home two heavy volumes of tables of ancient

[1] The Psalm which says: "The Lord gave the Word, great was the company of the preachers," ought (I am informed by the best Hebrew scholars) to be translated: "The Lord gave the Word. The *heraldesses* who proclaimed it were a great host."

and modern history, in which I noted down (in my long-past studious youth) all the sovereigns of all the countries concerning which I was able to glean any information; using a little system of my own for showing at a glance their descents and successions. It occurred to me some time ago to count over the names in these tables; and I found there were more than 2,500 *men* sovereigns on record—kings and emperors; and of these a proportion of something like 5 per cent. were to be ranked as "eminent" or "illustrious" rulers, according to Mr. Francis Galton's definitions.

Among them, at long intervals, in almost every country appeared also Queens, numbering altogether 51. But in that half hundred, nearly half were indisputably "eminent" or "illustrious"; some of them the best rulers which their countries ever possessed. We cannot enter far into this inquiry (I have often begged my literary friends to undertake it carefully), but I will just name a few out of the small number of women who have ever reigned as independent sovereigns, and ask the reader to consider whether they do not stand out lustrously in the pages of history?[1]

I must begin in order of time (even if modern investigation leaves them as half-mythical personages,) with the great SEMIRAMIS, and her successor (after five generations) NITOCRIS of Babylon. Both of these queens are credited by Herodotus with vast works of public beneficence connected with the great Rivers; and the former, Diodorus says, "traversed all parts of the vast Assyrian Empire, erecting great cities and stupendous monuments, and opening roads through savage mountains." NITOCRIS, Herodotus describes, as building a sort of drawbridge over the Euphrates, and making other great works.

After a second NITOCRIS (called in the Turin Papyrus NETAGERTI), Queen of Egypt, who is said to have wreaked a fearful retribution on her brother's murderers and then to have buried herself alive;[2] we come at last to firm grounds of history

[1] Many of the 51 above counted as Queens-Regnant were the daughters of preceding sovereigns, married to their successors, and practically not more independent rulers than other Queens-Consort.

[2] See *History of Egypt* by Flinders Petrie, Vol. I., p. 105.

in the actual movements of the glorious reign of Queen HATEPSU (or more properly HATSHEPSUT) at Deir-el-Bahri, and the great obelisks at Karnak. It is little to say to those who have studied these monuments, and the wondrous story of her Embassy to the Land of Punt, that Queen HATEPSU was one of the most enlightened princes of the ancient world, and one of the grandest of the mighty Pharaohs.

Again we find DEBORAH among the Judges; a woman whose generalship saved Israel from the tyranny of Jabin, and secured peace for the land for forty years; and whose "Song" remains to us (as recent criticism avers) the most ancient fragment of Hebrew Scripture. Again we find ARTEMISIA, the heroine of Salamis, who alone saved her ships in that disastrous battle, and for whose life the (not very chivalrous!) Athenians offered a reward of 10,000 drachmas because they "could not bear to be beaten by a woman"; also the second ARTEMISIA, of Halicarnassus, who built to her husband's memory the sublime *Mausoleum*, which has been ever since the archetype of noble funeral monuments.

Again: ZENOBIA, the magnificent and illustrious Queen of Palmyra, the friend of Longinus, of whom her conqueror, Aurelian (who so meanly compelled her to adorn his triumph) said that he had "never encountered so brave and resolute a foe."

Passing to the Western world we have our own British BOADICEA defying all the power of Rome, and, when she could do so no longer, killing herself to escape capture. Later on, MARGARET, Queen of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, reached, as we read, by her great ability as a sovereign and diplomatist, "a degree of power unequalled in Europe since Charlemagne." ISABELLA II., Queen of Castile, to whose discernment of the genius of Columbus the world owes the discovery of America. Our own Queen ELIZABETH, of whose greatness it is needless to speak; MARIA THERESA, of Austria, of whom we read that she "made great financial reforms," and that in her reign "Agriculture, Manufacture and Commerce flourished, and the national revenue greatly increased." CATHERINE II., of Russia, no doubt a bad woman, but not perhaps a very bad Empress,

to whom it is noticeable that, alone of all female sovereigns, the title of "*Great*" has been appropriated! Then we have the present mysterious Empress of China—"SHE"—who, whether innocent, or a monster of cruelty and craft, is probably the ablest living person, man or woman, among the four hundred millions of the Celestial Empire. And lastly, and greatest and best of all, QUEEN VICTORIA OF ENGLAND. Few will be found to say that this true Woman—fond wife, tender mother, kind and sympathizing friend to all who suffered—was not at least as good a politician as any male voter in her dominions, nay, perhaps as any of her illustrious subjects in the great "Victorian Age" which bears her name. Yet Queen Victoria was *not* "a genius." Her simple books show no trace of an intellect, or an imagination, which could have composed a *Hamlet*, or a *Macbeth*, or a *Paradise Lost;* still less a *Phædo*, or a *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* She was, in short, a "mere woman"; we might say a typical, duty-loving woman. But nevertheless she was (quite indisputably) a first-rate *Statesman!*

Thus I think we may fairly contend that if, in any branch of human intelligence, women are the equals of men, it is precisely in the one from which they are carefully excluded by law, unless they happen to be born princesses! *Then*, indeed, they are placed at the top of the constitution; and for sixty years we never hear a complaint of their incapacity for politics.

Where then, I ask, can be found any plea of justice for excluding our whole sex from the very simplest and smallest of political rights, when in *that* field at all events we have been proved to possess at least equal faculty with men? What right have our legislators to continue to classify for this important purpose every living woman—blameless as to crime, and of full age to form a solid judgment—as if she were of necessity by nature always a pauper, an idiot, a criminal, or a minor?

The refusal to us of Parliamentary votes is assuredly a rank injustice, and it practically involves a score of other injustices resulting from our unrepresented position, which causes our interests inevitably to go to the wall. We demand therefore in all seriousness and earnestness that this injustice be done away with in the United Kingdom, as it has been done away

with in our Southern Colonies, and in the Isle of Man, with none but beneficial results to the whole community.[1]

But now let us turn from the painful and, I confess, to me, irritating subject of the Injustice of which we complain in the refusal to us of the suffrage on the same terms as men, and consider for a few pleasant moments what may happen if the sense of justice in men ever rise high enough to induce them to grant us our natural rights. We have no means to force this concession on men. That is our misfortune. We have no *pou sto* from which to work, and sorely we have wanted one! But I believe in the universal progress of all humanity; and that the day will come when the difference of the constitution which stands between us will appear (as in truth it is) absolutely unreasonable and absurd, and the expediency of granting to us women the Parliamentary suffrage will become manifest.

I am persuaded that the right of voting (small as it seems) will carry with it (if we ever obtain it) a great intellectual and moral uplifting of women. We are all—men and women—subject to a law of our nature which I have described elsewhere as the *Contagion of the Emotions;* and to be despised is, in all but the very strongest natures, to despise ourselves. Now the refusal to us of the franchise in its present largely extended area is to *deconsider* us; to place us in an inferior category from even very ignorant and low-class men. It is degrading to our whole sex, *qua* sex; and it is impossible for any of us who are of an age and pecuniary position in which we should have votes if we were men, not to feel this, and to recognize that,

[1] The following is a letter testifying to this fact from my friend Dr. John Ellis McTaggart, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who is married to a New Zealand lady:

"So I jot down the following conclusions in which we both agree:—

(1) The Colony is completely satisfied with it.

(2) The percentage of women who vote is smaller, but only slightly smaller, than the percentage of men.

(3) Neither political party has gained by it—the women apparently dividing themselves in the same proportions as the men between the two parties.

(4) It has substantially, but not overwhelmingly, strengthened the temperance vote."

in the judgment of our fellow-countrymen, we are an inferior class of beings. This comes home to us more in the country than in a town, for there we are directly confronted with masculine privileges. Our own farmers, our servants, our very laborers, be they never so ignorant and stupid, have a voice in elections while we have none. It is all very well for men to glorify womanhood in prose and verse, and treat us with special courtesy, and even to worship the Madonna! At bottom most men feel to us as we do to children; and this acts most injuriously on our own characters in making us childish.

Now if we can obtain votes men will begin to adopt a different tone toward us, for they will want to interest us in their politics. It will not be a rapid change on their side or on our own; but it is bound to come in time. They will also seek more often the society of women who, as we all know, are apt to be a good deal left to themselves when they happen to be widows, or old maids, without any very special attractions. It is in every way desirable that the two sexes should frequently converse freely together, to the strengthening and enlarging the minds of women (and even putting animal spirits and pluck into them); and, we may hope, on the other side, to the softening and purifying of the minds of men. If I had the choice of associating only with women, or only with men, I should have no hesitation in preferring women's society. But, as the children say, "*Both is best,*" and there is always a loss when men never converse with women or women never converse with men. You know what George Eliot says, "The masculine mind—*what there is of it*—is always of a superior order!" I should always advocate every plan bringing us into common work and play—to sit on committees together and unite as much as possible in all public action. I even took on myself once to tell the lady Principal of one of our new colleges for women at Oxford, that I thought she ought to be a married woman with a husband who would sit at the head of the dinner table every day and lead the conversation! I believe it would be an excellent arrangement; better for the students than many a course of Lectures.

Many of my readers must have noticed the different *nuance*

in the talk of English and of American gentlemen to women. In America, though the women have not as yet votes, except in a few States, they have attained a different social position from that which we hold in England: and consequently an American man talks *up* to us; very visibly taking it for granted that we know as much and have as good a judgment of the subject in hand as himself. An Englishman on the contrary usually talks *down* to us. He assumes that we know little or nothing; and that our opinions (if we have any) are hardly worth ascertaining. This he does pretty universally to ladies who are strangers to him. Only if he happen to know that the woman to whom he is speaking is the possessor of brains, he is apt to treat her in a still more aggravating manner, and to imply, in all he says, that she is not as other women are, "fools and slight," but stands apart from her sex—a very great insult as we must all consider it. After a certain number of years of the new *régime* I am convinced that the minds of women would grow larger and stronger, even as their bodies have done in the last forty years by fresh air and exercise, and then a generation will arise in which women will scarcely be called any longer the "weaker sex."

But the moral and intellectual advantages to women personally which the franchise would in time—slowly perhaps, but surely—bring; and also the actual material gain which in many cases it would involve by compelling Parliamentary attention to the Bills in which their interests are concerned—these gains are secondary to the great issue: "What will be the influence of the feminine vote on the politics of the nation at large?" For a long time it will, of course, not tell very greatly in varying this policy one way or another; but as time goes on, it must turn the balance on many questions. Will that influence be for bad or for good?

I am sure that, on the whole, it will be greatly for good. Mistakes may be made, and no doubt women will be affected like men by waves of popular sentiment, causing them sometimes to throw their weight wrongly. But in the long run there can be little doubt that both the conscientiousness and the tenderness of women will influence public affairs and the making

of laws in the direction of greater humanity toward all the poor and suffering, to captives, to criminals, to children, to the aged, to animals; and also in that of public morality; in that of temperance; and finally, in that of peace. No Member of Parliament, depending largely for his election on the votes of women, will (for example) sanction the licensed torture of animals, on the ground that it is hoped it will pay in useful discoveries.

Thus viewing the whole field of politics, I do not doubt that the concession of the suffrage to women on the same terms as men now hold it (or on any terms on which they may hold it from time to time), will be expedient as well as just. We are not a sex of saints and sages, though there have been some saints and sages here and there belonging to us; and also a great many sinners and fools. But on the whole we are less often criminals than are men; perhaps we are a little less selfish; and certainly more conscientious than ordinary men. In short, in the lump, women are better than men, though not so strong and not so clever. As Theodore Parker well defined it: We are not the equals of men, but their equivalents. We are not their equals physically, æsthetically, or perhaps intellectually. They are not our equals in things higher than these—in the regions of morality and of the affections, human and divine.

But if this be conceded, is it not to under-estimate *goodness* itself, to doubt that this *better* weight, thrown into the scales of politics, will be beneficial? Once again, I am convinced, it will be proved (as I started by affirming), that what is JUST will always be, in the highest sense, also EXPEDIENT.

"THE ESSENTIAL EQUALITY OF MAN AND WOMAN"

BY

WILLIAM K. HILL

Of the many controversies which occupy the intellectual activities of the human race, probably none is more ancient, interesting, and long-lived than that which concerns the relative

position of the sexes in respect to capacity. Before the dawn of civilization there was presumably no controversy on this point. If any wandering doubt entered the mind of any individual woman, either she kept it to herself or the prompt application of a male hand or foot silenced its expression forever. Later on in the pre-Christian civilizations of Southeastern Europe, if womanhood was recognized as reaching nearer to the admitted superiority of manhood than barbarism believed, the admission was largely theoretical, and its illustrations in the Aspasias and Cornelias of the time were few and far between. The standard set up by Christ, if it took root at all, was soon disfigured by the famous gloss of his Apostle Paul. "In like manner, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands, . . . beholding your chaste behavior coupled with fear, . . . in the incorruptible apparel of a meek and quiet spirit, . . . as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord." The mediæval appreciation of womanhood, as is well known, was merely a vision of passion and fancy which rose above rational equality into the region of fulsome adulation. Thence through many stages of effort we have arrived at the so-called emancipation and higher education of woman, upon which disfranchisement is perhaps the last remaining blot of any magnitude.

But it is just in the fact of the persistence of this great and dark blot, and of the many smaller and lighter blots scattered over the sphere of sex-equality, that a great interest lies and much food for reflection. Why, when so many doors have been opened to women, are the great doors of the parliament-house and several other small wickets still closed to them? The answer will, I think, be found in the fact that, out of the sum of manhood, there are still but few men who, at all times and under all circumstances, really believe in the essential equality of the sexes. Of the rest, the majority are still sceptical, and the minority believe only with half their heart, being too ready to trim their sails to any wind of adverse criticism blown up by the passing crazes of the Press and platform, or the drawing-room.

Under these circumstances it is still a matter of interest to try and throw new light upon this ancient controversy, and

unveil, if it be possible, the subconscious opposition which makes so many men admit in theory the equality of the sexes and yet in practice act upon lines which can only be justified by the denial of such equality.

Let us consider, then, these leading characteristics of the human race: reason, imagination, and the initiative which manifests itself in creative work; emotion, courage, moral stability, and truth; strength and endurance.

Reason is equally the characteristic of both sexes, but its derivatives, reasonableness and reasoning, are said to be more strongly marked in man than in woman. Man usually thinks before he acts. Woman is inclined very often to act before she thinks. The truth of this would in no way be lessened by the thoughtful action of the man leading, as so often happens, to a result inferior to that which flows from the impulsive action of the woman. Deliberation is not always a virtue; yet, inasmuch as the man's action is fundamentally rational, it is likely to blunder less often than the sometimes successful intuition of the woman, and, under the conditions of the average, the superiority would lie with the man, assuming that this alleged distinction is really as widespread as men declare. I have heard one of the most strenuous advocates of the emancipation of woman assert that women are inclined to be very unreasonable about small matters in the sphere of the home. But this apparent unreasonableness has a basis in reason not properly appreciated by man. Take one example, which has so often been the subject of satire. Woman thinks punctual obedience to the dinner gong more important than the catching and fixing for posterity of some soul-compelling metaphor or one ray of "the light that never was on sea or land," which is hovering just on the horizon of the imagination, but just out of pen or pencil grip when the gong rings. Is it not because, but for the assiduous cultivation of such distorted estimates of relative importance, she would find the details of domestic management altogether too sordid and wearisome, and, as a result, starve and weaken the great mind that is at hand-grips with inspiration?

In the matter of imagination, as manifested objectively in

its works, the only form in which we can estimate it, woman cannot at present set anything against such male achievements as the *Iliad*, the *Divina Commedia*, *Hamlet*, *Faust*, the Venus of Milo, *Tannhäuser*, or the *Choral Symphony*, to cite only a few leading examples.

In the closely allied quality of initiative the weakness of woman is loudly asserted by man and, though I shall have occasion to traverse this contention in certain particulars, it is difficult to cite any considerable number of women who have initiated and shaped with creative touch great works or great movements. The capacity for scheming and intrigue, specially credited to woman, is quite a different and very inferior possession, no less common in man, as any one living amid the seething intrigue of present educational politics will admit. But, taking the quality of creative initiative, Sappho's output is merely fragmentary. Mrs. Browning's emotional beauty and imaginative fervor are, for many, disfigured by lack of musical sense. Cleopatra's statecraft was only destructive; and though Joan of Arc must be credited with the initiation of a truly statesmanlike conception of policy, it is doubtful if her success was due so much to able generalship as to the power of inspiring enthusiasm. The distinguishing characteristics of Elizabeth's greatness were a capacity for recognizing the wisdom of her servants and a devoted patriotism, rather than any such constructive faculty as must be credited to Henry II., Edward I., and others of England's great kings. In like manner the greatness of Victoria was much more the outcome of her success in the practical application of the doctrine of constitutional government than in any constructive power, for which indeed the very system of modern constitutional government left her little scope.

Great deeds may be laid to the credit of emotion in the history of the world when time and circumstance favored the form of stimulus it gives; but the sins chargeable to its account far outnumber these great deeds. Woman has long held the reputation of being more emotional than man.

"Uncertain, coy, and hard to please,
And variable as the shade
By the light quivering aspen made."

The reason commonly assigned is physiological, but I think the true cause is neither so permanent nor so incurable.

In courage, moral stability, mental endurance, and truth it would seem as if man could claim no superiority, and in the last three must even yield to woman; for there are many brave women, and woman's power of mental endurance is famous, while her morality, truth, conscientiousness, and general good behavior, in youth at least, are superior to man's. None the less woman has always been looked upon as more timid than man, while woman and nerves have always been associated in the popular fancy. It is well known that in fundamental virtues woman is more fastidious than man; for Pope's dictum that "every woman is at heart a rake" was merely a sacrifice of truth to epigram; but in the minor verities of social intercourse her laxity has long been the butt of the social satirist. No one charges her with a tendency to covet her neighbor's husband as a man covets his neighbor's wife; but, when it is a case of the neighbor's ox or ass, as symbolized in jewelry, servants, or a double coach-house, she is credited with being of an envious and even malicious disposition. Only two or three times in a century, as in the Humbert case, is she convicted of taking part in a great "deal"; but social fibs and hypocrisies are freely laid to her charge. The most virulent misogynist has never accused her of being *splendide mendax*, like the company promoter; but the support she gives to ceremonial observances whose spirit has long since evaporated, lends point to a charge of small insincerities. Few men have thought more highly of women than Thackeray did, yet he says: "There are some meannesses which are too mean even for man—woman, lovely woman alone, can venture to commit them." Here also I shall have occasion to traverse popular opinion, while admitting the germ of truth from which it is developed.

The asserted inferiority of woman in physical strength and endurance is difficult to controvert; for it may be contended that the endurance of pain, in which she claims a superiority, is merely the endurance which comes of use. The man cries out, because the sensation is strange to him. The woman suffers pain in silence, as one endures the querulousness of old

age, because one expects and allows for it. If, however, this be true, it would seem to be a question, not of inferiority, but of habit, with the sole difference that nature has assigned to woman larger opportunities of acquiring the particular habit in question.

Whatever, then, may be the virtue and ability of individual women, and however high such individuals may soar above the average of manhood, it is alleged that, on the main counts of human characteristics, woman in the mass is inferior to man in the mass. I shall presently try to show that, if the statement must be admitted a fact, it is only a present fact. I do not believe that this inferiority of woman need be, or is likely to be, permanent. I come now to my second thesis.

Assuming for the moment that woman's achievement is, up to the present time, inferior to man's, what is the fundamental cause of her backwardness? Surely false training fostered by fallacious tradition.

I have said that woman is now, even in this twentieth century, charged with being more unreasonable than man. If this be true, it is because generations of self-absorbed fathers and unenlightened mothers have steadily brought up their sons in such a manner as to develop reasonableness, and their daughters in such a manner as to develop unreasonableness. The teaching of Euclid in schools is a trite example. Even now in many schools this first essay in logical deduction is begun later by girls than boys. How long is it since elementary—or any—science was generally introduced into the curriculum of girls' schools? But the false lead in the direction of non-reasoning has long been given much earlier and more subtly—in the playing fields by the inferiority of the girls' games for developing reason (compare rounders and skipping with cricket and hockey, battledore and shuttlecock with football), and at home by the consideration which is given to childish whims when shown in the girl, while in the boy they are laughed at as unmanly. This toleration of action upon impulse and fancy has been carried on throughout the woman's childhood and youth until it has justified the Shakespearean satire upon the adult woman: "I have no other but a woman's reason; I think

it so because I think it so." For centuries romancers, who are among the most powerful moulders of sex character, have delighted in representing the pretty, but empty-headed, woman's unreasonableness as a positive charm in the eyes of her male adorer, that is, until the practical realities of married life have shown him that reasonableness is a maker, fancifulness a destroyer, of human happiness. In a word, lovers and romancers have combined to describe unreasonableness as a most reasonable thing in woman, and, heredity helping, woman has unconsciously moulded herself in strict accordance with the prosaic doctrine of supply and demand.

Again, aided and abetted by the approving smile of man, woman herself has clipped the wings of her own imagination so that it should not soar over the low walls of the nursery. How should woman conceive Iliads and Divine Comedies, when generations of mothers and grandmothers have taught her that woman's sphere of action is not life, time, or eternity, but the little world of infancy and childhood with its small delights and sorrows, its crude conceptions and narrow horizon of activities? So the Faust of womanhood is dwarfed into Jack of the Beanstalk, who sells his infantile obligations for an immoral purchase of beans. Her Venus of Milo becomes the plump and rosy Cupid of the bath-tub, so much so that her very notion of physical beauty becomes confused with that of physical luxuriance, and she describes a more or less shapeless presentment of healthy flesh and muscle as a "lovely" baby. Later on this early stunting of artistic appreciation brings her to the admiration and adoption of the false anatomy and false curves of the milliner's model. Similarly her sense of musical grandeur is kept chained to the ditties of the Piper's Son and all his fraternity. If she rocks her last cradle on the wrong side of forty, it is small wonder that her musical imagination never gets beyond the Choral Symphonies of the nursery. It is no answer to this argument to cite the large attendance of women at art galleries and classical concerts; for to galleries and concerts they go merely to absorb artistic and musical thought and beauty. The sphere of stimulus to artistic and musical imagination is, for the vast majority of women, the environment of the cradle.

Lastly, woman's physical inferiority also was the product of bad air and sedentary conventions rather than natural defectiveness. Every year opens to her some new profession, long thought to be too arduous for female limbs and feminine minds. Her tenacity and determination in these professions prove that the physical strength of her savage ancestress, who tilled the earth and built the home while her savage lord amused himself with bow and spear, has only been lying in abeyance till a wiser tradition called it forth to labor in the more refined fields of activity which modern civilization throws open equally to both sexes. Everywhere the opening up of woman's intellectual liberty asserts itself in her physical improvement—the height of her figure, the strength of her foot and arm, and the general quickening of her gait and carriage—all pointing to the breaking up of a false tradition of sedentary dulness and spiritual starvation.

False training, then, fostered by fallacious tradition, has lain at the root of that backwardness of woman which has so long been supposed to be the product of inherent and irremediable inferiority, but is now shown to be no more inherent than the rapidly disappearing savagery and coarseness of man, which also were once thought to be the distinguishing and not wholly unworthy mark of his manhood.

And now for my last thesis—Will woman ever be indisputably equal to man, and when? To this question the scoffer, shutting his eyes, answers glibly "no" and "never"; but the thoughtful man, looking round with wide eyes and a pondering mind, and applying the measure of his own experience, notes the rapid progress woman has made even in his own memory. If the bent of his mind leads him to look for the root of things below the efflorescence which alone attracts the average mind, he will observe the significant fact that woman has begun her race for equality with man by first securing the equipment of education.

Education is the great economizer of historic effort, and will enable woman to cover in a few years a field of accomplishment which illiterate man traversed with pain and error and frequent backsliding only in a decade or a century. Therefore woman will move rapidly through the necessary schooling of experience,

which man has traversed slowly through the ages. Our curious observer will note yet another significant phenomenon of the twentieth century, which, rumor says, has attained the proportions of a social anxiety in America—the gradual alienation of man from the powerful agent of self-development named above. If man turns from education, which, in the guise of modern science, has been mainly responsible for the abnormal strides made by modern civilization, in order to dull his finer susceptibilities upon the coarser grain of commercial and financial operations—if he allows woman to take over his responsibilities in the matter of brain production—the march of her intellectual and moral development will be proportionately accelerated, and the speed with which she is already overhauling him in the race will grow daily greater. Even now woman's once ready admission of inferiority has grown reticent, and she is generally eager to claim at least an equality of ability with its consequential rights. The modern Harriet Byron is no longer considered to outstep decorum when she enters upon an argument with the modern Walden, and it is no uncommon experience to see a mixed assembly listening with pleasure to an intelligent woman while she expounds her "views" on some matter of current interest. In the middle and upper classes woman is now expected to be intelligent and reasonable as well as pretty, and the absence of the last, when nature happens to be unkind, is more readily tolerated than the absence of either of the first two qualities. Indeed, some of us know cases where wit, wisdom, and character are found to obliterate entirely a positive ugliness which would have made the woman in question impossible in seventeenth and eighteenth century society. Though grace and beauty will always hold sway, the eyes of the lover are becoming less easily dazzled, and the exhilaration which thrills the male being when first inoculated with love's poison is apt to be followed by shrewd questionings as to the quality of the brain that lights the fascinating eyes. Dolls are less easily mistaken for goddesses, and mainly because your true divinity is more in request; for which reason, as the value of the real diamond makes its purchase a work of judgment that reacts upon its value, so the supply of a better class of femininity

has aroused a finer male discrimination that is again reacting upon the quality of that femininity.

In the matter of initiative, woman has shown a growing capacity since female emancipation brought opportunities to her. Naturally at first she has displayed this capacity in those spheres which were already the fields of her particular interest when emancipation came—education and philanthropy. The recent movement for the higher education of women, the associations for fostering child-study, co-education and the kindergarten, the temperance and various minor movements, furnish ample evidence of capacity for initiative in woman. If we bear in mind that, chronologically, these movements stand in the history of woman's effort where the Crusades, the Reformation, and the Renaissance stood in the history of man, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as time and opportunity bring experience and practice, it will be discovered that initiative in woman was never absent, but merely latent. Already on the governing councils of educational bodies, and on certain bodies engaged in municipal administration, woman shares with honor and distinction in the initiation and moulding of constructive work.

I have already noted woman's superiority in the fundamental virtues and the signs of her improvement in the minor verities. Ceremonial with all its insincerity still exerts its subtle influence over woman. The scoffer says "because woman is foolish." The physiologist says "because woman is woman," that is, "a creature that feels rather than reasons." I venture to traverse both assertions, and ascribe her excess of devotion to ceremonial, whether in life or religion, first to the stunting of her reasoning faculty during a long period of male tyranny, with the consequent intensification of the other—the emotional—side of her human nature. Secondly, I attribute it to the greater purity and naïve innocence of her character—the result of long years of training in the cult of "goodness"—which encourages and enables her to read reality into ceremonial shams and make the most soulless simulacrum a real expression of what it should be, but is not—a real feeling. But the reasoning faculty of woman is no longer stunted. It is nourished assiduously by modern science, which knows not sex. Her

"goodness" is no longer "goody-goodness." The prudery of affected ignorance has given place to the modesty of discreet knowledge. It is now possible for a woman to know the truths of physiology and yet be pure-minded, just as it is now possible for a man to be manly without being coarse. Both sexes are approximating to a modesty which is independent of drapery and, consequently, to an abhorrence and avoidance of shams, of coverings up, of whited sepulchres, of incongruities between the inside and the outside of the cup and platter. The great agent of this approximation has been modern science, which teaches men and women equally to look before they think, to think before they judge, and to judge before they generalize—a serial process which is fatal to hollow ceremonial and florescent shams. In the matter of physical strength and endurance, the rapid entry of woman into the arena of male labor, as soon as the artificial barriers of prejudice were broken down, and her ever-increasing and successful competition with man, show that the levelling up of her physical strength to his—certain temporary functional derangements excepted—is only a matter of time and training.

Everywhere, then, the rapid rise of woman from the characteristics of a depressed existence to those of a free and equal development shows that her inferiority to man is factitious and not inherent—the result merely of artificial restrictions now withdrawn, not the outcome of a poorer raw material which can never take the higher polish that man has acquired and now boasts to be the proof of a superior metal. That woman, then, will one day be and appear, in all but functional peculiarities, mentally, morally, and physically equal to man appears to me to be beyond a doubt. The question is, when will she arrive at this equality? Reasoning with the rule of actuality, no man can mark the point of future time at which this "consummation devoutly to be wished" will be attained. So many lets and hinderances crowd the path of progress. But, measuring by probabilities, if the present rate of woman's development is maintained, the attainment of equality cannot be far distant in the coming centuries. There is in woman's work, as many have noted, a driving earnestness and a conscientious concen-

tration of effort which far transcend the application of man, who likes to move leisurely and with due attention to comfort and relaxation. This deadly earnestness often dries up the sap of humor and stumbles for want of imagination; but its driving force is enormous and enables progress to cover ground in a surprising fashion. Therefore woman will not require all the centuries man has had to attain a proportionate perfection, and thereafter she will overhaul him by leaps and bounds. But, it may be asked, is it not probable that man's rate of progress may be accelerated when the fear of competition becomes present to his imagination, and may he not thus defy woman and retain his present lead? He may; but the probabilities are against it. For man's progress has been steady and natural, and there is no reason to suppose that its velocity could be materially accelerated. Woman's progress, on the other hand, has been "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd," and, now the repression has been suddenly withdrawn, the forward leap of her progress is not unlike the rebound of a new spring that has long been held down against the strong impulse of its potential power. Now she is free, more or less, woman makes haste to reap the fruits of freedom, and her haste will last until she draws level with the rights and powers of man. Then we may hope with confidence—for the grounds of hope are apparent even now—certain elements of her character—whether the product of her sex-individuality or her peculiar fate in the past, it is impossible to say with certainty—will add new elements to the character of man, drawing in exchange new elements to her own. Thereafter, and as a happy consequence, the velocity of their joint progress may exceed that of either in the unregenerate days of sex-prejudice and sex-oppression.

Finally, who will gain most by this equality of the sexes? Surely, man himself; for there is little exaggeration in Otway's panegyric on woman:

> "Nature made thee
> To temper man; we had been brutes without you.
> Angels are painted fair, to look like you;
> There's in you all that we believe of heaven:
> Amazing brightness, purity, and truth,
> Eternal joy, and everlasting love."

Those advantages which the days of woman's suppression gave to man were poor indeed—a little self-complacency, which only detracted from the dignity of his manhood—a little glorification of physical superiority, which was too often associated with intellectual inferiority—a monopoly of avocations, which only loaded him with the burden of himself maintaining his women relatives or seeing them humiliated, like Ruth Pinch, by the mortifications of shabby genteel dependence upon the caprice of insolent vulgarity—or, lastly, the pitiful consciousness of an intellectual superiority, which was daily and hourly revenged by a companionship that could bring neither sympathy, with his aims and aspirations in life, nor help and inspiration in the day of difficulty and defeat. Of all the joys that the emancipation of woman has brought to man, surely none can be greater than that which springs from the life companionship of an intelligent and cultivated wife and the devotion of daughters endowed with all the mental and physical beauties that are developed by modern education in place of the mean aspirations and futile follies of the old days of domesticity and deportment. And when woman has become equal to man, equal in every sense, the charm and happiness of the new companionship will permeate every walk of his life. Let his avocation be the study of "the floor of heaven," that's "thick inlaid with patines of bright gold," a study fraught with the loftiest intellectual suggestion and the charm of an infinite mystery that unfolds a little portion of its wonders day by day and yet remains as vast and incommensurate as ever. How delightful it will be for him to find in the constant companion of his days the rational interest, the intelligent sympathy of a Caroline Herschell, and a help as ready and as valuable as that of any hireling colleague, in place of a vacant look and a puzzled frown, or the irritating indifference of a soul that cannot soar above the price of steak or the misdemeanors of a witless housemaid! How delightful it will be to traverse with a companion of equal intellect and equal culture the glorious treasure-house of history or delve thus aided in the inexhaustible mine of nature! "The soul's armor," says Ruskin, "is never well set to the heart unless a woman's hand has braced it." There is no path now trodden

by man which will not become smoother, brighter, and more richly furnished with the light of imagination, the bloom of sentiment, the vigor of thought, and all that elevates the work of reason above the impulse of instinct, by the companionship of "earth's noblest thing, a woman perfected." The married state, so often now but little removed from a "paidotrophic partnership," where, after the first bloom of passion fades, contempt and bitterness are mitigated only by the pleasures of the lower nature, will more often become, as sometimes it does now, a perfect fusion of differing but equipollent entities. The union of these two will add to the treasure of the state a third more perfect twofold organism, and to the world-forces which are building for posterity the impetus of a mighty stream that springs from the union of two noble tributaries, bearing within its bosom a double fertility and in the sweep of its creating current a more than double power.

XIX

SOCIETY

"THE RÔLE OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY"

BY

LADY MARY PONSONBY

WE have endeavored to look on woman intellectually in her relation to the life of to-day, emotionally in her relation to man. It still remains to consider her in connection with that bewildering organization which she has herself built up and to which, instinctively allowing it precedence over all other social problems, we give the general name of society—the association of human beings of the "upper crust."

In America we have no very clearly established cult of aristocracy. It is true that the newspapers of one great city or another occasionally refer to their own particular set of money or idleness, as "society." But no one of the groups thus distinguished holds any special influence except such as rises from intellect or wealth, of the former of which they have assuredly no monopoly, while the other is usually employed much more effectually outside their circle. In England, on the other hand, a recognized aristocracy has long held assured control of life's best gifts. Lady Mary Ponsonby, herself a firmly established member of this favored class, is therefore appealed to here to explain to us the meaning of this social world, "the ladies' world," in its past, its present, and its future.

THEY were very delightful, those Frenchwomen of the eighteenth century. They were witty, clever, unscrupulous; often very loyal, always very powerful, as acknowledged rulers of their house or *salon*, and of Society. Their political opin-

ions were hopelessly wrong, but not more so than those of the men of the time.

Why did they possess a power denied to their English contemporaries; or rather held by these in far less strength? One might inquire why Society in France in the eighteenth century shows to that of England in the present day so many points of resemblance. It might be diverting, but unforeseen difficulties forbid a close comparison. Differences of tradition, of surroundings, of education are to be met with at every turn; yet the analogy is at moments so exact that it should be possible, by keeping the respective threads of resemblance and dissimilarity clear and untangled, to arrive at a fairly true presentment.

The psychological, physiological, analytical introspective method has been done to death. In studies of this order, even of the first rank, let us say such as M. Bourget's *Cosmopolis* or Mrs. Humphry Ward's *Marcella*, the author acts too much as showman; you cannot get rid of his presence; he or she is forever looking over your shoulder, pointing out how you ought to see this and detect the other. The value of impartiality in an artist has often been pointed out, and this rare quality he best shows by leaving it to the spectator to form his own judgment on what he sees, giving him no clue and pursuing him with no comment. This impartiality is more likely to be ours if we gather our information of a past epoch from contemporary memoirs, letters, and individual sayings, rather than from comments and disquisitions in which the place of critic and exponent takes up too much room. As a rule, however, it must be owned that a French writer rarely over-explains. In England we have improved in this respect, but we are still harassed by the over-explicit writer of biography. It is true, certain young and clever authors are drifting away from this position, perhaps too far, into a "green carnation" and cheaply paradoxical vein of impressional writing; yet the general public likes explanation, and, to please it, explanations rounded with literary platitudes are reeled off. On the stage, this mania for explanation, this craving for diffuse details, produces a still more offensive

state of things. In order that the inevitable and satisfactory *dénouement* should be rightly understood, it has been found sometimes necessary to add an act to an English adaptation of a French play, so that nothing may be left to the intelligence of the audience. But, in the present inquiry, in spite of our wish to leave the ordinary reader to his unbiassed judgment, it is impossible, even in a slight sketch on so knotty and intricate a question as the *rôle* played by women in past and present times, to ignore what has been written by some of our would-be teachers. When, for instance, some few years ago, Mrs. Lynn Linton made a series of fierce but able attacks on the champions of women's rights, she little guessed that that object of her particular scorn—the new woman—would be as extinct as the ichthyosaurus before the end of the nineteenth century, or that the inference she drew points to a source of power in the famous women in the past which, if analyzed, she would have been the first to reject. Mrs. Lynn Linton in her accounts of the women of Rome and Greece admits that their power was, in the main, in proportion to their frailty. This granted—and that there is no way of accounting for it, except by allowing for the different standard of morality then prevalent or by the fact that love in its sensual aspect will ever prove itself the strongest factor in the art of ruling man—then there is an end of the controversy.

This sceptre Frenchwomen wielded almost irresistibly in the eighteenth century. Their reign was still more remarkable in the seventeenth, but, except to glance at the qualities derived by our eighteenth-century friends from their predecessors, we must refrain from dwelling on the never-failing interest and charms of Mesdames de Sévigné, de Lafayette, de Maintenon, etc. The pedantic tone of the Hôtel Rambouillet was gradually abandoned after the appearance of *Les Femmes Savantes* and *Les Précieuses Ridicules*. After a while, nobody in Society durst indulge in long and wordy *jeux d'esprit*. For all that, a shadow of the old pedantry darkened the social sky at intervals. Mazarin's nieces, especially Marie Mancini, Princesse de Colonna, and la Duchesse de Mazarin, brought Italian exaggeration to bear on

French frivolity, and the result was not a happy one; but it is in the picture of the Cour de Sceaux that the acme of stilted and, at the same time, puerile and extravagant artificiality seems to have been reached.

The manner of life of this Court, inspired by the Duchesse du Maine, as described in the memoirs of the day, fully deserves this description. She paid her satellites to be amusing, but amusing in the mode she prescribed. Amused she would be, by day and by night, and every one had to contribute to this hunt for happiness through what would appear to the uninitiated as the very tedious paths of madrigals, sonnets, *bouts-rimés*, in which the little Duchesse appeared sometimes as Venus, sometimes as Minerva, now as a nymph, then as a siren. *On n'avait jamais une heure devant soi pour être bête en paix;* but the lighter recreations of poetical invitations to dinner, of anonymous compliments inserted in a bouquet, of laborious pleasantries which weary the soul even to hear of, began to pall on the *châtelaine* of Sceaux. Acting became the rage, and the indefatigable Duchesse divided her time between the stage and assiduous studies in astronomy, philosophy, and the classics. Needless to say, each pursuit and study was followed under the special guidance of the favorite reigning in that department. Among the Duchesse du Maine's intellectual disciples—let us put it so—she at one time could boast of Voltaire, who, having quarrelled with the authorities, took refuge at Sceaux. He was hidden away in a room apart, with closed shutters, and there he remained for two months. In the daytime he amused himself by writing his *contes*, and during the night he joined the Duchesse and her friends in their celebrations of *les grandes nuits de Sceaux*. These diversions of the Duchesse du Maine appear to have been more innocent than their title would imply. The form this amusement took made so severe a call on the literary capacity of those engaged in it that even scandal finds no place in the record of these nocturnal orgies. All the ardor, misplaced energy, the Duchesse had spent on fruitless political intrigues and small hole-and-corner conspiracies she now diverted to this frantic struggle against *ennui*. Her sleepless-

ness was what led her to turn night into day, and the guests, exhausted with games, madrigal-turning, sonnet-composing, and perhaps, who shall say, love-making, implored with no effect for a moment's peace during the gorgeous breakfasts served to them at sunrise; but the rule held good, in spite of a sleepless night, *de l'esprit, encore de l'esprit, toujours de l'esprit.* With the arrival of Voltaire and Madame du Châtelet the programme was altered, and tragedies, operas, ballets, farces, took the place of less ambitious pastimes. Madame du Châtelet evidently bored Madame du Maine considerably with her mathematics, her translations of Newton's works, her geometrical problems strewn over every available table in the comfortable reception-rooms; so Madame du Maine swept away the learned rubbish and insisted on forcing Madame du Châtelet on to the stage, and making her take an active part in the private theatricals. These, under the new direction, became a scene of indiscriminate social license; Voltaire and Madame du Châtelet inviting every one, known and unknown, to the Théâtre de Sceaux, so that a disturbance took place which threatened to break up the whole concern. Voltaire pleaded, wrote, faltered, and won his way back into favor, begging that the protecting genius, the soul of Corneille, the spirit of the great Condé, would deign to be his literary Egeria; and all ended well. The little Duchesse forgave and retained her star. She pursued her way undaunted, and her seventy-seventh birthday found her still hard at work, amusing herself, vexed now and then at the abrupt departure of some of her friends for the next world, but observing at the same time that after all it was less annoying than to keep her waiting for an entertainment or a card party. Perhaps her rank and her belief in the divinity of royal blood prevented the parties at Sceaux from being quite accurately typical of the artificial and pedantic *salon* which survived long after the Hôtel Rambouillet had been swept away. Be this as it may, one impression is worth noting —that not a trace of the love of the natural to be found even in the most pedantic and pompous moment of the *grand siècle* can be detected in the social atmosphere of Sceaux. We

have seen that some interest in that miniature Court was derived from the flavor and point which Voltaire's sayings and doings always seem to carry with them; but how incapable were the Duchesse du Maine and her friends of the enthusiastic appreciation of Lafontaine by Madame de Sévigné and her friends, Madame de Bouillon, Madame de la Sablière, etc.! Their admiration is more striking than the homage paid him by Molière, Racine, and La Rochefoucauld, who, of course, having *le flair littéraire* in a supreme degree, detected the master poet and writer, in spite of his extraordinary simplicity. Madame de Sévigné and her friends loved him for this simplicity. I do not know whether Madame de Maintenon was one of this group, but she certainly felt the reaction toward the natural and the actual that she is always insisting upon in her correspondence. Here we shake off the long and wordy *jeux d'esprit;* the tedious and rounded periods gave way to short and witty epigrams. These were the direct offpring of La Rochefoucauld's maxims. Women decided it was wicked to be bored. A hushed whisper to this effect soon found its way into the sacred precincts of the Court. Madame de Maintenon, who, it may be shrewdly suspected, put on the airs of a pedant to avoid tiresome functions, gave her rival, Madame de Montespan, enough to do when the latter attempted to answer the governess's sarcasms on the empty silliness of the lives of the courtiers; and Madame de Montespan always got the worst of the encounter.

The good-humored but very distinct aversion of Madame de Sévigné to bores inspired some of her wittiest letters and her most brilliant epigrams. The joyousness of her tone (Ninon de Lenclos said of her wit, "La joie de l'esprit en fait la force"[1]) took the sting out of the dart. She gave the word in favor of brightness and she damned heaviness. The notes of her friend Madame de Lafayette on La Rochefoucauld outdid his very maxims in brevity and pith, and very good advice these ladies gave their friends on style. Madame de Coigny, in a letter to Mademoiselle X——, "lui recommande de prendre des notes sur la lecture"; "d'écrire ses pensées c'est

[1] "The joy of wit makes its power."

une façon de savoir si on est bête. . . . Penser ses lectures, ne pas lire comme si on mangeait des cerises."[1] Their games even had become racy and amusing. One of the most diverting was the game of portraits, when each member of an assembled company, after taking the oath of sincerity, was bound to write a truthful account of himself in a few lines. To relate the disputes and corrections evolved by these worded portraits would take us too far from our present purpose.

It is easy to see that the ground for the reign of fair women of the eighteenth century was well prepared. The rule of *la parfaite bonne compagnie* was established in the absence of all moral law, and became an authority from which there was no appeal. The note of perfect and sincere politeness, the distinction in speech, manner, and expression, became a kind of freemasonry protecting the admitted members from any intrusion from without. The acquirements of a perfect manner may seem but a trivial aim; but when we find the code of rules to be observed to include delicacy of touch in dealing with the feelings of others, a readiness of perception as to what would cause offence, the avoidance of all unnecessary friction, the art of praising without flattery, of showing off the merits of others without appearing to protect them; and if you add to these characteristics the charm of ease and naturalness, and the feeling that air, manner, and speech combine to convey graceful and intelligent kindness, you feel inclined to agree with the author quoted by the De Goncourts who compared the spirit of good society at that time with the spirit of charity, a bold comparison, a little in the way of a very modern saying that defines "tact as inspiration in small things."

And so this code of gentle manners and conduct, rigorously enforced, supported the more important fabric of the law of honor—the law from which there is no appeal, the last religion of France. From the grand utterance, "Tout est perdu fors l'honneur," to the present day there have been

[1] "Would suggest taking notes of one's reading; to write one's thoughts is a way to see if one is stupid. . . . Think over your reading, do not read as if you were eating cherries."

doubtless violations of that code; and it is, perhaps, ridiculed by those who would rather sneer at it than account for it. In England and in France to-day it is running some risk of extinction from the worship of money, but human nature as we find it in the average gentleman has still an unconscious love of the ideal as represented in the point of honor. In England we prefer the men found dead with the colors of their regiment wrapped around them, to the reformers who cynically advise the disuse of the flag as a useless colored rag. In France, in spite of the destructives who are ready to cry "À bas la patrie! À bas l'honneur!" the current opinion of honest men flows in the opposite direction. The view that the complaisant husband is the lowest animal extant, that to be mercenary in love is vile, that to hold up even the caprice of a woman to the ridicule of one's friends is ignominious, is still held, as a matter of course, by men of honor, at the same time that they are unconscious of the source from which it springs. It is a truth of all time that men are slow to recognize what they owe to beliefs they may have shaken off, but which control their instincts, after the expression of such beliefs in set form has ceased to compel their assent and to embody their convictions.

In the eighteenth century the code of honor was enforced in vigorous and uncompromising terms, and it is for this reason that we find it regulating the lives of women strongly, if indirectly. In some respects it might seem that the honor of women had never been so lightly regarded, and that unbounded license reigned supreme; but, if we look more closely into the matter, we shall find it not exactly true. To generalize in this way would be as misleading as if, looking back still further, we were to regard the rough and brutal manners in the days of La Fronde as the essential feature of the time. At first sight it seems difficult to believe that the code of honor and morality of the heroes and heroines of that day was based upon a strong belief in themselves. But so it was. The "Gentleman," as he is called in Marguerite de Navarre's heptameron, never doubted that success in love, be it ever so unlawful, must be accomplished, and the lady's consent

was rarely questioned; but if she proved severely virtuous, death made the disappointed lover interesting for all time. The crudities, even the indecencies, were never vicious, and the whole atmosphere was charged with more vitality and strength than can be found with their descendants two hundred years later.

But, in judging the standard of conduct in the days of these descendants, we must allow as broad a margin for the spirit of the times as we find ourselves giving their predecessors. Let us take their views on marriage. In marriage, in the eighteenth century, there was little conception of a solemnity, still less of a sacrament. In exceptional instances, in the days of the Marguerites of Navarre and Valois, we find the atmosphere of crime and license lightened by redeeming traits of high loyalty and devotion, and by a distinct note of poetry and religion; but no such gleams illumined their descendants; yet we must allow that a conventional sense of honor persisted, and it led to curious contradictions in its application. The *mariage de convenance et non d'inclination* was as much the rule of good French society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a rule admitted and applauded, as it is, in spite of denials and disclaimers, in the England of to-day.

Examples show that there was observed a code of honor in dishonor as it were, an unwritten law the breaking of which brought the inevitable penalty of ostracism. The limits of a husband's forbearance were strictly defined, and the net result of the restraint which the necessity of keeping up appearances entailed was that a mystery of romance environed a woman who was known to live a separate existence from the man whose name she bore. A passion faithful and deep might be found to be the key to all that was best in her existence. Some, no doubt, were shameless, but they derived from *les femmes galantes* of the sixteenth century; and even among these, recklessness, but not commonness, was the main factor in their adventurous lives. Some were simply excellent and devoted wives, like the Duchesse de Choiseul, who had never, she said, been able to conceive greater perfection in mind or body than could be found in her very fickle lord.

It was the prerogative of the mother, and the mother alone, to direct the conduct not only of her daughters, but of her sons. A young man, says M. de Ségur, who failed in respectful attention to a woman, or to a man older than himself, knew that the fact would be reported to his mother that very evening. I forget whether it was the Duc de Nivernais or the Prince de Ligne who, upon being asked his permission by his sons to organize a *fête champêtre* or some such entertainment, pointed to their disordered dress after a day's chase and said: "When you have made yourselves fit to enter your mother's apartment and have obtained her leave, I will confirm it."

And so the rule of women became the principle on which rested, not only the government of the family, but also the control of the State. The spontaneous and natural note which strikes one in all these women did and said, the right royal power they wielded by reason of the high level of their intelligence—this power acknowledged by all and justifying their unbounded ambition—had for its foundation charm and strength; but charm gradually fades and strength becomes weakness in the downward course. The proceedings at the Court of Sceaux show the dark side of the picture, and it is painful to discern the beginning of the bad taste, the exaggeration, and the other symptoms of disordered brains which, as the century waxed older, seemed to characterize the bewildered women who succeeded the refined, intelligent *spirituelles*, though often profligate ladies, whose education was begun at the Convent of L'Abbaye-aux-Bois. The woman who could reign undisputed over husband, lover, or king was unable to cope with the attack on Society by the new destructive forces of the intellectual world, and fell into a more and more hopeless condition and became a helpless prey to her nerves. The feverish pursuit of pleasure, the ceaseless round of gatherings, brilliant and pointed with wit, but desperately exhausting in the long run, filled every hour of the day and night, and led, needless to say, to the worst form of reaction, the falling back on self and finding nothing there. Hence the demon, called by them in their despair *l'ennemi*, took up

his abode in them. The secret enemy, the incurable complaint, the unconquerable and ever-present foe they dragged smilingly about with them. This foe became the motive power of all their exertions, of all their ill-nature, and of their love of scandal; this gave zest to their intrigues, for to believe themselves amused, they thought, might shake off the obsession. But no, they could not escape it; the disgust of self, of friends, of society, even of solitude, persisted.

La grande ennuyée, Madame du Deffand, tells us that the bore of solitude is the most overwhelming and crushing form of *ennui*. This downward course was marked by stages which have a strange likeness to phases of social life in England at the present day. The description of these vagaries appears in most of the letters and memoirs of that day. MM. de Goncourt have perhaps collected more material than any other modern author on the mode of life of the eighteenth-century *fin-de-siècle* women. One of the points they insist on is the dryness of spirit and want of heart preceding the outbursts of maudlin sentimentality and affectation of tenderness which became the fashion; also the exaggerated manifestations of friendship between women. Hymns to friendship, altars to friendship, eternal vows of constancy became the vogue; also an exchange of love tokens, of colored emblematic knots, etc., the messenger employed to convey these being some effeminate man, who, content with the gossiping companionship of the young married woman, made it often his business to prepare the way for another's more signal success in rousing interest to the point of a real serious *liaison*. The path the young woman followed is defined with clearness. In the beginning, an absorbing friendship taken up at first as a means of showing off a conquest before rivals; this languished, and all of a sudden became unattractive when the little man's visits found her alone with no public to admire her triumph. We are assuming, of course, that she had not the faintest inclination to flirt in earnest with her companion; but if the man was skilful the moment quickly came when a mere friendly gossip gradually led to intimate discussion on the ways of love, the absurdities of husbands, with

compromising confidences and vainglorious hints on the part of the would-be lover, followed by more or less naïve admissions of former successes from the newly married lady. Often she was wholly unconscious of danger, had no evil intention; but the spark of coquetry, never very difficult to kindle into flame, would suddenly take fire, her imagination would be stirred, and gradually the harmless badinage and fun would take another aspect, and another guileless spirit would be plunged into fathomless trouble. It is not very clear whether MM. de Goncourt, who give us the most interesting examples of these semi-platonic love affairs, think the devoted woman friend or the complaisant *chien-de-poche* kind of man the more dangerous confidant. What they have no doubt about appears to be that religion, marriage, and love are equally powerless to influence these eighteenth century-ladies. Exceptional devotion in religion, deep attachment in marriage, and passionate loyalty in love are to be found in the seventeenth century, but no trace of anything of the kind can be detected in the eighteenth. Happiness in religion was out of date; a well regulated aspect of mild devotion at Mass was held to be part of good manners, even with the indifferent and the sceptical, and it was easier to assume that aspect than to scoff. Happiness in marriage, said Society, was ridiculous and distinctly plebeian. Happiness in love was unknown, and a *grande passion*, whether fortunate or the reverse, was foolishness. All three—religion, marriage, and love—would, in the current language of the time, prove to be "le néant."

The utter absence of naturalness that we have noted before became more and more accentuated; not a trace of real feeling, not a breath of freshness, not a gleam of light could be detected in this loaded atmosphere in which poor human beings groped, seeking vainly to find they knew not what, and drifting vainly toward their melancholy end. Of course this state of things reacted on the physical condition of these women. They suffered acutely from weakness, overstrung nerves, melancholia, and vapors. "Les vapeurs c'est l'ennui," said Madame d'Epinay; and this although the sufferers were spared neither ridicule nor epigrams, and their imagi-

nary ills were branded as affectations and exaggerations. A more acute observer[1] suggests that they were simply suffering intensely from the great malady of over-civilization, the increase of nervous disease, secret hypochondria, and, above all, from the terrible curse of that mysterious evil hysteria. The doctors now came upon the scene and insisted upon a change of *régime*. This somewhat modified the evil, and a more wholesome programme ensued. Fresh air was prescribed by the great Doctor Tronchin,[2] and to dig in the gardens, to take violent exercise, to pursue some object, and to work at some occupation hitherto unknown became the order of the day; and these pursuits were undertaken with the feverish excitement Society women had formerly shown in ransacking their gay world in search of a new amusement or a new distraction. The study of science, of natural history, of physics, even of metaphysics, filled the days and nights in the place of coquettish rivalries, of every form of amusement, and of the very fanaticism of pleasure. The mad appetite for pleasure was succeeded by an equal ardor for knowledge, and it is evident there was as little reality in this new search for happiness as there had been in the old. We no longer find the fair ladies affecting languor and exhaustion, perhaps having persuaded, as somebody said Madame d'Estarbey did, the doctor to bleed them, to give their looks a kind of delicate and sentimental interest; but their very attitude was changed. See, we now find them in a costume of stern simplicity, pale, with no trace of rouge, their eyes heavy with fatigue from brain work, the brow resting carelessly on the right hand, with a general look of undisturbed attention. This was, indeed, a new picture, and when at last they were roused they were no longer to be found as of yore flitting from fair to opera, from jewellers' to milliners' shops. Now courses of political study, of philosophical systems, of scientific theories, took up the spare hours, and, scarcely less exhausted than they had been before with frivolity, they slept but a few hours, to resume next day their arduous and self-imposed task.

[1] See *Mémoires de la Comtesse de Boufflers.*

[2] See *Les Sports de l'Ancienne France* by Jusserand.

And now we must leave our French friends, and with regret we do so. There is something pathetic in the way those who formed French Society hastened on to their doom, in a wholly unconscious way. They had no suspicion of the coming catastrophe. It was as well they did not foresee the Reign of Terror; but when it came they met their fate courageously.

We must now turn to the English compeers of the Frenchwomen of the seventeenth century. Here, till we get to the crucial point of the comparison, we shall find the task of sustaining the interest somewhat difficult. For it cannot be denied that the Frenchwomen of the seventeenth century were more interesting than the ancestors of the Englishwomen of the eighteenth. During the epochs under notice, the eighteenth century in France and the nineteenth in England, the charm as in the seventeenth century remains with France until we get to the end of both centuries, when the likeness between the women of the two centuries became very close. At their best the English of the eighteenth century seems to be too nearly a replica of their French contemporaries to be very arresting; but it is worth considering how a certain view of tradition derived from the latter can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century. There is also the temptation to linger over contemporary letters and memoirs, of which we have a good supply. Horace Walpole, dealing out his criticism and sharpening his wit on Lady Mary W. Montagu's ugly manners and Lady Craven's spitefulness, brings into full light many details of these ladies' lives they little guessed would ever see the light. This rather adds to the pleasure of reading what they carefully prepared for publication, for one does so with a liberal discount. There are moments when Lady Mary fearlessly exposes the follies of foreign Courts. "One foundation of these everlasting disputes," she writes, "turns entirely upon rank, place, and the title of Excellency"; and in other letters she gives a graphic description of the follies and futilities of English society, concerning which she seems to show more insight than her celebrated censor. And the same may be said of Lady Craven, who, however, was by no

means on the same level as her rival; but if she failed, as Horace Walpole said she did, to understand Lady Mary's best points, she was her equal in accurate delineation. For instance, in her letters to the Margrave of Anspach, whom she afterward married, she speaks of the misrule of the unspeakable Turk, of the discomfort and absurd ceremonials of the small Italian Courts; and the whole of her correspondence is seasoned with a fine insular savor of admiration for British freedom and British comfort, expressed in forcible and epigrammatic terms. Horace Walpole might, with his exaggeration and cosmopolitanism and his surrender through old Madame du Deffand, to French influence, almost have envied Lady Craven. And so it was with others in the same Society —Lady Cowper, Mrs. Montague, and a long way after them Mrs. West and others. They give one the same impression of possessing considerable cultivation and fine manners, but with stilted tediousness. Of the vein of Puritanism which had certainly permeated the middle class and the more retired upper class, as is shown in Rachel Lady Russell's and Lady Herbert's letters, etc., traces still remain in English Society. But it takes the light and air out of the subject, and confirms the impression that neither by way of contrast nor of likeness can the women of the eighteenth century in France be compared with those of the same epoch in England.

Before we reach our friends of to-day we must give a glance at their immediate predecessors, their mothers and grandmothers; and the experience of anyone with half a century's experience ought to be useful in helping us to see Society in the first part of this century as it really was. The great Whig Houses had much to say in the training of the smart world of those days. The traditions of perfect manners, lax morality, political shrewdness, excellence of taste, unrivalled skill in holding a *salon*, were handed down from mother to daughter, till the ebb of the tide set in during the fifties; then it is curious to observe the decline of each of these traditions. Who does not remember, if he is old enough, the courtesy without patronage, the gentleness to inferiors, the rigorous but perfectly natural bearing, which never failed, however morality or re-

ligion might fare in the days of his grandmothers? When I was a child it appeared to me impossible to believe that there could be any other way of getting old but that with which I was familiar. But, full of point and amusement as were her sayings, merciless as she was to false fine ladyism, swift and cutting as were her caustic, witty snubs to both old and young, yet I feel when I look back that old Lady G—— must have been a milder reproduction of the preceding generation; for the disintegrating forces of the French Revolution were at work in England, and a woman whose husband knew his Voltaire and Rousseau by heart found the Whig edition of liberalism strongly tinged with ideas which could revolutionize in a bloodless way the exclusive aristocratic upper classes; while the middle classes were protected by the Puritan influence from this disturbing agent.

And so it came about that the puzzled, restless phase which came over French society at the end of the eighteenth century began to undermine English society in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth in a dull respectable way; manners became democratized, *salons* lost their prestige because the entertainer no longer believed in herself. Of a group of *salons* which still held their own fifty years ago, Lady Palmerston's was the most successful and the most powerful politically, because the widest and the most cosmopolitan. Her charm and great distinction were unhampered by any shade of strictness. She had a delightful *naïveté* in the choice of her political agents that would make us smile now. "I think," she would say, "I shall send the Flea to Rotten Row (a certain little Mr. Fleming, who had the art *de se faufiler partout*), to report to me what the feeling of the country is on last night's debate." Her two daughters, Lady Shaftesbury and the incomparably witty Lady Jocelyn, helped her not a little.

Lady Granville's *salon* was of a different sort—more exclusive, much more affected, and frequented by foreigners. She had the French gift of receiving without effort. Sitting at work with a shaded lamp near her, she would call out with a word from among those passing through to the tea-room

a friend with whom she wished to talk, and one always longed to hear what she was saying, for the friend on the sofa looked very happy and much amused; even "the lodger," Charles Greville, who lived on the floor above in Bruton Street, thawed in that corner. Of course, there was the immense advantage of the presence of the master of the house, who, with his wonderful instinct for society, rapidly arranged and rearranged groups, so that a bore, if such were admitted by mistake, found himself neutralized by being handed to some one fully capable of dealing with him. Lady Palmerston, Lady Granville, and Lady Holland may be said to be the last charming *mondaines convaincues*, who never doubted what they should do and say to maintain their power. They sometimes indulged in an inner circle of intimate (small) dinners and tails to dinners, but, on the whole, devoted themselves mainly to the interest of "the party," and received all—and a very long list it was—with the most perfect manner, which was simply no manner at all. Each guest, young and old, left the house with the conviction that special attention and marked sympathy had been shown to him.

The later attempts to fill this *rôle*, the *grande dame* holding a *salon*, were not successful. Strawberry Hill had in Frances Lady Waldegrave's reign a reputation of its own. As a country house it was an amusing one to go to, though her receptions were a little too much of a scramble for it to be distinguished in its *façon d'être*. The generous qualities of the hostess and the mixed character of her guests made up a whole which, as a feature of the epoch, has a special value. Yet, as a *salon*, held by a *grande dame*, it was beside the mark. The strings were beginning to get tangled and to respond no longer to the hand that played with them with a political purpose, and it failed, in spite of skilful combinations and strong personal influence. In later attempts the failure was still more marked; to watch the pulling at bell-wires that rang no bells became to the looker-on oppressive and sometimes ludicrous. Before we leave the last of the *salons* for duller company, there is one personality who ought to find a place in a sketch, however slight, of the world in which

Lady Palmerston and Lady Granville reigned supreme. Lady William Russell did not attempt to hold a *salon;* she spent much of her time abroad, and, when she came to England, lived in the simplest foreign way, her establishment consisting of few servants beyond her courier and her maid. But, though not attempting the *rôle* of hostess, she was almost indispensable at the *salons* of her friends, and still more so at the small *recherché* dinners which were the fashion among the *crême de la crême.* She was by far the strongest personnality of that time, a powerful woman, powerful to violence. (So said rumor.) To the fascination which strength of character gives its owner she added the charm of being so free from insularity and provincialism that many people were puzzled as to her nationality. Each country claimed her as its own. A Parisian was at once arrested by her wittily expressed appreciation of both ancient and modern *régime*, of both solid and frivolous literature in France. Then she might be heard talking to the German Ambassador on abstruse political questions; she was equally able, in the purest Tuscan, to discuss with an Italian cardinal the latest news from the Vatican. All this without the slightest pose or effort. She brought up her three sons in a way of her own, utterly unlike any English system of education ever heard of. A Catholic herself, she hated the priest, and wished to have only inscribed on her grave: "The mother of Hastings, Odo, and Arthur."

We must leave these interesting personalities and pass on to a very dull epoch, glancing on the way at the theological High Church phase kindly interpreted by Miss Sewell and Miss Yonge. An ideal founded on the inculcation of obedience to the Church, instilled in brothers and cousins from Oxford, gave the more intelligent of the young women in the fifties some perception of what culture might imply; but its pursuit was on the whole uninteresting, still more so were the lives of their frivolous sisters, made up as they were mainly of a great deal of silliness, of love of dress that didn't result in good dress, of flirtations with no background of wit, vice sometimes having its turn at the wheel; but even the vice of that period was dull.

We have arrived at the point at which we may consider the question with which we started—what is common to the Frenchwomen of the eighteenth century and the English of the nineteenth—and this misgiving arises. Are not the dissimilarities so marked as to destroy all resemblance? Yet it is the one interesting point in the study, so the doubt must be conquered. An additional difficulty lies in the avoidance of any portrait-painting. Just as the *roman à clef* is generally very poor art, so in an essay, however unpretending, it would be odious to bolster up the interest by dealing with distinct personalities and not with types. Time is pressing, and some one else said the other day, *à propos* of the expression, "Now the psychological moment has arrived." You are talking as they did in the early nineties, and the types change before your very eyes.

Why, ten or fifteen years ago we had the academic fad. The higher education of women was the cry. It touched Society vaguely: Lady So-and-so was determined to send her daughters to Girton of Newnham. The ordinary English and even French governesses were made to wince when comparisons were made between the effect of their teaching and the result of a college course. In many a middle or professional home it came as a solution to the dreary problem of how the girls of the family were to earn their bread, besides giving them the unexpected joy of finding their brains to be undoubtedly fit for something. Those who hate academic training in either men or women railed at the *naïf* belief that to follow the exact curriculum which produced such poor results in men would advance the general status of women. Its evident narrowness and want of elasticity could not strike the enthusiastic promoters of the higher education. Enthusiasts are usually found to be without a sense of humor, and the inefficiency and defects of the women's colleges were scarcely apparent even to outsiders, who were, if in sympathy with the movement, too full of admiration for the wonderful energy and zeal, the untiring and self-denying devotion, of the founders, to find it in their hearts to criticise. They did not observe the deteriorating effect of the strain of over-work

during the growing years of the young girls who were forced into competition with strong men, the majority of whom cared not to beat them. Every faculty was bent to the task of obtaining marks. Commercially it answered to send such well-equipped teachers into the market, and this, in a way, met one of the pressing wants of the day. But later, in the homes of the intelligent classes, this practical solution was before long pronounced to be inadequate, and disappointment was felt by the parents of the very hard, trenchant, cut-and-dried young prig who returned from time to time to the home she had learned to contemn.

Now, the colleges have proved that they have to deal with influences more potent even than ignorance. In Society the ineradicable love of dress and the eternal power of physical beauty prevented at any time any great warmth of enthusiasm in the direction of intellectual training. Men disliked it. They had been used to the toy and doll's house theory. Useless to quote women of past ages; neither men nor women had imagination enough to see that, with all their weaknesses, not to speak of their vices, the women of the Middle Ages were a superior kind of animal to the average Englishwoman of the last decade of the nineteenth century.

The cult of the Virgin Mary in the Middle Ages did far more to raise the status of women than any other cause at work since the age of chivalry, and the efforts toward intellectual discipline in our day are futile in comparison. Still these efforts indirectly affected later developments of women's energies, and may play a more considerable part in the history of the woman of the twentieth century than we expect at present.

The "new woman" followed the student, but was gradually demolished by common consent, and the artillery spent in her destruction some ten years ago by such opponents as Mrs. Lynn Linton, of the *Saturday Review*, was rather a waste of force.

So quickly do we move on in these days, so rapidly do different ideals and different ways and customs start into life and follow each other, that what was a true description of

society two or three years ago may be an inaccurate picture now. Yet I believe that some members of each of these older groups survive in the present day. Such as those who led society before, in the main lead now; in so far as they do not, it is due to the uneasiness, very like that prevailing at the end of the eighteenth century that is beginning to show itself. The novelty of playing at intellectualism is beginning to lose its charm. Those who are born intellectual or have inherited literary aptitudes remain in a way masters of the situation. There are not many of these, and even they are amused by the desperate recklessness of experiment that seems to be not only a reaction against conventionality, but to result from a mad desire to exhaust every form of amusement, and indeed of vice. The husband-snatching, the lover-snatching—in short, the open profligacy—becomes unattractive because nobody is shocked. Gambling is resorted to, but that is such an exclusive passion that it protects its votaries from destruction by other forms of vice. In some cases the quality of attention required of the gambler is intermittently applied to other aims, and the scholar gambler is in a fair way to become a type. What remains? The Kingdom of Bore. We have seen how the Frenchwomen, *fin du 18ième siècle*, after exhausting every form of excitement, were found calling out for the *néant;* and the parallel is curiously close and suggestive. But history, as we know, does not actually repeat itself, and those Frenchwomen gave up trying to understand the days they lived in. There was a feeling of storm in the air that oppressed them, and whose cause they had neither the mental nor moral equipment to discern. So they sat and waited to see what would come, and the great storm did come and swept them all away before they had had time to understand it. Here such a storm may or may not come; should it come, it would be met more intelligently—who knows? perhaps guided and directed; but what would be the outcome it is idle to try to predict. The older generation sometimes amuse themselves by conjecturing what *régime* will follow the present.

Several thousand years ago the form of confession pre-

scribed by the Egyptian priests was a negative pronouncement—I have not stolen, murdered, etc., and so on, leaving the Deity to infer what sins have been committed. We might take the hint and find that a negative position has more chance of holding its own than a positive assertion, and the humble but definite aim of searching for facts, not theories, may prove a successful mode of arriving at something like a conclusion. I believe that the woman of the twentieth century will *not* in any way resemble the platforming, noisy, aggressive ladies of the advanced school, who may themselves be traced to the terrible new woman who afflicted us for a short time; but I also believe that the extinct woman—like Ibsen's master-builder's wife, Mrs. Solness—who threatened at one time to be rehabilitated by the force of reaction, has no chance at all of reincarnation. Nor do I think the *courtisane de haut étage* doubled with the philanthropist is a type that will commend itself to English opinion, for the men held in bondage by her are seldom those on the first line. Nor will the scholar and purely literary woman, or the *grande dame* who dabbles in literature, science, and art, and leads a charming life of eclecticism, æstheticism, and many other isms, prevail, for none of these are adequate; they are not the size, as an American would say. Our successors will insist on something built on a larger and wider conception of life, a type higher and nobler, and therefore more fascinating; for, after all, there seems to be lacking in the very distinct types I have tried to sketch that great quality of charm which is all too absent from the ordinary Englishwoman.

Charm! who can define it? It is an essence, a mystery; it rules in spite of vice and wickedness, not by reason of them. From Helen of Troy to Mary Stuart, the women who charmed look out through the mist of centuries with their "basilisk eyes," and arrest even now those who would, if they could, resist their fascination. Who that has seen Sarah Bernhardt as Cleopatra slowly stepping from the barge toward Anthony, with the simple words in the golden voice, "Je suis la Reine d'Egypte!" who that has felt with Swinburne that Mary Stuart's cold cruelty prevailed not with Chastelard, for with

her Ronsard in hand he met death with joy so that he might see that beautiful wicked face once more; who that has felt the power of these and other instances (why should we multiply them?) will deny that there is here an inscrutable secret? Baffled we *must* ever be if we try to explain the mystery. We feel it, though we cannot analyze it. But we should beware of one pitfall. In this, as in all mysteries, we have an instance of a duality which cannot be overlooked. It is easy enough to consider only one side of the question. Take the physical side alone: it does not require the lore of a Brantôme or a Boccaccio to point out that, if we do not acknowledge the power of beauty over the senses, we shall go terribly astray. But is this all? Surely the other aspect of the mystery inevitably must be met. The wit, the intellectual fire, the quickness of apprehension, what would sensual beauty be without these? Take them together, and you feel what magnetic charm may be, though you cannot explain it. The number of those who possess the secret is not so great in the present day that we need fear the subjugation of the entire race of man in the twentieth century. The exceptions to the commonplace must always be few.

Rare instances may exist now. Let us be thankful for them, as we are for genius, and turn our attention to the future woman. The future woman! There are many burning questions she will help to disentangle, but we cannot touch upon them here. Probably the improvement in her economic conditions may, as the Americans foresee, effect wonders. But I shall be told that I have for my ideal something made up of Vittoria Colonna, Diane de Poitiers, and Miss Nightingale. No, my aim is much more humble. I dream of a possible woman having something of the frank, fearless grace, the self-reliant daring, the open-air freedom of the Englishwoman of the past. Give her also charm and sympathy and capability of deep passion, and we may find . . . but, if I do not take care I shall begin to predict, and I have promised not to do so.

XX

THE CHILD

"THE BEGINNING OF THE MIND"

BY

H. G. WELLS

ARE our children getting the very best training possible for those trials of life which they, like the rest of us, must one day face? To every father and mother that question ranks high among the most important. Even some of us who are not parents may, perhaps, have recognized the value of the question as bearing on the future of the world, and may be willing to give the subject closer consideration. Is it possible that the way of the beast with its cub is not the best way? that intellect is better than instinct in the raising of the human young? The Indian mother lashed her pappoose upon her back, and there it hung, to live or to die as chance might fall, as the Great Spirit willed. We have rejected "instinct," in that aspect at least, and summon intellect in the guise of learned doctors to advise us as to every step in our darling's physical career. But in matters of mentality, so far as babies are concerned, we still cling to the blind method of instinct. The child learns what it can, what chance dictates, though these things may easily mean life or death to its mental and its moral being.

Perchance we have only acted thus at hazard because along these lines science has offered us no positive guide. Physicians for the mind and soul have no such assured authority among us, no such positive facts upon which to act, as have their brethren of the body. Each of us therefore, however unwilling and incompetent, feels himself compelled to assume the responsibility

of the judge, and to do for his children what to him seems good. With most of us, it is to be feared, this results merely in letting things drift till the child is old enough to go to school. Then as the little one begins its second birth into the world of books, we marvel to find its character already partly formed. It is, we say, a bright child or a determined one. It has caught—feeble verb vividly suggestive of our own sense of haphazard helplessness—it has caught some ideas quickly, others it has failed to assimilate. Heredity, which accuses our ancestors equally with ourselves, is a so much more comfortable explanation to offer for the youngster's failures, than to blame them upon our own ignorance, misguidance, and neglect.

Fortunately, for our recently awakening consciences, science begins to investigate this subject along with others. The whole problem is as yet at an elementary stage; but no suggestions have been advanced more valuable than those of Mr. H. G. Wells. Mr. Wells, who first became known to most of us some dozen years ago as a writer of fantastic tales about the future, has gradually, with deepening interest in the social problems he portrayed, abandoned the story-telling part of his books and plunged ever more thoughtfully and earnestly into their philosophic side. To-day he stands among the most vigorous and most advanced of our social teachers, an "Associé de l'Institut International de Sociologie." *He preaches a "New Republicanism," to which he makes occasional reference below. His "New Republicans" are to devote themselves to the future and ignore the past, to bind themselves not to any single land, but to a league of new thought and higher purpose extending through all lands. Perhaps these ideas are fanciful, but nothing could be more practical than his approach to the practical problem of the conditions which do and which should surround the child.*

THE newborn child is at first no more than an animal. Indeed, it is among the lowest and most helpless of all animals, a mere vegetative lump; assimilation incarnate—wailing. It is for the first day in its life deaf, it squints blindly at the world, its limbs are beyond its control, its hands clutch drowningly

at anything whatever that drifts upon this vast sea of being into which it has plunged so amazingly. And imperceptibly, subtly, so subtly that never at any time can we mark with certainty the increment of its coming, there creeps into this soft and claimant little creature a mind, a will, a personality, the beginning of all that is real and spiritual in man. In a little while there are eyes full of interest and clutching hands full of purpose, smiles and frowns, the babbling beginning of expression and affections and aversions. Before the first year is out there are obedience and rebellion, choice and self-control, speech has commenced, and the struggle of the newcomer to stand on his feet in this world of men. The process is unanalyzable; given a certain measure of care and protection, these things come spontaneously, with the merest rough encouragement of things and voices about the child they are evoked.

But every day the inherent impulse makes a larger demand upon the surroundings of the child, if it is to do its best and fullest. Obviously, quite apart from physical consequences, the environment of a little child may be good or bad, better or worse for it in a thousand different ways. It may be distracting or over-stimulating, it may evoke and increase fear, it may be drab and dull and depressing, it may be stupefying, it may be misleading and productive of vicious habits of mind. And our business is to find just what is the best possible environment, the one that will give the soundest and fullest growth, not only of body, but of intelligence.

Now from the very earliest phase the infant stands in need of a succession of interesting things. At first these are mere vague sense impressions, but in a month or so there is a distinct looking at objects; presently follow reaching and clutching, and soon the little creature is urgent for fresh things to see, handle, hear, fresh experiences of all sorts, fresh combinations of things already known. The newborn mind is soon as hungry as the body. And if a healthy well-fed child cries, it is probably by reason of this unsatisfied hunger, it lacks an interest, it is *bored*, that dismal vacant suffering that punishes the failure of things living to live fully and completely. As

Mr. Charles Booth has pointed out in his *Life and Labor of the People*, it is probable that in this respect the children of the relatively poor are least at a disadvantage. The very poor infant passes its life in the family room, there is a going and coming, an interesting activity of domestic work on the part of its mother, the preparation of meals, the intermittent presence of the father, the whole gamut of its mother's unsophisticated temper. It is carried into crowded and eventful streets at all hours. It participates in pothouse soirées and assists at the business of shopping. It may not lead a very hygienic life, but it does not lead a dull one. Contrast with its lot that of the lonely child of some woman of fashion, leading its beautifully non-bacterial life in a carefully secluded nursery under the control of a virtuous, punctual, invariable, conscientious rather than emotional nurse. The poor little soul wails as often for events as the slum baby does for nourishment. Into its gray nursery there rushes every day, or every other day, a breathless, preoccupied, excessively dressed, cleverish, many-sided, fundamentally silly, and universally incapable woman, vociferates a little conventional affection, slaps a kiss or so upon her offspring, and goes off again to collect that daily meed of admiration and cheap envy which is the gusto of her world. After that gushing, rustling, incomprehensible passage, the child relapses into the boring care of its bored hireling for another day. The nurse writes her letters, mends her clothes, reads and thinks of the natural interests of her own life, and the child is "good" just in proportion to the extent to which it doesn't "worry."

The ideal environment should contain the almost constant presence of the mother, for no one is so likely to be constantly various and interesting and so untiring as she. It is entirely on account of this ideal environment that monogamy finds its practical sanction, because it insures the presiding mother the maximum of security and self-respect. A woman who enjoys the full rights of a wife without a complete discharge of the duties of motherhood profits by the imputation of things she has failed to perform. To secure an ideal environment for children in as many cases as possible is the second of the

two great practical ends—the first being sound births, for which the rules of sexual morality exist.

The ideal environment should no doubt centre about a nursery—a clean, airy, brightly lit, brilliantly adorned room, into which there should be a frequent coming and going of things and people; but from the time the child begins to recognize objects and individuals it should be taken for little spells into other rooms and different surroundings. In the homely, convenient, servantless abode over which the able-bodied, capable, skilful, civilized women of the future will preside, the child will naturally follow its mother's morning activities from room to room. Its mother will talk to it, chance visitors will sign to it. There should be a public or private garden available where its perambulator could stand in fine weather; and its promenades should not be too much a matter of routine. To go along a road with some traffic is better for a child than to go along a secluded path between hedges; a street corner is better than a laurel plantation as a pitch for perambulators.

When a child is five or six months old it will have got a certain use and grip with its hands, and it will want to handle and examine and test the properties of as many objects as it can. Gifts begin. There seems scope for a wiser selection in these early gifts. At present it is chiefly woolly animals with bells inside them, woolly balls, and so forth, that reach the baby's hands. There is no reason at all why a child's attention should be so predominantly fixed on wool. These toys are colored very tastefully, but as Preyer has advanced strong reasons for supposing that the child's discrimination of colors is extremely rudimentary until the second year has begun, these tasteful arrangements are simply an appeal to the parent. Light, dark, yellow, perhaps red and "other colors" seem to constitute the color system of a very young infant. It is to the parent, too, that the humorous and realistic quality of the animal forms appeal. The parent does the shopping and has to be amused. The babyish parent who really ought to have a doll instead of a child is sufficiently abundant in our world to dominate the shops, and there is a vast traffic in facetious baby toys, facetious nursery furniture,

"art" cushions and "quaint" baby clothing, all amazingly delightful things for grown-up people. These things are bought and grouped about the child, the child is taught tricks to complete the picture, and parentage becomes a very amusing afternoon employment. So long as convenience is not sacrificed to the æsthetic needs of the nursery, and so long as common may compete with "art" toys, there is no great harm done, but it is well to understand how irrelevant these things are to the real needs of a child's development.

A child of a year or less has neither knowledge nor imagination to see the point of these animal resemblances—much less to appreciate either quaintness or prettiness. He is much more interested in the crumpling and tearing of paper, in the crumpling of chintz, and in the taking off and replacing of the lid of a little box. I think it would be possible to devise a much more entertaining set of toys for an infant than is at present procurable, but, unhappily, they would not appeal to the intelligence of the average parent. There would be, for example, one or two little boxes of different shapes and substances with lids to take off and on, one or two rubber things that would bend and twist about and admit of chewing, a ball and box made of china, a fluffy, flexible thing like a rabbit's tail with the vertebræ replaced by cane, a velvet-covered ball, a powder puff, and so on. They could all be plainly and vividly colored with some non-soluble inodorous color. They would be about on the cot and on the rug where the child was put to kick and crawl. They would have to be too large to swallow and they would all get pulled and mauled about until they were more or less destroyed. Some would probably survive for many years as precious treasures, as beloved objects, as powers and symbols in the mysterious secret fetichism of childhood—confidants and sympathetic friends.

While the child is engaged with its first toys, and with the collection of rudimentary sense impressions, it is also developing a remarkable variety of noises and babblements from which it will presently disentangle speech. Day by day it will show a stronger and stronger bias to associate definite sounds with definite objects and ideas, a bias so comparatively powerful

in the mind of man as to distinguish him from all other living creatures. Other creatures may think, may, in a sort of concrete way, come almost indefinably near reason (as Professor Lloyd Morgan in his very delightful *Animal Life and Intelligence* has shown); but man alone has in speech the apparatus, the possibility, at any rate, of being a reasoning and reasonable creature. It is, of course, not his only apparatus. Men may think out things with drawings, with little models, with signs and symbols upon paper, but speech is the common way, the highroad, the current coin of thought.

With speech humanity begins. With the dawn of speech the child ceases to be an animal we cherish, and crosses the boundary into distinctly human intercourse. There begins in its mind the development of the most wonderful of all conceivable apparatus, a subtle and intricate keyboard, that will end at last with thirty or forty or fifty thousand keys. This queer, staring, soft little being in its mother's arms is organizing something within itself, beside which the most wonderfully organized orchestra one could imagine is a lump of rude clumsiness. There will come a time when, at the merest touch upon those keys, image will follow image and emotion develop into emotion, when the whole creation, the deeps of space, the minutest beauties of the microscope, cities, armies, passions, splendors, sorrows, will leap out of darkness into the conscious being of thought, when this interwoven net of brief, small sounds will form the centre of a web that will hold together in its threads the universe, the All, visible and invisible, material and immaterial, real and imagined, of a human mind. And if we are to make the best of a child it is in no way secondary to its physical health and growth that it should acquire a great and thorough command over speech, not merely that it should speak, but, what is far more vital, that it should understand swiftly and subtly things written and said. Indeed, this is more than any physical need. The body is the substance and the implement; the mind, built and compact of language, is the man. All that has gone before, all that we have discussed of sound birth and physical growth and care, is no more than the making ready of the soil for the mind that is to grow therein.

As we come to this matter of language we come a step nearer to the intimate realities of our subject, we come to the mental plant that is to bear the flower and the ripe fruit of the individual life. The next phase of our inquiry, therefore, is to examine how we can get this mental plant, this foundation substance, this abundant mastered language best developed in the individual, and how far we may go to insure this best development for all the children born into the world.

From the ninth month onward the child begins serious attempts to talk. In order that it may learn to do this as easily as possible it requires to be surrounded by people speaking one language and speaking it with a uniform accent. Those who are most in the child's hearing should endeavor to speak —even when they are not addressing the child—deliberately and clearly. All authorities are agreed upon the mischievous effect of what is called "baby talk," the use of an extensive sham vocabulary, a sort of deciduous milk vocabulary that will presently have to be shed again. Froebel and Preyer join hands on this. The child's funny little perversions of speech are really genuine attempts to say the right word, and we simply cause trouble and hamper development if we give back to the seeking mind its own blunders again. When a child wants to indicate milk, it wants to say milk, and not "mooka" or "mik," and when it wants to indicate bed the needed word is not "bedder" or "bye-bye," but "bed." But we give the little thing no chance to get on in this way until suddenly one day we discover it is "time the child spoke plainly." There comes an age when children absolutely loathe these adult imbecilities. Preyer has pointed out very instructively the way in which the quite sufficiently difficult matter of the use of I, mine, me, my, you, yours, and your is made still more difficult by those about the child adopting irregularly the experimental idioms it produces. When a child says to its mother, "Me go mome," it is doing its best to speak English, and its remark should be received without worrying comment; but when a mother says to her child, "Me go mome," she is simply behaving stupidly and losing an opportunity of teaching her child its mother-tongue.

In learning to speak, the children of the more prosperous classes are probably at a considerable advantage when compared with their poorer fellow-children. They hear a clearer and more uniform intonation than the blurred, uncertain speech of our commonalty, that has resulted from the reaction of the great synthetic process of the past century upon dialects. But this natural advantage of the richer child is discounted in one of two ways: in the first place by the mother, in the second by the nurse. The mother in the more prosperous classes is often much more vain and trivial than the lower-class woman; she looks to her children for amusement and makes them contributors to her "effect," and by taking up their quaint and pretty mispronunciations and devising humorous additions to their natural baby talk, she teaches them to be much greater babies than they could ever possibly be themselves. They specialize as charming babies until their mother tires of the pose, and then they are thrust back into the nursery to recover leeway, if they can, under the care of governess or nurse.

The second disadvantage of the upper-class child is the foreign nurse or nursery governess. There is a widely diffused idea that a child is particularly apt to master and retain languages, and people try and inoculate with French and German as Lord Herbert of Cherbury would have inoculated children with antidotes for all the ills their flesh was heir to —even, poor little wretches, to an anticipatory regimen for gout. The root-error of these attempts to form infantile polyglots is embodied in an unverified quotation from Byron's *Beppo*, dear to pedagogic writers—

"Wax to receive and marble to retain".

runs the line—which the curious may discover to be a description of the faithful lover, though it has become as firmly associated with the child-mind as has Sterne's "tempering the wind to the shorn lamb" with Holy Writ. And this idea of infantile receptivity and retentiveness is held by an unthinking world in spite of the universally accessible fact that hardly one of us can remember anything that happened before the

age of five, and very little that happened before seven or eight, and that children of five or six, removed into foreign surroundings, will in a year or so—if special measures are not taken—reconstruct their idiom and absolutely forget every word of their mother-tongue. This foreign nurse comes into the child's world, bringing with her quite weird errors in the quantities, the accent, and idiom of the mother-tongue, and greatly increasing the difficulty and delay on the road to thought and speech.[1] And this attempt to acquire a foreign language prematurely at the expense of the mother-tongue, to pick it up cheaply by making the nurse an informal teacher of languages, entirely ignores a fact upon which I would lay the utmost stress in this paper, which indeed is the gist of this paper, that only a very small minority of English or American people have more than half mastered the splendid heritage of their native speech. To this neglected and most significant limitation the amount of public attention given at present is quite surprisingly small.

There can be little or no dispute that the English language in its completeness presents a range too ample and appliances too subtle for the needs of the great majority of those who profess to speak it. I do not refer to the half-civilized and altogether barbaric races who are coming under its sway, but to the people we are breeding of our own race—the barbarians of our streets, our suburban "white niggers," with a thousand a year and the conceit of Imperial destinies. They live in our mother-tongue as some half-civilized invaders might live in a gigantic and splendidly equipped palace. They misuse this, they waste that, they leave whole corridors and wings unexplored, to fall into disuse and decay. I doubt if the ordinary member of the prosperous classes in England has much more than a third of the English language in use, and more than a half in knowledge, and as we go down the social scale we may come at last to strata having but a tenth part of our full vocabulary, and much of that blurred and vaguely under-

[1] The same objection applies to the Indian ayah and the black "mammy," who are such kind, slavish, and picturesque additions to the *ensemble* of white mother and children.

stood. The speech of the Colonist is even poorer than the speech of the home-staying English. In America, just as in Great Britain and her Colonies, there is the same limitation and the same disuse. Partly, of course, this is due to the pettiness of our thought and experience, and so far it can only be remedied by a general intellectual amplification; but partly it is due to the general ignorance of English prevailing throughout the world. It is atrociously taught, and taught by ignorant men. It is atrociously and meanly written. So far as this second cause of sheer ignorance goes, the gaps in knowledge are continually resulting in slang and the addition of needless neologisms to the language. People come upon ideas that they know no English to express and strike out the new phrase in a fine burst of ignorant discovery. There are Americans in particular who are amazingly apt at this sort of thing. They take an enormous pride in the jargon they are perpetually increasing—they boast of it, they give exhibition performances in it, they seem to regard it as the culminating flower of their Continental Republic—as though the Old World had never heard of shoddy. But indeed they are in no better case than that unfortunate lady at Earlswood who esteems newspapers stitched with unravelled carpet and trimmed with orange peel the extreme of human splendor. In truth, their pride is baseless, and this slang of theirs no sort of distinction whatever. Let me assure them that in our heavier way we in this island are just as busy defiling our common inheritance. We can send a team of linguists to America who will murder and misunderstand the language against any eleven the Americans may select.

Of course, there is a natural and necessary growth and development in a living language, a growth that no one may arrest. In appliances, in politics, in science, in philosophical interpretation there is a perpetual necessity for new words, words to express new ideas and new relationships, words free from ambiguity and encumbering associations. But the neologisms of the street and the saloon rarely supply any occasion of this kind. For the most part they are just the stupid efforts of ignorant men to supply the unnecessary. And side by side

with the invention of inferior cheap substitutes for existing words and phrases, and infinitely more serious than that invention, goes on a perpetual misuse and distortion of those that are insufficiently known. These are processes not of growth but of decay—they distort, they render obsolete, and they destroy. The obsolescence and destruction of words and phrases cuts us off from the nobility of our past, from the severed masses of our race over-seas, far more effectually than any growth of neologisms. A language may grow—our language must grow—it may be clarified and refined and strengthened, but it need not suffer the fate of an algal filament and pass constantly into rottenness and decay whenever growth is no longer in progress. That has been the fate of languages in the past because of the feebler organization, the slenderer, slower intercommunication, and above all the insufficient records of human communities; but the time has come now—or at the worst is rapidly coming—when this will cease to be a fated thing. We may have a far more copious and varied tongue than had Addison or Spenser—that is no disaster—but there is no reason why we should not keep fast hold of all they had. There is no reason why the whole fine tongue of Elizabethan England should not be at our disposal still. Conceivably Addison would find the rich, allusive English of George Meredith obscure; conceivably we of this time might find a thousand words and phrases of the year 2000 strange and perplexing; but there is no reason why a time should ever come when what has been written well in English since Elizabethan times should no longer be understandable and fine.

The prevailing ignorance of English in the English-speaking communities enormously hampers the development of the racial consciousness. Except for those who wish to bawl the crudest thoughts, there is no means of reaching the whole mass of these communities to-day. So far as material requirements go it would be possible to fling a thought broadcast like seed over the whole world to-day, it would be possible to get a book into the hands of half the adults of our race. But at the hands and eyes one stops—there is a gap in the brains. Only thoughts that can be expressed in the meanest common-

places will ever reach the minds of the majority of the English-speaking peoples under present conditions.

A writer who aims to be widely read to-day must perpetually halt, must perpetually hesitate at the words that arise in his mind; he must ask himself how many people will stick at this word altogether or miss the meaning it should carry; he must ransack his memory for a commonplace periphrase, an ingenious rearrangement of the familiar; he must omit or over-accentuate at every turn. Such simple and necessary words as "obsolescent," "deliquescent," "segregation," for example, must be abandoned by the man who would write down to the general reader; he must use "impertinent" as if it were a synonym for "impudent" and "indecent" as the equivalent of "obscene." And in the face of this wide ignorance of English, seeing how few people can either read or write English with any subtlety, and how disastrously this reacts upon the general development of thought and understanding amidst the English-speaking peoples, it would be preposterous, even if the attempt were successful, to complicate the first linguistic struggles of the infant with the beginnings of a second language. But people deal thus lightly with the mother-tongue because they know so little of it that they do not even suspect their own ignorance of its burden and its powers. They speak a little set of ready-made phrases, they write it scarcely at all, and all they read is the weak and shallow prose of popular fiction and the daily press. That is knowing a language within the meaning of their minds, and such a knowledge a child may very well be left to "pick up" as it may. Side by side with this they will presently set themselves to erect a similar "knowledge" of two or three other languages. One is constantly meeting not only women but men who will solemnly profess to "know" English and Latin, French, German, and Italian, perhaps Greek, who are in fact—beyond the limited range of food, clothing, shelter, trade, crude nationalism, social conventions, and personal vanity—no better than the deaf and dumb. In spite of the fact that they will sit with books in their hands, visibly reading, turning pages, pencilling comments, in spite of the fact that they will discuss authors and

repeat criticisms, it is as hopeless to express new thoughts to them as it would be to seek for appreciation in the ear of a hippopotamus. Their linguistic instruments are no more capable of contemporary thought than a tin whistle, a xylophone, and a drum are capable of rendering the Eroica Symphony.

In being also ignorant of itself this wide ignorance of English partakes of all that is most hopeless in ignorance. Except among a few writers and critics, there is little sense of defect in this matter. The common man does not know that his limited vocabulary limits his thoughts. He knows that there are "long words" and rare words in the tongue, but he does not know that this implies the existence of definite meanings beyond his mental range. His poor collection of every-day words, worn-out phrases, and battered tropes constitute what he calls "plain English," and speech beyond these limits he seriously believes to be no more than the back-slang of the educated class, a mere elaboration and darkening of intercourse to secure privacy and distinction. No doubt there is justification enough for his suspicion in the exploits of pretentious and garrulous souls. But it is the superficial justification of a profound and disastrous error. A gap in a man's vocabulary is a hole and tatter in his mind; words he has may indeed be weakly connected or wrongly connected—one may find the whole keyboard jerry-built, for example, in the English-speaking Baboo—but words he has not signify ideas that he has no means of clearly apprehending; they are patches of imperfect mental existence, factors in the total amount of his personal failure to live.

This world-wide ignorance of English, this darkest cloud almost upon the fair future of our confederated peoples, is something more than a passive ignorance. It is active, it is aggressive. In England at any rate, if one talks beyond the range of white-nigger English, one commits a social breach. There are countless "book words" well-bred people never use. A writer with any tenderness for half-forgotten phrases, any disposition to sublimate the mingling of unaccustomed words, runs as grave a risk of organized disregard as if he tampered

with the improper. The leaden censures of the *Times*, for example, await any excursion beyond its own battered circumlocutions. Even nowadays, and when they are veterans, Mr. George Meredith and Mr. Henley get ever and again a screed of abuse from some hot champion of Lower Division Civil Service prose. "Plain English" such a one will call his desideratum, as one might call the viands on a New Cut barrow "plain food." The hostility to the complete language is everywhere. I wonder just how many homes may not be witnessing the self-same scene as I write. Some little child is struggling with the unmanageable treasure of a new-found word, has produced it at last, a nice long word, forthwith to be "laughed out" of such foolish ambitions by its anxious parent. People train their children not to speak English beyond a threadbare minimum; they resent it upon platform and in pulpit, and they avoid it in books. Schoolmasters as a class know little of the language. In none of our schools, not even in the more efficient of our elementary schools, is English adequately taught. . . . And these people expect the South African Dutch to take over their neglected tongue! As though the poor partial King's English of the British Colonist was one whit better than the Taal! To give them the reality of what English might be: that were a different matter altogether.

These things it is the clear business of our New Republicans to alter. It follows, indeed, but it is in no way secondary to the work of securing sound births and healthy childhoods, that we should secure a vigorous, ample mental basis for the minds born with these bodies. We have to save, to revive this scattered, warped, tarnished, and neglected language of ours, if we wish to save the future of our world. We should save not only the world of those who at present speak English, but the world of many kindred and associated peoples who would willingly enter into our synthesis, could we make it wide enough and sane enough and noble enough for their honor.

To expect that so ample a cause as this should find any support amongst the festering confusion of the old politics is to expect too much. There is no party for the English language

anywhere in the world. We have to take this problem and deal with it as though the old politics, which slough so slowly, were already happily excised. To begin with, we may give our attention to the foundation of this foundation, to the growth of speech in the developing child.

From the first the child should hear a clear and uniform pronunciation about it, a precise and careful idiom and words definitely used. Since language is to bring people together and not to keep them apart, it would be well if throughout the English-speaking world there could be one accent, one idiom, and one intonation. This there never has been yet, but there is no reason at all why it should not be. There is arising even now a standard of good English to which many dialects and many influences are contributing. From the Highlanders and the Irish, for example, the English of the South are learning the possibilities of the aspirate *h* and *wh*, which latter had entirely and the former very largely dropped out of use among them a hundred years ago. The drawling speech of Wessex and New England—for the main features of what people call Yankee intonation are to be found in perfection in the cottages of Hampshire and West Sussex—are being quickened perhaps from the same sources. The Scotch are acquiring the English use of shall and will and the confusion of reconstruction is world-wide among our vowels. The German *w* of Mr. Samuel Weller has been obliterated within the space of a generation or so. There is no reason at all why this natural development of the uniform English of the coming age should not be greatly forwarded by our deliberate efforts, why it should not be possible within a little while to define a standard pronunciation of our tongue.

We have available now for the first time, in the more highly evolved forms of phonograph and telephone, a means of storing, analyzing, transmitting, and referring to sounds, that should be of very considerable value in the attempt to render a good and beautiful pronunciation of English uniform throughout the world. It would not be unreasonable to require from all those who are qualifying for the work of education the reading aloud of long passages in the standard accent. At present

there is no requirement of this sort in England and too often our elementary teachers at any rate, instead of being missionaries of linguistic purity, are centres of diffusion for blurred and vicious perversions of our speech. In the pulpit and the stage, moreover, we have ready to hand most potent instruments of dissemination, that need nothing but a little sharpening to help greatly toward this end. At the entrance of almost all professions nowadays stands an examination that includes English, and there would be nothing revolutionary in adding to that written paper an oral test in the standard pronunciation. By active exertion to bring these things about the New Republican could do much to secure that every child of our English-speaking people throughout the world would hear in school and church and entertainment the same clear and definite accent. The child's mother and nurse would be helped to acquire almost insensibly a sound and confident pronunciation. No observant man who has lived at all broadly, meeting and talking with people of diverse culture and tradition, but knows how much our intercourse is cumbered by hesitations about quality and accent, and petty differences of phrase and idiom, and how greatly intonation and accent may warp and limit our sympathy.

And while they are doing this for the general linguistic atmosphere, the New Republicans could also attempt something to reach the children in detail.

By instinct nearly every mother wants to teach. Some teach by instinct, but for the most part there is a need of guidance in their teaching. At present these first and very important phases in education are guided almost entirely by tradition. The necessary singing and talking to very young children is done in imitation of similar singing and talking; it is probably done no better, it may possibly be done much worse, than it was done two hundred years ago. A very great amount of permanent improvement in human affairs might be secured in this direction by the expenditure of a few thousand pounds in the systematic study of the most educational method of dealing with children in the first two or three years of life, and in the intelligent propagation of the knowledge

obtained. There exist already, it is true, a number of Child Study Associations, Parents' Unions, and the like, but for the most part these are quite ineffectual talking societies, akin to Browning Societies, Literary and Natural History Societies: they attain a trifling amount of mutual improvement at their best, the members read papers to one another, and a few medical men and schools secure a needed advertisement. They have no organization, no concentration of their energy, and their chief effect seems to be to present an interest in education as if it were a harmless, pointless fad. But if a few men of means and capacity were to organize a committee with adequate funds, secure the services of specially endowed men for the exhaustive study of developing speech, publish a digested report, and, with the assistance of a good writer or so, produce very cheaply, advertise vigorously, and disseminate widely a small, clearly printed, clearly written book of pithy instructions for mothers and nurses in this matter of early speech they would quite certainly effect a great improvement in the mental foundations of the coming generation. We do not yet appreciate the fact that for the first time in the history of the world there exists a state of society in which almost every nurse and mother reads. It is no longer necessary to rely wholly upon instinct and tradition, therefore, for the early stages of a child's instruction. We can reinforce and organize these things through the printed word.

For example, an important factor in the early stage of speech-teaching is the nursery rhyme. A little child, toward the end of the first year, having accumulated a really very comprehensive selection of sounds and noises by that time, begins to imitate first the associated motions, and then the sounds of various nursery rhymes—pat-a-cake, for example. In the book I imagine, there would be, among many other things, a series of little versicles, old and new, in which, to the accompaniment of simple gestures, all the elementary sounds of the language could be easily and agreeably made familiar to the child's ears.

And the same book I think might well contain a list of foundation things and words and certain elementary forms of

expression which the child should become perfectly familiar with in the first three or four years of life. Much of each little child's vocabulary is its personal adventure, and Heaven save us all from system in excess! But I think it would be possible for a subtle psychologist to trace through the easy natural tangle of the personal brier-rose of speech certain necessary strands, that hold the whole growth together and render its later expansion easy and swift and strong. Whatever else the child gets, it must get these fundamental strands well and early if it is to do its best. If they do not develop now their imperfection will cause delay and difficulty later. There are, for example, among these fundamental necessities, idioms to express comparison, to express position in space and time, elementary conceptions of form and color, of tense and mood, the pronouns and the like. No doubt, in one way or another, most of these forms are acquired by every child, but there is no reason why their acquisition should not be watched with the help of a wisely framed list, and any deficiency deliberately and carefully supplied. It would have to be a wisely framed list, it would demand the utmost effort of the best intelligence, and that is why something more than the tradesman enterprise of publishers is needed in this work. The publisher's ideal of an author of an educational work is a girl in her teens working for pocket-money. What is wanted is a little quintessential book better and cheaper than any publisher, publishing for gain, could possibly produce, a book so good that imitation would be difficult, and so cheap and universally sold that no imitation would be profitable. . . . But in this discussion of school-books and the like, we wander a little from our immediate topic of mental beginnings.

At the end of the fifth year, as the natural outcome of its instinctive effort to experiment and learn acting amidst wisely ordered surroundings, the little child should have acquired a certain definite foundation for the educational structure. It should have a vast variety of perceptions stored in its mind and a vocabulary of three or four thousand words, and among these and holding them together there should be certain structural and cardinal ideas. They are ideas that will have been

gradually and imperceptibly instilled, and they are necessary as the basis of a sound mental existence. There must be, to begin with, a developing sense and feeling for truth and for duty as something distinct and occasionally conflicting with immediate impulse and desire, and there must be certain clear intellectual elements established already almost impregnably in the mind, certain primary distinctions and classifications. Many children are called stupid and begin their educational career with needless difficulty through an unsoundness of these fundamental intellectual elements, an unsoundness in no way inherent but the result of accident and neglect. And a starting handicap of this sort may go on increasing right through the whole life.

The child at five, unless it is color blind, should know the range of colors by name and distinguish them easily, blue and green not excepted; it should be able to distinguish pink from pale red and crimson from scarlet. Many children through the neglect of those about them do not distinguish these colors until a very much later age. I think also—in spite of the fact that many adults go vague and ignorant on these points—that a child of five may have been taught to distinguish between a square, a circle, an oval, a triangle, and an oblong, and to use these words. It is easier to keep hold of ideas with words than without them, and none of these words should be impossible by five. The child should also know familiarly by means of toys, wood blocks, and so on, many elementary solid forms. It is matter of regret that in common language we have no easy, convenient words for many of these forms, and instead of being learnt easily and naturally in play they are left undistinguished and have to be studied later under circumstances of forbidding technicality. It would be quite easy to teach the child in an incidental way to distinguish cube, cylinder, cone, sphere (or ball), prolate spheroid (which might be called "egg"), oblate spheroid (which might be called "squatty ball"), the pyramid, and various parallelopipeds, as, for example, the square slab, the oblong slab, the brick, and post. He could have these things added to his box of bricks by degrees, he would build with

them and combine them and play with them over and over again and absorb an intimate knowledge of their properties, just at the age when such knowledge is almost instinctively sought and is most pleasant and easy in its acquisition. These things need not be specially forced upon him. In no way should he be led to emphasize them or give a priggish importance to his knowledge of them. They will come into his toys and play mingled with a thousand other interests, the fortifying powder of clear general ideas, amidst the jam of play.

In addition the child should be able to count, it should be capable of some mental and experimental arithmetic, and I believe that a child of five might be able to give the *sol-fa* names to notes and sing these names at their proper pitch. Possibly in social intercourse the child will have picked up names for some of the letters of the alphabet, but there is no great hurry for that before five certainly, or even later. There is still a vast amount of things immediately about the child that need to be thoroughly learnt, and a premature attack on letters divides attention from these more appropriate and educational objects. It should be able to handle a pencil and amuse itself with freehand; and its mind should be quite uncontaminated by that imbecile drawing upon squared paper by means of which ignorant teachers destroy both the desire and the capacity to sketch in so many little children. Such sketching could be enormously benefited by a really intelligent teacher who would watch the child's efforts, and draw with the child just a little above its level.

The child will already be a great student of picture-books at five, something of a critic (after the manner of the realistic school), and it will be easy to egg it almost imperceptibly to a level where copying from simple outline illustrations will become possible. About five, a present of some one of the plastic substitutes for modeling clay now sold by educational dealers, *plasticine* for example, will be a discreet and acceptable present to the child—if not to its nurse.

The child's imagination will also be awake and active at five. He will look out on the world with anthropomorphic (or rather with pædomorphic) eyes. He will be living on a

great flat earth—unless some officious person has tried to muddle his wits by telling him the earth is round; amidst trees, animals, men, houses, engines, utensils, that are all capable of being good or naughty, all fond of nice things and hostile to nasty ones, all thumpable and perishable, and all conceivably esurient. And the child should know of Fairy Land. The beautiful fancy of the "Little People," even if you do not give it to him, he will very probably get for himself; they will lurk always just out of reach of his desiring, curious eyes, amidst the grass and flowers and behind the wainscot and in the shadows of the bedroom. He will come upon their traces; they will do him little kindnesses. Their affairs should interweave with the affairs of the child's dolls and brick castles and toy foundlings. Little boys like dolls—preferably masculine and with movable limbs—as much as little girls do, albeit they are more experimental and less maternal in their manipulation. At first the child will scarcely be in a world of sustained stories, but very eager for anecdotes and simple short tales. At five I suppose a child would be hearing brief fairy-tales read aloud. At five it is undesirable that the child should have heard horrifying things and he should not be afraid of the dark. It is, I am sorry to believe, very difficult to eliminate the horrors of fear absolutely from a child's life. Vulgarly illustrated toy-books should be guarded against. Pictures of ugly monsters will haunt imaginative children for years. An intelligent censorship may do much to ward off these sufferings until this passion of fear—so needless in the civilized life—begins that process of withering which is its destiny under our present and future security. Cowardly mothers and nurses who scuttle from cows and dogs and prancing horses may do infinite harm to a child by confirming this vestige of our animal past. The simple and obvious fearlessness of those about him should wean the child steadily from his instinctive dread of strangers and strange animals and strange unexpected objects and sudden loud noises. . . .

This is the hopeful foundation upon which at or about the fifth year the formal education of every child in a really civilized community ought to begin.

I—THE OUTLOOK

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY MR. LOW

1. When and under what circumstances began the "era of revolution" which opened the way for the nineteenth century?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. XIII et seq.

2. When and how did modern education begin?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 364.

3. What were the great "transportation" triumphs of the past century in America?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 94; Vol. XVIII., p. 287.

4. What triumphs equally great were elsewhere achieved?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVIII., pp. 175 and 275.

5. What started the vast emigration to Australia and to Africa?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVII., p. 238; Vol. XVIII., p; 225.

6. In what did the banking system of the United States originate?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 230.

7. Whence sprang that of England?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XII., p. 286.

8. How were the markets of China opened to the world? And those of Japan?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 352; Vol. XVII., p. 265.

9. What has been the course of democracy's struggle in England?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 311; Vol. XII., p. 200; Vol. XVI., pp. 175 and 252; Vol. XVII., p. 11.

10. How has this struggle progressed throughout the world?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 281; Vol. XVII., p. XIV et seq.

I

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE OUTLOOK," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture I

PAGE.

6. The great revolution in science and the earliest application of the new methods are described in *History of Philosophy*, by George Henry Lewes, or *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 116.

6. The application of scientific methods to the problems of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics is explained in *The Dawn of Civilization*, by G. C. C. Maspero, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. xxxviii et seq.

7. The full story of the religious struggle against the acceptance of the teachings of Copernicus is given in *Great Astronomers*, by Sir Robert Ball, or *Great Events*, Vol. IX., p. 285.

11. The origin of the American banking system is detailed in *History of the Bank of North America*, by Alexander Hamilton, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIV., p. 230.

20. The history of the gradual extension of the franchise in England is narrated in *The Constitutional History of England*, by Sir Thomas May, or *Great Events*, Vol. XVI., p. 252.

20. The tumult occasioned in Germany by the lack of suffrage and the repressive measures of the government is described in *Prince Bismarck*, by Charles Lowe, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIX., p. 104.

23. Anarchism, its history, hopes, and aims, are explained in *King Stork and King Log*, by Sergius Stepniak, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIX., p. 70.

23. The hopes of the socialists, and also the growth of their party in politics, are explained in *History of Socialism*, by Thomas Kirkup, or *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 141.

II—THE DANGER

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

1. When and where have the American farming classes proved their devotion to the country?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 1.

2. Where have the laborers proved their value?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVIII., p. 12.

3. When were the financial straits of the country and the distress of all classes most severe?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 230.

4. What was the feeling of our Revolutionary leaders as to the equality of men?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XV., p. xxi.

5. When were class distinctions most sharply emphasized here, and the classes politically opposed?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 143.

6. What was the beginning of the Roman strife between Patricians and Plebeians? What was its outcome?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 1.

7. What led to the downfall of the Athenian Republic?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 48

8. How was the First French Republic overthrown?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 339.

9. What led to the downfall of the Second?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVII., p. 230.

10. What were the principles of Washington to which President Roosevelt refers?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 206.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE DANGER," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture II Page

4. The dangers introduced into the Roman republic by class legislation are pointed out in the *History of Rome*, by Theodor Mommsen, or *Great Events*, Vol. II., p. 259.

4. The failure of the French nation to maintain its liberty against the despotism of Napoleon is fully told in the *Life of Napoleon*, by William Hazlitt, or *Great Events*, Vol. XV., p. 76.

5. For details of the way in which the "government of a mob" brought modern France into desolation consult *Contemporary France*, by Gabriel Hanotaux, or *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 351.

5. The intrigues aroused by class government in ancient Greece are depicted in many of Plutarch's *Lives*, or in *Great Events*, Vol. II., p. 12.

5. The utter corruption of the so-called republics in mediæval Italy is revealed in the works of Machiavelli, or *Great Events*, Vol. VIII., p. 360.

6. The internal strife of the Flemish cities and their consequent downfall are portrayed in H. Denicke's work, *Von der deutschen Hansa*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VI., p. 214.

10. President Lincoln's purposes and hopes in the Civil War are fully explained in his own works, or see *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 70.

10. The sore struggles of soul which beset General Grant are revealed in his *Memoirs*, or see *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 153.

III—THE BELIEFS

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY SIR OLIVER LODGE

1. How did religion and science harmonize in earliest history?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. xxv et seq.

2. What was their feeling toward each other just before the advent of Christianity?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. xiv et seq.

3. In mediæval days what attitude did religious leaders assume toward doubters?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 340; Vol. VI., p. 173; Vol. VII., p. 229.

4. What was the reason for this attitude?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 301.

5. What was the "Reformation," and what its causes?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IX., p. xiii et seq.

6. What attitude toward science did the Church adopt after this period?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 27.

7. For what reasons?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 184 et seq.

8. What was the attitude of science toward the Church at this time?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., pp. 184 and 116 et seq.

9. When did scientific philosophy rise to open and equal antagonism against Christianity?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. xvi et seq.

10. What disastrous consequences followed?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 144.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE BELIEFS," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture III Page

2. For a historical account of the Bible, and especially its translation into English, see *How We Got Our Bible*, by J. P. Smyth, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 227.

3. The chief struggles of the mediæval church to buttress its faith against doubters are narrated in the *Close of the Middle Ages*, by Richard Lodge, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 284.

4. For the sad story of the Crucifixion read Archdeacon Farrar's *Life of Christ*, or *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 23.

4. The turn which the preachings of St. Paul gave to the Christian faith are suggested in the *Origin of Christianity*, by I. M. Wise, or *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 69.

5. The tragic story of the opposition of the Church to scientific progress is detailed in our author's own volume, *Pioneers of Science*, or see *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 14.

12. As to Plato's dreams and plans for posterity consult his own works, or *Great Events*, Vol. II., p. 87.

18. The aid which Herodotus has offered to Egyptologists is emphasized in M. Maspero's work, *The Dawn of Civilization*, or see *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 1.

19. For the marvels narrated by Herodotus, one must read his *History*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 354.

IV—THE SUCCESSES

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY PRESIDENT ELIOT

1. What chief contributions to modern civilization were made by the ancient races?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IV., p. XI et seq.

2. How far had civilization progressed when the colonization of America began?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. X., p. XIII.

3. In what country at that time was man's progress most advanced, and why?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. X., p. 8.

4. What gave special impetus to progress among the American Colonies?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., pp. 93 and 153.

5. Since, as President Eliot points out, the ordinary causes of war have been inoperative in America since 1759, from what have our wars originated?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XV., p. 241; Vol. XIX., p. 235.

6. How did the United States first formally attempt to substitute arbitration for war?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVIII., p. 367.

7. How and where was religious toleration first established in America?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 303.

8. What had been Europe's attitude upon this matter?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. XIII et seq.

9. What was the attitude of Europe in the nineteenth century toward democracy and "manhood" suffrage?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. XIII et seq.

10. What were America's earliest contributions to the practical inventions of the world?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 130; Vol. XIV., p. 211.

IV

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE SUCCESSES," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture IV Page	
2.	The struggle of the Dutch for freedom is described in the celebrated work of Schiller, *The Revolt of the Netherlands*, or *Great Events*, Vol. X., p. 81
2.	The teaching of Europe by France in the eighteenth century is pointed out in G. W. Kitchin's *History of France*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 144.
2.	For the two mighty upheavals of German sentiment consult *History of Germany*, by W. Menzel, or *Great Events*, Vol. XV., p. 281, and Vol. XVII., p. 152.
3.	The circumstances and value of the *Geneva Arbitration* are described by Theodore D. Woolsey, in a special monograph. See *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 367.
4.	The bitterness of the strife between England and France in America is depicted in W. H. Withrow's *History of Canada*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 181.
5.	The naval events of the War of 1812 are given by Theodore Roosevelt in his *Naval War of 1812;* the land strife, from contemporary partisan standpoints, in the histories of Agnes Machar and David Ramsay, or see *Great Events*, Vol. XV., p. 241 and p. 268.
6.	*The Monroe Doctrine* is fully explained in a monograph by Captain A. T. Mahan. See *Great Events*, Vol. XVI., p. 80.
13.	The tremendous influence of the Crusades is discussed by G. W. Cox in *The Crusades*, or in *Great Events*, Vol. V., p. 276.

V—THE BEGINNINGS

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY MR. ROBINSON

1. What were the views of the ancient Egyptians as to the origin of man?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 4 et seq.

2. What in Babylonic chronicles were the relations of gods and men?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 15.

3. Had the ancient Asiatics any scientific conception of the problems involved in man's creation?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 42 et seq.

4. What was the attitude of Greek philosophy upon man's origin?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 88 et seq.

5. How did the Roman world regard the problem?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. xv.

6. When and in what region did man make his first great step away from the "developed brute"?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. xxv.

7. What was the first important step in man's recognition of his true relation to the rest of creation?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 245.

8. When and how did the Biblical narrative come to be accepted in an overliteral sense?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. 87.

9. When did modern science first begin to realize the error of the religious historians?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 113 et seq.

10. What has so far been the culmination of this movement?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIX., p. 282.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE BEGINNINGS," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture V Page

2. Darwin's own feeling as to the consequences of his doctrines is expressed in *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, by his son, or *Great Events*, Vol. XVII., p. 326.

4. The methods of Newton's analysis and approach to his great discovery are explained in *Life of Sir Isaac Newton*, by Sir D. Brewster, or *Great Events*, Vol. XII., p. 51.

11. The strife of Northern Europe against the South is best portrayed in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. See *Great Events*, Vol. IV., p. 1.

18. The struggles and sufferings attendant on dawning civilization in the regions of northern cold are suggested by Tacitus in his *Annals*, or *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 1.

19. For the birth of language consult also *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. xxi et seq.

20. The earliest historic form of Aryan civilization is described by Sir William Hunter in his *Brief History of the Indian People*, or in *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 57.

VI—THE ORIGIN OF LIFE

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY MR. BURKE

1. What belief as to the origin of life existed in ancient Greece?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 105.

2. What ideas are suggested in the Roman tales of Livy?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 132 et seq.

3. What are the legends of Japan as to the vital source?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 140.

4. What were the myths of India?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 62.

5. Did mediæval science make any advance upon these views?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 130.

6. What terrible disasters opened the way to the recognition of the existence of bacteria?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XII., p. 29.

7. What was the earliest scientific study made of them?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 366.

8. What practical results were obtained from this?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 372.

9. What practical knowledge of crystallography has been acquired from African mining?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVIII., p. 225.

10. How have vigorous changes of scientific thought been previously received?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 338; Vol. XVII., p. 1.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE ORIGIN OF LIFE," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture VI Page

2. The scientific attempts of Harvey to trace the connection between life and the flow of blood are described by Thomas Huxley in a monograph on *Harvey*. See *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 50.

2. The beginnings of modern scientific experimentation are told by George Henry Lewes in his *History of Philosophy*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 116.

3. The antagonism and disputes into which scientists have sometimes been drawn are suggested in Sir Oliver Lodge's *Pioneers of Science*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 14.

5. The character and peculiarities of African diamonds are explained by G. F. Williams in his work, *The Diamond Mines of South Africa*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 225.

6. The first practical result of research into the world of microscopic life is described by Sir Thomas Pettigrew, in his *Medical Portrait Gallery*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIV., p. 363.

8. For the earliest practical study of electricity see John Bigelow's *Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 130.

VII—THE BIRTH OF CONSCIENCE

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY PRINCE KROPOTKIN

1. What was the nature of the revolution caused by Darwin?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. xxii.

2. What was the nature of that earlier thought revolution with which Prince Kropotkin compares the epoch of Darwin?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 116.

3. On what famous "first conclusion" is modern philosophy founded?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. xvi.

4. What is Darwinism itself as contrasted with evolution, with the origin of species, and other allied questions?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 326 et seq.

5. Do present-day scientists accept the Darwinism of 1859?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 326.

6. Have the Japanese the same view as we concerning animals and their relation to man?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 156.

7. Have the Chinese?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., pp. 291 and 296.

8. What have been the chief broad social movements of humanity?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. xiii; Vol. VII., p. xiii et seq.

9. In what ages has this social "instinct" seemed feeblest?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. xii.

10. At what period did the feeling of political union begin to supersede that of religious union among European races?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., pp. xiii–xv.

VII

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE BIRTH OF CONSCIENCE," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture VII Page

2. The conditions in Russia which led to the exile of Prince Kropotkin are described in Wilhelm Mueller's *Political History of Recent Times*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIX., p. 1.

2. For the character and influence of the work of Darwin consult the *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, by his son, or *Great Events*, Vol. XVII., p. 326.

6. The story of Bodisatta, or Buddha, is narrated in *Buddhism*, by J. W. Rhys-Davids, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 160.

6. The gradual *Development of Christian Doctrine* is pointed out by Cardinal Newman in his work of that name. See *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 88.

11. For the period of government by logic, and "benevolent despotism," see *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., *Outline Narrative.*

11. The spirit which underlay the foundation of religious schools in the Middle Ages is analyzed by J. A. Symonds in *The Renaissance in Italy*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 110.

18. The many beast legends of the mythologies of the East are discussed by W. W. Hunter in his *Brief History of the Indian People*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 57.

19. For the sacred respect shown the crocodile in Egypt see G. C. C. Maspero's *Dawn of Civilization*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 1.

VIII—THE SOUL IN BEASTS

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY COUNTESS CESARESCO

1. What idea of animals was held in ancient Babylonia?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 37 et seq.

2. What was their place in the religious faith of Egypt?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 6 et seq.

3. What attitude toward animals was held by the people of India?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 60.

4. What importance is given beasts in Japanese legend?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 149.

5. What importance is given them in the Buddhist faith?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 165 et seq.

6. How did the early Christian Church regard those who disputed its doctrines?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. 299.

7. At the time of "beast trials" in the courts of Europe, what sort of justice was meted out to men?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 51.

8. Did sense or superstition guide the courts?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 356.

9. How did the Eastern fairy-tales of beasts become spread through Europe?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 270.

10. When did science begin to make valuable use of vivisection?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 52.

VIII

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE SOUL IN BEASTS," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture VIII Page

1. The attitude of both republican and imperial Rome on religious questions is summed up in Niebuhr's *Lectures on the History of Rome*, or *Great Events*, Vol. II., pp. 313 and 333.

2. The religious influence of Egypt on the western world is discussed by J. P. Mahaffy in his *Empire of the Ptolemies*. See *Great Events*, Vol. II., p. 295.

3. The growth of early Christian dogma is described by A. P. Stanley in his *History of the Eastern Church*. See *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 299.

4. The attitude of the Inquisition toward the fantasies of its day is explained in W. H. Rule's *History of the Inquisition*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VIII., p. 166.

8. The persecution of the Albigenses is described by T. F. Tout in *The Empire and the Papacy*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VI., p. 156.

12. For the æsthetic enjoyment of animals and their beauty, which came with the Renaissance, consult Jacob Burckhardt's *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 93.

15. The difficulties with the Church in which Descartes became involved are detailed in G. H. Lewes's *History of Philosophy*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 116.

IX–THE FAILURE OF EVOLUTION

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY MR. WALLACE

1. What evidence does human history give us as to possibilities of modification through environment?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., pp. XXIV et seq. and 66.

2. Did the laws established by man in Greece tend to modify or emphasize the survival of the fittest?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. XXXIII.

3. Did the "fittest" survive under the domination of Babylon and Assyria?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. III et seq.

4. To what extent were the matrimonial customs of the time possibly responsible for this?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 25 et seq.

5. Where has this natural law of selection shown marked evidence of failure in its application to mankind?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. XVIII; Vol. XIII., p. XIV.

6. Has civilized man ever really succeeded in acquiring the supposedly hereditary characteristics and abilities of the savage?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XII., pp. 108 et seq. and 297.

7. Has recent history offered any marked justification for Mr. Darwin's despondent view of man's future?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIX., p. 70.

8. What justification does it offer for Mr. Wallace's optimism?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIX., p. 282.

9. To what extent have Mr. Wallace's natural checks on population actually operated in past ages?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IV., p. XIV; Vol. V., pp. 22 and 130.

10. Is war likely to be less destructive of life in the future?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIX., p. 381.

IX

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE FAILURE OF EVOLUTION," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture IX Page

6. The feebleness of the Romans as compared with the barbaric invaders is shown in the *Roman History* of Ammianus Marcellinus, or in *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 352.

6. The degeneration of the Roman race under the Emperors is graphically portrayed in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, or see *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 263.

10. For the ancient laws upon the indissolubility of marriage consult the Code of Laws of Justinian. See *Great Events*, Vol. IV., p. 138.

10. The gradual advance of monogamy in the course of civilization is pointed out in *Great Events*, Vol. IV., Introduction.

12. The checks upon population caused by war may be vividly realized from Dr. Gardiner's work on *The Thirty Years' War*. See *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 50.

12. The effects of pestilence in checking population are summarized in *The Black Death*, by J. F. Hecker, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 130.

14. The limitations placed upon population by the necessities of savage life are shown in *Great Events*, Vol. IV., p. XII et seq.

X—THE LATEST KNOWLEDGE

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY IRA REMSEN

1. What ancient races were foremost in the early development of science?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. xxvi.

2. Did mediæval science exert any genuine control over disease?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., pp. 130 and 187.

3. What were the first important steps in modern scientific advance?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IX., p. 285.

4. What was the last great horror in which man's ancient helplessness before disease was manifested?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XII., p. 29.

5. How has science revolutionized the theories of medical practice?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 363.

6. How has science revolutionized traffic?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XV., p. 159; Vol. XVI., p. 157.

7. How has it altered art?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 338.

8. What has been the greatest triumph of mathematical science?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVII., p. 25.

9. How has science revolutionized war?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVIII., p. 38.

10. What have been its chief triumphs in electricity?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVII., p. 1; Vol. XVIII., p. 175.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE LATEST KNOWLEDGE," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture X Page

3. The state of science in the earliest historical times is shown in *The Dawn of Civilization*, by G. C. C. Maspero. See *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 1.

3. The efforts of medical science to alleviate the sufferings of our race are illustrated in J. C. Hecker's *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*, or in *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 187.

6. The commercial condition of Chili and the value of its mines are pointed out in Sir Clements Markham's work, *The War between Chili and Peru*, or in *Great Events*, Vol. XIX., p. 50.

9. The enormous wealth of India is shown in *Ledger and Sword*, by H. B. Willson, or in *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 30.

10. For the early struggles of medical men to introduce inoculation against disease consult Sir Thomas Pettigrew's *Medical Portrait Gallery*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIV., p. 363.

13. The industrial advance of Germany is described by Emil Reich in his *Foundations of Modern Europe*, or in *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 340.

13. The attitude of the generation of men first called on to discard the idea that the earth was flat is depicted in *Pioneers of Science*, by Sir Oliver Lodge, or *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 14.

XI—OUR COUNTRY

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY PRESIDENT WILSON

1. Where do we find the beginnings of constitutional government in America?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 76.

2. By what steps did it develop previous to the Revolution?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., pp. 153 and 205; Vol. XII., p. 241; Vol. XIII., p. 289.

3. How was the United States Constitution finally established?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 173.

4. Where did English constitutional government begin?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VI., pp. 75 and 246.

5. In what sense has the war of 1812 been specially regarded as "making the nation"?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XV., p. 241.

6. What events opened the way for the westward progress of our nation?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XV., pp. 39 and 284.

7. What was the first great effort of Eastern capital to facilitate communication with the West?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVI., p. 94.

8. Under what stimulus did settlers first cross the great plains of the Central West?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVII., p. 94.

9. What led them to the Pacific coast?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XVII., pp. 34 and 188.

10. What sentiment of disunion found expression in the "Hartford Convention"?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XV., p. 326.

XI

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "OUR COUNTRY," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XI Page

2. The views of early American statesman as to the strength and permanence of the union of the States are given by Andrew Young in *The American Statesman*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIV., p. 173.

2. For the spirit of the American nation in 1812 consult President Roosevelt's *Naval War of 1812*. See *Great Events*, Vol. XV., p. 268.

4. The early and increasing dissatisfaction felt by the Southern States at the high tariff laws is explained in the speeches of Senator Calhoun. See *Great Events*, Vol. XVI., p. 217.

6. The truly national desire for union which persisted in the South in 1860 is shown in Jefferson Davis' *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 1.

9. The way in which the American colonies were forced into united action by England is perhaps best illustrated in Bancroft's *History of the United States*. See *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 289.

12. Washington has himself told us the story of his connection with the French and Indian war. See his *Works*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 163.

14. For the views of Jefferson on the Louisiana Purchase and the difficulties he encountered consult the *Life of Thomas Jefferson*, by H. S. Randall, or *Great Events*, Vol. XV., p. 39.

16. The Missouri Compromise has been fully discussed in a recent monograph by James A. Woodburn. See *Great Events*, Vol. XVI., p. 14.

XII—PATRIOTISM AND POLITICS

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY CARDINAL GIBBONS

1. How was "party spirit" roused among the politicians of Athens, and to what length did it go?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 329; Vol. II., pp. 15, 28, 32, 45, and 87.

2. What extremes of political corruption do we find revealed in Greek history?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 350; Vol. II., p. 25.

3. How did the enemies of Greece take advantage of this corruption?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., pp. 68 and 166.

4. What were the early political parties in Rome, and in what disasters did their strife involve the city?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 313; Vol. II., p. 1.

5. What gross abuses did the increasing wealth of Rome bring into its politics?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 259.

6. To what heights of patriotism were the Athenians roused by Pericles?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 42 et seq.

7. What did the Romans endure for the love of country in the war with Carthage?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 179.

8. What sacrifices to patriotism were made by the ancient Jews?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., pp. 150 and 222.

9. How did the founders of the American Republic show their confidence in the patriotism of succeeding generations?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 173.

10. What opposing problems of patriotism arose in the American Revolution?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 30.

XII

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "PATRIOTISM AND POLITICS," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XII Page

2. The Elizabethan methods of dramatic presentation as compared with the modern stage are shown in Halliwell-Phillipps' *Memoranda on Hamlet*, or *Great Events*, Vol. X., p. 287.

3. The story of Brazil and the flight of its Emperor are told in *Sketches in Brazil*, by D. P. Kidder, or *Great Events*, Vol. XV., p. 181.

3. The development of American patriotism is well illustrated in the literary *Works* of Lincoln, or in *Great Events*, Vol. XVIII., p. 70.

5. The tale of Leonidas and his Spartans is told by Herodotus in his *History*. See *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 354.

5. The story of Marathon and the probable effect the victory of Xerxes would have had upon civilization are discussed in Sir Edward Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 322.

6. The deeds of Horatius and the other early Romans are narrated in Liddell's *History of Rome*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 300.

7. The submission to civil government shown by the early Christians is described by Archdeacon Farrar in his *Early Days of Christianity*, or in *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 134.

8. For the American notion of a State see the *Declaration of Independence*, and *Works* of Thomas Jefferson. See *Great Events*, Vol. XIV., p. 39.

10. The debauchery of the electorate, by which Cæsar won election to office, is shown in Mommsen's *History of Rome*, or *Great Events*, Vol. II., p. 259.

XIII—AMBITION

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY DR. NORDAU

1. What are the changes in the constitution of society which have given impetus to ambition?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 1 et seq.

2. What was the first of the written free constitutions which stand as the basis of modern life? What were its provisions?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 205 et seq.

3. What is it that has mainly stimulated what Nordau calls "the democratic transformation of the peoples"?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., pp. XIII, XIV, and XVIII.

4. In what period did the "human spirit" first attain to self-conscious freedom?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 112.

5. What were the "conditions of success" at the time of the early Renaissance?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VIII., p. 136 et seq.

6. Of the later Renaissance?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VIII., p. 360 et seq.

7. What were the "conditions of success" in the ages of chivalry?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 109.

8. What were the ambitions of a still earlier age?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 117 et seq.

9. When did literary success first become the most powerful means of influencing the world?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., pp. XIII and XV et seq.

10. What was then the general character of that influence?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 144.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "AMBITION," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XIII Page

2. Feudalism, its value and also its destructive influence through all Europe, are fully discussed in *The Constitutional History of England*, by William Stubbs or *Great Events*, Vol. V., p. 1.

5. For Leonardo, Michael Angelo, and the whole awakening joy of their era, consult J. A. Symonds' *The Renaissance in Italy*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 110; Vol. VIII., p. 134.

6. The history and also an appreciative criticism of Dante's poems are given by R. W. Church in his *Dante*. See *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 1.

13. The story of Newton's advance toward the great discovery of gravitation is more fully told in the *Life of Newton*, by Sir David Brewster. See *Great Events*, Vol. XII., p. 1.

16. The literary struggles of Bunyan and the other writers of his time are fully described in *History of English Literature of the Eighteenth Century*, by Edmund Gosse, or see *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 100.

16. For Schiller's thought and work consult *German Thought*, by Karl Hillebrand, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 347.

16. The tragedy of Byron's life is narrated in John Nicol's *Byron*. See *Great Events*, Vol. XVI., p. 65.

XIV—OUR PAST

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY M. MAETERLINCK

1. In the early ages, what great men recognized for themselves the superior importance of mental experiences over outside life?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., pp. 94 and 270; Vol. II., p. 147.

2. When did philosophy first teach the dominance of the subjective?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 160.

3. What are the Hindu doctrines as to this?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 161 et seq.

4. Have these ideas had any marked influence upon the Hindu race?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 57.

5. How did the Greeks estimate the dominance of the past?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 87.

6. What were the views of Socrates upon this?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 99 et seq.

7. When did the civilization of Rome become unprogressive, weighed down by pride in its past?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 133.

8. How did this weight palsy the efforts of even the noblest of her Emperors?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. 263.

9. When has the history of Europe seemed to grow stagnant behind similar barriers?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XII., p. 1.

10. How did this blight come to fall with deadly effect upon the land of Spain?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. X., p. 251.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "OUR PAST," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XIV Page

4. A remarkable progressive development in character under this influence of the past may be studied in the *Life of Luther*, by Julius Koestlin. See *Great Events*, Vol. IX., p. 1.

5. This stagnation in a nation whose moral growth has ceased is grimly illustrated in *The Civilizations of India*, by Gustave Le Bon, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 52.

8. The spirit by which the Romans conquered the world is shown in Niebuhr's *Lectures on the History of Rome*, or *Great Events*, Vol. II., p. 313.

8. The power and rectitude of vision which enabled Napoleon to triumph are shown in Sir Walter Scott's *Life of Napoleon*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIV., p. 339.

8. The early sense of the power and influence of the dead is revealed in all savage races, as in the introduction to the *Law Code of Hammurabi* of Babylon. See *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 14.

9. The contrast between a fading past and a vigorous present are illustrated in the lesson Tacitus tries to draw for Rome from the German tribes. See *Annals* of Tacitus, or *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 1.

XV—ART

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY MR. HOWELLS

1. What views were held by the earliest nations as to the value of art in life?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. xxv.

2. What progress had they made in the development of art?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 1.

3. What place did art hold in the Grecian world?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 181.

4. How did the power of Grecian art finally prove more endurant than that of Roman military genius?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. xix.

5. When did the power and value of art begin to reassert themselves after the Dark Ages?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 1.

6. What caused the remarkable awakening known as the Renaissance?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 110.

7. At what period did architecture hold the highest place among the arts?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VIII., p. 46.

8. When was poetry crowned with this distinction, and what was predicted as to its future?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 93.

9. When did music hold a similar pre-eminence?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 33.

10. What faith did music lovers then hold as to its future?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 42.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "ART," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XV Page

2. The lack of artistic interest or knowledge in patrons of art is illustrated in Margaret Oliphant's *Makers of Rome*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VIII., p. 46.

3. The attitude of the modern public toward artistic work found its first expression and example in their treatment of Dante. See *Dante*, by R. W. Church, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 1.

5. The combined subtlety and simplicity of Shakespeare are displayed by Halliwell-Phillipps in his *Memoranda of Hamlet*, or *Great Events*, Vol. X., p. 287.

7. The abdication of Charles V., with its causes and consequences, is fully described in Robertson's *History of the Reign of Charles V.*, or *Great Events*, Vol. IX., p. 348.

9. The modern change of attitude toward work and workers is revealed in William Stubbs' *Constitutional History of England*, or *Great Events*, Vol. V., p. 1.

9. For a modern example of work by those who need not work consult Charles Lowe's *Prince Bismarck*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIX., p. 104.

21. The delight of mediæval and renaissance artists in painting the Madonna is explained by Charles Clement in his *Michael Angelo*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VIII., p. 369.

XVI—ART AND MORALITY

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY M. BRUNETIÈRE

1. What was the origin of the French Academy?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 347.

2. What was the general moral tone of the French drama of the seventeenth century?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 347 et seq.

3. What work is generally accepted as the culmination of dramatic literature, and why?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. X., p. 287.

4. Who were the iconoclasts and what their attitude toward art?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 191.

5. What attitude did early Christianity assume toward art?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. 247.

6. When did art dominate morality in Italian life?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 121.

7. In the Italian Church?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IX., p. 2.

8. What union was established between art and religion?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VIII., p. 369.

9. When did art first recognize the beauty of nature?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 93.

10. When did nature and emotion dominate art?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 40.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "ART AND MORALITY," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XVI Page	
4.	The really pagan nature of the Greek and Roman gods is shown in Lytton's *Last Days of Pompeii.* See *Great Events,* Vol. II., p. 207.
9.	The environment of French life in the eighteenth century is described in the *History of France,* by G. W. Kitchin, or *Great Events,* Vol. XIII., p. 160.
11.	The conditions of Italian life in the fifteenth century are described in the *History of the Italian Republics,* by Sismondi, or *Great Events,* Vol. VIII., p. 265.
11.	The criticism quoted is from J. A. Symonds' *Renaissance;* see also *Great Events,* Vol. VII., p. 110.
15.	For the lives of Molière and Racine consult the *History of French Literature,* by H. Van Laun, or *Great Events,* Vol. XI., p. 347.
19.	For Samuel Richardson consult the *History of English Literature in the Eighteenth Century,* by Edmund Gosse, or *Great Events,* Vol. XIII., p. 101.
23.	The influence of the Papacy on Rome is delineated by Gregorovius in his *History of the City of Rome.* See *Great Events,* Vol. VI., p. 378.
23.	France, under the régime of the seventeenth century, has been depicted in a monograph, *Louis XIV.*, by J. C. Morison, or *Great Events,* Vol. XII., p. 1.

XVII—WOMAN

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY ELIZABETH S. DIACK AND WILLIAM LILLY

1. Was Cleopatra an exception to the condition of women in Egypt?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 295.

2. What was the general condition of Grecian morality in the time of Aspasia?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 12.

3. Was the "mother of the Gracchi" the typical Roman woman, or exceptional?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. II., p. 259.

4. What position did woman hold amid the orgies of Nero?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. 139.

5. How was she regarded among the primitive Christians?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. III., p. 254.

6. Whence arose the mediæval glorification of woman?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 109.

7. To what extent did it influence her practical condition?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 125.

8. What great divorce case aroused strife between the Papacy and France, and how was it settled?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VI., p. 156.

9. What were the circumstances of the still more serious divorce question between the Papacy and Henry VIII. of England?

   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IX., p. 137.

10. How did the German Empire and the Papacy become embroiled over this same dispute, and with what disastrous results?

    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IX., p. 124.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "WOMAN," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XVII Page

2. The peculiar marriage customs of ancient Egypt are described in *The Empire of the Ptolemies*, by J. P. Mahaffy, or *Great Events*, Vol. II., p. 295.

2. The sufferings of women under the later Egyptian tyranny are set forth in *The Mameluke or Slave Dynasty in Egypt*, by Sir W. Muir. See *Great Events*, Vol. VI., p. 240.

3. For the position of woman among the Babylonians see the *Law Code of Hammurabi*, in *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 28.

7. The condition of women in early Rome is described by H. G. Liddell in his *History of Rome*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 300.

7. The Roman women of Nero's day are well depicted by Sienkiewicz in *Quo Vadis*, or *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 108.

10. The position of the aboriginal women in Britain is described in Goldsmith's *History of England*, or *Great Events*, Vol II., p. 285.

16. The broad question of the assertion of supremacy by the Roman pontiffs is historically discussed by T. F. Tout in *The Empire and the Papacy*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VI., p. 156.

18. The general Catholic estimate of the Reformation may be gathered from Audin's *Life of Luther*, or *Great Events*, Vol. IX., p. 26.

XVIII—UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY FRANCES POWER COBBE AND WILLIAM K. HILL

1. What share had women in the government of any of the early nations?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., pp. 9, 73, and 120.

2. What was their legal status in Greece?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 236.

3. In Rome?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IV., p. 151 et seq.

4. What was woman's status in mediæval law?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 117 et seq.

5. Is Mr. Hill justified in his estimate of the narrowness of Queen Elizabeth's statesmanship?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. X., p. 8.

6. How much power did Isabella of Spain really exercise upon her contemporaries?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VIII., p. 202.

7. To what extent was she swayed by others?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VIII., p. 166.

8. What were the real aims and successes of Margaret of Denmark?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 243.

9. Were the triumphs of Joan of Arc intellectual or spiritual?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 233.

10. In which light were they regarded by her contemporaries?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VII., p. 350.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture	Page	
XVIII	2.	The purely personal government of ancient Greece is shown in Grote's *History of Greece*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 203.
	2.	The autocratic power of Louis XIV. is described by J. C. Morison in his *Louis XIV.*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XII., p. 1.
	3.	The character of the Rig Veda is described, with extracts, in W. W. Hunter's *Brief History of the Indian People*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 57.
	6.	The full story of the struggles and triumphs of Maria Theresa is given by W. Smyth in his *Lectures on Modern History*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 108.
	6.	An excellent account of Russia under the rule of Catharine is given by W. K. Johnson in his *Catharine II.*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 250.
	12.	The influence of St. Paul in changing the practical application of Christianity is pointed out in the *Origin of Christianity*, by I. M. Wise, or *Great Events*, Vol. III., p. 69.
	14.	For the sources of Joan of Arc's success consult Michelet's *History of France*, or *Great Events*, Vol. VII., p. 350.
	14.	A careful analysis of the causes of Queen Elizabeth's greatness is made by H. R. Cleveland in his *Queen Elizabeth* or *Great Events*, Vol. X., p. 8.

XIX—SOCIETY

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY LADY PONSONBY

1. What was the origin of the modern aristocratic system in Europe?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 1.

2. From whom are the aristocracy of France and Germany descended?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 22.

3. From what race sprang the upper classes in England?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. V., p. 204.

4. How did the French nobility become changed from feudal barons to courtiers?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 129.

5. How did Voltaire regard the "society" of his day?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 144.

6. How did the "society" regard Voltaire?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. xv.

7. To what extent was the French Revolution caused by the upper classes?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 212.

8. Did they meet it in a way to justify their repute?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIV., p. 295.

9. Was the English Revolution of 1688 caused by the lower classes or the aristocracy?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XII., p. 200.

10. What great events mainly fastened the rule of an aristocracy upon England?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. VI., p. xviii.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "SOCIETY," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XIX Page

3. The vast influence of Molière's *Les Précieuses Ridicules* is described by H. Van Laun in his *History of French Literature*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 347.

3. The career of Mazarin in France, and his influence on society, are discussed by Arthur Hassall in his *Mazarin*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 285.

7. The pose of "honor" set up by Francis I., and its downfall, are detailed by Robertson in his *History of the Reign of Charles V.*, or *Great Events*, Vol. IX., p. 111.

14. The trials of the French noblewomen in the Reign of Terror are depicted by Guizot in his *History of France*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIV., p. 311.

14. The conditions of life in England in the eighteenth century may best be gathered from W. Lecky's *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 57.

15. English society of the early nineteenth century is portrayed in Justin McCarthy's *Epoch of Reform*. See *Great Events*, Vol. XVII., p. 11.

20. The contrasting natures of mediæval and modern society are illustrated in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. See *Great Events*, Vol. IV., p. 138.

22. Swinburne's celebrated account of the Scottish Queen is given in a monograph, *Mary Stuart*, or see *Great Events*, Vol. XI., p. 51.

XX—THE CHILD

QUESTIONS

LEADING TO A COURSE OF COLLATERAL READING ON THE THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY MR. WELLS

1. How was the infant received and how were its needs recognized in ancient Babylon?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 30 et seq.

2. What training was given it among the East Asiatic people?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 273.

3. What under the Buddhist system?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 55.

4. Why did the early Aryan races specially value children?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. I., p. 161.

5. How were children welcomed in early Roman days?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. IV., p. 151.

6. When did present-day ideas of early training first take root?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 194.

7. To whom had the training of children been successfully intrusted before?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 192.

8. What were the principles announced by Comenius, the founder of modern education?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XI., p. 200.

9. What was the origin of the kindergarten system?
   See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 364.

10. What were the chief precepts of Pestalozzi?
    See GREAT EVENTS, Vol. XIII., p. 368.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

FOR STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTS BROUGHT UNDER DISCUSSION IN "THE CHILD," SEE AS FOLLOWS:

See Lecture XX Page

8. The earliest effort at teaching very little children according to modern ideas is described in *Pestalozzi's Method of Education*, by G. Ripley, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIII., p. 364.

12. For the causes and the probability of the loss of early languages see Introduction to *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. XXI.

12. The destruction of the old Sanskrit as a literary language was completed by the Mahometan conquest of India. See *History of Hindustan*, by Alexander Dow, or *Great Events*, Vol. V., p. 151.

12. The vigor of the English tongue in the sixteenth century is depicted by H. R. Cleveland in his *Reign of Elizabeth*, or *Great Events*, Vol. X., p. 8.

15. The substitution of England's rule and England's language for that of Holland in Cape Colony is detailed in the *History of South Africa*, by H. A. Bryden, or *Great Events*, Vol. XV., p. 127.

16. The struggle between old politics and new policies is depicted in Wilhelm Mueller's *Political History of Recent Times*, or *Great Events*, Vol. XIX., p. 1.

18. The beginning of our nursery rhymes is to be found in the poetry of the old Aryans, such as the Rig Veda, which are illustrated in Sir W. W. Hunter's *Brief History of the Indian People*, or *Great Events*, Vol. I., p. 57.

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